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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine under what political conditions 
public policy issues are likely to become judicialized in Argentina. This study shows that 
the most widespread theoretical explanation, the loser argument, is too general and does 
not provide much analytical insight about the relationship between the political context 
and the judicialization of policy. Meanwhile, other explanations developed by the 
literature, mainly the politically disadvantaged group and the fragmented legislative 
power, although theoretically valid, have a limited empirical coverage and cannot fully 
explain the phenomenon of policy judicialization in Argentina. Taking into account the 
limitations and contributions of the existing theories, the theoretical argument of this 
dissertation is predicated upon the idea that there are various, alternative political 
scenarios under which judicialization is likely to occur. In other words, there is not just 
one, but several, different political conditions or combinations of conditions that might 
trigger the involvement of courts in public policy.  Within this conceptual framework, the 
 viii 
dissertation argues that policy disputes are likely to become judicialized under two 
political scenarios which have not been considered by the existing literature: first, when 
the state apparatus is unable to implement or enforce policy goals and mandates already 
approved by the political branches of government, and second, when the political elites in 
charge of the executive do not fully support existing policy mandates, and the legislature 
is too passive or deferential to the government regarding that policy issue. In these types 
of political contexts, social actors are likely to judicialize their policy claims. To assess 
these arguments, the dissertation develops a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 
13 major policy conflicts that occurred in Argentina during the last two decades, 
complemented by case studies. As a result of my analysis, I identify three combinations 
of political conditions that are sufficient to trigger the judicialization of policy in 
Argentina. Two of these combinations clearly fit with my theoretical argument and 
expectations about what political scenarios are likely to lead to policy judicialization, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCCION 
This dissertation is about the relationship between democratic governance and the 
judicialization of public policy. More specifically, it analyzes the political conditions that 
drive the demand for judicial involvement in public policy issues. In this way, it is an 
attempt to go beyond the simplistic but largely accepted conventional argument that 
policy “losers” (those that cannot achieve their policy goals through the traditional 
policymaking venues) are the ones who turn to the judiciary. That argument tends to 
oversimplify how democratic governance works and how it is linked to the phenomenon 
of judicialization. This dissertation, instead, precisely focuses on that relationship by 
identifying and analyzing the political conditions that are likely to lead social actors to 
use courts and judicial procedures to contest government‟s policies. 
Argentina is a good case in which to study this relationship. Since the return to 
democracy in 1983, Argentina has made important advances in terms of institutionalizing 
electoral competition and pluralism. From 1983 up to date, there have been six 
presidential elections with peaceful alternations of different political coalitions in charge 
of the national government.1 Moreover, despite the dominance of the Peronist party 
(especially after the crisis of 2001),2 the country has a relatively competitive party 
system. Argentina has also made significant advances in guaranteeing the basic 
institutional framework for political participation. The country enjoys satisfactory levels 
of freedom of opinion and association, free press, and has not experienced political 
persecutions or sustained state repression of political activities since the restoration of 
                                               
1 This is the longest period of democratic governments without interruption since 1930. 
2 During the political and economic crisis of December 2001, the country suffered successive changes of 
government in a period of few weeks. It is worth noting that, for most observers of Argentine politics, the 
political regime was not at risk despite the seriousness of the political crisis. 
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democracy.3 In short, all these features speak of a relatively open system of governance, 
in which societal actors can politically organize themselves and pose their demands on 
the state.  
Interestingly, as the political system has become more open and accessible, 
Argentina has also experienced an increasing judicialization of public policy issues 
(Maurino et al. 2005; Smulovitz 2005, 2007). That is, social actors have increasingly 
turned to the courts to achieve their policy goals instead of pursuing them exclusively or 
mainly through the traditional political venues, the executive and the legislature. I briefly 
mention three examples just to illustrate this phenomenon. During the 1990s, the 
Argentine congress passed very progressive legislation regarding HIV-AIDS, and the 
executive branch of government established programs aiming to provide health coverage 
and medicines to people living with HIV-AIDS. However, the provision of medicines and 
health treatments was intermittent and suffered multiple problems, and by 1996-1997 
associations and groups working on HIV-AIDS issues judicialized their claims regarding 
the government‟s policy on this matter. Another illustrative example, from a different 
policy field, is the judicialization of the indigenous land policy in Jujuy. Between 1996 
and 2000, the government of the province of Jujuy signed agreements with the national 
government establishing a program to regularize the land tenure status of indigenous 
communities in the province, known as PRATPAJ, and the provincial legislature ratified 
those agreements. However, the PRATPAJ was barely implemented by the province, and 
by 2003 the involved indigenous communities judicialized their policy claims against the 
provincial government. The third example refers to the policy disputes regarding the 
Matanza-Riachuelo basin, one of the most polluted areas in Argentina. During the 1990s, 
                                               
3 For the period 1994-2008, Freedom House scores ranked Argentina in a second tier of countries in Latin 
America regarding the protection of political rights and civil liberties, below Uruguay, Costa Rica and 
Chile (the Latin American countries with the best scores), but above Brazil and Mexico (Freedom House 
data cited by Mainwaring et al. 2010, 17-18). 
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the policy claims and debate about what to do in the Riachuelo developed mainly through 
the traditional policymaking venues (governmental agencies, and to much lesser extent in 
the national and local legislatures); there was an increased but fragmented societal 
demand to clean up the basin, and there were several, failed governmental attempts to 
deal with this problem. During the 2000s, however, legal claims were brought to the 
Supreme Court about the pollution affecting the basin, and the policy debate and process 
about the Riachuelo began to develop mainly through judicial procedures.  
As these examples suggest, courts and judicial procedures have become a central 
venue through which social actors attempt to advance their policy agenda and achieve 
their policy goals in the post-transitional Argentine democracy. The question is why? If 
the political system has become more open and accessible, why are social actors 
increasingly turning to non-elected, non-democratically accountable courts to pursue their 
policy agendas? What are the political reasons that account for this phenomenon? Is it 
just that those actors that lose in the political arena then turn to the courts, as the political 
loser argument suggests? However, in all the examples briefly described above, the 
groups came to the courts with legal resources acquired through the policy process. Are 
there other political features of how the Argentinean democratic polity works that lead 
social actors to judicialize their policy claims?  
Before embarking in the search for these answers, it is necessary to clearly 
conceptualize this phenomenon; in other words: what do I mean by the judicialization of 
public policy. After that, I briefly present my main arguments and research methodology. 
Finally, I provide a “road map” for the rest of the dissertation. 
 
 4 
DEFINING POLICY JUDICIALIZATION 
In its most basic terms, policy judicialization refers to the involvement of courts 
and judicial procedures in public policy processes. Following the literature on policy 
studies, the policy process is conceptualized as including the formulation as well as the 
implementation and revision of authoritative government decisions and measures 
(Theodoulou and Cahn 1995; Sabatier 1999). A distinguishing characteristic of these type 
of cases is the collective nature of the disputes brought to the courts.4 In other words, 
these are disputes involving the making, implementation or reform of government 
decisions that affect broad sectors of the population of a polity. The increasing recourse 
to the judiciary on these issues clearly contrasts with the classical image of the courts as 
adjudicating individual disputes arising from personal grievances (Horowitz 1977). 
Moreover, these are issues that, historically, had been a rather exclusive domain of the 
“political” branches of government – the executive and the legislature (Tate and 
Vallinder 1995). 
This notion of policy judicialization merits two further clarifications. First, the 
critical element for the judicialization of policy is not that legal claims are brought to the 
courts (although this is obviously necessary), but that the judiciary and judicial 
procedures become a central venue for the unfolding of the policy process and debate. 
Initial works on the judicialization of policy have framed this distinguishing feature in 
terms of the displacement of policy decision-making from the executive and legislature to 
                                               
4 A public policy can also become judicialized as result of a massive number of individual legal claims 
regarding a specific content of a policy or how it is implemented, etc. Although each individual case might 
affect only the parties to that legal case, the mere addition of a great number of similar individual legal 
complaints allows for considering a certain policy as judicialized.  A good example of this dynamic is the 
conflict over the freeze on savings deposits enacted by the Argentina government in 2001-2002 (the famous 
“corralito”), and the successive waves of individual legal complaints that overwhelmed the Argentine 
court system during the first part of the 2000‟s. For a more detailed political analysis of the process of 




the judiciary. For instance, Tate and Vallinder (1995, 28),  probably the most cited work 
on this matter, conceptualize judicialization as courts and judges “…dominat[ing] the 
making of public policies that had previously been made…by other governmental 
agencies...”. More recent work, however, also stresses that the involvement of the courts 
in policy disputes generate alternative new scenarios for policy negotiations, without 
necessarily displacing the other branches of government. For instance, based on their 
comparative analysis of socioeconomic right litigation in the developing world countries, 
Brinks and Gauri (2008) conclude that judicialization (or their preferred term, 
legalization) is not so much about the courts closing off debates in the more 
representative venues as adding another venue and injecting new elements into the policy 
debate. In sum, regardless of whether judicial procedures “displace” the other branches of 
government or “add” another institutional setting for negotiation, it is clear that the key 
feature in the conceptualization of the phenomenon of judicialization is that courts 
become a main venue in which a policy process and debate evolves. 
Second, the involvement of courts and judicial procedures in policy processes can 
take different formats.5 Judicial review, that is the power of the judiciary to invalidate 
government policies that are inconsistent with constitutional rules, is undoubtedly the 
primary way by which courts can become involved in public policies. For instance, the 
famous school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is a 
paradigmatic example of the policy implications of the exercise of judicial review in the 
US context. Courts may also go beyond just determining whether the constitution has 
been violated, to become involved in defining the remedies establishing (with different 
levels of specificity) what governments have to do to meet unfulfilled constitutional 
obligations (Tushnet 2004).  After Brown v. Board of Education, for instance, federal 
                                               
5 For a simple but informative overview of different types of judicial policymaking, see Tarr  (2010, 256-
265). 
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courts got involved in devising school desegregation plans over southern states and 
school districts that failed to eliminate racial segregation in their public school systems. 
At the same time, although constitutional cases usually receive most attention, the 
judicialization of policy is not just about judicial review. Courts get deeply involved in 
public policy in other ways, such as through statutory interpretation. Policy disputes often 
arise over the meaning of a statute and its application, or whether a statute applies to a 
certain situation or actors or not. Courts‟ choices on these matters often have profound 
policy implications, affecting not only the parties involved in the litigation, but also broad 
sectors of society.  In the US, for example, the legislation approved by congress requiring 
federal agencies to file environmental impact assessments was the object of a long wave 
of environmental litigation during the 1970‟s, which finally defined the scope of that 
policy (Handler 1978, 44-48). In short, as these examples indicate, judicial involvement 
in policy disputes can take different forms. In all cases, the distinguishing feature is that 
the judicialization of the disputes is crucial in the process of defining and implementing 
those policies. 
 
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF  
At its most basic level, the central claim of this dissertation is that the 
judicialization of public policy does not occur in a political vacuum. On the contrary, this 
study argues there are certain regularities, certain patterns in how a democratic polity 
works that drive the demand for judicial involvement in policy issues. This is an aspect of 
the phenomenon of judicialization which –with exceptions- has largely been overlooked 
by the literature on legal mobilization and judicial power. Scholarly work in this field has 
mainly focused on those factors that make it possible for actors to turn to the courts and 
judicialization to occur. Different explanations have rightly stressed the relevance of 
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actors having an easy access to the judiciary (González Morales 1997; Wilson and 
Rodriguez Cordero 2006; Smulovitz 2007), the centrality of independent judges and 
courts (Chavez 2004; Brinks 2005; Ríos-Figueroa and Taylor 2006),6 and the importance 
of a support structure for litigation (Epp 1998). These factors identified by the literature 
can be considered as enabling conditions which make it possible for judicialization to 
happen; cases (whether countries or specific policy issues) lacking any of these basic 
elements are unlikely to experience significant processes of policy litigation. However, 
these enabling conditions, by themselves, cannot account for the political reasons and 
factors that trigger the demand for judicialization of public policy in the first place, which 
is precisely the focus of this study. In other words, why public are policy issues 
judicialized instead of addressed and resolved through the traditional political venues? 
The conventional answer to this question is that the losers (or likely losers) of 
policymaking processes are the ones who turn to the courts because they cannot achieve 
their goals through the traditional political forum. As I will analyze in detail in the next 
chapter, this argument is too general and does not provide too much insight into the 
political contexts and factors leading to the judicialization of policy disputes. In this type 
of dispute, there is always a party that can be considered as a loser of the policy process 
or negotiation; otherwise if the involved actors had obtained what they want from the 
policy process in the first place, there would be no reason to judicialize.   
Besides the policy loser argument mentioned above, there are other two 
theoretical explanations that have received attention by the literature. In brief, one 
stresses that policy litigation is mainly pursued by politically disadvantaged groups that 
have limited capabilities or possibilities to access and affect democratic policymaking 
(Cortner 1968; Sathe 2002). Meanwhile, the other argues that policy judicialization is 
                                               
6 The literature on judicial independence is very abundant. Here I have just cited some works analyzing the 
issue of judicial independence in the Latin American context. 
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basically a result of legislative fragmentation and stalemate, which drive actors to the 
courts in search of policy responses that elected policymaking institutions are unable to 
offer (Edelman 1995; Ferejohn 2002; Whittington 2005). Both of these arguments make 
an important contribution by identifying some of the key political conditions triggering 
processes of policy judicialization. However, as I show in this study, these explanations 
have limited empirical coverage, especially in the Argentinean context. They are able to 
account for certain processes of judicialization, but not for others. In particular, these 
theoretical arguments do not address, and therefore cannot really explain, processes of 
policy judicialization related to the lack of enforcement or implementation of existing 
legislation. 
Taking into account the limitations but also the contributions of the existing 
explanations briefly discussed above, the theoretical argument developed by this 
dissertation is built upon the idea that there are various, alternative political scenarios 
which are likely to drive the judicialization of public policy. In other words, no single 
political condition or factor provides a catch – all explanation of the phenomenon of 
policy judicialization; on the contrary, there are several, different political conditions or 
combinations of conditions that trigger the involvement of courts in policy issues. 
Within this general conceptual framework that assumes the possibility of 
equifinality, this dissertation identifies two sources of policy judicialization which do not 
fit within the existing explanations developed by the literature. Specifically, my 
dissertation argues that the judicialization of policy can also be triggered by weak rule of 
law scenarios. In these political contexts, the policy goals and measures demanded and 
claimed by social actors are already part of the existing normative framework, but these 
goals and mandates are not realized in practice because either the state apparatus is 
unable to implement or enforce these policies, or the political elites in charge of the 
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executive do not fully support those existing policies, and the legislature is too passive 
and deferential towards the executive on that policy issue. In sum, when public policy 
processes take place in these types of weak rule of law scenarios, social actors are likely 
to turn to the courts to pursue policy responses to their claims. 
 
Relevance 
By addressing the political conditions leading to the judicialization of policy, this 
dissertation speaks to three questions of practical and theoretical relevance. First, what 
does the phenomenon of policy judicialization tell us about the quality of democratic 
governance? Citizens‟ legal mobilization through the courts is often perceived as 
evidence of a solid or consolidating democracy; it speaks of a polity invested in the 
protection of the rule of law, and where the system of checks and balances between the 
different branches of government seems to work. However, the judicialization of public 
policy might also be indicating certain weaknesses of how a democratic polity works 
(Sieder et al. 2005). In other words, deficits of the system of governance might help the 
courts and judicial procedures to become an important resort -or even the last resort- for 
the resolution of certain policy issues and debates.  
This is particularly relevant in the context of post - transitional democracies in 
Latin America, as is the case of Argentina. While the processes of democratization in the 
region have moved forward in terms of institutionalizing electoral competition, 
democratic polities still face many problems. Fragile mechanisms of government 
accountability, extended corruption and clientelistic practices are some of the main 
weaknesses generally attributed to many democracies in Latin America (O'Donnell 1993, 
1994; Agüero 1998).  Thus, the quality of democratic governance rather than democratic 
stability has become the main issue of concern for scholars and political actors in the 
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region (Munck 2004a; Mainwaring and Scully 2010).7 In this context, the phenomenon of 
policy judicialization, of social actors turning to the courts instead of pursuing their 
policy agendas exclusively or mainly through political venues, opens new possibilities to 
study how democratic polities work. 
Second, is the judicialization of public policy mainly a result of the dynamics of 
the policymaking process, or is it rather related to how state power is exercised once 
policies are already made? Most of the literature on judicialization tends to focus on 
policy litigation triggered by groups that cannot obtain their goals through the political 
process (Cortner 1968; Sathe 2002) or as result the political fragmentation and gridlock 
in the policymaking processes (Clayton 1992; Tate 1995; Edelman 1995; Ferejohn 2002; 
Whittington 2005). Other studies, however, show that policy litigation springs largely 
from disputes resulting from lack of implementation or weak enforcement of 
democratically sanctioned regulations (Olson 1984; Brinks and Gauri 2008). In short, 
what political factors drive the demand for judicial intervention in public policy issues? 
Finally, is the judicialization of policy disputes basically a countermajoritarian 
phenomenon, as traditionally has been suggested by the literature, or can it be a way to 
overcome obstacles to democratic politics? Generally, the courts are conceived as a 
venue in which minorities seek to protect their rights and interests against the will of the 
majorities, regardless of whether they are powerless and voiceless minorities (Ely 1980; 
Dworkin 1985), or strong and powerful ones (Hirschl 2004). However, the courts can 
also function as a vehicle for overcoming political barriers that hamper policies enjoying 
broad political and societal support (Graber 1993; Whittington 2005), or as a fire alarm 
                                               
7 Following Mainwaring, Scully and Vargas Cullel (2010), by democratic governance, I broadly refer to the 
processes by which the state formulates and implements policies within the conditions and institutions of 
democracy.  This conceptualization stresses that the exercise of state power in a democracy presents 
distinctive challenges, advantages and problems compared to governing under others types of political 
system. 
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system, signaling when there are deficits in how the state bureaucracy implements policy 
commitments made by elected branches of government (Brinks and Gauri 2008). By 
analysing under what circumstances social groups bring policy issues to the judicial 
spheres in Argentina, this project also assesses these rival views about the political role of 
courts in a democracy. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
Case Selection 
In order to assess under what political conditions public policy is likely to become 
judicialized, this dissertation examines 13 major policy conflicts that occurred in 
Argentina during the last two decades.8 The cases come from four different policy fields: 
environment, consumer protection, health care and indigenous people‟s rights. These 
policy sectors show some of the highest levels of policy litigation in Argentina. Maurino, 
Nino and Sigal (2005) calculate that environmental and consumer protection litigation 
represent around 51% of the total of “recursos de amparos” submitted to Argentine 
courts between 1987 and 2004.9 Bergallo (2010) reports that only one judicial decision on 
health care issues was published by the main legal journals for practicing lawyers in 
Argentina in 1987, while there were 81 and 75 decisions published in 2006 and 2007 
                                               
8 The constitutional reform of 1994 provides a baseline for the selection of cases. Article 43 of the 
reformed Argentine constitution recognizes broad legal standing to various actors to bring claims of diffuse 
or “collective nature” to the courts. Before the constitutional reform, it was very unlikely that this type of 
legal claims would be admitted in court, although there were exceptions (for instance, "Kattan, Alberto E. y 
otro c/ Gobierno Nacional -Poder Ejecutivo"  1983).  
9 A “recurso de amparo” is, essentially, a summary judicial procedure for the protection of basic 
individual and collective rights. Article 43 (first paragraph) of the 1994 Argentine constitution states: “Any 
person shall file a prompt and summary proceeding regarding constitutional guarantees, provided there is 
no other legal remedy, against any act or omission of the public authorities or individuals which currently 
or imminently may damage, limit, modify or threaten rights and guarantees recognized by this Constitution, 
treaties or laws, with open arbitrariness or illegality. In such case, the judge may declare that the act or 
omission is based on an unconstitutional rule…” 
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respectively. I did not find specific figures about indigenous rights litigation, although 
scholars and activists also consider it as one of the most dynamic areas of policy and 
rights litigation in Argentina.10 More importantly, policy disputes related to indigenous 
rights represent a hard test for our argument. Indigenous groups are a clear example of 
historically disadvantaged groups in Argentina, and therefore, it is reasonable to expect -a 
priori- that policy judicialization in this field is more likely to be triggered by the low 
political leverage of indigenous groups than by state deficiencies or weak horizontal 
accountability. In short, all these policy fields are empirically and theoretically relevant 
for any study about the judicialization of public policy in Argentina. 
Within each policy field, the specific policy conflicts were selected based on a 
combination of expert opinion and reviews of specialized literature, although the weight 
of each of these sources varied according to the policy field (for a more detailed 
explanation on the process of selecting the cases in each policy field, and on the 
conceptualization and selection of the negative cases see Appendix B).  This method of 
selection had two main advantages. First, it ensured that the selected positive cases were 
perceived by experts and activists as judicialized disputes which had clear policy 
relevance and a broad impact. In other words, it ensured that the cases were 
“representative” of the particular type of litigation under analysis.11 As explained above, 
this study is not interested in individual claims arising from personal grievances, but in 
those that have a “collective” or “diffuse” nature.  These are cases in which potential 
                                               
10  See, for instance, the increasing coverage given to indigenous rights litigation by the different CELS‟s 
Annual Reports on Human Rights in Argentina (reports available at http://www.cels.org.ar/documentos/), 
as well as by the annual national ombudsman reports (reports available at www.dpn.gob.ar/index.php). 
11 The cases have not been selected on the basis of a random sample, and therefore they cannot be 
considered representative from a statistical point of view. However, following Horowitz (1977) and 
Handler (1978), I use the term representative with a more modest meaning, to stress that the selected cases 
are not “aberrational”. That is, the selected cases are not deviations from what can be generally considered 
to be typical cases of judicialization of public policy issues. In other words, the selected cases share the 
same basic characteristics of the larger population of judicialized policy disputes. 
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outcomes of the judicial procedures are likely to have broad policy implications, affecting 
not only the parties involved in the litigation, but also larger sectors of society. Second, 
by involving a pool of experts in the selection process, I reduced my margin of 
subjectivity in the selection of cases, avoiding the risk of including disputes that might 
favor one explanation over the others. In this way, I averted a very common and severe 
risk of selection bias in qualitative research (George and Bennett 2004). 
 
Methods 
In order to analyze the political conditions under which these 13 policy conflicts 
develop, I carry out a qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). Two 
main reasons justify the use of QCA approach and techniques in this study. First, QCA 
facilitates the study of causal complexity. Instead of a linear and additive analysis of 
causality, QCA views causation as conjunctural and heterogeneous (Ragin 2000). Causal 
conditions, then, might combine in different ways to produce the same outcome; 
furthermore, the effect of any particular condition may depend on the presence or absence 
of other conditions. In this way, QCA is especially suited to identify and appraise 
different alternative combinations of political conditions that might lead to the same 
result: the judicialization of public policy disputes. 
Second, as a technique, QCA makes it easier to develop and present comparative 
qualitative analysis of several cases.  A common problem in qualitative analysis of more 
than just few cases is that, in many instances, the comparison of the cases can be rather 
loose (Rihoux and Lobe 2009). QCA, instead, allows researchers to systematize 
similarities and differences across several cases through the use of “truth tables”, and in 
that way, it helps to examine complex patterns of causation and to identify basic causal 
configurations (minimal formulas) that might be related to the outcome under study.  
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Once I have obtained the results from the QCA analysis, I return to the cases. In 
this second part of the research, I develop detailed case studies of almost all of the 13 
policy disputes encompassed by the QCA. The purpose of the case studies is twofold. 
First, they allow for evaluating the fsQCA coding of the outcome and causal conditions 
of each of the policy disputes. In this way, the case studies help to strength the validity 
and transparency of the QCA analysis. Second, they also allow for assessing the internal 
validity of the causal configurations (minimal formulas) identified through the QCA 
analysis. In other words, the case studies allow for evaluating whether the “thick”, 
historical narratives and analysis of the cases reflect the basic, causal configurations 
resulting from the QCA. In sum, methodologically, this research is developed in two 




The data for the QCA analysis and the case studies was mainly obtained through 
archival research, complemented by semi-structured interviews. For each policy dispute I 
reviewed an extensive collection of documents including the relevant judicial resolutions 
(and when available, the plaintiff‟s legal complaints and governments‟ legal responses), 
reports produced by governmental agencies (for instance, ombudsman‟s office), 
congressional records, public statements and reports produced by associations and other 
non-governmental actors involved in the conflicts, and other secondary sources. In every 
dispute, I did a detailed review of the media coverage of local and/or national 
newspapers. Furthermore, I carried out semi-structured interviews with relevant experts 
and individuals involved in each of the policy disputes. In all the cases, I interviewed at 
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least one of the leaders or main activists of the social groups involved in the policy 
dispute, or their main lawyer. Appendix A lists all the interviews.  
The weight of the different type of documents and sources varied according to the 
dispute under study. In many cases, there was abundant secondary literature describing 
and analyzing different aspects of the historical development of a policy dispute (that was 
the case, for instance, of the dispute about the re-structuring of the phone tariffs during 
the Menem administration, the conflict about indigenous land tenure rights in Salta, or 
the dispute about mining in Esquel). In other cases, instead, there were no written 
historical accounts of the policy processes. Therefore my research had to “reconstruct” 
those processes with pieces of information from different sources. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
As explained before, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine under what 
political conditions public policy issues are likely to become judicialized in Argentina. 
The following chapter (Ch. 2) develops the theoretical framework to address and answer 
that question. It shows that the most widespread theoretical explanation, the loser 
argument, is too general and does not provide much analytical insight about the 
relationship between the political context and the judicialization of policy. Meanwhile, 
other explanations developed by the literature, mainly the politically disadvantaged group 
and the fragmented legislative power, although theoretically valid, have a limited 
empirical coverage and cannot fully explain the phenomenon of policy judicialization in 
Argentina. Taking into account these limitations, but also the contributions of the existing 
theories, the theoretical argument of this dissertation is predicated upon the idea that there 
are various, alternative political scenarios under which the judicialization of public policy 
is likely to occur. In other words, there is not just one, but several, different political 
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conditions or combinations of conditions that might trigger the involvement of courts in 
policy processes and disputes.  Within this conceptual framework, the dissertation argues 
that policy disputes are likely to become judicialized under two political scenarios which 
have not been considered by the existing literature: first, when the state apparatus is 
unable to implement or enforce policy goals and mandates already approved by the 
political branches of government, and second, when the political elites in charge of the 
executive do not fully support existing policy mandates and rules, and the legislature is 
too passive or deferential to the government regarding that policy issue. In these types of 
political contexts, social actors are likely to turn to the courts and judicialize their policy 
claims.  
Chapter 3 assesses these arguments by developing a fsQCA analysis of 13 mayor 
policy disputes that occurred in Argentina during the last couples of decades. I built one 
(1) fuzzy set for the outcome, the judicialization of policy disputes, and five (5) fuzzy 
sets to assess the political conditions that might trigger processes of judicialization. These 
five conditions are based on the theoretical arguments and explanations developed in 
chapter 2. These conditions are: policy loser, the weak political leverage, passive 
legislature, opposition of the executive and deficient state capacity. As a result of the 
fsQCA analysis, I identify three (3) combinations of political conditions that are 
sufficient to trigger the judicialization of policy in Argentina. Two of these combinations 
clearly fit with my theoretical argument and expectations about what political scenarios 
are likely to lead to policy judicialization, while the third combination closely reflects the 
political disadvantage argument. Finally, I am also able to identify one (1) combination 
of conditions under which judicialization is likely to be extremely weak or not likely to 
occur at all. 
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The following three chapters develop detailed historical narratives of the policy 
conflicts encompassed by each of the political scenarios identified thought the fsQCA.  
Chapter 4 describes and compares three of the cases of judicialization of public policy in 
Argentina: the 2007 health and food emergency affecting the indigenous communities in 
Chaco, the provision of treatment and medicines to people living with HIV-AIDS during 
the 1990s, and the production of the vaccine against the Argentine hemorrhagic fever or 
“mal de los rastrojos.” These three cases shared a common, basic pattern: the 
involvement of the courts in these policy disputes occurred in contexts in which the 
legislature and the executive were attentive to the issues, and sometimes even supportive 
of the policies in question, but the state apparatus was ill prepared to fully 
implement/enforce them. In short, these three cases share a causal configuration built 
around the weak capability of the state apparatus to fulfill existing policy mandates. The 
involvement of the courts in these disputes, then, was triggered by deficiencies at the 
level of the state rather than problems in the political system.  
Chapter 5 analyzes in detail three other cases of policy judicialization in 
Argentina: the land tenure program for indigenous communities in Jujuy, CEAMSE‟s 
waste disposal policy in the Punta Lara landfill, and the re-negotiation of the public 
utilities concessions during Duhalde‟s government. It also briefly analyzes a dispute 
about indigenous land rights in the province of Salta. All these cases shared a common 
pattern: the judicialization of these policy issues occurred in contexts in which the 
governments did not implement or enforce existing policies, and the legislatures were 
quite passive. In short, this configuration stresses that the discretionary exercise of power 
by the executive and the weaknesses of legislative oversight were the main political 
conditions triggering the judicialization of policy.  
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Chapter 6 describes and compares in detail three other cases: the re-structuring of 
the phone tariffs during the Menem administration, the dispute about oil drilling in the 
Llancanelo wetlands in Mendoza, and the re-negotiation of the metropolitan train 
concessions during the 1990s. It also analyzes, although briefly, the conflict over 
environmental pollution in the Matanza-Riachuelo basin.  All these cases shared one 
basic pattern: the judicialization of these policy issues was triggered by social actors with 
very low political leverage, unable to modify the existing status quo in a certain policy 
field or to block policy reforms promoted by the governments. In short, this configuration 
is the paradigmatic example of judicialization driven by politically disadvantaged groups.  
In turn, chapter 7 analyzes cases of weak judicialization (which are the negative 
cases of this study). The chapter compares two policy disputes: the Esquel case about 
mining policy in the province of Chubut, and the health coverage reform for disabled 
people promoted by the national government in 2002.  These are cases in which legal 
claims were brought to the judiciary, but the courts and judicial procedures played a very 
minor role and were not relevant in the unfolding of these policy processes. The analysis 
of these cases suggests that when the involved social actors have political leverage, and 
the legislature is attentive and active, a policy dispute is not likely to become fully 
judicialized even if the executive is initially opposed to the policy demands made by 
social actors. The interesting aspect of this configuration is how this combination 
between an active legislature and actors with political leverage can counterbalance and 
contain the executive‟s exercise of power. Moreover, these cases suggest that, in this type 
of political scenarios, policy issues are unlikely to become fully judicialized, because the 
social actors have other political venues available and open to them. 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes the project. It summarizes the main arguments and 
findings of the dissertation, and outlines its theoretical and empirical implications. 
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Furthermore, it stresses how this study provides a framework for analyzing how the 
working of a particular system of democratic governance might affect the judicialization 
of public policy issues.  
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE JUDICIALIZATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 
As stated in the introductory chapter, this study argues there are certain 
regularities, certain patterns in how a democratic polity works that drive the demand for 
judicial intervention in public policy issues and disputes. The largely accepted 
conventional argument that policy “losers” (those that cannot achieve their policy goals 
through the traditional policymaking venues) are the ones who tend to litigate, 
oversimplifies the functioning of democratic governance and how it is linked to the 
phenomenon of judicialization. Moreover, my empirical work in Argentina shows that 
very often social actors come to the courts with legal resources acquired through the 
policy process, and therefore, they can hardly be considered losers of the policymaking 
process. Thus, why do actors turn to the courts (a non-elected, non democratically-
accountable branch of government) instead of pursuing their goals mainly through the 
traditional political venues, the legislature or the executive? Are there other political 
features of how a democratic polity works that lead social actors to judicialize their 
policy claims?  
In this chapter, I attempt to provide a theoretical framework to answer those 
questions. First, I briefly analyze those conditions that enable judicialization to occur. 
These conditions constitute the scope of applicability of my argument. Second, I review 
alternative theoretical explanations developed by the specialized literature. Finally, 
drawing on the limitations but also on the contributions of the existing explanations, I 
present and develop my own theoretical argument. 
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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE ARGUMENT: ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR 
JUDICIALIZATION 
Before we can analyze whether and how the quality of governance is related to 
policy judicialization in a democratic polity, certain conditions have to be present in the 
first place in order for judicialization to occur. Based on the literature on legal 
mobilization and judicial politics, one can identify three main sets of enabling conditions 
for judicialization: a favorable legal framework, a relatively autonomous judiciary and a 
certain basic level of organizational support for policy litigation.  
A favorable legal framework mainly refers to the substantive and especially the 
procedural rules that govern the access to courts. Low judicial costs and, especially, 
broad legal standing regulations (which refer to the right to bring a claim to a court) are 
considered to be key factors facilitating citizens´ access to the judicial system (González 
Morales 1997; Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006).  For instance, the Argentine 
constitution reformed in 1994 grants broad legal standing to the ombudsman, affected 
parties and NGOs to bring claims of a “collective nature” to the courts (article 43). 
Before 1994, it was very unlikely that this type of legal claims would be admitted by 
Argentine courts. 
Moreover, policy judicialization tends to occur when the judiciary is relatively 
autonomous from the government, and it is open to and receptive to this type of claims. 
Judges decide whether particular policy demands will be accepted or rejected and, 
ultimately, who wins and who loses; in that way, they can encourage (or not) other actors 
to bring their policy claims to the courts. A good example of this dynamic was the 
jurisprudential evolution about the extent of the legal standing established by article 43 of 
the 1994 Argentine Constitution. During the first years after the reform, there were some 
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intense doctrinal disputes about this issue.12 However, Argentine courts steadily 
supported interpretations of the constitutional text which did not restrict the legal 
standing of individuals and associations to file judicial claims on behalf of diffuse 
interests. In this way, the courts were signaling that they were open and willing to hear 
this type of collective claims. Certainly, the relevance of judicial leadership heavily 
depends on the structural autonomy of the courts; that is, the institutional arrangements 
protecting the courts from external pressures.13 If the courts operate within an 
institutional framework that protects them from government, this allows judges to resolve 
policy disputes according to their preferred legal interpretations. In this context, people 
are more likely to judicially contest government‟s policies and behavior (Gloppen 2006).  
Finally, the judicialization of policy issues also depends on the existence of a 
certain level of organizational support for policy litigation. The existence of organized 
social actors capable of using litigation in a strategic and sustained manner, the 
availability of lawyers willing to take this type of cases as well as funding to cover 
litigation costs, are some of the main organizational factors stressed by activists and 
academics. Support structures, then, facilitate and articulate the resources (legal 
knowledge, specialized lawyers, money, etc.) that allow social actors to bring and sustain 
                                               
12 One of the main doctrinal debates was about the extent of the term “affected party” mentioned by article 
43 of the Constitution. For more traditional or conservative legal approaches to the issue of legal standing, 
the term ¨affected party¨ just referred to individuals whose personal rights and interests were being harmed. 
Thus, individuals were not legitimized to bring legal claims on behalf of collective, diffuse interests. That 
was historically the role of the state. The alternative view basically argued the term “affected” referred to 
people who in spite of not suffering a personal and direct damage or threat, can claim certain type of 
relation or interest with the collective good which is being affected or harmed. This interpretation clearly 
provided broader legal standing for the protection of interests of “collective or diffuse” nature (for a more 
detailed analysis see Sabsay 1997). 
13 For a general discussion on judicial independence see Russell & O‟Brien (2001). For a more specific 
discussion of judicial independence in the Latin American context, including Argentina see Iaryczower et 
al (2002), Chavez (2004), Brinks (2005), Ríos Figueroa and Taylor (2006), and Kapiszewski and Taylor 
(2008).  
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this type of claims at the courts (Galanter 1974; Epp 1998;  in relation to Argentina see 
Smulovitz 2007). 
In conclusion, all these factors affect the prospects of policy judicialization. A 
relatively autonomous judiciary, a favorable legal framework and a certain level of social 
and organizational support, are rightly seen as enabling conditions for judicialization to 
occur.14 These conditions, then, set the scope of applicability of the theoretical 
proposition of this study.15 Cases that completely lack any of them are unlikely to 
experience significant processes of policy litigation, and therefore, are of no use for 
analyzing the relationship between quality of governance and the judicialization of policy 
issues. However, it is important to stress that these enabling conditions, by themselves, 
cannot explain what triggers judicialization in the first place. In other words, they provide 
the “structure of opportunity” for taking policy claims to the courts, but they cannot 
account for the political factors leading to the judicialization of policy issues, neither for 
the political conditions under which the courts and judicial procedures may become a 
main venue for the policy negotiations and debate surrounding a particular public policy.  
 
WHAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS TRIGGER THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLICY? 
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
Assuming that the conditions enabling judicialization are present, then, one can 
pose the question of why public policy issues are judicialized instead of addressed and 
                                               
14 Based on Ragin (2000), Mahoney (2004) and other qualitative researchers I am conceptualizing these as 
necessary, enabling conditions in a probabilistic fashion. Furthermore, I am not arguing that these three sets 
of conditions have equal causal weight. On the contrary, these conditions may combine in different ways to 
contribute to the same outcome. For instance, it can be argued that the level of organizational support 
needed to judicialize a policy claim in Argentina is relatively lower in comparison to what is needed in 
other countries. In part, this can be explained by low judicial costs and legislation granting very broad legal 
standing to access to the courts in defense of collective interests. In contrast, Epp (1998) argues that in the 
cases of the USA and Canada, the development of a litigation support structure has been the key factor in 
increasing the levels of rights litigation in those countries. 
15 For a detailed discussion on the notion of scope conditions see Mahoney & Goertz (2004). 
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resolved through the traditional political forums of the legislature and the executive. The 
conventional response is that the “losers” (or likely losers) of a policymaking process are 
the ones who turn to the courts, because they cannot achieve their policy goals through 
the other branches of government. France, with its Constitutional Council and its process 
of abstract judicial review, is frequently cited as a paradigmatic example of this dynamic, 
by which opposition parties defeated in the parliamentary arena resort to the courts in an 
attempt to defeat the government‟s policy proposals  (Stone Sweet 2000).  Similarly, 
most of the literature on interest-group litigation is basically built around the premise that 
groups litigate when it is more likely that they can attain their goals through the courts 
than through the elected political institutions or the bureaucracy (for a review of this 
literature see S. Olson 1990).  More recently, theorizations about the adoption and 
institutional design of judicial review are also basically built around the idea that political 
losers are the ones who turn to the courts. Ginsburg (2003), for instance, argues that 
during periods of constitutional design, political actors that see themselves losing in 
future elections will favor strong judicial review and easy access to the courts as a sort of 
insurance mechanism against future political majorities. Similarly, Hirsch‟s theory of 
hegemonic preservation (2004) argues that current ruling elites promote judicial 
empowerment as a way to protect their policy preferences and interests from future 
majoritarian politics. 
At first sight, the loser argument seems a very reasonable and parsimonious 
explanation. Furthermore, it fits very well with the traditional view of the courts as 
defenders of political minorities against the potential abuses of majoritarian institutions. 
However, when studied in depth, an analysis merely framed in terms of winners and 
losers of conventional politics does not provide too much insight into the phenomenon of 
judicialization of policy disputes.  In such cases there is always a party who can be 
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broadly labelled as a loser. Otherwise, if the actors involved in the policy negotiations 
have obtained what they want from the state in the first place, there would be no reason to 
bring a lawsuit. Moreover, many times groups come to the courts with legal resources 
acquired through the political process, seeking to enforce them against the state (Galanter 
1974; S. Olson 1990; Brinks and Gauri 2008). Arguably, these groups cannot be 
considered “policy losers” in a strict sense.  
More importantly, this explanation implies a very linear and non-problematized 
view of democratic politics. It assumes a regular functioning of the system of 
governance. It does not raise questions about whether the losers‟ opinions and views 
could be heard in the policy process, or whether the disputed policies were taken and 
approved according to the proper rules of a democratic polity, or whether the state was 
properly upholding laws and regulations already in force. In short, this standard 
explanation of winners and losers is too general, it does not give us insights on whether 
and how the modes in which a democratic polity works might affect or lead to the 
judicialization of policy issues; ultimately, it does not help us to analyze the relationship 
between the quality of democratic governance and the processes of policy judicialization. 
 
Besides the loser argument, in the literature on judicial politics and legal 
mobilization there are two other main explanations about how political conditions affect 
the judicialization of policy issues. These are the political disadvantage and the political 
fragmentation arguments. 
The first one focuses on the social groups making claims on the state, and on their 
ability to access and influence the policy process. In this view, policy litigation is 
basically pursued by politically disadvantaged groups that have limited capabilities or 
possibilities to affect majoritarian or regulatory policy processes (Cortner 1968; Sathe 
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2002). In a way, this seems to be just another formulation of the loser argument: social 
groups turn to litigation when their policy goals are unattainable in other political forums. 
However, while the loser argument is based just on the lack of the desired policy 
outcome, political disadvantage explanations stress the structural limitations 
systematically affecting the capacity of certain social groups to access and participate in 
the policy process. In this view, political disadvantage is not conceived just as a 
circumstantial consequence of ordinary democratic politics, in which today‟s “losers” 
might be tomorrow‟s “winners” and vice-versa. Rather, it is a result of structural patterns 
of the social and political dynamics of a polity. The famous footnote four of the US 
Supreme Court decision in Carolene Products is a good example of this view of litigation 
and the role of courts, as a way to guarantee the openness of the political process to 
“discrete and insular minorities”.16 The use of the courts by the civil rights movement in 
the US during the 1940s and 50s is usually cited as the paradigmatic historical example 
of this argument. Due to entrenched discriminatory institutions and open social 
intimidation, most political channels were closed to African-Americans in the South of 
the US. In that historical context, for many actors in the movement such as the NAACP, 
litigation appeared as the only viable institutional channel for promoting civil rights 
policies (Olson 1990). Criminal defendants and prisoners is another often cited concrete 
example of social groups suffering a structural political weakness to access and influence 
the political system in a democracy (Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006). For this type 
of groups, litigation might be the main or even the only institutional resort available to 
protect and promote their interest.  
Despite its analytical strengths, this traditional view of politically disadvantaged 
groups as resulting from structural obstacles to access the political system has a relatively 
                                               
16 Although, it is worth pointing out, that the footnote specifically refers to the use of judicial review power 
("United States v. Carolene Products Co."  1938,  304 US 144, 152 n.4). 
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narrow empirical coverage. This view is largely based on the historical experiences of 
social groups suffering institutional discrimination or even political persecution, and 
therefore the type of cases it can explain rather specific and limited. Therefore, we 
expand the scope of applicability of the politically disadvantaged explanation by 
including arguments that point out that political disadvantages may also derive from 
structural and enduring problems of collective action (M. Olson 1965). Indeed, this is a 
systematic problem faced by social actors pursuing policies that promote diffuse 
interests;17 that is, goals and interests that benefit broad and general sectors of society, 
such as many types of consumer or environmental protection legislation (Wilson 1995; 
Handler 1978; Beyers 2004).18 In these cases, the (individual) costs of engaging in 
political activity tend to be high, while any potential benefits deriving from it are likely to 
be widely distributed among a diffuse constituency, which results in a lack of incentive 
for organized, massive political action. By contrast, the specific interest groups or sectors 
bearing the costs of these policies have strong incentives to organize themselves and 
influence the policy process (J. Wilson 1995).  
In these contexts, litigation becomes a way to overcome the structural 
organizational disadvantage for political mobilization affecting diffuse constituencies. It 
allows active social actors to promote policies benefiting diffuse interests, without the 
need for mobilizing vast resources or coordinating large collective actions, which are 
                                               
17 These types of interests are also commonly labeled as “public interest” by many social activists and 
academics. However, following Beyer (2004, 236), I prefer the term diffuse to public interest because it 
better captures the diffuseness or fragmented nature of the involved social constituencies or sectors, which 
is precisely the main point of this argument. Moreover, it avoids the normative debate about what should be 
considered a “public interest”. 
18 Following J. Wilson (1995, 331-332), it is important to conceptually differentiate diffuse interest (or in 
Wilson‟s terminology, distributed policy benefits) from the economists‟ notion of collective goods: 
“…widely distributed benefits may or may not be what economists call a collective goods –that is, 
something from the enjoyment of which no one can feasibly be excluded. All collective goods such as 
national defense, are a widely distributed benefit, but not all widely distributed benefits, such as social 
security payments, are collective goods.” 
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generally deemed necessary to successfully influence representative political institutions.  
Of course, one can reasonably argue that policy litigation can often be a lengthy and 
costly process (see, for instance, Epp 1998). However, depending on the characteristics of 
the involved groups and the institutional contexts, judicializing a policy dispute can be 
comparatively easier and less resource-demanding than trying to influence the legislature 
or the executive. Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero‟s (2006) analysis of the case of legal 
mobilization of people living with Aids (PLWA) in Costa Rica is a good example of this 
argument.  Because of the fear of the social consequences, PLWA in Costa Rica tended 
to keep their identities in secret and did not openly become involved in advocacy actions 
aiming to change public policy. At the same time, legal rules allowed for open and easy 
access to the courts at a low cost. In this context, it should not be surprising that groups 
promoting PLWA interests prioritized the use of the courts to pursue their policy goals 
over lobbying congress or executive agencies.  
Another way in which judicialization helps social groups to overcome their 
structural weakness for political mobilization is that once a policy claim is admitted in a 
court of law, the government is required to provide an official and formal response. In 
other words, the government has to take a position on an issue and to publicly justify its 
action or inaction (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2002).  This is not necessarily the case when 
social groups make policy demands to an executive agency or submit a bill in congress, 
where policymakers can simply ignore their claims or proposals. In fact, this lack of 
response is very likely to occur when the involved social actors do not have enough 
political leverage to engage state actors in policy negotiations or exchanges. Clearly, this 
makes judicialization even more appealing for politically disadvantaged social actors.  
In sum, the political disadvantage explanation stresses that policy judicialization 
is driven by the structural difficulties facing certain societal groups to influence policy 
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developments as a result of the limited access to the policy processes or because of 
endogenous problems of collective action, or a combination of both.   
 
In its turn, the political fragmentation explanation stresses the role played by 
majoritarian decision-making institutions in the judicialization of policy issues. Among 
this literature, the typical argument is that political fragmentation often leads to policy 
litigation (Clayton 1992; Tate 1995; Edelman 1995; Ferejohn 2002; Whittington 2005). 
When governments are unable to produce policies because of the lack of disciplined 
political parties or effective legislative majorities, it is more likely that policy conflicts 
will be brought to the courts as a way to overcome political deadlocks and stalemate. The 
paradigmatic example of political fragmentation is divided government, where the 
executive and the legislative branches of government are controlled by distinct parties or 
political coalitions. However, fragmentation can also arise when a majority party controls 
both political branches but that majority is ideologically heterogeneous or party discipline 
is very low (Chavez et al. 2011). In any case, the distinguishing feature of all these 
scenarios is that political fragmentation limits the capability of congress to legislate or to 
be the place where policy is effectively formulated. In these contexts, it is reasonable to 
expect that certain actors will turn to the courts for policy responses to issues that elected 
policymaking institutions are unable to address and resolve. The judicialization of the 
legislative reapportionment issue in the US during the 1960s is considered to be an 
example of this type of dynamics.  Whittington (2005) argues that the Kennedy 
administration through the Justice Department “encouraged” the Supreme Court to 
address this issue in Baker v. Carr (1962), because there were insuperable obstacles to 
any significant action in the legislative sphere. Similarly, Clayton (1992, 2002) argues 
that the judicialization of civil rights policies during the Truman, Eisenhower and 
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Kennedy administrations occurred in a context in which democratic policymaking - at the 
federal level - was blocked by an electoral system that allowed a minority, Southern 
Democrats, to thwart any possibility of legislative reform in this matter. In the context of 
parliamentary democracies, Edelman (1995) makes a similar argument in relation to 
Israel; he argues that the increased judicialization of Israeli politics during the 1980s and 
1990s was a result of the inability of its elected institutions to address and resolve 
important political and policy disputes due to increasing partisanship and lack of strong 
parliamentary coalitions. In short, according to this argument, situations of divided 
government or fragmented legislature are likely to trigger the judicialization of policy 
issues because the ability of the elected branches of government to act in concert and 
advance policies is very limited.  
 
The political disadvantage and political fragmentation explanations clearly go 
beyond the policy loser argument in their attempt to elucidate the sources of the 
phenomenon of judicialization. Both explanations identify specific political conditions or 
features that trigger the involvement of courts in public policy. In that way, they provide 
elements to understand how the ways in which a democratic polity works can lead to the 
judicialization of policy processes. However, both of these theories have a limited 
empirical coverage. Political fragmentation, in particular, does not seem to be a relevant 
factor to explain the role of legislatures in triggering the judicialization of policy in Latin 
America. Empirical studies on legislative assemblies do not show many instances of 
policy deadlock or divided government dynamics in the region (Munck 2004a) nor in 
Argentina specifically (Mustapic 2002). This is also reflected in my research. As I will 
show in the empirical chapters, legislative stalemates were not a factor in the 
judicialization of the public policies examined in this study.  Indeed, most of these policy 
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conflicts occurred in political contexts that could hardly be considered fragmented, and in 
which the involved governments had policy making majorities or were potentially able to 
garner the legislative support they needed.   
Similarly, most studies based on either of these two explanations (the inability of 
the certain social actors to access to political system, or the fragmentation of the 
legislative power) usually refer to disputes in which actors were advocating legislative 
changes. However, the involvement of the courts in policy processes and issues is many 
times related to disputes regarding the implementation or enforcement of existing 
legislation. As argued by Brinks and Gauri (2008), judicialization tends to follow 
legislation. In these contexts, neither explanations based on the lack of political leverage 
of the actors involved nor those focusing on legislative deadlock, seems to provide a 
convincing account of the political conditions triggering the judicialization of policy 
disputes. If the social groups are demanding policy goals or measures that were already 
approved through the democratic decision making process, how can it be claimed that the 
legislatures have been ineffective? Similarly, to what extent judicialization can be the 
result of the lack of access of politically disadvantaged groups to the policymaking 
process if their policy goals are already part of the existing normative and policy 
framework?  
In sum, both of these theoretical explanations made an important contribution by 
identifying some of the key political conditions triggering processes of policy 
judicialization. However, these explanations have a limited empirical coverage; and as 
this study shows in the case of Argentina, they are able to account for certain types of 
processes of judicialization, but not for others. 
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TOWARDS A THEORY ON THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF JUDICIALIZATION 
Drawing on the limitations and contributions of the previous explanations and 
also based on the insights gained from my empirical research, the theoretical core of this 
dissertation is built upon the idea that, instead of a single, general explanatory factor, 
there are several, different political conditions or combinations of conditions that trigger 
the involvement of courts in policy issues. In other words, there is not just one, but 
various, alternative political scenarios which are likely to drive the judicialization of 
public policy.  
One way to address and frame this assumption of equifinality is through 
typological theorizing. Such kind of theoretical approach provides a way of modeling 
contingent causal explanations of a given phenomenon, and to draw together existing 
research in one framework. In contrast to a general explanatory theory, a typological 
theory seeks to identify the various and alternative types of configurations or 
combinations of causal conditions that are linked to the outcome under investigation 
(George and Bennett 2004). A first step in building a typological theory is to identify the 
initial list of possible independent variables or causal conditions. Partly based on the 
analysis and, in some cases, reformulation of existing theoretical explanations discussed 
above (namely, the policy loser, the politically disadvantaged groups and the political 
fragmentation argument), and partly based on the empirical analysis of the cases covered 
by the study, I identified five distinct yet interactive conditions that I consider are the 
critical sources triggering the judicialization of public policy disputes. These conditions 
are: a strict formulation of the policy loser argument (below, I develop the rationale for 
this concept in detail), the political leverage of the actors posing policy claims to the state 
(which is based on the findings and contributions made by the political disadvantage 
arguments already discussed above), the role of the legislature and the role of the 
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executive branch of government (both critical factors to understand why actors would 
decide to turn to the courts instead of pursuing their policy goals through the elected 
policymaking venues),  and the capability of the state apparatus (a key element that 
affects to what extent the policies commitments expressed in the legislation are realized 
in practice). These conditions, either individually or in combination, constitute the main 
political factors that drive the demand for judicial intervention in public policy disputes.  
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to develop a fully specified typological 
theory of judicialization based on these five conditions. Such an endeavour implies to 
provide hypotheses on all the mathematically possible combinations of these five 
conditions in relation to the outcome under study. However, as George and Bennett 
explained (2004, 235), it is entirely reasonable for a research project to focus on certain 
types of configurations, either because they are the more common causal paths or have 
relevant theoretical or empirical implications.  
Within this conceptual framework, then, this study focuses on two specific 
configurations leading to the judicializacion of public policy which have not been 
examined, and cannot be accounted for, by the existing theoretical explanations discussed 
in the previous section. These two combinations of political conditions can loosely be 
characterized as weak rule of law scenarios (or “estado de derecho” or “état de droit” as 
it is called in countries of the civil law tradition). In these political contexts, the policy 
goals and measures demanded by social actors are already part of the existing regulatory 
and legislative framework, but these goals and mandates are not realized in practice 
because either the state apparatus is unable to implement or enforce these policies (the 
state deficiency scenario) or the political elites in charge of the executive do not fully 
support those existing policy mandates and rules, and the legislature is too passive and 
deferential towards the executive (the weak horizontal accountability scenario). When 
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facing these political contexts, social actors are likely to turn to the courts to pursue their 
policy claims and demands.  
These two scenarios constitute two alternative, different paths to the 
judicialization of public policy. However, in order to analyze these configurations and 
explain why and how they trigger processes of policy judicialization, we need first to 
revisit the policy loser argument.    
 
Strict formulation of the policy loser argument:  A building block 
Above, I have strongly pointed out the limitations and problems of the 
conventional notion of the policy loser as a general explanatory theory of the 
phenomenon of policy judicialization. However a more strict formulation of who is a 
policy loser and what does it mean, constitute a key building block to account for the 
different political scenarios in which policy judicialization occurs.  
In many cases, it is quite simple to identify when a social actor is a loser of a 
policymaking process (for instance, when the legislature approves a bill that the involved 
social groups are opposed to), and when a group is not a loser (the opposite example: 
when the legislature rejects the same bill). The more complex situations are those in 
which the policy demands of the social groups are based on policy mandates established 
by existing legislation but the government is unresponsive to or ignores the demands of 
the social actors. According to the standard policy loser notion, these actors would be 
considered losers of the policy process because they did not obtain from the state what 
they were demanding. However, such assessment implicitly subsumes the notion of 
policy loser into that of government unresponsiveness. As a result, it does not have much 
analytical utility to explain processes of policy judicialization. As mentioned above, in a 
judicialized policy dispute, always there is a party whose demands or claims have not 
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been met by the state, otherwise, there would be no reason to bring a lawsuit in the first 
place.  
In contrast, a more restricted understanding of the notion of policy loser allows 
for differentiating between two situations leading to policy judicialization: on the one 
hand, the lack of favourable government response to social demands for new legislation 
(or to social opposition against new policies promoted by the government), and on the 
other hand, the lack of positive government response to demands regarding the 
implementation of existing legislation and policies. In the former situation, the groups 
that unsuccessfully claimed for or against new legislation are clear losers of the 
democratic policymaking process. For instance, in the case of Brazil, the use of the “ação 
direta de inconstitutionalidade” by opposition parties and other actors, such as trade 
union confederations, provides a good example of this dynamic. Once they lose in the 
legislative arena, these actors often resort to the high court (specifically, the Supreme 
Federal Tribunal) in an attempt to defeat the government‟s proposals in the judicial arena 
(Taylor 2004; Arantes 2005; Taylor 2008). On the contrary, in the latter situation 
described above, the social groups are not entirely losers of the policy process; they are 
demanding the implementation or enforcement of policy measures that were favourably 
approved by the elected branches of government in the first place, and which are already 
part of the existing normative framework. Clearly, these are two completely different 
types of political scenarios that might lead to the judicialization of a policy issue. 
A critical issue when making this distinction (and which speaks to the general 
validity of this argument) is how sound is this notion of social actors making policy 
demands based on the lack of implementation or enforcement of existing legislation. 
Legal norms (and here I am using these terms in a generic way, to refer to any type of 
legal norm, from constitutional to mere administrative norms) are often undetermined, 
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vague and can be object of different reasonable interpretations. Many times, legal 
provisions contain broad policy goals or aspirations without establishing clear and 
concrete measures to achieve them. Political actors often attempt to advance their policy 
agendas by expanding or constraining the meaning of already existing legal norms. 
Given, then, that the meaning of the law is often object of contention, until what point is 
it possible to argue that an actor is just demanding the implementation or enforcement of 
a particular legislation? How can we determine that?  
To a certain extent, this is basically an empirical issue, and in the following 
chapter (chapter 3),  I develop basic criteria for assessing the policy demands made by 
social actors in relation to the existing normative framework, which ultimately allows me 
to determine whether an actor should be considered a loser of the policy process or not.  
At this stage, however, it is worth clarifying that policy demands based on alleged 
infringement of broad constitutional commitments are not considered as a situation of 
lack of enforcement or implementation for the purpose of this study. This type of 
aspirational legal norms generally allows for a wide margin of potential policy responses, 
and it is therefore up to the political branches of governments to define the specific 
policies to be taken.19 Claims for lack of implementation, on the contrary, have to be 
based on clear and concrete policy mandates established by laws passed by the 
legislature, regulations issued by the executive or very specific and directly applicable 
constitutional provisions. Only in these cases, it is conceptually and empirically sound to 
argue that a group judicializing their policy claims, has not been a loser of the 
policymaking process.  
In sum, a strict formulation of the notion of policy loser provides a key building 
block that allows for distinguishing between two different, general types of political 
                                               
19 Although, it is important to stress this is not an argument against the justiciability of constitutional rights, 
particularly socio-economic rights. In the next chapter, I address this issue with some more detail. 
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scenarios in which policy issues might become judicialized. In the first one, policy 
litigation is linked to actors and groups that unsuccessfully claimed for new 
legislation/policies or against new legislation/policies promoted by government. This is 
the typical case of the losers of the democratic policymaking process triggering the 
judicialization of public policy. In the second scenario, instead, judicialization is linked to 
social demands made by actors that are not strict losers of the policy process, because 
they are demanding the application of measures that were already approved by the 
political branches of government. This is a key analytical and empirical distinction. 
However, as mentioned above, the loser argument by itself cannot take us any further. It 
cannot give us insights about how a democratic polity works, or why actors that are not 
policy losers turn to the courts to pursue their policy goals. Clearly, it requires to be 
combined with other conditions in order to provide a more complete political account of 
the phenomenon of policy judicialization.  
Based on this conceptual and empirical distinction between the strict losers of the 
policymaking process, and those who demand the implementation/enforcement of 
existing legislation, we are ready to analyze under what political conditions these actors 
that are not policy losers are likely to turn to the courts to pursue their policy goals. In 
that regard, and as mentioned above, I identify two main alternative scenarios under 
which policy judicialization might occur. I have labelled them as the weak horizontal 
accountability and the state deficiencies scenarios.  
 
Weak Horizontal Accountability 
My first explanation of the judicialization of policy disputes focuses on the role of 
the political elites in charge of the government and the weakness of the mechanism of 
checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. In this account, 
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judicialization is likely to occur in situations in which politicians in charge of the 
executive do not wholly support the implementation and enforcement of laws and 
policies already in force. This is the typical “lack of political will” argument, very 
common among rights activists and political observers in Latin America. Moreover, in 
this type of cases, weak or lack of policy implementation results from politicians‟ 
preferences which differ from the existing legislation.20 There may be different 
circumstances (electoral or reputational costs, international pressures, etc.) explaining 
why political elites would not openly attempt to modify existing policies and normative 
frameworks so they are in line with their policy preferences. Whatever the reasons might 
be, the relevant point here is that political elites decide not to fully uphold the rule of law, 
forcing interpretations of existing legislation and constitutional provisions so as to fit 
their real policy preferences, or many times just ignoring these rules altogether. 
Moreover, this discretionary exercise of power by the political elites in charge of 
the executive government is often aided and abetted by a passive and deferential 
legislature, which does not fully exercise its monitoring functions and oversight powers, 
allowing the executive to interpret and apply existing laws and policies as it pleases. By 
passive, I am referring to a legislature that does not shape or modify policies defined by 
the executive, nor does it control how policies are implemented (or not) by the executive. 
This type of legislature clearly contradicts a main premise of representative and liberal 
democracy, in which legislative assemblies are conceived as a main arena for policy 
deliberation and interest aggregation in democratic politics, as well as a main component 
of the system of check and balances, overseeing the implementation of policies by 
executive branch officials and agencies. To a certain extent, this notion of “passive 
                                               
20 In similar, but rather more holistic terms, Brinks and Gauri (2008) speak of situations of “incomplete 
commitments”, in which universalistic policy goals expressed in constitutional and legislative 
commitments are in dissonance with the particularistic and clientelist exchanges used by political elites to 
maintain the extant political order. 
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legislature” fits with a widespread perception among certain political observers and 
academics that legislatures in Latin America tend to play a rather subordinate role, often 
being bypassed by or even abdicating powers in favour of the executive. O‟Donnell‟s 
well known description of many Latin American polities as “delegative democracies” 
(1994) is a paradigmatic example of this view.21 
A critical issue in this conceptualization of passive legislatures is how to consider 
situations in which the government has legislative majorities. Is a legislature supportive 
of the executive a passive legislature? Governments regularly seek to garner legislative 
majorities supporting their policy initiatives and positions and this is part of the normal 
dynamic of majoritarian decision-making institutions. However, as mentioned above, the 
work of congress also entails policy deliberation and negotiation as well as overseeing 
and monitoring the executive. The focus here, then, is not only on whether the legislative 
assembly supported the government in a particular policy dispute, but also on how the 
legislature inserted itself into the policy process. In this view, then, a legislative majority 
aligned with the executive can be considered as passive when the legislature approves 
executive policies without engaging in policy negotiations, or when the legislators 
aligned with the government block congress initiatives to monitor and control the 
government‟s exercise of executive powers. 
In sum, this explanation depicts a political scenario in which the executive applies 
and enforces existing legislation and regulations as it pleases, and the legislature is 
passive and does not monitor the discretionary exercise of executive power. Facing this 
type of political scenario, my research shows that social actors turn to the courts to 
demand the implementation of existing policies and the government‟s compliance with 
                                               
21 In contrast, some more recent works on Latin American legislatures argue that they are not as deferential 
and subordinate to the executive as it is generally believed (Cox and Morgenstern 2002; Morgenstern and 
Nacif 2002). 
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existing laws. It is worth noting that these social groups are not strict losers of the policy 
process. Basically, they are demanding the government fulfill or enforce relatively 
concrete policy commitments or mandates that were taken and approved by the elected 
branches of government, but which are not realized in practice by the state.  Ironically, in 
this type of cases, it is a weak rule of law what drives the judicialization of public policy. 
This scenario, however, seems to contradict a predominant view within the 
judicial politics literature that argues that when political power is not disseminated or 
there is a single dominant party or political coalition, courts tend to be more deferential to 
the political branches of government and less likely to confront governmental policies 
(Ferejohn 2002; Ginsburg 2003; Chavez 2004; Chavez et al. 2011), which logically tends 
to reduce the attractiveness of policy litigation. According to this view, then, 
judicialization is less likely to occur in situations of unified government because the 
courts are less likely to act against the government. I do not contend the argument that the 
political context can affect (and does affect) judicial behaviour. There is a large body of 
empirical research supporting that claim. However, as stated by Clayton (2002), this 
argument only truly captures the supply - side of the phenomenon of judicialization. It 
does not tell us much about the demand - side for judicial intervention in public policy, 
which is precisely the focus of this study. Obviously, lawyers and actors assess the 
potential judicial responses and their chances of winning or not before filing claims to the 
courts. However, as several of my case studies show, social actors do judicialize their 
policy claims in political systems characterized by unified governments or the presence 
of a relatively dominant political coalition (even if judicialization might be less frequent 
than in contexts of more competitive political systems).22 Arguably, for the actors 
                                               
22It is worth noting that even if we are referring to cases of unified government or dominant political 
coalitions, we are working under the assumption that there is a relative level of judicial independence. If a 
particular case is lacking even that minimum level of judicial independence, then it is clearly outside the 
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involved in these disputes, courts and judicial procedures might represent the last or even 
the only institutional resort available to pursue their policy goals. The interesting issue 
from a quality of democracy point of view, is that these actors do not turn to the court 
after losing in the majoritarian policymaking venues or because the legislative process is 
in deadlock and cannot produce policy, but because the government is not fulfilling 
existing policy commitments. In short, in contrast to the predominant theoretical 
expectation that policy judicialization is less likely to occur in scenarios of unified 
government, my research shows that social actors judicialize their claims regarding the 
enforcement or implementation of existing policies even in contexts in which the political 
party or coalition in charge of the executive also controls the legislative branch of 
government. 
  
State Deficiencies  
This explanation of the phenomenon of judicialization focuses on problems of 
state capacity as a main factor triggering the judicialization of policy disputes. This 
occurs when explicit policy goals and mandates established by the existing legislation are 
not fully implemented because the state apparatus lacks organizational/institutional 
resources and capabilities, or these resources and capabilities are poorly managed and 
exercised. In other words, the legislature and the executive approve and establish 
programs and policies, but these are only weakly implemented or enforced due to 
deficiencies in the organization and capacity of the state.  
Problems of state capacity encompass a variety of situations that can affect and 
hinder bureaucratic implementation and enforcement, ranging from lack of appropriated 
                                                                                                                                            
scope of applicability of our argument, because one of the necessary, enabling conditions for 
judicialization, is missing (for a discussion on the scope conditions, see the first part of this chapter).  
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resources to problems of policy coordination. For instance, Hoffmann and Bentes (2008) 
describe how the judicialization of health policy in Brazil is many times related to 
informational failings of the public health care system to be updated with the state of 
medical art, or to logistical problems in delivering and making a medicine available to the 
public in time and sufficient quantity. More generally, Kagan (2001) argues that the 
process of policy judicialization in the USA (what he called “adversarial legalism”) is 
basically the result of a fragmented and bureaucratically weak state which is unable to 
respond to rising social demands for government protection. Policy advocates, then, seek 
to “legalize” their policy goals in detailed substantive and procedural rules and to enforce 
them through the courts. In short, as these examples suggest, judicialization occurs in 
situations in which policy goals and mandates, approved and established by the political 
bodies of government, outpace the capabilities and the performance of the state in 
implementing and enforcing them. Moreover, the social actors bringing claims to the 
courts in this type of scenarios are not strict losers of the policy process; these are groups 
favoured by legislation approved by the political branches. However, given the 
systematic lack of effective and proper implementation of these policies, these actors turn 
to the courts and judicialize their claims. 
A main issue in this type of scenario is to empirically distinguish weak 
enforcement due to state deficiencies, from that resulting from politicians‟ preferences. 
This raises methodological as well as conceptual challengers. As explained by Munck 
(2004a), there is a complex interplay between politicians‟ preferences and state capacity 
to implement policy. Sometimes politicians cannot uphold the rule of law due to a lack of 
state capacity, other times they do not intend to apply the law, and just invoke a lack of 
state capacity to cover their real preferences. How can we differentiate them? In 
conceptual terms, my argument about state deficiencies refers to more enduring features 
 43 
of the bureaucratic capability to carry out its implementation and enforcement tasks. 
These are features that are usually the result of medium or long term processes and 
which, therefore, are not easily changed by short term variations in politicians‟ 
preferences. The political will argument, on the other hand, refers to decisions and 
actions taken by the politicians in charge of government during a particular period under 
analysis. Undoubtedly, many of these decisions may negatively affect the ability of the 
state to implement certain legislation in the short run (for example, changes in the budget 
of an agency) but for the same reasons, they can be relatively easily undone by a future 
government. More significantly, as some of the cases covered by this study will show, 
even when the political elites in charge of the government are relatively supportive of the 
policy in question, state deficiencies can still lead to the judicialization of a public policy. 
In sum, although both of these conditions (the “lack of political will” and state 
deficiencies) affect the proper enforcement or implementation of existing policies, they 
constitute two substantially different and alternative types of political scenarios under 
which policy judicialization is likely to occur. 
 
SUMMARY  
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine whether there are certain patterns in 
the way a democratic polity works that lead to the judicialization of public policy. This 
chapter shows that the most widespread explanation in the literature, the loser argument, 
does not provide a sound response to this question. This argument is too general and does 
not provide much analytical insight about relationship between the political context and 
the judicialization of policy. Meanwhile, other explanations developed by the specialized 
literature, mainly the politically disadvantaged group and the fragmented legislative 
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power, although theoretically valid, have a limited empirical coverage and cannot fully 
explain the phenomenon of policy judicialization in Argentina.  
Accordingly, taking into account the limitation of the existing explanations but 
also building upon their contributions, this dissertation makes two main claims. First, it 
argues that there are various, alternative political scenarios under which the 
judicialization of public policy is likely to occur. In other words, there is not just one, but 
several, different political conditions or combinations of conditions that might trigger the 
involvement of courts in policy processes.  Second, and within this conceptual 
framework, the study  argues that public policy is likely to become judicialized under two 
political scenarios which have not been fully considered by the existing literature: in the 
first one, judicialization occurs because the state apparatus is unable to implement or 
enforce policy goals and mandates already approved by the political branches of 
government; in the second scenario, social actors turn to the courts because the political 
elites in charge of the executive do not fully support existing policy mandates and rules, 
and the legislature is too passive or deferential to the government regarding that policy 
issue. In both of these political scenarios, the social actors bringing claims to the courts 
are not losers of the policy process; they are demanding the fulfillment of policy 
mandates and commitments already made by the elected branches of government, but 
which are not fully or properly realized in practice. 
In order to assess these arguments, in the following chapter I develop a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) of 13 major policy disputes that occurred in Argentina 
during the last couple of decades.  
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CHAPTER 3: ONE OUTCOME, SEVERAL CAUSAL PATHS  
As mentioned in previous chapters, this dissertation basically claims that the 
judicialization of public policy does not occur in political vacuums. On the contrary, this 
study argues there are certain regularities, certain patterns in the political contexts which 
lead to the judicialization of policy issues. In other words, there are certain types of 
combinations of political conditions, what I label political scenarios, which are likely to 
trigger policy judicialization. Moreover, the dissertation also argues that no political 
condition or factor provides a catch- all explanation of this phenomenon. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, existing explanations focusing on the political leverage of the 
involved social groups or in the role of the legislature can account for certain types of 
processes of policy judicialization, but not for others. Accordingly, the study claims that 
there are several alternative political scenarios offering sufficient basis for the 
judicialization of public policy. Within this conceptual framework, then, the dissertation 
argues that judicialization is likely to occur in scenarios of discretionary exercise of 
executive power and weak legislative oversight, and in political contexts characterized by 
a deficient state apparatus, unable to implement or enforce policies commitments already 
made by the political branches of government. 
To assess this argument, this chapter develops a qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) of 13 major policy disputes that occurred in Argentina during the last two 
decades. QCA is a very suitable methodological approach for this study because is based 
on a conception of causality as conjunctural and heterogeneous (Ragin 1987, 2000). 
Thus, QCA allows me to identify and to assess whether there are different alternative 
political scenarios under which public policy might become judicialized. Moreover, it 
allows for defining and appraising these political scenarios in terms of combinations of 
 46 
conditions. Therefore, instead of isolating and estimating the causal weight of each 
political variable against the others, the analytical focus of this methodology allows for 
examining how political conditions combine and whether those combinations are linked 
to the outcome. 
The chapter is organized in the following way. First, given that the qualitative 
comparative analysis is based on the use of fuzzy set (fsQCA), it provides a brief 
explanation of this technique; second, it describes how I build the fuzzy set for the 
outcome and the fuzzy sets for the different causal conditions; third, it develops the 
fsQCA analysis; fourth, it concludes with an interpretation of the QCA results. 
 
QCA USING FUZZY SETS 
As mentioned above, this qualitative comparative analysis is based on “fuzzy” 
sets (fsQCA). This technique allows for assessing variation in the outcome and causal 
conditions by degree. In contrast to conventional, dichotomous sets (in which a case is 
either “in” or “out”), fuzzy set analysis permits partial membership of a case in a 
category.23 Thus, for instance, instead of just characterizing a group as politically 
disadvantaged or not, the use of fuzzy sets allows for assigning a score, indicating the 
degree to which a group belongs to this category. Clearly, this allows for a much more 
fine – grained analysis of the evidence and, at the same time, it demands a more detailed 
knowledge of the cases. Furthermore, it requires researchers to be very explicit and 
specific in the conceptualization and operationalization of the qualitative breakpoints or 
anchors in the set, all of which clearly increases the transparency of the qualitative 
analysis. 
                                               
23 For a detailed discussion and analysis of the concept of fuzzy set in qualitative research, see Ragin 
(2000, chapter 6). 
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In this study, I use a four-value fuzzy set (0; .33; .67; 1) to assess variations in the 
outcome and the causal conditions. Each value in the set expresses a qualitative 
breakpoint or anchor in the interval 0 to 1. In other words, each value conveys a 
qualitative criterion, based on theoretical reasons and substantive knowledge. I choose to 
use a four-value fuzzy set and not other more fine-grained fuzzy sets, because a four-
value scheme is especially useful for studies like this one, in which there is a substantial 
amount of information gathered about the cases, but the nature of the evidence is not 
always identical across cases (Ragin 2009). In a four-value scheme, there are two clear 
and easily differentiated qualitative states: full membership in a set (1) and full non-
membership (0); and there are two other states in which the data might not be definitive 
but it strongly suggests that a case is “more in than out” of a set (.67), or inversely, that a 
case is “more out than in” a set (.33).  In this regard, It is worth stressing the difficulties 
in identifying and developing the empirical criteria for each of the breakpoints in the 
fuzzy sets when the nature of the data is not identical across the cases. As words can take 
on different meaning when used in different contexts, indicators can also measure 
different things in different contexts (Munck 2004b). Moreover, not all pieces of 
evidence count equally. Certain observations may be a “smoking gun” in certain contexts, 
contributing substantially to a researcher‟s assessment about the causal weight of a 
condition (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Therefore, in many of the fuzzy sets, the 
description of the empirical criteria justifying the qualitative breakpoints encompasses 
several different indicators or pieces of evidence. Sometimes these different indicators 
work jointly in helping make an assessment about the degree of membership of a case in 
a category; in other cases, the presence of one piece of evidence is enough to make an 
assessment. In sum, all of this outlines that the assessment of memberships in a fuzzy set,  
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especially in the case of a four-value scheme, is basically an interpretative act and should 
not be conceived or understood as a mechanical operation. 
 
DEFINING JUDICIALIZATION AS A FUZZY SET 
While it is clear that some policy conflicts are judicialized and others are not, the 
degree of involvement of the courts in a policy dispute can vary significantly. These 
variations speak to the different level of relevance that judicial procedures might have in 
the unfolding of a particular policy process and debate. Table 3.1 describes the four-value 
fuzzy set I created to assess the level of judicialization, and includes a brief formulation 
of the criterion that justifies each value.  
 
Table 3.1: Policy Judicialization Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in.  The policy process is  
clearly judicialized  
The judiciary is the main institutional arena where the 
policy debate takes place. Social actors focus their 
advocacy efforts on the judicial process. 
.67 = More in than out. The policy 
process is more than less 
judicialized 
The policy discussion occurs in several institutional 
venues simultaneously, including the judiciary (for 
instance, legislature, regulatory agencies, etc.). Social 
actors distribute their lobby and advocacy efforts between 
the different policy-making venues involved. 
 
.33 = more out than in. The policy 
process is less  than more 
judicialized 
Legal claims were filed to and admitted by the courts, but 
the development of the judicial process follows the 
unfolding of policy negotiations taking place in other 
venues. Social actors and policy actors stress these 
venues over the courts. 
 
0 = fully out. The policy process is 
clearly not judicialized 





From a quick reading of Table 3.1, it seems quite obvious when policy conflicts 
are judicialized and when they clearly are not. The critical point in the set refers to certain 
types of policy disputes, in which legal claims are brought to and admitted by the courts, 
but the judicial procedures play a clearly secondary role, or no role at all, in the 
development of the policy process. In this type of cases, although there are legal claims 
filed at the courts, other central requisites to consider these policy processes judicialized 
are missing. The judiciary is not “displacing” the executive and/or the legislature in the 
policymaking process (Tate and Vallinder 1995), nor “adding” another main venue for 
policy negotiation and debate (Gauri and Brinks 2008). Accordingly, this type of disputes 
is considered “less than more” judicialized. In short, these are disputes with weak 
membership in the set policy judicialization. 
 
DEFINING CAUSAL CONDITIONS AS FUZZY SETS 
I also created a four-value fuzzy set for the five political conditions theorized in 
the previous chapter as potential triggers of the judicialization of public policy. These 
conditions are: strict loser of the policy process, social groups with low political leverage, 
passive legislature, executive opposition and deficient state capacity. It is worth stressing 
that although these factors or conditions are based on the theoretical explanations 
discussed in chapter 2, the construction of these fuzzy sets was hardly an exclusively 
deductive exercise. Instead, they were the result of an intense dialogue between the 
relevant theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence. The knowledge of the cases 
and their contexts provided insights that help conceptualize and operationalize the theory-
based conditions in ways that they could become relevant and applicable to the cases 
under study. Accordingly, each breakpoint or anchor in the fuzzy sets (0; .33; .67; .1) 
reflects a criterion based on substantive and theoretical knowledge. Following, I describe 
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and explain the fuzzy set for each of the causal conditions that might trigger the 
judicialization of policy. 
The first fuzzy set refers to the strict “policy loser” argument (Table 3.2). 
Basically, it assesses whether the involved social groups have been able to obtain their 
policy goals through the traditional political branches of government, the legislature 
and/or the executive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is quite straightforward to 
identify when a social group is a loser of a policymaking process (for instance, when the 
legislature approves a bill that the involved social groups is opposed to), and when it is 
not (the opposite example: when the legislature rejects that bill). The critical breakpoint 
in this set refers to situations in which the policy demands of the social groups refer to 
concrete policy mandates established by existing legislation or regulations but the state is 
unresponsive to the demands of the social actors. In these cases, we consider the involved 
social groups as “more out than in” the set of policy losers (in other words, they are not 
strict policy losers), because the policy goals or measures they are demanding were 
already approved by the political branches of government.24 
The challenging issue in this type of situations is to determine whether an actor‟s 
policy demands are based on concrete existing norms and policies or not. As mentioned 
above, legal rules can often be quite undetermined and object of different and sometimes 
contrasting interpretations. Moreover, political actors many times attempt to advance 
their policy agendas by expanding or constraining the meaning of already existing legal 
norms, especially constitutional provisions. Take, for instance, a hypothetical situation in 
which certain social actors unsuccessfully demanded and lobbied the government to 
                                               
24 As explained in the previous chapter, two main reasons justify the strict formulation of the policy loser 
argument. First, the standard notion of policy loser is extremely general, and therefore, does not have much 
analytical utility to explain the political scenarios under which policy judicialization occurs. Second, a 
more strict formulation of the policy loser argument allows for distinguishing between the lack of 
favourable government response to social actors‟ demands regarding the making of new legislation and 
policies (a strict policy loser case) from those demands regarding the implementation of existing ones.  
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establish a particular health care policy, and those actors based their demands on 
constitutional provisions that recognize a right to health. How should these social actors 
be considered? Are they strict losers of the policy process because the government was 
unresponsive to their demands, or are they demanding the government fulfillment of 
existing policy mandates? As a general criterion, this study considers that claims for lack 
of implementation or enforcement have to be based on concrete policy mandates 
established by laws passed by the legislature, regulations issued by the executive or very 
specific and directly applicable constitutional provisions. Only in these cases, it is 
conceptually and empirically sound to argue that a group has not been a loser of the 
policymaking process. On the contrary, if a government is unresponsive or opposed to 
certain policy demands based on relatively broad constitutional commitments or 
aspirations, the actors posing those demands on the state are regarded as losers of the 
policy process for the purpose of this study. This assessment is justified by the fact that 
this type of aspirational legal norms generally allows for a wide margin of potential 
policy responses; it is therefore up to the political branches of governments to define the 
specific policies to be taken.  
As a final note, however, it is important to stress that the distinction made above 
between concrete legal mandates and broad constitutional provisions, does not constitute 
an argument against the justiciability of constitutional rights, particularly socio–economic 
rights.25 The purpose of this distinction is to help us make an assessment about the 
political status of social actors making claims to the state; that is, are these actors policy 
losers or not? Hence, this distinction should not be construed as implying an assessment 
of the legal merits of right–based claims, or for that matter, of the general legal 
arguments made by the different actors involved in a policy dispute. 
                                               
25  For an analysis of the arguments justifying the justiciability of socio economic rights see, for instance, 
Abramovich and Courtis (2002; 2006). For arguments against, see Cross (2001). 
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Table 3.2: Strict Policy Loser Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in.  The actors are clearly 
strict losers of the policymaking 
process  
The legislature passes laws that the social actors are 
opposed to. Alternatively, the legislature rejects bills 
supported by the social actors  
 
.67 = More in than out. The actors 
are more than less strict losers of 
the policymaking process 
The executive takes administrative/regulatory measures 
opposed by the social actors, or it does not take measures 
claimed by the actors.  
These executive actions or inactions do not openly 
contradict existing legislation or they are based on 
reasonable interpretations of existing legislation (to make 
this assessment I take into account –when possible- how 
the courts have assessed the government‟s legal 
arguments: If several courts ruled against the government, 
I consider that the government interpretation was not 
reasonable. In contrast, if some courts ruled against the 
government, but other ruled in its favor, I consider that 
the government interpretation was reasonable).  
 
.33 = more out than in. The actors 
are less  than more strict losers of 
the policymaking process 
The executive takes measures opposed by social actors or 
it does not take measures demanded by social actors to 
implement/enforce relatively clear and concrete existing 
laws and policies.  
These executive‟s actions or inactions contradict existing 
legislation or are based on discretionary interpretations of 
existing legislation (to make this assessment, I use the 
same indicators and evidence described above). 
Or the executive does not openly deny that the social 
demands are based on existing policy and legal mandates, 
or even acknowledges that the social demands are based 
on existing laws and policies.  
 
0 = fully out. The actors are clearly 
not strict losers of the 
policymaking process 
The legislature/executive rejects policies the social actors 
are opposed to. Alternatively, the legislature/executive 
approves policies supported by the social actors. 
 
 
The weak political leverage fuzzy set (Table 3.3) speaks to the political 
disadvantage arguments discussed in chapter 2. This set assesses social actors‟ access to 
the policy process and capability to influence the policy negotiations. The purpose is not 
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to evaluate whether these actors effectively get the policy results they pursue, but the 
extent to which their policy claims and positions are part of the policy debates and 
policymaking processes.  
The qualitative breakpoints of this fuzzy set combine two types of elements. On 
the one hand, pieces of evidence that refer to the level of access that the social actors 
have to the policy process and policymakers (for instance, participation in committees or 
advisory boards, meetings with policymakers, access to inside information, etc.). On the 
other, elements that speak to the level of social mobilization and the strength of the 
actors‟ support structure for political action (for instance, whether there were street 
mobilizations or other type of massive protests; whether actors were able to reach and 
mobilize broader constituencies; whether they were able to sustain their advocacy efforts 
and collective action through time; etc.). The combination of these criteria provides the 
basis for our assessment of political leverage. However, it is worth noting that the 
relationship between access and mobilization is not necessarily linear (See Tilly 1978).26 
In principle, when social actors are less organized and mobilized, it is more likely that 
their claims will not be part of the policy debate. However, in many cases, low levels of 
social mobilization might be the result not of structural problems of collective action, but 
of social actors having inside access to the policy process (Meyer 2004). In short, the 
assessment of the link between political access, resources and mobilization has to take 





                                               
26I am adapting Tilly‟s (1978) explanation of the curvilinear relationship between social protest and 
political openness.  
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Table 3.3: Weak Political Leverage Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in.  The social actors’ 
political leverage is clearly weak  
Actors are not part of the policymaking process.  
And/or social demand over a policy issue is fragmented, 
atomized (sporadic and punctual claims or protests) and 
weak (social demand is not sustained through time, 
minimal collective action).  
 
.67 = More in than out. political 
leverage is  more than less weak 
Social actors have formal access to policy process and are 
able to voice their concerns (participate in public hearings 
or have meetings with government officials, etc.). But 
actors‟ support structure for political action is weak (they 
lack resources); collective action is low (no massive street 
mobilizations or other type of massive collective actions), 
and actors are not able to gain support from or to 
mobilize broader constituencies. 
 
.33 = more out than in. political 
leverage is less than more weak 
 
Social actors participate in policy negotiations (they are 
members of committees or other institutional settings 
which allow them to have access to inside information, 
direct contact with policymakers, etc.).  
Or the level of organized collective action is relatively 
high (they are able to sustain advocacy efforts through 
time; to organize and carry out significant mobilizations 
and protests), and their claims gain support among elite 
groups or broader sectors of the public opinion (for 
instance, favorable coverage by relevant media). 
 
0 = fully out. The social actors’ 
political leverage is clearly not 
weak 
Social actors are part of the policymaking process and 
show a high level of sustained and massive collective 




At this point it is useful to clarify, again, the differences between the political 
disadvantage argument assessed by this fuzzy set and the notion of the strict policy loser. 
These are two clearly different conceptual and empirical categories. The fact that an actor 
is a strict loser of a policy process does not necessarily indicate that the political leverage 
of that group is low, and vice versa. Taylor‟s (2008) analyses of the judicialization of 
social security reform policy in Brazil during the Cardoso administration is a good case to 
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exemplify the differences between the two concepts. Once the Brazilian congress 
approved the security reforms package after four years of intense legislative negotiations, 
interest groups hurt by the reforms such as the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) and 
other professional unions, turned to the court to try to block the new legislation.27 
Clearly, these groups were losers of the policymaking process, but could hardly be 
considered politically disadvantaged; they had considerable political leverage and had 
access to the policy process.  
Meanwhile, the opposite configuration refers to a type of cases in which the social 
actors posing demands on the state are politically disadvantaged but they are not strict 
losers of the policy process. This scenario seems quite counterintuitive:  if a social group 
is not a policy loser, how can it be politically disadvantaged? There might different 
reasons and circumstances explaining why the elected branches of government passed 
regulations and set policies in favor of groups with low political leverage (ideological or 
normative reasons, international pressure, reputational costs for not acting, etc.). 
Whatever the reasons, the relevant point is that these groups are not losers of the 
democratic policymaking process. As I will show in the following chapters, this study 
identifies and analyzes several judicialized disputes that respond to this pattern. In these 
cases, the social actors making demands on the state had limited access and low political 
leverage to advocate and advance their policy goals and interests, but could not be 
considered strict losers of the policy process; they were demanding the implementation or 
enforcement of existing legislation or policy mandates.28 In sum, there are clear 
                                               
27 In fact, the judiciary was already involved in this policy process even before the reform package was 
approved by congress. When the reform bill was under consideration in one of the legislative chambers, 
opponents of the social security reform filed a legal claim to suspend the congressional hearings based on 
procedural issues (for a more detailed overview see Taylor 2008, 61-62). 
28 In fact, this is not an uncommon situation in Argentina (or for that matter, in the region).  As many 
observers of Latin American politics could testify, there are numerous examples of “symbolic” legislations 
and policies approved and established by the elected branches of government which are not fully enforced 
or implemented in practice (see, for instance, O'Donnell 1993; Weyland 2002). 
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conceptual and empirical differences between the political leverage of the social groups 
and whether they are strict losers of the policy process or not. Moreover, the way these 
two conditions combine can lead to substantially different type of political scenarios 
under which the judicialization of public policy might occur. 
In its turn, the fuzzy set developed in table 3.4 refers to the role of legislative 
assemblies. It assesses the level and type of involvement of the legislature in the policy 
process and debate surrounding a policy issue. This fuzzy set is built around the notion of 
passiveness of the legislature discussed in the previous chapter.29 As explained above, a 
passive legislature is basically one that does not take the policy initiative in a particular 
issue (that is, it does not initiate and pass its own legislative proposals), nor does it shape 
or modify policies proposed by the executive. Similarly, a passive legislature does not 
control how policies are implemented (or not) by the government. There could be many 
reasons explaining this “passive” behavior of the legislative assembly, but for the 
purposes of this study the critical point is that the legislature is neither working as a 
venue for accommodating and aggregating interests and views in the policy making 
process, nor as a central component of the system of check and balances, overseeing the 
implementation of policies by executive branch officials and agencies. 
A key issue when assessing cases for this set is how to consider situations in 
which the government has legislative majorities. Governments regularly seek to garner 
legislative majorities supporting their policy initiatives and positions and this is part of 
the normal dynamic of majoritarian decision-making institutions. However, as mentioned 
above, the work of congress also entails policy deliberation and negotiation as well as 
                                               
29 The set can also reflect legislative inaction as a result from legislative stalemates and deadlocks, which is 
an argument stressed by the comparative literature on judicialization. Although, based on our previous 
knowledge of the cases covered by this research and also on the literature on the legislative power in 
Argentina, we do not expect legislative deadlocks to be a factor driving the demand for judicial intervention 
in these policy disputes. 
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overseeing and monitoring the executive. The focus of this fuzzy set, then, is not on 
whether the legislative assembly supported the government in a particular policy dispute, 
but rather on how the legislature inserted itself into the policy process. Accordingly, a 
legislative majority aligned with the executive is considered passive when the legislature 
approves executive policies without engaging in policy negotiations or without 
introducing policy changes, or when the legislative block aligned with the government 
does not allow congress to exercise its power to monitor the executive‟s implementation 
of existing policy.  
 
Table 3.4: Legislature Passiveness Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in.  The legislature is 
clearly passive  
The legislature delegates broad, open-ended policy 
making authority to the government over the issue.  
Or, the government takes unilateral policy measures, 
avoiding the legislature, and the legislature does not 
revise these policies. 
 
.67 = More in than out. The 
legislature is more than less 
passive 
Legislative majorities support the government policy 
without introducing/requiring substantial policy changes. 
Or, policy proposals are introduced in the legislature by 
opposition groups but are blocked by the government 
legislative block, and they fail to gain enough support to 
be considered in plenary. 
 
.33 = more out than in. The 
legislature is less  than more 
passive 
Legislative majorities support the government policy in 
general but introduce substantial amendments.  
Or, policy proposals introduced by the opposition are 
treated in plenary, although they might not be approved. 
Or, the legislature performs its oversight role over the 
executive, holding hearings and requesting information to 
executive branch officials and agencies. 
 
0 = fully out. The legislature is 
clearly not passive 
The legislature is fully engaged in the policy making 
process. It takes the initiative, setting or substantially 




Meanwhile, the fuzzy set developed in Table 3.5 refers to the role of the executive 
branch of government. It assesses the extent to which politicians in charge of an 
administration are opposed to the policy demands made by social actors involved in a 
policy dispute. More importantly, when read in combination with the strict policy loser 
set described in Table 3.2, it helps assessing whether the political elites in charge of 
government trigger judicialization because their policy preferences are inconsistent with 
the goals and mandates of existing laws and policies. For instance, if a social group 
making policy demands on the state is not a strict policy loser (in other words, their 
demands are based on existing legislation), and the government is opposed to the groups‟ 
demands, that combination is suggesting that the government is not willing to implement 
or enforce existing policy mandates.  
 
Table 3.5: Executive Opposition to the Policy Demands Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in. The Executive is 
clearly opposed  
The government takes strong actions and measures 
opposed to the social actors‟ demands.  
Alternatively, the government is openly opposed to 
taking measures requested by the social actors to modify 
the status quo in certain policy field. 
 
.67 = More in than out. The 
Executive is more than less 
opposed. 
The government‟s opposition to certain social demands 
(either to modify a status quo situation or to stop a policy 
reform) varies through time or among different members 
of government. 
 
.33 = more out than in. The 
Executive is less than more 
opposed. 
The government takes measures (either to modify the 
status quo in certain policy issue, or to stop a policy 
change) which are consistent with the social actors‟ 
policy goals, although the measures are considered 
insufficient 
 
0 = fully out. The Executive is  
clearly not opposed 
The government takes measures clearly consistent with 
policy demands made by the social actors.  
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Finally, the last fuzzy set (Table 3.6) evaluates the capacity of the state apparatus 
to intervene in a policy issue. This set speaks to the argument that a deficient state, unable 
to implement or enforce existing policies mandates, triggers the judicialization of policy. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a main challenge in assessing cases for this set is 
to empirically distinguish weak enforcement due to state deficiencies from that resulting 
from politicians‟ preferences. Accordingly, our state capacity fuzzy set focuses on more 
enduring and structural features of the bureaucratic capability to carry out its enforcement 
tasks. These are features that are usually the result of medium or long term processes and 
which, therefore, are not easily changed by short term variations in politicians‟ 
preferences. In contrast, political measures taken by a particular administration (for 
instance, reduction in the budget of an agency), although they can undoubtedly affect the 
ability of the state to implement certain legislation in the short run, they can also be 
relatively easily undone by a future new government. 
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Table 3.6: Deficient State Capacity Fuzzy Set 
1 = Fully in.  The capacity of the state 
apparatus to intervene in a policy issue 
is clearly deficient 
The state lacks the proper physical (e.g., a running 
hospital to serve a certain area) and organizational 
infrastructure (trained human resources, etc.) 
needed to intervene in a policy issue. 
Alternatively, the institutional capabilities needed to 
intervene in a policy issue are heavily fragmented 
among different departments and levels of the state 
apparatus, without proper coordination. 
 
.67 = More in than out. The capacity of 
the state to intervene in a policy issue is 
more than less deficient 
The state suffers serious management and 
organizational problems to effectively and 
efficiently intervene in an issue (for instance, 
problems of communication and coordination, 
inadequate bureaucratic procedures, lack of human 
resources and lack of information, etc.). 
 
.33 = more out than in. The capacity of 
the state to intervene is less than more 
deficient 
There is a bureaucratic department responsible for a 
policy issue, and has the basic needed physical and 
organizational infrastructure. Problems in the state‟s 
involvement in a policy issue are related to choices 
made by the particular administration in charge of 
the government (e.g., budget cuts, limited legal 
powers assigned to an agency, etc.). 
 
0 = fully out. The capacity of the state 
apparatus to intervene is clearly not 
deficient 
There is a responsible bureaucratic department, 
which have sufficient organizational and 
institutional capabilities and resources. Capacity 
issues do not affect the involvement of the state 
apparatus in a policy issue. 
 
 
QCA EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 3.7 presents the fuzzy-set membership scores of the 13 policy disputes 
under study. The first column lists the score of the outcome in each case (that is, the 
degree of membership in the set judicialized policy conflicts); the following five columns 
list the value of the causal conditions in each case.  This fuzzy-set table works as an 
ordering device. Given the number of cases (13) and causal conditions modelled (5), it is 
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difficult to systematically compare these cases in the classical narrative mode of 
qualitative analysis. Clearly, this table makes the analytical comparison of the cases 
easier and more transparent, while keeping the configurational basis of the qualitative 
analysis. 
 
Table 3.7: Fuzzy Membership Scores  












1 .33 1 .67 .67 1 
Mining policy 
Esquel  
.33 .33 0 0 1 .33 
CEAMSE  
Ensenada 
.67 .33 .33 .67 .67 .33 
Oil production 
Llancanelo 
1 .33 .67 .33 1 .33 
Health care for 
HIV/AIDS 
people  








.33 .67  .33 0 .67 0 
PRATPA. 
Indigenous 
land, Jujuy  








.67  .33 .67 .33 .33 1  
Train service 
reform 
.67 1 .67 .33 1 .33 
Public services 
tariffs increase 
.67  .33 .33 .67 .67 .33 
Re-structuring 
Phones tariffs  
1 .67 .67 .67 .67 .33 
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As Table 3.7 shows, there are no cases with 0 membership score in the set policy 
judicialization. Even though there is still a significant variation in the level of 
judicialization among the policy conflicts covered by this study, this situation merits a 
clarification. In appendix B, I explain in detail the conceptualization and the conditions a 
negative case has to fulfill in order to be considered a “relevant” negative case for this 
study.30 As described in that appendix, during my field research I identified many 
instances of policy disputes in which the involved governments were unresponsive but 
the conflicts were not judicialized. The lack of judicialization, however, was usually 
related to the absence of one or more of the enabling conditions for judicialization.31 A 
common situation, for instance, was that certain social actors making policy demands on 
the state, lacked proper legal standing or did not have sufficient legal bases to bring 
claims to the courts. These types of non-judicialized cases might be relevant for 
assessing, for example, whether a proper legal framework is a necessary enabling 
condition for judicialization to occur; but they are irrelevant to analyze what political 
conditions might trigger the judicialization of policy issues –which is the purpose of this 
study-, because the lack of judicialization is due to the absence of one of the enabling 
conditions in the first place. In short, these non-judicialized disputes do not meet the 
scope conditions of our research and, therefore, do not help in assessing the theoretical 
propositions of this study.32 
                                               
30For the concept of relevant negative cases, see Mahoney and Goertz (2004) .  
31 As explained in chapter 1, judicialization occurs when certain enabling conditions are in place: namely, a 
favorable legal framework, a relatively autonomous judiciary and a certain level of organizational support. 
32 To further clarify the issue of scope conditions, the theoretical framework of this study can be formally 
specified with a Boolean notation:   X = (A+B+C+D+E) * (F*G*H).  
Where X = policy judicialization (outcome), A = policy loser, B = low political leverage, C= inefficient 
legislature, D = opposition of executive, E=deficient state capacity, F= favorable legal framework,  
G = autonomous judiciary, and H = support structure.  The symbol * indicates the logical AND, and the 
symbol + indicates the logical OR. 
The set A, B C D and E constitutes the core of this study‟s theoretical framework. We want to assess 
whether any of these political conditions, individually or combined, might be sufficient to trigger the 
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It is worth stressing, however, that despite the lack of cases with 0 membership in 
the set judicialization, the study does capture relevant variation in the outcome. It 
includes policy disputes that are fully (1) or quite judicialized (.67), and policy conflicts 
in which judicialization is not really relevant (.33). As explained earlier in the chapter, 
the cases in which judicialization was not relevant refer to disputes in which legal claims 
were brought and admitted to the courts, but the judicial procedures did not become an 
important venue in which the policy process and debate evolved. In these cases, the 
courts did not displace the other branches of government nor added another main forum 
for policy negotiations. In short, these are cases that have a weak membership in the 
fuzzy set judicialization; in other words, they are more “out” than “in” the set, and 
therefore can be considered as negative cases. Furthermore, these “less than more” 
judicialized disputes clearly fall within the scope conditions of this research, and hence, 
are “relevant” negative cases for this study (Mahoney and Goertz 2004).  
Once we have clarified this issue, the next step is to identify which are the 
empirically relevant conditions, or combinations of conditions, linked to our outcome. 
With five causal conditions, there are 32 logically possible causal combinations.33 That 
is, there are 32 possible different scenarios under which judicialization might occur. At 
this point, it is worth reminding the reader what is the analytical focus of qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA), and how it differs from the standard co-variation analysis. 
As explained by Ragin (2005) while the central goal of co-variation analysis is to isolate 
and estimate the independent net effects of causal variables on an outcome, QCA seeks to 
                                                                                                                                            
judicialization of policy. The logical AND (*) links this core theoretical proposition with the second set of 
conditions. F, G and H are, jointly, necessary conditions for judicialization to occur, and constitute the 
scope conditions of this study. Thus, only cases that meet conditions F, G and H (in other words that are 
potentially judiciable), are relevant to assess whether political conditions A, B, C, D or E triggers policy 
judicialization. 
33 As explained by Ragin (2000), QCA analysis can be better understood by viewing the property space as 
a multidimensional vector space with 2K corners, where K is the number of causal conditions. Therefore, in 
our study there are 5 causal conditions, then, there are 32 logically possible causal arguments. 
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discern the different combinations of causally relevant conditions linked to that outcome. 
In other words, QCA‟s primary analytical focus is not on the net effects of independent 
variables but on the different ways causal conditions combine. 
Continuing with the analysis, I use the computer program fs-QCA 2.0 (Ragin et 
al. 2006) to identify which are the empirically relevant causal combinations in our 
study.34 The analysis indicates that 10 out of the 32 possible causal paths have instances 
of the policy conflicts examined in this study.35 Table 3.8 lists these 10 causal 
combinations (columns 1 to 5) and specifies which policy disputes are covered by each of 
them (column 6).  
 
















Number of Cases  (2) Consistency Outcome(3) 
 
0 0 1 1 0 3 (Jujuy; Ceamse; 
Tariffs utilities) 
1 1 
0 1 0 0 1 2 (FHA; Chaco) 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 (HIV-AIDS) 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 (Salta) 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 (Llancanelo) 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 (Phone) 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 (Riachuelo )  1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 (Trains) 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 (Disability) 0.89 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 (Esquel) 0.89 0 
(1) 1 indicates that, in a given case, a causal condition is relevant / present and 0 indicates that a causal 
condition is irrelevant / absent. A causal condition is considered to be relevant /present, when the 
membership score of a case in that fuzzy set is greater than 0.5. 
(2) Fs-QCA analysis requires establishing a threshold of number of cases for assessing which combinations 
of causal conditions are relevant to explain the outcome. Given that the number of cases for the study is 
relatively small, I follow Ragin‟s suggestion (2009) of establishing a frequency threshold of one case. 
Hence, the 10 causal combinations are empirically relevant. 
(3) The outcome is based on the consistency score. If a causal combination is considered inconsistent, the 
outcome is 0, if it is considered consistent, the outcome is 1.  
                                               
34 The program can be downloaded from: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 




Table 3.8 also indicates the degree of consistency between each of these causal 
combinations and the outcome, judicialization (column 7). To explain what consistency 
indicates in QCA analysis, I need first to briefly explain the notion of sub-set relation. A 
subset relation basically means that one set (causal combination X) is contained within 
another set (the outcome Y); in other words, X is a subset of Y. When the concept of 
subset relations is applied to the study of causal complexity, it indicates that a specific 
causal combination may be interpreted as sufficient for an outcome to happen. As 
explained by Ragin (2000, 2009), if cases sharing a causal combination also exhibit the 
same outcome, then these cases constitute a subset of instances of the outcome. Such a 
subset relation signals that a specific causal combination might be sufficient for the 
outcome. If there are other sets of cases sharing other causal combinations and also 
exhibiting the same outcome, then these combinations also may be interpreted as 
sufficient for the outcome. Consistency, then, basically assesses the degree to which 
cases sharing a given causal configuration also agree in displaying the outcome in 
question. As column 7 shows, the first eight configurations have a perfect consistency 
degree (1), which indicates that these combinations of conditions are a subset of the 
outcome, and hence, can be considered sufficient conditions for judicialization to occur. 
At the same time, there is a substantial gap between the first eight combinations and the 
last two rows, which provides a strong basis to consider these two last causal 
combinations as inconsistent.36 This is not surprising given that they covered cases in 
which the courts were not relevant venues in the unfolding of the policy process. In short, 
                                               
36 In principle, values below 0.75 are considered to be inconsistent.  However, good practices in QCA 
analysis recommend a higher cut-off value if there is a substantial gap in the upper ranges of consistency 
scores like in our study (see Ragin 2009). For that reason, we consider the 0.89 value of the last two rows 
as inconsistent, given that all the rest of the cases have a perfect degree of consistency (1). 
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this suggests that these last two combinations are insufficient for triggering the 
judicialization of policy disputes. 
In the next step of the QCA analysis, the eight consistent causal combinations 
previously identified are logically reduced into a more parsimonious result through a 
process of Boolean minimization. The most fundamental rule in this logical procedure is 
the following: “...If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet 
produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguished the two 
expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, 
combined expression…” (Ragin 2008, 38). Appendix C describes how the process of 
minimization was performed. The result of this process shows that there are three 
alternative main combinations of political conditions under which policy disputes are 
likely to become judicialized.37 Below, I describe with a Boolean notation the minimal 
formula composed by the three configurations (in Boolean language, uppercase indicates 
“positive” values or presence and lowercase indicates “negative” values or absence; 
furthermore, the symbol * indicates the logical AND, and the symbol + indicates the 
logical OR): 
 
Policy loser * Legislative passiveness *Executive opposition* DEF STATE CAP +  
(cases covered: FHA; Chaco; HIV-AIDS) 
 
Pol loser * LEG PASS * EXE OPP +   
(cases covered: Ceamse; Jujuy; Tariffs; Salta; Riachuelo) 
 
WEAK POLITICAL LEVERAGE * EXE OPP  → JUDICIALIZATION 
(cases covered: Phone, Llancanelo, Trains, Riachuelo, Salta) 
 
                                               
37 In QCA terminology, this result is known as the “intermediate” solution. Appendix C also describes the 
two other results that can be obtained from the QCA minimization procedure: the complex and the 
parsimonious solution. 
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In plain language, this Boolean formula reads as follow: judicialization is 
observed when the state is deficient, and the actors are not strict policy losers, the 
legislature is not passive and the executive is not opposed to the social demands (first 
configuration); or when the actors are not strict policy losers and the executive is opposed 
and the legislature is passive (second configuration); or when the social actors have low 
political leverage and the executive is opposed to their demands (third configuration). 
To further enhance the QCA analysis, I also list the causal configuration covering 
the two policy conflicts in which judicialization was not relevant; in other words, the 
causal combination encompassing the negative cases of our study. The process of 
minimization of these two cases is very simple; they differ only in one condition (policy 
loser), which therefore is removed to create a relatively simpler combination:38  
 
Weak pol lever * Leg pass * EXE OPP * def state cap → WEAK OR  
NON JUDICIALIZATION 
(cases covered: Esquel, Disability) 
In this case, the Boolean formula reads as follows: weak or non-judicialization 
can be observed when the executive is opposed but the social actors have political 
leverage, and the legislature is not passive and the state apparatus is not deficient. 
 
INTERPRETATION OF THE QCA RESULTS 
What do these results mean? How can we read them beyond the logical 
description we did above? It is worth remembering that QCA is basically a way to 
formalize comparative case-oriented analysis. The goal is not to make causal inferences 
                                               
38 Although this causal combination displays the outcome (weak or non-judicialization), it is worth noting 
that its degree of consistency is quite low, 0.67. This suggests that the causal relationship is not strong 
enough to consider this combination as regularly sufficient for this outcome to occur. Nevertheless, we 
include this combination because, as it is shown below, it provides some interesting insights about the 
relationships that can developed between certain conditions and how they might impact on the outcome. 
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per se, but to help in the process of causal analysis and interpretation. In other words, the 
minimal Boolean formulas are not “explanations” of a given outcome (De Meur et al. 
2009). It is the researcher‟s task to make sense of these descriptive formulas based on the 
knowledge of the cases and in dialogue with the theoretical framework. Following, I 
provide a first, brief interpretation of the QCA results:  
 
Policy loser * Legislative passiveness * DEFICIENT STATE CAPACITY 
*Executive opposition → JUDICIALIZATION 
(cases covered by this causal combination: HIV/AIDS, Chaco, FHA) 
The first causal combination indicates that judicialization of policy disputes is 
likely to occur in political scenarios in which the involved social groups are demanding 
the implementation or enforcement of existing policy mandates (therefore, they are not 
strict losers of the policy processes), congress is attentive to the social demands, the 
political elite in charge of the executive is not opposed to the policy in question, but the 
state apparatus is unable or deficient to fully carry it out. The policy conflicts covered by 
this causal combination show processes of judicialization triggered by the lack of 
implementation of policies and programs due to serious, structural problems of state 
capacity, even when the political elites in charge of the government relatively supported 
implementation or at least were not openly opposed to it, and the legislative assemblies 
were somehow attentive to the issue and involved in the policy process. In other words, 
these cases involved disputes about policy goals and mandates which have been approved 
and established by the political branches of government but that the state as an 
organization could not properly deliver. In short, this scenario stresses deficiencies in the 




Policy loser * EXECUTIVE OPPOSITION * LEGISLATIVE PASSIVENESS → 
JUDICIALIZATION   
(cases: Jujuy, Tariffs, Salta, CEAMSE ) 
The second causal configuration indicates that public policy is likely to become 
judicialized in scenarios in which the involved social groups demand the implementation 
or enforcement of existing policy mandates (they are not strict policy losers), but the 
politicians in charge of the executive branch of government are opposed to the existing 
policies, and the legislature fails to check and control the executive. In contrast to the first 
combination that stressed problems of state capacity, the distinguishing feature of this 
second scenario is that the political elites in charge of the executive do not fully uphold 
existing policy mandates or they enforce them according to their own policy preferences.  
Furthermore, this occurs in contexts in which the legislature is generally passive and 
deferential to the government in relation to the policy under dispute, allowing the 
executive to interpret and apply existing laws as it pleases. In short, this configuration 
points out the discretionary exercise of power by the executive and the weaknesses of 
legislative mechanisms of political accountability as triggering the judicialization of 
policy issues.  
 
WEAK POLITICAL LEVERAGE * EXE OPPOSITION → JUDICIALIZATION  
(cases: Llancanelo, Trains, Phones and Riachuelo) 
The third causal combination indicates that the judicialization of public policy 
issue is likely to occur in political scenarios in which the involved social groups do not 
have enough political leverage to influence the policy process, and the government is 
opposed to policy measures demanded by the social groups. The cases with strong 
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membership in this causal combination show policy disputes in which there are social 
groups opposed to a government‟s policy, but the social opposition is very isolated or 
fragmented, unable to gain support from broader constituencies, and therefore, it is 
politically too weak to be a significant party in the policy negotiations and to influence 
the policy process. In short, this configuration is the paradigmatic example of 
judicialization triggered by politically disadvantaged groups.  
 
Weak political leverage * Legislative passiveness * EXECUTIVE OPPOSITION 
*deficient state capacity →WEAK JUDICIALIZATION 
(cases: Esquel, Disability) 
The last causal configuration refers to policy conflicts in which judicialization 
was not relevant. These are cases in which legal claims were brought to and admitted by 
the courts, but the judicial procedures did not become a main venue in which the policy 
process and negotiations evolved. As mentioned above, we cannot make strong claims 
about the causal sufficiency of this combination in relation to the outcome weak or non-
judicialization. Nevertheless, the configuration does allow for some interesting insights 
and interpretations. It indicates that when a conflict develops because the executive is 
opposed to policy demands made by certain social groups, the involvement of courts and 
judicial procedures in a policy conflict is not likely to be relevant if the social groups 
have political leverage, congress is attentive to the issue and involved in the policy 
process, and the state apparatus is capable. In short, this scenario suggests that the 
opposition of the politicians in charge of the government is not a sufficient factor, per se, 
for a policy dispute to become fully judicialized. Moreover, it also seems to imply that 
the combination of an active and involved legislature and social actors with political 
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leverage can counterbalance and contain the executive‟s exercise of power, making the 
full judicialization of policy disputes relatively unnecessary. 
 
Summing up, the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) identifies three 
combinations of causal conditions that are sufficient to trigger processes of policy 
judicialization in Argentina.  None of these three configurations, however, is both 
sufficient and necessary to produce the outcome. This would mean that one of the 
conditions or combination of conditions has to be always, or almost always, present for 
judicialization to occur. On the contrary, the analysis shows that these three causal 
combinations constitute alternative political scenarios, and each one offers sufficient 
bases for triggering the judicialization of policy disputes in Argentina. Moreover, the 
QCA analysis also pinpoints at least one configuration of political conditions under 
which policy disputes are not likely to be fully judicialized. 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS  
Although the last chapter develops the conclusion of this study in more detail, in 
this section I briefly flesh out some of the main theoretical and empirical implications of 
the QCA analysis. First of all, the QCA results clearly demonstrate that the judicialization 
of public policy is a result of a much more complex political picture than the widespread 
notion of the policy loser portraits. It makes evident that the attempt to explain processes 
of judicialization by just arguing that those who litigate is because they cannot attain their 
policy goals through the policy venues, clearly oversimplifies how democratic 
governance works. Furthermore, it misses the possibility of exploring the links between 
judicialization of public policy and the political scenarios in which those issues and 
disputes develop.  
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Second, the existing theoretical explanations considered and assessed throughout 
this research (namely, the political disadvantage and the political fragmentation 
arguments, including a strict formulation of the policy loser argument as the one 
developed in our QCA analysis) can explain certain types of cases of judicialization of 
public policy, but not others. For instance, the political disadvantage argument was only 
fully reflected in one of the three political scenarios under which judicialization was 
likely to occur in Argentina according to our QCA results; in the other two scenarios, the 
political leverage of the involved social actors was not a key condition. This is a finding 
of significant empirical and theoretical value given that observers and scholars generally 
overstress the relevance of under-represented actors when explaining the phenomenon of 
judicialization of policy issues. This is an even more striking finding when one takes into 
account that the policy fields covered by the study involved populations that are 
historically disadvantaged social groups like indigenous people, or suffer from structural 
problems of collective action like the cases of societal demands for consumer or 
environmental protection. Moreover, in relation to the political fragmentation argument, 
legislative deadlocks or stalemates were not a factor at all in explaining the 
judicialization of public policy issues in the cases covered by this research.  Indeed, most 
of these policy conflicts occurred in political contexts that could hardly be considered 
fragmented, and in which the involved governments had policy making majorities or 
were potentially able to garner the legislative support they needed.  
It is worth stressing that this does not mean that these causal arguments are 
invalid, but rather that they can explain only certain types of cases of policy 
judicialization. A key contribution of my QCA analysis is precisely to show that there are 
substantially, different configurations of political conditions under which public policy 
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disputes are likely to become judicialized, and that the existing theoretical arguments can 
explain only some of them.  
Third, the QCA results validate the empirical relevance of the two weak rule of 
law scenarios I develop in chapter 2 for explaining the phenomenon of judicialization of 
public policy in Argentina. In two out of the three final combinations identified through 
the QCA analysis, the judicialization of policy issues was related to the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to uphold policy goals and mandates already in force. In one 
scenario, this was the result of the lack of a capable and effective state apparatus to 
deliver the public goods resulting from democratic policymaking processes and expressed 
in the legislation. In the other scenario, judicialization was related to the fact that the 
elites in charge of the executive branch of the government did not apply the law when it 
contradicted their policy preferences, or at most, they applied it in ways that were 
beneficial to or consistent with their preferences. Moreover, this discretionary behavior of 
the elites in charge of the executive was generally complemented by the passivity of the 
legislative assemblies, who failed to fully exercise their power of legislative control and 
oversight. This combination of discretional exercise of executive powers and relatively 
passive legislatures underlines a chronic problem of weak accountability affecting 
democratic governance in Argentina (O'Donnell 1994), which in turn, becomes another 
main trigger for the judicialization of policy issues in this country. 
Finally, from a theory building point of view, the formulation and empirical 
validation of these of two configurations of conditions as significant scenarios in which 
policy judicialization is likely to occur, is a main contribution of my research. These 
configurations (especially the one built around the notion of state deficiencies and to a 
lesser extent the combination between discretional exercise of executive power and the 
passive role of the legislature) had not been really conceived and analyzed by the 
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specialized literature as triggering the demand for judicial involvement in public policy 
disputes. In this way, the two types of causal configurations identified and developed by 
this study, can be visualized as building blocks for a typological theory about the political 
conditions leading to judicialization of public policy.39  
After this brief analysis of the QCA results and its theoretical and empirical 
implications, the following four chapters develop the case studies of all the policy 
disputes encompassed by each of the causal configurations resulting from the QCA.  
                                               
39 In the last chapter of this dissertation, I analyze in more detail the contribution of my research and the 
prospects of constructing a typological theory. At this point, I just want to stress again that the notion of 
typological theory is inherently open to the possibility of equifinality. In other words, it allows for different 
alternative “types” of causal configurations in relation to a certain outcome (see George and Bennett 2004). 
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CHAPTER 4: STATE DEFICIENCIES AS A SOURCE OF 
JUDICIALIZATION  
This chapter describes and compares three of our cases of judicialization of public 
policy in Argentina: the 2007 health and food emergency affecting the indigenous 
communities living in El Impenetrable (Chaco), the provision of treatment and medicines 
to people living with HIV-AIDS during the 1990‟s, and the production of the vaccine 
against the Argentine hemorrhagic fever or “mal de los rastrojos”. Based on the QCA 
analysis developed in the previous chapter, these three cases shared a common, basic 
pattern: the involvement of the courts in these policy processes occurred in contexts in 
which the legislature and the executive were attentive to the issues, and sometimes even 
supportive of the policies in question, but the state apparatus was ill prepared to fully 
implement/enforce them. In short, these three cases of policy judicialization share a 
causal configuration built around the weak capability of the state apparatus to fulfill 
existing policy mandates. 
Given that this is the first of the empirical chapters of the dissertation, it is worth 
explaining again, the reasons for including case studies. First, a detailed, historical 
analysis of the cases allow for assessing the QCA coding of the outcome and causal 
conditions presented in chapter II. This speaks to the transparency and replicability of the 
fsQCA analysis. Second, the case studies allow for assessing the internal validity of the 
minimal formulas developed through the QCA analysis. In other words, they allow for 
examining whether the “thick”, historical narratives and analysis of the cases reflect the 
causal configurations resulting from the QCA. To facilitate this endeavor, I include the 




Table 4.1: Fuzzy Membership Scores of Causal Conditions  













.33 (1) .67 .33 .33 1 
Health care for 
HIV/AIDS 
people  




.33 .67 .33 .33 1 
(1) As explained in the previous chapter, in fuzzy set language, 1 means a case has full membership in a 
set, .67 means that a case is more in than out of a set, .33 means a case is more out than in a set, and 0 
means a case is clearly excluded from the set. When these scores are translated into Boolean logic, scores 1 
and .67 indicate that a causal condition is relevant or present in a given case. On the contrary, scores .33 
and 0 indicates that a causal condition is irrelevant or absent. 
The configuration displayed by these judicialized policy disputes reflects one of 
our theoretical arguments about the type of political scenario under which judicialization 
of public policy is likely to occur in Argentina. This argument has a couple of main 
elements that the reader should pay special attention when reading these case studies. 
First, in this type of disputes, there are legislation and policies already approved by the 
democratically political venues, the legislature and the executive. The judicialization of 
these policy issues, then, is not triggered by losers of policymaking process turning to the 
courts, but by social actors demanding the state to uphold relatively clear existing policy 
mandates. Second, the lack of implementation and enforcement of these legislation and 
rules occurs in a political context in which the political elites controlling the government 
relatively support the policies in question or are not openly opposed to them. However, 
and this is the key element in this scenario, the state apparatus has serious, structural 
limitations to properly fulfill the legal mandates.  
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The three cases examined in this chapter are organized in the following way: The 
first part of each study is a historical description of how the particular policy issue 
evolved and became judicialized. This part emphasizes the chain of events and situations 
leading to the involvement of the judiciary in the policy process. The second part 
constitutes a more “focused” analysis. It only deals with those aspects or features of a 
case that directly speaks to each of the five conditions that are theoretically relevant for 
this study:  losers of the policy process, political leverage of the involved social actors, 
the passivity of the legislature, the opposition of the executive, and state capacity. This 
part of the analysis parcels out different aspects of the case in order to gain more 
analytical leverage. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the similarities and 
differences between the three cases examined, and an overall assessment of the validity 
of this causal path to the judicialization of policy. 
 
THE 2007 HEALTH AND FOOD EMERGENCY AFFECTING INDIGENOUS POPULATION 
IN “EL IMPENETRABLE” 
During the last months of 2006, groups working on indigenous issues publicly 
alerted about the lack of food and the levels of health deterioration affecting indigenous 
communities living in “El Impenetrable”, a dense forest region in the west part of the 
province of Chaco.40 The reports were not referring to a novel state of affairs, but rather 
to the deepening of an already critical social situation. Historically, indigenous 
communities in the Chaco have suffered very high levels of poverty as well as very low 
levels of social development (high level of infant mortality, low life expectancy, etc.). 
                                               
40In December 2006, the Centro Mandela, a local NGO from the province of Chaco, made presentations to 
the human rights secretary of the national government and to the national Ombudsman about the health and 
food situation of the rural indigenous communities in El Impenetrable (Página 12, “Genocidio étnico en El 
Impenetrable, May 21, 2007).  Furthermore, the Human Rights Secretary of the national government also 
received reports from the Chaco Human Rights Commission about the critical health situation of the 
indigenous communities in the region (information cited by the plaintiff‟s legal claim, p. 40).  
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This social situation has persisted over time regardless of the existence of national and 
provincial legislation and diverse social programs aiming to address the needs of this 
population.  
Few months later, in April 2007, the Chaco Aboriginal Institute (Instituto del 
Aborigen Chaqueño, IDACh) issued Resolution 64  declaring the state of food and health 
emergency affecting the indigenous communities.41 The Resolution described the lack of 
medical staff and medicines affecting the provincial health system in the region and 
denounced an increase in the number of deaths among the local population. Local and 
national media attention around the issue began to grow.42 By the middle of 2007, the 
health situation in the region worsened with the arrival of the winter. Between July 11 
and the first week of August, at least 11 indigenous people were reported death due to 
malnutrition and other poverty-related sickness.43 The main national newspapers (La 
Nación, Clarín, Página 12) gave great coverage to the issue and national TV channels had 
their news programs at prime time covering what was happening in Chaco.44 The health 
and food situation of the indigenous communities in the Chaco became an issue of 
national public attention.  
                                               
41 The IDACh is an autarchic agency established by provincial law 3258/87. It is the agency, within the 
provincial state apparatus, in charge of dealing with indigenous issues, but at the same time it represents the 
interests and concerns of the indigenous communities in relation to the state. IDACh‟s authorities are not 
appointed  but are elected by the indigenous population of the province of Chaco. 
42 An episode that raised a lot of media attention was a trip to the provincial capital city of Resistencia of a 
group of indigenous people suffering severe problems of malnutrition. The trip was organized by Centro 
Mandela, with the purpose of delivering a petition to the provincial health minister requesting urgent 
government measures to address the ongoing health situation in El Impenetrable.  The Health Minister R. 
Mayol did not agree to meet the group, but pictures of the sick covered central pages of local newspapers 
(see for instance, Diario Norte, “Dramático pedido de asistencia sanitaria para aborígenes al borde de la 
muerte”, May 16, 2007). 
43 Data reported by the Centro Mandela and cited by Página 12 (“Ya son 11 las víctimas del frio y la 
desnutrición”, August 7, 2007).  
44For example, Telefe Noticias covered the issue on August 11, 2007.  Similarly, America TV has specials 
on the situation of the Chaco indigenous communities in July and August (data cited by the national 
ombudsman in its legal claim). 
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Meanwhile, the national and provincial governments were somehow trying to 
respond to the increasing social concern. In April, the national government began an 
emergency program delivering food aid to the affected communities every two months, 
but the main responsible in addressing the situation of the local population was the 
government of the province of Chaco. At that moment, the provincial government was 
held by an electoral coalition led by the UCR. The governor was Roy Nikish ( Dic. 2003-
Dic. 2007) also belonging to the UCR.45 The first reaction of the provincial government 
was to minimize the existence of a health crisis. The health minister publically stated that 
the provincial public health system was reaching most of the population in the province 
and cultural factors explained why indigenous communities often did not access the 
health system.46 Nevertheless, and regardless of these types of statements, the provincial 
government finally did assign more funds to social programs targeting indigenous 
population.47 The provincial legislature also got involved in the policy debate. The 
legislature discussed and approved a couple of resolutions proposed by the opposition, 
calling the government to improve the measures taken to address the emergency and to 
better coordinate their efforts with the national government. A proposal to declare a 
Provincial Health and Food Emergency, however, was rejected by the party of the 
government which controlled the legislature.  
                                               
45 The UCR governed the province since 1995 (1995-1999, and then 1999-2003). The Peronist party 
governed the province since the return to democracy in 1983 until 1991. During the period 1991-1995, a 
provincial party, Acción Chaqueña, ruled the province. 
46 Página 12 (“Genocidio étnico en El Impenetrable”, May 21, 2007). 
47 The government passed Decree 1057/07 assigning funds to the IDACH for social programs. 
Furthermore, the government passed other decrees re-directing part of the budget of different state agencies 
(Minister of Production, Housing Agency, etc) to target indigenous communities. These measures, 
however, were not the result exclusively of the health and food crisis, but of a broader negotiation between 
the government and the IDACH that began as a result of a series of indigenous protests that occurred 
during the year 2006 concerning mainly land tenure rights (See Acta Acuerdo entre el Instituto del 
Aborigen Chaqueño y el Poder Ejecutivo de la Provincia del Chaco, August 23, 2006). 
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Meanwhile, indigenous groups and their allies strongly criticized how the 
provincial government, and to lesser extent the national government, were addressing the 
crisis. They claimed that the situation on the ground did not improve, and that the 
governments‟ actions were insufficient to address the situation affecting the communities. 
ENDEPA (Equipo Nacional de Pastoral Aborígen), the agency of the Catholic Church 
working on indigenous issues, made a very strong public statement criticizing the state‟s 
response to the crisis in the Chaco.48 The National Ombudsman, in its turn, began an 
inquiry about possible human rights violations of the indigenous communities living in El 
Impenetrable.49  
By September 2007, the health and food crisis was judicialized. The national 
Ombudsman filed a recurso de amparo at the Supreme Court against the national 
government and the government of the province of Chaco ("Defensor del Pueblo de la 
Nación c/ Estado Nacional y otra (Provincia del Chaco) s/ proceso de conocimiento 
(D.587.XLIII)").50 The plaintiff asked the Court to order the governments to take 
measures to improve the living conditions of the indigenous communities in El 
Impenetrable. Furthermore, the Ombudsman asked as a provisional remedy to order the 
governments to send medicines, food and drinkable water to cover the immediate needs 
of the affected population as well as medical assistance and equipments to fumigate 
                                               
48 Diario Norte (“La Pastoral Aborigen responsabiliza al gobierno por la situación indígena”, August 8, 
2007).  
49 A team from the ombudsman office visited the region to assess what was happening on the ground. The 
team‟s report is dramatic. It provides a detailed description of the living conditions of the families 
interviewed in the different communities visited by the team. The report concluded that most of the 
population in those communities lacked access to potable water, enough food, health care services and 
suffered from endemic sickness (See Viñas et al. 2007). 
50  Even though the legal strategy was defined by the Ombudsman office, the office was in closed contact 
with the local organizations, especially with IDACH. At that time, a legal issue that raised a lot of 
uncertainty was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction or not over the issue. To strength the legal 
argument for the Court‟s jurisdiction, the Ombudsman decided to fill the recurso de amparo alone, and the 
local organizations agreed with that strategy (interview with Lic. Adriana Viñas, Buenos Aires, July 10, 
2008). For a brief explanation of what a  recurso de amparo is, see footnote 9, in chapter 1. 
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against pests. The Court granted the provisional remedy and also ordered the national and 
provincial governments to provide information about demographics, budget and levels of 
implementation of the social programs in the region. The Court convened a first public 
hearing on November 6, 2007, to hear the parties‟ positions and to gather information 
about what was happening on the ground. The defendants argued that the provisional 
remedy was not necessary because the governments were already taking measures to 
address the crisis. Officials from different agencies of the national and provincial 
governments provided detailed data about the range of existing social and health 
programs. However, they could not explain the poor results in the field. As the hearing 
evolved, the operation of the existing programs and the effectiveness of the state 
intervention became the focus of the questions and concerns of the Justices.51 As result, 
the Court scheduled a new hearing in April 2008 to follow up the implementation of the 
provisional remedy and the development of the situation on the field. 
Meanwhile, in September 2007, Chaco had elections for governor and for the 
renewal of half of the provincial legislature. The main opposition party, the Peronist 
party, won the election for governor by a small difference. The electoral coalition led by 
the UCR won the legislative election and kept the majority of the legislative 
assembly.52Although the health and food crisis affecting the indigenous communities did 
not seem to occupy a central place in the provincial electoral campaign, local newspapers 
pointed out that the Tobas, the ethnic group that was most affected by the situation, 
largely supported the Peronist candidate for governor.53 Furthermore, the Peronist party 
                                               
51 For accounts of the hearing see Clarín (“La Corte, insatisfecha con los informes sobre la situación de los 
aborígenes en el Chaco”, November 7, 2007) and also Página 12, on the same date (“Inédita audiencia por 
los aborígenes”).    
52 16 legislative seats were renewed. The UCR won 9 and the Peronist party 7 of the seats. The UCR and 
its allies still held the majority of the assembly with 18 seats (56%), the Peronist party had 11, and other 
parties had 3 seats. 
53 See, for instance, comments about the electoral vote of the indigenous communities in Diario Norte 
(“Inocencia Charole, la vuelta de un dirigente aborígen a Diputados”, September 20, 2007).  
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had a Toba indigenous leader, Inocencia Charole, as one of the legislative party 
candidates. When she assumed her legislative seat, Charole was the only indigenous 
member of the provincial legislature.  
In December 2007, the new governor, Jorge Capitanich, took office. The new 
administration was much more accessible to the indigenous groups. It immediately 
declared the Health and Food Emergency (Decree 115/07) and substantially increased the 
budget for indigenous programs. Furthermore, the government launched a new initiative 
called Hunger Zero (Hambre Cero) targeting the local communities in El Impenetrable. 
Nevertheless, the health and social situation of the affected communities did not improve 
significantly. Reports produced by the Centro Mandela (Nuñes 2008) and by the national 
Ombudsman office (Defensoría del Pueblo de la Nación 2008) acknowledged that the 
governments were taken measures, but they also stressed that many basic needs of the 
communities were still unsatisfied, especially in relation to the health care system. As 
with measures taken by the previous administration, structural problems of state capacity 
affected the potential impact of the governmental policies in El Impenetrable. A mission 
of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) visited the region invited by the 
provincial and the national governments. Its report stressed that the public health care 
system in the region was extremely poor, hospitals‟ building were tumbledown and in 
many places there were no doctors. Even basic infrastructure to implement social 
                                                                                                                                            
In relation to the electoral relevance of the indigenous vote in the province of Chaco, I did not find official 
data about indigenous people electoral participation, nor even about the actual number of indigenous people 
living in the province of Chaco. Media sources estimate the total indigenous population of Chaco in 60.000.  
Moreover, around 30.000 indigenous were registered in the 2008 IDACH‟s electoral roll (Diario Norte, 
“Casi 30.000 aborígenes votarán para renovar la conducción del IDACh”, July 26, 2008). Based on that 
information, I estimate that indigenous voters accounted for 4% to 6.5% of the provincial electorate 
(527.327 people voted in the 2007election for governor, source: Tow, Atlas de Elecciones en Argentina). 
Nevertheless, I have no information to weight the distribution of the indigenous vote among the three main 
ethnic groups living in the province of Chaco: Tobas, Wichis and Mocovies. 
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programs, such as storage places for food aid, was sometimes lacking (Organización 
Panamericana de la Salud 2008).  
In this context, the process of judicialization continued. As mentioned above, in 
April 2008, the Supreme Court held a new hearing between the national and provincial 
governments, the Ombudsman and the IDACh, mainly as a way to monitor and follow up 
the implementation of the provisional remedy.  Almost a year later, in March 2009, and 
based on a request from the IDACh and the other parties, the Court convoked a new, 
closed meeting, as result of which the Court ordered the national and provincial 
governments to present a common plan of action to address the critical health and food 
situation affecting the indigenous communities of El Impenetrable.54 At the time of 
writing this case study (fall 2009), the judicial procedure was still open. 
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
This first issue to analyze is whether the indigenous groups and its allies were 
“losers” of the policy process or not. Even though a too quick reading of this case might 
suggest an affirmative answer to this question, a deeper analysis of the evidence indicate 
that the social demand for a strong government intervention in the Chaco‟s food and 
health crisis can hardly be considered a policy loser. Two main reasons justify this 
assessment. In the first place, and as mentioned above, there were already legislation that 
established clear legal mandates over the provincial government and the national 
government to address the social needs of the indigenous communities. At the provincial 
level, the Aboriginal Law 3285/87 states the general purpose of improving the living 
conditions of the indigenous communities, and establishes particular policies to be 
implemented by the state. For instance, chapter IV of the law refers to health care, and 
                                               
54 See La Nación (“La Corte Suprema obliga al gobierno a asistir a los aborígenes del Chaco”, March 25, 
2009); also Diario Judicial (“La emergencia no cesa”, March 25, 2009).  
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states basic operational policies to be implemented by the minister of health such as 
creating health centers in indigenous inhabit areas, training health agents from within the 
indigenous communities, even making transportation available to move patients from the 
rural areas to medical centers. This provision about transportation is a good example of 
the lack of implementation of the existing policy mandates. For the reader, this might 
appear to be a minor issue, but a very common complaint among the affected 
communities in El Impenetrable was precisely the lack of transportation. In other words, 
there were no ambulances to quickly move seriously ill patients to the medical centers, 
and as reported by the NGOs and the Ombudsman office, the lack of transportation -in 
many cases- lead to the death of people gravely sick. 
Similarly, at the national level, Law 23302/85 declares of national interest the 
support and development of the indigenous communities and created the Instituto 
Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas (INADI) with legal authority to elaborate and implement 
measures in different policy fields, including heath care (see for example, chapter VI of 
the law). Furthermore, there was a broad range of social programs, belonging to different 
agencies and ministers of the national and provincial governments, aiming to address 
populations like the indigenous communities in El Impenetrable. The national 
Ombudsman (in its legal complaint against the national and provincial government) listed 
some of these programs: PRODERNA (Programa de Desarrollo Rural de las Provincias 
del Noroeste Argentino); PROINDE (Desarrollo de Pequeños Productores 
Agropecuarios); PSA (Programa Social Agropecuario); Ayuda Social a Personas; Plan 
Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria and others.55 Arguably, the existence of these 
programs indicated that the national and provincial states have already assumed some sort 
                                               
55 Item IV 3 of the legal compliant filed by the national ombudsman. 
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of legal or at least policy commitments to provide support and assistance to those 
communities.  
Secondly, although the governments (especially the provincial administration of 
Governor Roy Nikish) did not fully respond to the social demands for larger and better 
public intervention to address the crisis, the governments did not deny the existence of 
legal and policy mandates to provide social and health aid and support to the 
communities. This is an important point in relation to the policy loser argument. It makes 
evident that the indigenous groups and its allies were demanding the implementation or 
enforcement of policy goals and measures that were already approved through the policy 
making processes and, hence, were already part of the existing legislation. 
 
The second factor to be analyzed is the political leverage of the involved social 
groups. Historically, indigenous communities in Chaco have had limited capability to 
access the state and to influence public policy. Indigenous collective action has been 
characterized by fragmentation and division, especially along the main ethnic groups: 
Tobas, Wichis, and Mocovies.56 Clientelistic practices from the state have further 
conditioned the capacity of indigenous communities and organizations to articulate 
collective policy demands. This picture seems to begin to change during the last few 
years. In 2006, for instance, Chaco experienced massive indigenous protests –known as 
The Uprising (“El Levantamiento”) due to claims for land tenures rights and other policy 
measures.57 However, the health and food crisis that hatched out during the winter of 
2007 did not trigger massive indigenous mobilizations or protests. Arguably, the directly 
                                               
56 Interview with Licenciada Adriana Viñas (Buenos Aires, July 10, 2008). 
57 El Levantamiento, which lasted for almost 100 days,  included a massive indigenous mobilization to the 
capital city of Resistencia (May 31,  2006), and the camping for almost two months of several hundred of 
indigenous people in front of the governor‟s house. The protests included communities and organizations 
from the three main ethnic groups (see coverage of Página 12, from May to August 2006).  
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affected communities in El Impenetrable were concerned with daily survival, and did not 
have the resources to organize and pose collective demands on the state. In this context, 
the IDACh, NGOs and other institutions working on indigenous issues were the main 
forces behind the social demands around the health and food crisis. For instance, the 
report produced by the local NGO Centro Mandela during the last months of 2006 is 
considered to have triggered the public alert about the health situation in the indigenous 
communities (see above, footnote 40).  Similarly, IDACh played a main role promoting 
and sustaining the social demands for government intervention to address the crisis. The 
involvement of the national Ombudsman office, in its term, was critical to gain access to 
the Supreme Court. However, the key factor in the process of building up the social 
demand over this issue was when the national media began to intensively covering what 
was happening in Chaco. From that moment on, the health and food crisis affecting the 
indigenous communities in El Impenetrable became an issue of national attention that the 
governments could not ignore nor treat lightly. In short, the affected population by the 
health and food crisis was politically disadvantaged, without much capacity of social 
mobilization and limited access to the state, although the IDACh, local NGOs and other 
allies triggered and sustained the social concerns and demands about the situation 
affecting these communities, and media coverage definitely helped placing the issue in 
the public agenda. 
 
In relation to the legislature, even though it did not play a main role in the policy 
debate around the health and food crisis, the provincial assembly was relatively attentive 
to the issue. Chaco has a unicameral legislature composed by 32 legislators. At that time, 
the governing coalition (UCR and its allies) controlled the assembly with 18 legislators 
(56% of the legislature), while the main opposition party, the Peronist party, had 11 
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legislators.58 During that winter of 2007, the opposition proposed three resolutions 
dealing with the health and food situation of the indigenous communities of Chaco. Two 
of the proposed resolutions called the provincial government to increase the social aid to 
the communities and to improve the coordination with the national government.59 These 
proposals were integrated in Resolution 818/07 which, with a somehow softer language, 
was unanimously approved by the legislature.60 The third proposed resolution asked the 
provincial government to declare the indigenous communities of Chaco in social 
emergency.61 To justify this proposal, the opposition stressed the weak implementation of 
the existing state programs and the need for the government to prioritize the critical 
situation affecting the communities and re-direct its available resources to that end.62 The 
proposed resolution was discussed in the plenary of the assembly, but it was not 
supported by the party of government and, therefore, was not approved. The government 
legislative block basically argued that the executive was already taking measures to 
address the crisis; the declaration of emergency, then, was a politically motivated 
proposal of the opposition in the context of the electoral campaign.63 Regardless of the 
legislative outcome, the legislative debate shows that the provincial assembly was 
relatively attentive to the issue and, to some extent it fulfilled its role of overseeing the 
government‟s policy on the matter. 
 
                                               
58 The other three legislators each belonged to different opposition parties. 
59 Resolution proposals 1051/07 and 1052/07 submitted by legislator María Elena Vargas (PJ) 
60 See the legislative record of the Chaco‟s House of Representatives (Versión Taquigráfica de las Sesiones 
de la Cámara de Diputados  2007 (c), 61) 
61 Resolution proposal 1049/07 also submitted by María Elena Vargas (PJ) 
62 See statement of legislator Vargas (Versión Taquigráfica de las Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados  
2007 (a), 72-79) 
63  As mentioned earlier, in September 2007, Chaco was holding legislative and gubernatorial elections. 
See statements of legislators Lizárraga, Siri and Aguero (Versión Taquigráfica de las Sesiones de la 
Cámara de Diputados  2007 (b), 103-118). 
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In relation to the role of the executive branch of government, there were important 
differences regarding the way the two involved provincial administrations (the 
administrations of Governor Nikish –UCR- and Governor Capitanich –PJ-) addressed and 
dealt with the health and food crisis that affected the indigenous communities in El 
Impenetrable. However, the fact that the issue continued to be judicialized despite of the 
change of government (and the change of policies) shows that the role and the policy 
preferences of the executive were not a critical factor in the judicialization of this dispute. 
As described above, the administration led by governor Nikish was not very accessible to 
the demands of the indigenous rights groups. Its initial response was to deny the 
existence of a health crisis in the region. Nevertheless, the Nikish administration did take 
some measures to address the situation, even though they were considered largely 
insufficient by the indigenous groups and its allies. The judicialization of the conflict 
began during this period. In its turn, the administration of governor Capitanich was much 
more accessible to the indigenous groups. As it was also explained above, the new 
government immediately took measures to address the crisis affecting the indigenous 
communities in El Impenetrable. In this context, one would have expected the process of 
judicialization to stop or, at least, that the judiciary would have become a far less relevant 
venue for the unfolding of the policy process and negotiations. However, despite of the 
new measures, the situation in the communities did not improve significantly, and hence, 
the process of judicialization continued. In sum, there were clear differences in the way 
these administrations dealt with the health and food crisis, even though both 
administrations took some type of policy measures to address the situation. Nevertheless, 
the relevant point for our analysis is that the judicialization of the public policy towards 
the indigenous communities in the Chaco continued, despite of the change of government 
and the differences between the two administrations. 
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In contrast to the role of the legislature or the executive, issues of state capacity 
were a major factor affecting the process of judicialization of this policy. As explained 
before, the main social and political demands regarding the health and food crisis 
affecting the indigenous communities were not related to the enactment of new policies 
or laws but rather to the effective implementation of existing policy goals and mandates. 
In this context, several reports from institutions and individuals working in the field 
clearly described and illustrated how the lack of policy implementation was mainly 
related to different deficiencies of the state apparatus. Poor infrastructure of the public 
health system and lack of trained human resources to provide health care to indigenous 
communities, were some of the main weaknesses often mentioned by these different 
actors.  See, for instance, the following extracts from the report prepared by the Pan 
American Health Organization mission (2008, 3-5) about the situation of the public 
health care system serving El impenetrable (own translation from Spanish): 
 
…The provincial government does not have enough professionals to extend these 
measures [the health emergency measures taken by the new administration of 
Governor Capitanich] to other towns of El Impenetrable. Therefore, the 
emergency measures have been focalized in only one town… 
…[in relation to human resources] at the first level of the health care system, 
there are only 16 interns…each one receive a salary of $365 [around 100 US 
dollars at that time] to attend 700 scattered families... 
...there is no infrastructure in the health sector or in social services to distribute 
food in the area. In Castelli, for instance, there is only one warehouse to store 
food… 
…the infrastructure deficit in the health sector is very important at all levels….It 
is necessary to build a new hospital in Castelli to provide service to the 
population living in El Impenetrable…”64 
                                               
64 In relation to the existing Hospital in Castelli, see the media interviews with Rolando Núñez, director of 
Centro Mandela (own translation from Spanish):”…the sick aboriginal people do not want to go to the 
Castelli Hospital, because they know that once they get in that place, they die…the network of health care 
centers of El Impenetrable as well as the Castelli hospital are not useful any more…the Castelli is not a 
hospital, it is just a shell…”  (Clarín, “La Corte insatisfecha”, November 7, 2007).  “…That hospital 
[Hospital Castelli]would not be functioning if were subject to inspections using the basic biosafety 
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Another problem often mentioned by different actors was the weak coordination 
between different agencies and programs of the national and provincial governments.  
For instance, the public statement made by ENDEPA (the agency of the Catholic Church 
for indigenous issues) specifically mentioned this issue (own translation from Spanish):  
…[the indigenous people]are not treated on time and properly by the public 
health system; social aid, health care and food programs only partially reach 
them, and the different state agencies work isolate from each other and many time 
their relations are characterized by struggle and competition…65  
The need to improve coordination and implementation was also a main problem 
stressed during the legislative debate to declare the health and social emergency. See for 
instance, the following brief extract from the statement made by legislator Vargas, the 
main speaker of the Peronist legislative block on this matter (own translation from 
Spanish):  
…The province of Chaco has many programs targeting population in situations of 
emergency…[but] they are badly articulated and badly implemented. ..Resources 
are being wasted and people is dying for lack of health care and chronic diseases 
like ..malnutrition… tuberculosis…”(Versión Taquigráfica de las Sesiones de la 
Cámara de Diputados  2007 (a), 76).  
 
In short, the weaknesses of the provincial state apparatus to intervene in the area, 
plus the fragmentation of the state efforts and the lack of proper coordination, severely 
limited the potential impact of any policy aiming to address the urgent needs of the 
indigenous communities of El Impenetrable. Moreover, this inability of the state to 
                                                                                                                                            
standards that are applied to any health center…it is located over a huge cesspool, it does not have an 
autoclave, it does not have a pyrolytic oven [for hazardous waste treatment]…the tisiology center is not 
working –even though this area has the highest concentration of population with tuberculosis in Argentina-
…,  the neonatology center does not function either,  they incorporated  some  modern technical equipment 
but they do not have trained people to use them...” (Argentina Indymedia, 
http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2007/09/545911.php, September 8, 2007). 
65Cited by Diario Norte (“La Pastoral Aborigen responsabiliza al gobierno por la situación indígena”, 
August 8, 2007). 
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effectively intervene in the field was relatively autonomous from the changes in the 
policy preferences of the politicians in charge of the executive. As explained before, the 
administration of Governor Capitanich (PJ) was much more open and active regarding 
the crisis than the previous administration of Governor Nikish (UCR). However, the 
Capitanich administration was also unable to improve significantly the situation in the 
field.  
 
In sum, a deficient state apparatus, with limited capability to fulfill existing policy 
mandates, led to a process of judicialization of the health and food crisis affecting the 
indigenous communities of El Impenetrable, even in a political context where the 
legislature and the executive were relatively attentive to the issue. 
 
 
TREATMENT AND MEDICINES FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH  HIV- AIDS 
During the 1990s, several laws and regulations were passed at the federal level, 
establishing a national policy in relation to HIV/AIDS. The cornerstone of this policy was 
the law 23.798/90 approved with broad political support by the Argentine congress. This 
norm declares “the fight against [AIDS] of national interest”, which includes the 
diagnosis and treatment of the illness, its prevention as well those measures aiming to 
avoid the spreading of the disease (article 1). Furthermore, the law establishes the 
national ministry of health as the authority in charge of its application in the whole 
territory of Argentina (article 3). The national government at the time –the administration 
of President Menem- relatively supported the new legislation.66 The government was 
                                               
66At that time, the party of the executive also controlled the national congress. The Peronist party held 
around 60% of the Senate seats and 49% of the seats in the House of Representatives ( in the House, the 
Peronist party easily reached legislative majorities with the votes of some of the provincial parties or 
smaller national parties). 
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reluctant to take measures in relation to HIV/AIDS prevention, particularly in relation to 
the promotion of the use of condoms (See Bianco et al. 2003, 45-46), but it took 
measures to implement the legislation approved by congress in general. In 1992, the 
government –through the ministry of health- created the National Program against The 
Human Retrovirus and AIDS (Resolution 18/92), which was in charge, among other 
tasks, of the purchase and provision of the medicines and drugs needed for HIV/AIDS 
treatments.67  In 1994, the ministry of health established by Resolution 169/94 the 
“Vademecum to treat HIV/AIDS patients”, which listed the medicines to be provided. 
These medicines and treatments were supplied free of charge to those people who did not 
have social security or means to afford private medical coverage. 68 
By the middle of the 1990s, the development of new drugs and medicines for 
HIV/AIDs had profound implications for the public policy on this matter. In the XIth 
International AIDS Conference held in Vancouver (July 1996), researchers presented the 
positive results of a therapy based on the combined use of antiretroviral medicines and 
protease inhibitors. The auspicious results of the tri-therapy (also known as the AIDS 
cocktail) were widely and quickly spread among the Argentine community involved with 
HIV/AIDS issues. By the end of 1996, ANMAT, the state agency responsible of 
monitoring the quality of medical products, had authorized the use of the new drugs in 
Argentina, which were later added to the vademecum to treat HIV/AIDS. However, the 
                                               
67 The Program carried out several others tasks, including research, prevention and information. For a more 
detailed analysis of the program and its evolution see Fairstein and Zimerman (2005). 
68 At this point, it is worth to give the reader some basic information about how healthcare is organized in 
Argentina. The Argentine healthcare system is constituted by three subsectors: social security, private 
medicine and the public health sector. The social security sector basically covers employees and their 
families through institutions managed by each trade union. The private sector encompassed individual 
practitioners, hospitals, clinics and varied forms of private medical insurance. The public sector is made up 
of public hospitals (under provincial and municipal authority). In principle, this sector offers free health 
services to the whole population, but in fact, it mainly serves the poorest sectors of argentine society, those 
who do not have social security medical coverage and cannot afford private health services. For a brief but 
more detailed description of the Argentine health care system, see Fairstein and Zimerman (2005). 
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costs of the try-therapy were substantially higher.69 Moreover, their good results triggered 
an increase in the number people seeking treatment. In this context, NGOs and groups of 
people living with HIV/AIDS alerted that the available public budget was insufficient to 
meet the higher costs and lobbied the national government and congress to add more 
funds for HIV/AIDS (Bianco et al. 1999, 30-31). However, their efforts were 
unsuccessful and the budget, at that time, was not increased. 
Meanwhile, the state‟ system of distribution and provision of medicines suffered 
multiple problems. The National Program Against AIDS envisaged a mechanism of 
distribution through the health authorities of the different provinces and the city of 
Buenos Aires. However, there were serious problems of coordination and communication 
between the different health authorities. In parallel, the national health minister began 
drawing up lists of the people who could receive the new drugs. The medicines had to be 
pick up at the ministry‟s headquarters located in the city of Buenos Aires. This 
mechanism created a huge tension and competition among people living with HIV/AIDS 
to be included in those lists. It clearly favored those living in the Buenos Aires region to 
the detriment of the rest of the country, and especially those who were well connected or 
informed (Bianco et al. 2003, 46). Furthermore, shortcomings or delays in the provision 
of medicines became very usual due to lack of sufficient stock as well as for diverse 
problems in the state procedures to purchase the medicines or other operational problems. 
In this context, the protests of NGOs and people living with HIV/AIDS increased. 
By the end of 1996, eight NGOs belonging to the Network of NGOs working on 
HIV AIDS (“Encuentro de ONGs con Trabajo en VIH/SIDA”) submitted a joint amparo 
against the national ministry of health at a federal district court ("Asociación 
Benghalensis y otros c/Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social -Estado Nacional s/amparo 
                                               
69 According to various sources, the cost of the treatment was approximately between U$1000 to U$1200 a 
month (see, for example, La Nación, “El SIDA creció más entre mujeres y niños”, November 30, 1996). 
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ley 16.986 ").70 The plaintiffs basically asked the judge to order the national government 
to provide medical treatment and medicines to people living with HIV/AID registered at 
hospitals and other health entities, in accordance to law 23.798 and several general 
constitutional provisions. Furthermore, as a provisional remedy, they asked the court to 
order the national government to deliver the medicines that had been required by 
provincial and municipal health programs and for individuals. Few days later, the federal 
district court granted the provisional order after confirming the lack of medicines in some 
public hospitals.71  
The national government, then, took measures aiming to improve the provision of 
the medicines and treatment for HIV/AIDS. By the middle of 1997, the government 
increased the HIV/AIDS budget for that year from $19 millions of pesos to $54.7. For the 
year 1998, the budget was further increased to 77.06 millions.72 The government also 
changed the system of purchase and distribution of the medication for HIV/AIDS. By 
resolution 346/97, the ministry of health de-centralized the distribution of medicines 
based on the demand reported by the public hospitals and other entities where treatments 
were provided. The purpose was to optimize the provision of medication, avoiding the 
need of the patients to go to the national ministry to get their drugs.73 Furthermore, the 
ministry signed agreements with provincial health ministries, committing itself to provide 
the drugs and medicines to treat the people living with HIV/AIDS reported by each 
province (Bianco et al. 1999, 13). 
                                               
70The amparo was submitted at the Juzgado Nacional de 1ra. Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo 
Federal  Nro. 3, judge Claudia Rodríguez Vidal. 
71 For instance, the court contacted the Garrahan Hospital to learn if they had enough medicines to treat 
AIDS. The Hospital reported that they were lacking stock of different drugs (report cited by Maurino et al. 
2005, 137). 
72 Data from the national ministry of health (cited by Bianco et al. 1999, 30). 
73 Later, the ministry passed resolution 763/98, which established that the medication could be also 
obtained at the ministry‟s headquarters, until the hospitals‟ requests were fulfilled. 
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The budget increase helped alleviating the shortage of medicines. However the 
delays in the distribution and other operational failures continued to affect the timely and 
regular provision of medicines. Hospitals did not receive the drugs on time, or in 
sufficient quantity to attend the demand, or received certain drugs and not others.74  A 
good indicator of the problems with the provision of HIV/AIDS medication at the 
hospitals was the increasing number of people trying to obtain their drugs directly from 
the national minister of health. Just as an example, in July 1998, 400 persons received 
their medication at the headquarters of the health minister; by December 1998, that 
number increased to 1600.75  
In this context, the process of judicialization continued. As evidence of the lack of 
provision of HIV/AIDS medicines, the plaintiffs offered the administrative claims 
submitted by AIDS patients to the health minister as well as reports from several public 
hospitals and from the health authorities of the province and the city of Buenos Aires. In 
turn, the government basically responded that it met its obligation under law 23.798, 
since it had implemented a national AIDS program. Furthermore, it argued that the 
program had delivered all the medicines that were required by the different sub-national 
jurisdictions.76 In February 1998, a little over a year after the beginning of the judicial 
procedures, the district court issued its final ruling. The judge considered proved that the 
medication was not being provided in a regular and timely manner, and ordered the 
ministry of health to comply with its obligations under law 23.798, to assist and treat 
AIDS patients registered in hospitals and health centers throughout the country. The 
government appealed, first to the Federal Court of Appeal, and then to the Supreme 
                                               
74  See, for instance, La Nación (“Enfermos de SIDA reclamaron drogas. Dialogo en el Ministerio”, 
February 10, 1998). 
75 Data elaborated by the national minister of health (cited by Bianco et al. 1999, 23). 
76 In other words, the national government‟s response suggested that if AIDS patients were not receiving 
the medicines, was because the sub-national jurisdictions were not making the proper requests. 
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Court. On June 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the judicial resolution of the district 
court, closing the case.77  
By the time the Supreme Court took its decision, a new political coalition – the 
Alianza- was in charge of the national executive.78 The new government did not go back 
on the measures taken by the previous Peronist‟s administration regarding the provision 
of HIV/AIDS medication.79 In fact, the Alianza‟s public budget was rather similar.80 
Furthermore, the new administration also carried out several organizational and 
operational changes aiming to improve the system of distribution and purchase of 
medicines (see Bianco 2006). However, problems and delays in the provision continued 
to happen, even though not in the scale of the years 1996-1997.81 And as result, AIDS 
patients regularly resorted to litigation to obtain their medicines from the state, either 
individually or in groups. In short, the pattern of problems in the provision of medicines / 
judicialization of demands continued and, arguably, it became a rather standard feature of 
HIV/AIDS policy in Argentina. 
 
                                               
77  For a more detailed overview of the legal proceedings, see Maurino et al. (2005, 135-147). 
78 The Alianza was a political coalition formed by the UCR and the FREPASO. Fernando de la Rua, the 
presidential candidate of the Alianza defeated the Peronist candidate, Antonio Duhalde, in the presidential 
election of 1999. De la Rua took office on December 1999. 
79There were, however, other HIV/AIDS issues in which there were important policy differences between 
the two administrations. For instance, the government of the Alianza placed  more emphasis on HIV/AIDS 
prevention than the Menen‟ administration (See Bianco et al. 2003, 45-49). 
80 The HIV/AIDS budget was almost $88 millions of pesos for the year 1999 (it was $77 millions in 1998, 
the last year of the Menen‟s administration), $69.7 million for the year 2000 and $65 million for the year 
2001.  Even though there was a budget reduction during the last 2 years of the Alianza‟s administration, 
these budgets were still far larger than the budgets assigned for HIV/AIDS before 1997 (data from the 
minister of economy cited byFairstein and Zimermam 2005, 38).    
81 For instance, during the year 2000, the health minister had to resort to parceling out the dosages of 
medication in smaller rations due to problems with the drug companies supplying certain medicines. 
Patients had to return every five days to pick up their medication which were often distributed in simple 
plastic bags and after long hours of waiting (See Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales -CELS 2001, 193). 
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Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization  
As in the previous case, the first issue to analyze is whether the social actors 
demanding the government to provide HIV/AIDS treatment and medicines were “losers” 
of the policy process. One can argue that they were policy losers because their demand 
for budget increase was not satisfied immediately, but after the conflict was judicialized. 
However, such assessment is too narrow and it does not pay attention to the development, 
as a whole, of the policy on public health coverage of HIV/AIDS. First, the political 
system has already approved a strong legal instrument, law 23.798, establishing relatively 
clear legal and policy mandates on the state towards the population living with 
HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the national government took some important legal and policy 
steps to fulfill those mandates. As mentioned earlier, by Resolution 18/92, the 
government created a national program against AIDS; by Resolution 169/94 it 
established the vademecun of medicines and drugs that should be supplied to HIV/AIDS 
patients, and when the new drugs and medicines appeared in the market in 1996 (the 
“cocktail”), they were also added to the vademecum. All these were concrete legal and 
policy measures taken by the government to provide treatment and medicines to people 
living with HIV/AIDS. Clearly, they also indicated that the social demand for public 
health coverage of HIV/AIDS was not a “loser” of the policymaking process at all; these 
actors were essentially demanding the implementation of policy mandates and goals 
already approved by the political venues. 
 
In relation to the political leverage of the associations and groups working on 
HIV/AIDS, these social actors were able to access and be part of the policy making 
processes and debate. In fact, civil society organizations were a main force helping to 
place the issue of HIV/AIDS in the policy agenda in Argentina. For instance, some NGOs 
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were active players in the making of important pieces of legislation such as law 
24.455/95 on social security coverage for AIDS patients and drug addicts and also law 
24.754/96 which requires private medical insurance to provide treatment and medicines 
to people living with HIV/AIDS (Bianco et al. 1999, 14-15). They also actively 
advocated for increases in public funds for HIV/AIDS. Indeed, when the budget was 
discussed at the Congress in 1996, NGOs and people living with HIV/AIDS took part in 
the meetings and expressed their concerns that the funding approved would be 
insufficient to meet the medication demands and the costs of the new therapy (Bianco et 
al. 1999, 30-31). Furthermore, the struggle of people living with HIV/AIDS to obtain 
their medicines received significant media coverage during 1996 and 1997. The main 
national newspapers had stories about the lack of medicines in public hospital, long 
waiting lists, interruption of treatments, etc, all of which arguably help raising public 
opinion attention and placing the issue on the public agenda.82 In sum, the social actors 
demanding health coverage for HIV/AIDS were not politically disadvantage. On the 
contrary, they were able to access and take part of the policy processes and debates. 
 
The national Congress, in its turn, played a relatively significant role in the policy 
processes and debates about healthcare and HIV/AIDS.  During the 1990s the national 
legislature passed, besides law 23.798/90, the two other main legal instruments already 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, which finished structuring the coverage of the 
Argentine health care system in relation to HIV/AIDS. Law 24.455/95 establishes that the 
social security system ought to provide medical, psychological and pharmaceutical 
treatment to people infected with AIDS. A year later, Congress approved law 24.754/96, 
                                               
82 See for instance, coverage of La Nación (“Prometen que no faltará una droga contra el HIV”, March 7, 
1997; “Continúa la escasez de remedies para el SIDA”, April 5; “Problemas con las drogas para el SIDA”, 
July 25; “Más de 6500 pacientes esperan su droga”, September 10, 1997).  
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which states that private medical insurances schemes are also obliged to provide 
treatment and medicine to people living with HIV/AIDS. Despite of strong opposition 
from the “obras sociales” belonging to the unions and from private health insurances, 
these laws were approved with broad political support. Both, the party of government -
the Peronist party, and the main opposition parties -the UCR and FREPASO, supported 
them.83 Furthermore, the Congress also took some oversight measures in relation to the 
government‟ actions and policies on HIV/AIDS. During 1996-1997 there were several 
resolutions approved in the Senate and in the House of Representatives related to the 
provision of the new drugs and funding for HIV/AIDS.84 In sum, all these indicate that 
the national Congress was not passive in relation to the healthcare coverage of  
HIV/AIDS, but rather attentive and involved in the policy developments and debates on 
this matter.  
 
In relation to the role of the executive, even though the Menem administration 
initially refused to increase the HIV/AIDS budget, the government was not opposed to 
the policy of providing treatment and medicines to people living with HIV/AIDS 
established by law 23.798/90.85 Two main reasons justify this assessment. First, before 
the conflict was judicialized, the government took important and concrete measures 
                                               
83 As another indicator of the broad political support, it is worth noting that in the case of law 24.754, the 
bill was presented by congresswomen Moreau (UCR) and co-sponsored by two Peronist legislators. 
84 Just as an example, on September  1996, the House of Representatives approved a resolution requesting 
the executive to approve the drug Nevipravina to treat HIV/AIDS (see the online database of the  Cámara 
de Diputados de la Nación Argentina, file 3390-D-96). This resolution was co-sponsored by legislators 
from the Peronist party and from the FREPASO. In the same session, the House also approved a resolution, 
proposed by legislators of the UCR, requesting the executive to inform about the delay in the provision of 
medicines free of charge to people with HIV/AIDS (see online database, Cámara de Diputados de la 
Nación Argentina, file 4510-D-96). 
85 It is worth stressing that we are referring specifically to the government positions about the policies 
established by the law 23.798 in relation to the provision of treatment and medicines. As explained earlier, 
the Menem administration had a more ambivalent attitude regarding HIV/AIDs prevention and information  
policies, and it was clearly opposed to the promotion of condoms (Bianco et al. 2003). 
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implementing law 23.798, such as the creation of the AIDS national program and the 
development of the vademecun of medicines to treat HIV/AIDS. Second, despite its 
initial rejection, the Menem government substantially increased the budget for 1997, and 
then for 1998. It also modified the system of distribution aiming to strength the provision 
of the medicine at the public hospitals where treatment was provided. If the policy 
preferences of the government had been clearly opposed to those of the law 23.798, it is 
difficult to understand these decisions to increase the budge and reform the mechanisms 
of distribution of medicines even before the district court issued its final judicial 
resolution. In short, HIV/AIDS issues might not had been a priority of the Menem 
administration health policies, but the government was not openly opposed to the policy 
of providing medicines and treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, and in fact, took 
measures to implement law 23.798. In this context, the initial rejection of the Menem 
administration to increase the HIV/AIDS budget during the second half of 1996, helped 
bringing this issue to the judiciary, but it cannot explain the continuous judicialization of 
this policy. 
 
The capability of the state apparatus, in contrast, was clearly a main factor 
negatively affecting the implementation of the HIV/AIDS policies and, hence, “feeding” 
the judicialization of the demands for medication. As explained above, despite of the 
budget increase, problems in the provision of drugs and treatments continued to happen. 
Weak communication and coordination between the national minister and the sub-
national health authorities was a common problem affecting the distribution of 
medicines.86  The following dialogue transcribed by the newspaper La Nación, between 
                                               
86 The public hospital system in Argentina was decentralized in the 1990s. Therefore, hospitals and health 
centers were now run by the provinces and the city of Buenos Aires, and not by the national ministry of 
health. 
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public officials and representatives of NGOs who were claiming for the lack of medicines 
in public hospitals, is very illustrative of the problems in the state mechanisms of 
distribution (own translation from Spanish):87  
 
Leppen (Director, Minister of Health): Give us the list with the name of the 
patients who have problems…  
Lorenzo Vargas (NGO): These are not isolated cases. There are no drugs in San 
Isidro, Escobar, in the Ramos Mejías Hospital and in several provinces… 
Leppen:  We deliver the drugs as we get the requirements from the health centers, 
and to be sure that the drugs reach the places they are supposed to, we are 
auditing the health regions… 
 Vargas: For the last two years you have given us the same answer, and in the 
hospitals, they say it is your fault… 
Bourgeols (Chief, Medicines Delivering Program, Minister of Health): But, we 
are delivering all the supplies we are being asked for… 
Vargas: Then, something is wrong in the monitoring system, because the figures 
you have do not reflect what we see. Someone must be taking the medicines that 
are missing… 
Interruptions or delays in the provision of the medication were also often related 
to problems in the state procedure to purchase the medication. Following, I quote a short 
paragraph of an interview with Dr. Pedro Cahn, Chief of Infectology at the Fernandez 
Hospital and one of the most well known and respected medical experts on HIV/AIDS in 
Argentina, who vividly explained some of the bureaucratic problems facing the 
implementation of HIV/AIDS policies in Argentina (interview published by La Nación, 
own translation from Spanish): 88 
 
Journalist: What is true about the complaints that there is a lack of medicines for 
the treatment? A problem that Minister [of Health] Mazza denies 
Dr. Cahn: Well, look, historically, always there was a lack of enough medicines. 
Sometimes, because there was no budget, other times, like now, because the 
minister of health buys the medicines  with the same procedures and sensitivity 
they buy pads of paper; they call for a bid to buy paper, and the  companies  A 
                                               
87 La Nación (“Enfermos de SIDA reclamaron drogas. Dialogo en el Ministerio”, February 10, 1998). 
88 La Nación (“Si hay plata para un aeropuerto en Anillaco, tiene que haber para el SIDA”, September 28, 
1997). 
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and B take part of the bid, and when A wins, B challenges the bid. Then, the 
procedure is suspended, an auditor‟s office gets involved, and after 3 months, 
someone finally says that company A was right…. When this happens with paper 
pads, one can manage the situation somehow. But when this happens with the 
medicines, the virus does not stop growing…So, first, [the state] does not work 
with a critical stock, and second, the patients have to go through an enormous 
amount of bureaucratic procedures [to get the medicines]... 
 
Other times, interruptions or delays were due to the problems with the private 
suppliers of medicines. A repeated situation was that pharmaceutical companies 
responsible for supplying the government with AIDS drugs failed to meet their 
contractual obligations, causing interruptions in the provision of the medication to the 
patients, which also outlined the lack of proper state control over these companies.89 
In short, there was a deficient state apparatus which was ill prepared to effectively 
implement the policy mandates and goals established by the HIV/AIDS legislation. 
Furthermore, the fact that delays and interruptions in the provision of medication 
continued during the administration of de La Rua (Alianza) outlines that the problems in 
the implementation of the policy were mainly related to problems of state capability 
rather than to the policy preferences of those in charge of the executive branch of 
government. 
 
A VACCINE FOR THE “MAL DEL RASTROJO” 
The Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever (AHF), locally known as “mal de los 
rastrojos”, is an infectious disease that affects mainly agricultural workers and rural 
                                               
89 See, for instance, the report on La Nación about the lack of AZT due to problems with the drug company 
(“Prometen que no faltará una droga contra el HIV”, March 7, 1997). See also Bianco et al (1999, 24) in 
relation to similar problems in the  provision of  Ritonavir  during 1998. Also in 2000, the government 
resorted to parceling the dosages due to problems in the supply by the drugs companies (Centro de Estudios 
Legales y Sociales -CELS 2001, 193). 
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populations in an endemic central region of Argentina.90  The development of the disease 
is very fast and acute (1-2 weeks) and without proper treatment, its case-fatality ratio is 
very high (15-30%). Between 1958 (when it was first identified) and the beginning of the 
1990s (when the vaccination campaigns began), there were over 20.000 reported cases of 
AHF. According to the experts, the most efficacious preventive measure is the 
application of a vaccine called Candid 1 (Maiztegui et al. 1998). This case is the story of 
the policy process that led to the local production of that vaccine in Argentina. 
In 1978, with the support of UNDP and the PAHO, the Argentine government (at 
that time under a military dictatorship) and the USAMRIID (Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases) began a research project aiming to produce a vaccine 
against AHF.91 The research results were successful and by 1990 the vaccine, Candid 1, 
was ready. Through a contract with the USA State Department, the Argentine 
government (at that time, already under the administration of a democratically elected 
president, Carlos Menem) acquired 340.000 doses of the vaccine produced from the Salk 
Institute, and by 1991, it began the first vaccination campaigns among the risk 
population. 
The production of Candid 1, however, was problematic. It was considered an 
“orphan vaccine” and hence of little commercial value for the private pharmaceutical 
industry.92 In the 1980s, then, Argentina began the slow construction of a high security 
laboratory at the National Institute of Research on Hemorrhagic Virus (Instituto Nacional 
de Estudios sobre Virosis Hemorragicas) - INEVH, with the purpose of producing the 
                                               
90 The qualification of “Argentine” to this type of fever is due to the fact that the disease only occurred in 
this country. Other countries and geographical areas are affected by similar hemorrhagic fevers but they are 
caused by different virus. 
91 For a brief overview of the history of the research efforts to produce a vaccine against AHF see the web 
site of  INEVH (http://www.fundacionmaiztegui.org.ar/1024x768/Marcos/INEVH/Marcos/Total.htm.)  
92 The term “orphan vaccines” refers to vaccines in which the costs of production surpass the potential 
sales, and therefore the private industry is generally not interested in producing them. 
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vaccine. The project was promoted by a well known Argentine scientist, Dr. Julio 
Maiztegui, with a strong support of the research community and local actors from the 
communities affected by the disease.93 However, the project was advancing extremely 
slow and without enough public financial support. As one would expect, after the 
successful creation of Candid 1 and the first vaccination campaigns, the demands to 
produce the vaccine in Argentina grew. In 1991, the national Senate and the House of 
Representative approved several declarations and resolutions requiring the executive 
branch of government to provide funds for the construction of the laboratory and for the 
production of the vaccine.  In spite of these efforts, however, the pace of the project did 
not change substantially.  
By 1996, the public health situation around AHF worsens. There were only 
80.000 vaccines left, from the stock acquired in 1991, to attend a potentially risk 
population of approximately 3.5 million people. That year, then, the vaccination 
campaigns against AHF were cancelled in order to save the remaining stock for 
emergency situations. Some national newspaper covered the story, which was an 
important development since the issue had been absent in the national media. 
Furthermore, that same year, an outbreak of Hantavirus (a deadly infectious disease) in 
the southern part of Argentina generated a lot media coverage, which also helped raising 
some public attention about the health risks posed by infectious diseases in general, but 
especially AHF.94 Congress also began paying some attention to the issue again. Several 
                                               
93 At the beginning of the 1980s, farmer organizations, local business and other local groups formed an 
association to support the construction of the laboratory and more generally the work of Dr. Maiztegui and 
his group of researchers. Later, during the 1990s, they helped creating the Foundation Dr. Julio Maiztegui 
for Regional Scientific and Technological Research (Fundación Dr. Julio Maiztegui para el Desarrollo 
Científico y Tecnológico Regional). The construction of the laboratory and the production of the vaccine 
Candid 1 were two of the main objectives of the creation of the Foundation (see website of Fundación 
Maiztegui,  http://www.fundacionmaiztegui.org.ar/800x600/Marcos/Total.htm) . 
94 Due to the Hantavirus outbreak, the director of INEVH, Delia Enria, as well as other researchers, was 
interview many times during those months. They took full advantage of that media exposition to stress the 
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resolutions were approved in the House of Representative and the Senate, with broad 
political support, asking the national government to inform about the advances in the 
construction of the laboratory and to support the local production of the vaccine. In that 
context, the national Minister of Health announced a budget increase for AHF for the 
year 1997.   
Meanwhile, the CELS, a well known Argentine NGO specialized on human rights 
litigation, become involved in the AHF vaccine issue. Triggered by the media reports 
about the cancellation of the vaccination campaigns, the CELS contacted researchers at 
the INEVH and gathered information about the lack of advances in the local production 
of Candid 1.95 A main piece of evidence was a report prepared by the Director of the 
INEVH, Delia Enria, which stated that there had been no public funding available for 
equipment and for the construction of the laboratory during the last two previous years.96 
By the end of 1996, CELS filed a “recurso de amparo” against the national government 
at a federal district court ("Viceconte, Mariela Cecilia c/Estado Nacional -Ministerio de 
Salud y Acción Social- s/ amparo ley 16.968").97 The plaintiff basically asked the court to 
order the national government to take urgent measures to complete the production of the 
vaccine Candid 1 and to provide it to the population under risk. The district court rejected 
the claim arguing that the government had already taken policy measures to that end, 
                                                                                                                                            
risks to public health posed by AHF and the problems they were facing to combat it (interview with Victor 
Abramovich, Buenos Aires, August 12, 2008).  
95 At that time, CELS was analyzing the possibility of bringing a collective legal claim based on the 
constitutional right to health. It was not clear that such a right was included in article 43 of the Argentinean 
constitution reformed in 1994, and CELS‟s attorneys were looking for cases that allow for making such a 
claim before a court of law. When they learnt from the newspapers about the cancellation of the vaccine 
campaign against AHF, CELS got in contact with the actors involved in this policy issue. For CELS, then, 
this was the case of strategic litigation that they were looking for to advance the judicial recognition of the 
right to health (interview with Victor Abramovich, Buenos Aires, August 12, 2008). 
96 This report is later cited in the sentence of the court of appeals on Vicenconte c/ Estado Nacional (see 
item XV of the resolution of June 2, 1998).  
97 Mariela Viceconte was a student at the law clinic run by CELS and the School of Law of the University 
of Buenos Aires, and a resident of Azul, a city which was located in the AHF endemic area (Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales 2008, 69).  
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namely the budget increase. Indeed, during the judicial procedure the health minister 
confirmed that funds had been assigned to INEVH in the 1997 national budget to finish 
the construction of the laboratory. Nevertheless, CELS and the national Ombudsman 
(who, by that time, was also a legal party in the judicial case) appealed the resolution to a 
higher court. 
In June 1998, after assessing the development of the project to produce the 
vaccine, a federal court of appeals (Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo Federal, sala IV) revoked the decision of the district court. The court of 
appeals affirmed that the Argentine government had clearly assumed a legal commitment 
to produce the vaccine against AHF, but that obligation was not being fulfilled. The 
court‟s resolution described that 80% of the production technology and quality control 
processes needed to produce the vaccine were finished, but the laboratory and technical 
equipment were far from ready, regardless of the budget increased (see item XIII of the 
court‟s resolution). The court of appeals, then, concluded by ordering the government to 
produce the vaccine according to a schedule prepared by the INEVH. 
A year and a half later, in July 2000, the schedule approved by the court was 
overdue and the vaccine was still not ready. The plaintiff, then, requested a district court 
to enforce the court of appeal‟s resolution.98 At that point, there was a new administration 
in charge of the national executive. The Alianza, an electoral coalition between the UCR 
and FREPASO, had defeated the Peronist party in the presidential election of 1999. The 
new president, Antonio de La Rua, had taken office in December of 1999. In its response 
to the plaintiff‟s claim, the new government stated that the vaccine could not be produced 
according to the schedule. The judge, then, applied a fine to the minister of health for the 
                                               
98 For a brief but detailed legal overview of the stage of judicial enforcement of the court of appeals‟ 
resolution (ejecución de sentencia, in Spanish) see Maurino et al. (2005, 177-122). 
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lack of compliance with the court‟s resolution.99 The government appealed and the case 
went back to the court of appeals. 
In 2001, the court of appeals convened to a public hearing with the different states 
agencies involved in the process with the purpose of identifying the obstacles hindering 
the production of the vaccine. In the hearing, there were strong disagreements between 
the different agencies about the steps needed to finish the production of the vaccine 
(Maurino et al. 2005,117; also Cerro 2007). The court of appeal, then, convoked the 
Minister of Health Hector Lombardo, in person, to clarify the situation. Lombardo was 
very skeptical about the effectiveness of the vaccine and did not entirely support the 
project.100 Nevertheless, the minister presented a new schedule for the production of the 
vaccine, which was approved by the court of appeals. This time, the court also designed a 
scheme to monitor the implementation of the judicial resolution: the national ombudsman 
was appointed to follow up and to inform about the measures taken by the government; 
the SIGEN (Sindicatura General de la Nación) was ordered to control the budget 
execution; and an Advisory Commission was appointed to assess the technical results of 
the measures taken by the government. Furthermore, the court of appeals began assuming 
a very strong role monitoring the implementation of the judicial resolution, holding 
hearings with the involved parties to follow up the process.  
During 2001-2002, the economic and institutional crisis affecting Argentina also 
impacted on the development of the project. Funds were assigned but were not received 
on time by the Institute.101 In spite of all that, in September 2002, the construction works 
                                               
99 The judge also resolved that the funds assigned in the 2001 national budget for the production of the 
vaccine were restricted (indisponibles), meaning that those funds could only be used to that end. 
100 Interview with Delia Enria (October 1, 2008). See also the comments made in the local media by the 
president of Fundación Maiztegui, Ildefonso Olego (Semanario Colon Doce, “Fiebre Hemorrágica 
Argentina”, August 9, 2002). 
101For instance, the President of Fundación Maiztegui stated in an interview for a local newspaper that the 
INEVH was receiving its assigned funds with a 3-4 months delay, and this was making the functioning of 
the research institute almost impossible (Semanario Colón Doce, “Fiebre Hemorrágica”, August 9, 2002). 
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were over and the laboratory was ready. At that point, a new administration was in charge 
of the executive branch of government. The new president, Eduardo Duhalde and his 
minister of health, Ginés González Garcia, both attended the opening of the laboratory, 
and the government granted a special fund for the production of the vaccine. However, 
production could not begin yet. The Argentine version of Candid 1 had still not been 
authorized by the quality control agencies belonging to the minister of health. Only in 
2003, the vaccine was authorized, and shortly after, the fist stock of 40.000 vaccines 
produced in Argentina was ready.102  
The next stage in the process was the clinic trial and the final validation of the 
vaccine. Only then, the vaccine could be applied to the population. By that time, there 
was a new government in charge of the executive, Nestor Kichner from the Peronist 
party, who had won the presidential election in May 2003.  In August 2005, INAVH 
finally received the authorization to proceed with the clinic trial. 946 volunteers, residents 
from rural communities of the area affected by AHF, received the vaccine. By the middle 
of 2006 the results were known and were positives, and in August of that year, the 
ANMAT approved and registered the vaccine Candid 1.103  
During all this time, the court of appeals was closely following up this process. 
Between 2001 and 2006, the court held at least two public hearings a year to monitor the 
development of the project to produce the vaccine. In the last hearing, in September 
2006, the court was formally informed that Candid1 has been approved and, in 2007, the 
vaccine began to be applied to the population in the AHF endemic area.104 More than 15 
                                               
102 Website of Fundación Maiztegui  (http://www.fundacionmaiztegui.org.ar/800x600/Marcos/Total.htm) 
103 In contrast to the lack of national media attention to the AHF policy issue, these advances in the local 
process to produce the vaccine did received coverage from the national print media (see La Nación, 
“Avance en el país contra el mal de los rastrojos ”, June 24, 2006; Página 12, “Vacuna”, September 15, 
2006; Clarin, “La vacuna contra el mal de los rastrojos ya se puede elaborar en el país”, September 29, 
2006; La Nación, “Producirán en el país la vacuna contra el mal de los rastrojos”,  October 10, 2006). 
104 Página 12, “El campo ya tiene su vacuna”, March 7, 2007. 
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years after taken the policy decision, the Argentine state was finally able to locally 
produce the vaccine against the “mal de los rastrojos”. 
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization  
Despite the long time it passed before achieving a successful ending, the social 
and political demand to produce the vaccine in Argentina can hardly be considered as a 
“loser” of the policy process.  In the 1990s, the Menem government clearly undertook the 
policy commitment to locally produce the vaccine and assigned a budget to that end.105 
Moreover, no one of the subsequent national administrations openly reviewed that 
decision, nor denied the existence of those legal and policy commitments to address the 
FHA. In this context, the judicialization of the conflict about the production of the FHA 
vaccine clearly dealt with the implementation of policy goals and measures that were 
already taken through the policy making processes. 
 
In relation to the social actors demanding the local production of the vaccine, they 
were able to access the policy process but did not have much political leverage to 
influence the policy debate. The core of the social demand for the vaccine was embodied 
by members of the scientific community, many of whom worked in scientific agencies 
and institutions belonging to the state. Their professional prestige and position within the 
state apparatus facilitated individual access to policy makers, but at the same time their 
                                               
105 In fact, that is the argument of the court of appeals. In its resolution, the court stressed that the 
government had already assumed a legal commitment to produce the vaccine (own translation from 
Spanish):“…that clearly emerges from the proceedings that the national state…has taken the commitment 
to produce the vaccine against the Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever…the issue to decide, then,  is whether the 
defendant has accurately  fulfilled its duties or, on the contrary, it has committed omissions harmful to the 
right to health of the population potentially affected by the above mentioned illness…” ( item XII, sentence 
of the court of appeals on "Viceconte, Mariela Cecilia c/Estado Nacional -Ministerio de Salud y Acción 
Social- s/ amparo ley 16.968"). 
 110 
ability to openly advocate for this issue, and especially to openly criticize the government 
was rather limited.106 Moreover, they did not have the institutional and organizational 
capability to reach and mobilize broader audiences around AHF issues beyond the local 
communities in the endemic area. The disease mainly affected rural populations, and it 
was not an issue that raised the attention of the national media and, hence, of the public 
opinion at large.107 At the local level, farmer associations and other local groups did play 
an important role supporting scientific and medical activities around AHF issues, which 
led to the creation of Foundation Maiztegui.108 The foundation carried out many 
advocacy actions such as holding meetings with members of congress, sending letters to 
policy makers, etc.109 However, there was not a widespread and sustained social 
mobilization at the local level or other type of massive collective actions aiming to 
influence the policy about the AHF vaccine.110 In sum, the affected rural population was 
not organized and mobilized around the demand for the  production of the vaccine against 
FHA, the involved scientific community did not had the institutional resources to sustain 
advocacy efforts, and the matter was largely unknown for the broader public opinion. 
 
In spite of the lack of political leverage of the social demand for the local 
production of the vaccine, the national Congress was relatively attentive to the issue. 
                                               
106 Interview with Victor Abramovich (August 12, 2008) and Delia Enria (October 1, 2008). 
107 An exception to the lack of media attention was the outbreak of Hantavirus in 1996. This issue also 
raised media and public attention to the risks posed by AHF. See above, footnote 94. 
108 Federación Agraria Argentina, Federación Argentina de Cooperativas Agrarias, Asociación de 
Cooperativas Argentinas, Cámara de Comercio de Pergamino were some of the associations involved in the 
creation of Foundation Maiztegui  (see website of Fundación Dr. Julio Maiztegui para el Desarrollo 
Científico y Tecnológico Regional).  
109 Phone interview with Delia Enria (October 1, 2008). 
110 A fact that might help explaining the lack of massive collective action is that since 1991, when the 
vaccination campaigns began, the number of people affected by the disease decreased significantly from a 
historical average of 700 cases a year to only 150-200. Nevertheless, when fatal cases were known, it 
triggered social demands for the vaccine among the local communities (see, for instance, Página 12 “El mal 
de los rastrojos ya crea terror por la falta de vacunas”, July 4, 2002). However, these protests were rather 
episodic and did not constitute a sustained effort of massive social mobilization. 
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Between 1991 and 1999, there were over 10 resolutions and declarations approved by the 
House of Representatives and/or the Senate requiring the executive branch of government 
to provide funds for the construction of the laboratory, requesting information about the 
delays, etc.  Congress was particularly active during the years 1991 and 1992, when the 
government at the time was taking the decision of producing the vaccine in Argentina.111 
Moreover, the support for the local production of the vaccine crossed party lines. The 
resolutions were generally approved with broad political support, and most of them were 
co-sponsored by legislators from the party of government and parties of the opposition. 
However, despite of the political consensus around the policy of locally producing the 
vaccine, the issue did not occupy a place of relevance in the legislative agenda. A good 
example of this was the trajectory of a bill approved by the House of Representative on 
November 1997, declaring of national interest the production of the vaccine and 
assigning funds to that end. The bill was co-sponsored by legislators from the Peronist 
party and opposition parties, and was passed by the House with broad political support.112 
However, it lapsed in the Senate‟s commissions two years later without even being 
treated. The fate of this bill is an indicator that although congress was relatively attentive 
and supportive, the issue was clearly not a legislative priority.  
                                               
111 On July 3, 1991, the House of Representative passed a declaration requiring the national executive to 
complete the construction of the laboratory needed to produce the vaccine. This declaration was co-
sponsored by legislators from the Peronist party and several opposition parties (see the online database of 
the Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina, files 4957-D-90 and 5989-D-90). On August 15, 1991, 
the House approved a new declaration requesting the executive to provide funds to build the laboratory. 
The declaration was co-sponsored by legislators from the Peronist party and the UCR (file 2255-D-91) 
Similarly, on May 23, 1991, the Senate approved a resolution requiring the executive to provide funds to 
produce the vaccine Candid 1. That declaration was sponsored by the Peronist legislators from the province 
of Santa Fe, one of the provinces most affected by the disease (see the online database of the Honorable 
Senado de la Nación Argentina, file 1341-S-90). During that same year, the Senate also approved two other 
resolutions requesting the government to inform about the measures taken in relation to AHF (see files 
1133-S-90 and 1208-S-90, and file 0119-S-91). 
112 There were two bills proposed in the House. One was authored by Estevez Boero, a socialist legislator 
from the province of Santa Fe, and co-sponsored by several deputies of the opposition parties. The second 
bill was co-sponsored by a group of legislators of the Peronist party. Both bills were aggregated and treated 




In relation to the role of the executive, the successive national governments 
involved in this dispute, were somehow supportive or at least were not openly opposed to 
the policy of producing the vaccine in Argentina. It is worth remembering that it took 
more than 15 years to produce the vaccine since Menem‟s government decision to assign 
a specific budget to that end.  During that time, four different national administrations 
passed.113 All of them took some measures or steps –although insufficient and/or 
inadequate- towards the goal of locally producing the vaccine against FHA. Moreover, all 
of them assigned funds from the national budget to continue the project.  Only during the 
period of Minister of Health Hector Lombardi (1999-2001), the national government 
openly raised doubts about the convenience of producing the vaccine Candid.  But even 
in this case, the government did not modify the existing policy on the matter. 
 
In contrast, problems and deficiencies at the level of the state apparatus strongly 
affected the implementation of the policy towards the AHF vaccine. The construction of 
the high security lab and validation and production of the vaccine were very complex 
technical and operational tasks, and as the evidence indicates, the state apparatus and 
procedures were not always well suited to deal with this type of project.114  For instance, 
in relation to budgetary issues, funds were often formally assigned but were not 
transferred to the INEVH on time, or the funds were assigned to be spent on certain 
specific items but not on others that were needed for that particular stage of the 
                                               
113 Of course, this number does not take into account the institutional crisis of 2001, with four presidents in 
two weeks. 
114 Interviews with Victor Abramovich (August 12, 2008) and Delia Enria (October 1, 2008). It is 
interesting to note the similarities between some of the comments and critiques about how state procedures 
affected the production of the vaccine to those formulated in the case of the state provision of medication 
for HIV/AIDs. For instance, there was a shared critical assessment of the state‟s procedures to purchase 
goods and supplies and how many times they negatively impact on the implementation of policies dealing 
with public health issues. 
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production process, etc.115 This type of situations caused delays and affected the 
development of the project.  For instance, in a report submitted by INEVH to the court 
explaining the delays in the production of the vaccines (September 2000), the institute 
informed that the construction works for the laboratory were finished and that the next 
stage in the production of the vaccine required the appointment of new personnel and the 
acquisition of certain supplies.116 The INEVH‟s report stated that the institute had already 
required this to the minister of health, but it had not received anything yet (report cited by 
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales 2001, 202).  However, at the same time, the 
minister of economy informed to the court that the budgets assigned for the production of 
the vaccine during the previous years had been invariably sub-executed ( Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales 2001, 202). In short, while the executing agency was 
claiming that did not receive the resources to carry out the tasks needed for that stage of 
the project,  the minister of economy was saying that the funds assigned for the 
production of the vaccine had not been entirely used. Arguably, this suggests that the 
delays were not due to lack of funds, but rather to operational problems in the functioning 
of the state apparatus.117  
Similarly, bureaucratic politics and weak communication and coordination among 
the different state agencies greatly affect the implementation of the policy.  For instance, 
when in 2001 the court of appeals held a meeting with the different state agencies to 
identify the obstacles hindering the advance of production of the vaccine, there were 
strong disagreements among them about the steps needed to finish the process of 
production. The National Administration of Health Laboratories and Institutes –ANLIS 
                                               
115 Interview with Delia Enria (October 1, 2008). 
116 The ANLIS (Administración Nacional de Laboratorios e Institutos de Salud), also submitted a report 
making the same point. The ANLIS‟ report stated that new personnel (15 positions, specifically ) and 
supplies were needed to advance to the next stage in the production of the vaccine ( report cited by Centro 
de Estudios Legales y Sociales 2001, 202).  
117 In relation to this point see also Millón Quintana (unpublished manuscript). 
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(Administración Nacional de Laboratorios e Institutos de Salud), informed that the local 
production of the Candid 1 required the previous habilitation of the laboratory and of the 
clinical trials by the National Administration of Medicines, Food and Medical 
Technology –ANMAT- (Administración Nacional de Medicamentos, Alimentos y 
Tecnología Médica) and the INEVH, the national institute which was working on the 
local production of the vaccine since the beginning of the 1990s,  had not requested those 
authorizations yet (Cerro 2007).118 Moreover, even after the laboratory was finished and 
authorized (September 2002), it still took approximately 3 more years for INEVH to 
obtain the authorization for the clinical trials (September 2005). These delays in this 
process of authorization and validation of the vaccine are a good example of how 
problems of communication and coordination among the different state departments and 
agencies, including situations of bureaucratic politics, affected the development of the 
vaccine. 
 
Summing up, the policy decision to locally produce the vaccine against the 
Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever took almost 15 years to be achieved. The heavy 
involvement of the judiciary in the implementation of this policy occurred in a context in 
which the original political decision to locally produce the vaccines was not revised or 
rejected for any of the successive national governments nor for congress, however, 
problems and deficiencies at the level of management and operation of the state apparatus 
greatly affect the implementation of this policy and the social demand for the vaccine was 
weak and did not have sufficient political leverage to push the issue forward in the policy 
agenda. 
 
                                               
118 It is worth noting that all the state agencies mentioned (ANLIS, ANMAT, INEVH), were part of the 
same national minister, the minister of health. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
These cases studies reaffirm the “state deficiencies” scenario to policy 
judicialization resulting from the QCA analysis. In the three cases, the policy processes 
were heavily judicialized. The judiciary was one of the main institutional arenas, if not 
the main, where these policy discussions and processes unfolded. Moreover, the 
judicialization of the policies in question occurred under the same, basic, causal 
configuration. In all the cases, the social demand and groups behind the claims, either for 
addressing the social needs of the indigenous communities in Chaco, providing health 
treatment and medicines to people living with HIV-AIDS or producing the vaccine 
against AHF, could hardly be considered losers of the policy processes. In each of the 
cases, there was already legislation or administrative regulations establishing clear policy 
commitments and legal mandates. The judicialization of these policies, then, clearly 
referred to and dealt with the implementation of policy goals and measures that were 
already taken through the policy making processes and were already part of the legal 
framework. 
This lack of proper policy implementation, however, was not due to the 
opposition of the political administrations in charge of the executive. In fact, in many 
instances, the executive supported the policies in questions. In contrast, in all of the three 
cases, there were structural problems at the level of the state apparatus that strongly 
affected the implementation of these policies mandates and goals. Each of the case 
studies is full of details and evidence about how different types of problems in the 
organization and functioning of the state negatively affect policy implementation.  
Some may argue, however, that these policies were not properly and timely 
implemented by the state apparatus because at the end they were not priorities for the 
political elites in charge of the government. I acknowledge that this argument might have 
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some potential validity. If these issues had been a first priority for the administrations in 
charge of the executives, and they would have put all their efforts and attention in 
overcoming the obstacles hindering these policies, one could reasonable expect that 
implementation could had been better and faster (and maybe, these disputes would had 
not become judicialized). However, this hypothetical does not invalidate our general 
argument about the relevance of state capacity issues for explaining weak implementation 
and ultimately, the judicialization of certain type of public policies. There is a significant 
conceptual and empirical difference between a situation in which an executive 
government is resistant, or even reluctant, to implement a policy approved through the 
democratic decision-making process, and therefore it forestalls the state bureaucracy to 
comply with that legislation; and a situation in which a government takes the minimum 
and necessary steps to implement a policy measure, but they are not sufficient to 
overcome state capacity problems weakening its implementation. These two situations 
speak of two different types of political scenarios under which judicialization of policy 
issues is likely to occur. The former is clearly built around the lack of political will of the 
politicians in charge of government to comply with the rule of law, while the latter is 
mainly built around the weaknesses of the state to properly and timely implement or 
enforce a policy. In the three cases discussed in this chapter, the involved administrations 
took a very basic but fundamental step needed to implement a policy: budget funds were 
assigned to carry out the policy measures in question. At least, this indicates that the 
involved governments were not openly opposed to these policies and were not reluctant 
to comply. However, in all three cases, policy implementation was greatly limited and 
affected by different structural problems in the operation and organization of the state 
apparatus. 
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Furthermore, the deficient capability of the state to intervene in these policy 
issues was clearly autonomous from changes in the political administrations in charge of 
the executive. In fact, there were several different governments involved in each of the 
three policy issues, and nevertheless and despite of the political changes, judicialization 
continued in all of the cases. This is very clear in the case of the health and food 
emergency in Chaco. The involvement of the courts begun during the administration of 
governor Nikish (UCR), who took measures to address the emergency that were largely 
considered insufficient by the actors involved. The new administration of governor 
Capitanich (PJ) was much more accessible to the indigenous groups and took much more 
aggressive measures to address the emergency, however, the situation in the communities 
did not change significantly, and the judicialization of the policy continued. Similarly, in 
the case of the AHF vaccine, four different national administrations passed until the 
vaccine was finally produced.  No one of the subsequent government reviewed Menem‟s 
policy of assigning a budget to produce the vaccine. In fact, all of them took some 
measures or steps –although insufficient and/or inadequate- towards the goal of locally 
producing the vaccine against AHF. In short, the lack of fulfillment of the policy 
commitments and mandates in these three cases was rather related to structural problems 
at the level of the state than to the opposition of those in charge of the executive 
government. 
Similarly, in all three cases, the legislative assemblies were relatively attentive to 
the policy issue and involved in the policy process. In the HIV-AIDS case, the legislature 
was a main actor in building the policy framework.  In the cases of the health and food 
emergency in Chaco and the AHF vaccine, the legislatures played more of an oversight 
role of the government‟s policies on these matters. Moreover, there was a general and 
broad political consensus around these issues. This is very clear in the case of the AHF 
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vaccine, where most of the legislative resolution were co-sponsored by legislators of the 
governing and opposition parties, and also in the case of medical treatment for 
HIV/AIDS.  This political consensus across parties in the legislature was less strong in 
the case of the health and food emergency in Chaco. This might be related to the 
temporal proximity between the emergency and the provincial election, and the electoral 
need of the parties to differentiate one from each other.119 Despite of this, the Chaco 
provincial legislature, as well as the legislatures in the other two cases, were not absent in 
the policy process.  
In relation to the political leverage of the social demand and actors behind each of 
these policy issues, there were clear differences among the cases. In the HIV/AIDS case, 
the social actors had access and were part of policy making processes and debate. In the 
Chaco case, the affected indigenous communities were in abject poverty and had very 
limited capability to mobilize and press demands on the state, however the IDACH and 
other allies triggered and sustained the social concerns about the situation affecting these 
communities, and media coverage definitely helped placing the issue in the public 
agenda. In the case of the AHF vaccine, in contrast, the matter was largely unknown for 
the broader public opinion. Furthermore, the involved scientific community had limited 
capability to be part of the policy process and the affected rural population was not 
strongly organized and mobilized around the issue. In short, there were clear differences 
in the political access and leverage of social actors involved in each policy issue. 
However, the fact that the judicialization (the outcome) occurred in all three cases it is a 
clear indicator that this was not a relevant factor, at least in this causal configuration. 
Summing up, the long and heavy involvement of the courts in the three policies 
examined in this chapter was due to serious and structural state deficiencies in the 
                                               
119 This was a point stressed by several of the speakers during the debates in the Chaco‟s legislature about 
whether declaring the indigenous communities in social emergency or not (see above, footnote 63). 
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implementation of existing policy mandates. Interestingly, this occurred in contexts 
where the executives were not openly opposed to these policies, and the legislatures were 
relatively attentive and involved in the policy issue. This scenario, then, stresses that 
problems of implementation or enforcement at the level of the state, not the lack of 
responsiveness of the political system, constitute a main condition for the judicialization 
of certain policy issues. 
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CHAPTER 5: WEAK HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS A 
SOURCE OF JUDICIALIZATION  
This chapter analyzes in detail three cases of judicialization of public policy in 
Argentina: the land tenure program for indigenous communities in the province of Jujuy, 
CEAMSE‟s waste disposal policy in the Punta Lara landfill, and the re-negotiation of the 
public utility concessions during the Duhalde government. It also includes a brief 
analysis of the conflict about indigenous land tenure rights in the province of Salta. 
According to the QCA analysis developed in chapter II, these cases shared a common 
pattern: the judicialization of these policy issues occurred in contexts in which the 
governments did not implement or enforce existing policies, and the legislatures were 
rather passive. This configuration reflects one of our theoretical arguments developed in 
chapter 1, about the type of political scenario under which judicialization of public policy 
is likely to occur in Argentina. This argument has two main elements that the reader 
should pay special attention when reading the case studies covered by this chapter. First, 
in this type of disputes, social groups judicialized a policy issue not because the 
majoritarian policy making venues have rejected or denied their policy demands, but 
because the state does not uphold relatively clear existing policy mandates. Second, this 
lack of implementation or compliance with the rule of law occurs in a political context 
characterized by the combination of a discretionary exercise of power by the executive 
and a legislature that allows the executive to interpret and apply the existing rules as it 
pleases.  
As in the previous empirical chapter, the development of these case studies allows 
for assessing the internal validity of the QCA coding for these policy disputes and of the 
causal configuration identified through the QCA analysis. Each case study is organized in 
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two parts. The first one is a historical, detailed description of how that particular policy 
issue evolved and became judicialized. The second part focuses on certain aspects or 
features of the case that directly speaks to the five conditions that are theoretically 
relevant for this study. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the similarities and 
differences among the cases examined and an overall assessment of the validity of this 
causal configuration as an explanation of why public policy becomes judicialized. 
Following, I include the fuzzy set coding of the causal conditions for the four 
cases analyzed in this chapter. 
 
Table 5.1: Fuzzy Membership Scores of Causal Conditions  
Cases Policy Loser  Weak Political 
Leverage 









0 (1) .33 .67 1 .33 
CEAMSE  
Ensenada 
.33 .33 .67 .67 .33 
Public services 
tariff increases 




.33 .67 .67 1 0 
(1) As explained above, in fuzzy set language, 1 means a case has full membership in a set, .67 means that 
a case is more in than out of a set, .33 means a case is more out than in a set, and 0 means a case is clearly 
excluded from the set. When these scores are translated into Boolean logic, scores 1 and .67 indicate that a 
causal condition is relevant or present in a given case. On the contrary, scores .33 and 0 indicates that a 
causal condition is irrelevant or absent. 
 
INDIGENOUS LAND TENURE RIGHTS IN JUJUY 
In December 1996, the national government and the provincial government of 
Jujuy signed a covenant establishing a program to regularize the land tenure status of 
indigenous communities in the Puna region, called “Plan de Regularización y 
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Adjudicación de Tierras para la Población Aborigen de Jujuy” (PRATPAJ).120  
Basically, the national government committed to provide the funds to cover land 
measurements and other costs, and the provincial government pledged to implement the 
program.121 The program benefitted around 22.000 families of indigenous communities 
already settled in public lands (“tierras fiscales”) that belonged to the province of 
Jujuy.122 The covenant also established that the land titles would be granted in the way 
requested by the communities. 
A year later, in November 1997, the provincial legislature passed law 5030 
ratifying the covenant signed by the executive. Both, the provincial executive (at that 
time under the administration of Carlos Ferraro, 1996-1998) and the local legislature, 
were controlled by the Peronist party of Jujuy. Law 5030, however, established very 
demanding requirements to grant collective land titles, while making easy the granting of 
property rights at the individual level. Article 3 of the law stated that the granting of any 
collective land title had to be approved by law of the legislature.123 This provision aimed 
to make the operation of the program more difficult and complex, which generated 
                                               
120 The PRATPAJ was part of a broader initiative of the national government (at the time, under the 
administration of President Menem) to promote the access of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands.  
Besides Jujuy, similar plans were developed in the provinces of Chubut and Rio Negro. The initiative was 
presented as an effort to put into practice the constitutional reform of 1994, which recognizes that 
indigenous communities can have communal possession and ownership of the lands they have traditionally 
occupied (article 75, subsection 17). 
121 The covenant established that the funds would be transferred to the provincial government in 8 
installments. According to the text of the agreement, the first installment was immediately transferred upon 
signature of the covenant, and the provincial government had a term of three months to use the funds. The 
rests of the installments were to be transferred according to the advances of the program and as the 
provincial government renders account of how the funds were being used (clause 1 of the covenant). 
122 The story of how that land became property of the province of Jujuy is relevant to understand the 
PRATPAJ. These lands were originally expropriated by the national government during the presidency of 
Juan Peron in 1949 to be granted to the original communities living in the area (decree 1884/49). In 1958, 
the national congress passed law 14.551/58, which transferred the expropriated land to the province of 
Jujuy with the purpose of granting it to the population settled there.  
123 The granting of individual property rights, on the other hand, was comparatively much simpler. It just 
had to go through an administrative procedure established by law 4394/88 on public lands and settlements 
(“ley de tierras fiscales y colonización”). 
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problems with the national government (ENDEPA and MEDH, 2003, section IV). 
Moreover, the provincial government did not render account for the first transference of 
funds, so the national government did not make the second transference of funds 
established by the covenant. As a result the program stalled.   
The indigenous communities and other organizations and groups working on 
indigenous issues began to mobilize around this matter. In May 2000, with strong support 
from the Catholic church, they created the Forum of Indigenous Communities of Jujuy 
(Foro de Comunidades Aborígenes de Jujuy), which has as one of its main purposes to 
reactivate the land tenure program (ENDEPA and MEDH, 2003, section IV). By 
December 2000, the provincial government (at this time already under the administration 
of Eduardo Fellner, 1998-2007) signed an additional protocol to the original covenant 
with the national government.124 The Forum as well as other indigenous organizations 
took part in the negotiations for the new agreement and strongly advocated for the 
participation of the indigenous communities in the implementation of the program. As 
result, the protocol created the Commission for Indigenous Participation (“Comisión de 
Participación Indígena”), known as CPI for its acronym in Spanish. The CPI was formed 
by an elected representative from each indigenous community, the Catholic bishop of 
Jujuy and the Catholic bishop of Humahuaca. Furthermore, the execution of the program 
was now under the responsibility of a commission (known as the UEP), formed by a 
representative of the provincial government, of the national agency for indigenous issues 
(Instituto Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas -INAI), a legislator of the party of government 
in the provincial legislature, and a legislator from the opposition.  
A few days later, the provincial legislature –controlled by the party of the 
government, the Peronist party- approved law 5231/00, ratifying the new agreement 
                                               
124 “Protocolo Adicional al Convenio de Regularización y Adjudicación de Tierras, en Beneficio de la 
Población Aborigen de la Provincia de Jujuy” (December 11, 2000). 
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between the provincial government and the national government. Article 2 of the new law 
expressly established that land rights should be granted to the communities, and therefore 
repealed the corresponding provisions of the previous law 5030/97.125 Between March 
and April 2001, the indigenous communities elected their representatives at the CPI. The 
provincial government, in its turn, approved the conformation of the CPI and of the UEP 
(decree 3810-BS). Furthermore, the national government began transferring the funds for 
the program again. In short, the structure and resources to re-enact the implementation of 
the land tenure program were ready. 
However, the program did not advance as planned. Instead, the provincial 
government, thought its land settlement agency (Instituto de Colonización), continued to 
grant land titles to individual settlers, either members of indigenous communities or 
“criollos”. Furthermore, the government set aside land included in the PRATPAJ to be 
used for other purposes such as natural protected areas, infrastructure, etc.  Indigenous 
groups denounced the lack of progress in the implementation of the land tenure program 
and that the government was systematically taking measures weakening the program‟s 
goals. The following paragraph, belonging to a public statement made by Jujuy‟s 
indigenous organizations and addressed to the national minister of social affairs Alicia 
Kirchner in September 2003, is quite indicative of how the indigenous groups and their 
allies viewed the implementation of the program (own translation from Spanish):  
…seven years have passed since the covenant signed by the province and still we 
do not have the titles of our lands. In most cases, not even the land measurement 
works have been done. The provincial government has tried many different 
explanations to justify the delays, and very often its state agencies –such as the 
„instituto de colonización‟- walked behind our backs, undoing the work we have 
                                               
125 “La regularización de los títulos de las tierras tradicionalmente ocupadas por las comunidades 
indígenas que se realicen con los fondos establecidos en el Convenio serán para el otorgamiento de títulos 
de propiedad comunitaria…” (article 2, law 5231/00). 
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done, spreading confusion among the communities or slowing down land titling 
processes with illegal and absurd requirements…126 
By the middle of 2003, a group of 86 indigenous leaders, including the indigenous 
representatives and the Catholic church representatives of the CPI, filed a “recurso de 
amparo” against the province of Jujuy at a provincial administrative court. Basically, the 
plaintiffs asked the court to order the provincial state, in particular the Instituto de 
Colonización, to stop granting individual property rights over land assigned to the 
indigenous communities through the PRATPAJ, and to establish a year dateline for the 
government to grant the collective land tenure rights to the communities. In its response, 
the government basically argued that, in some cases, indigenous people have asked for 
individual property rights over the land where they were settled, and that granting those 
rights was legal. Furthermore, it argued that the delays in the implementation of the 
program were related to the lack of timely transfer of funds from the national 
government.  
The legal process moved very slowly as did the execution of the indigenous land 
program. By 2006, almost a decade after establishing the PRATPAJ, the provincial 
government –still under the administration of governor Fellner- had granted only 3 
communal tenure rights and 4 other were under process; more than 100 communities 
                                               
126 Cited by Argentina indymedia (http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2003/10/139776.php, October 9, 
2003). There are other several public statements issued by the indigenous communities and organizations of 
Jujuy about this issue. I mention just few of them: On April 18, 2002, it was issued the Petitorio del Foro 
de Comunidades Aborígenes de Jujuy, which stated that almost over a year after the reenactment of the 
program, the PRATPAJ had only marked the boundaries of the territory of one community. On October 8 
2002, the Forum and other indigenous organizations issued a public statement called  “Mensura y Entrega 
de Títulos comunitarios !YA!”, (document included in the Report prepared by Endepa and MEDH, 2003, 
section IV). On March 26, 2004, the CPI issued a  media statement in which the members of the 
commission detailed the provincial government‟s failures to implement the PRATAJ. It is worth 
transcribing the first sentences of the statement: “The land program began in 1996, up to this date, almost 
500 hundred thousand pesos has been already spent, and not even one communal land titled has been 
granted yet…” (Parte de prensa de la CPI del programa de tierras de Jujuy, March 26, 2004). 
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were still waiting for their land tenure rights.127 In May 2006, the court finally issued its 
resolution ("Andrada de Quispe y otros c/ Estado Provincial. Acción de Amparo. Expte. 
Nro. 8-105.437/03").128 It ordered the government to stop granting individual property 
rights over land assigned to the indigenous communities. Moreover, it set a term of 15 
months for the government to complete measurement and other works needed to grant 
collective rights to the indigenous communities. The government strongly criticized the 
court‟s resolution; it argued that it was not possible to grant the land titles in 15 months 
and announced that it would appeal it. 
The government‟s decision to appeal was read by the indigenous communities as 
an open rejection of the land program, and it triggered strong indigenous protests. In 
August 2006, the protests reached its peak when several hundred indigenous people 
blocked interstate route 9 for several days.129 After negotiations, the provincial 
government signed an agreement with indigenous leaders by which, among other issues, 
it made the commitment to deliver at least 29 land tenure titles by the end of the 2006.130  
During the rest of 2006, the level of implementation of the PRATPAJ increased 
significantly. On December 29, 2006, in a formal event in the “Casa de Gobierno” 
attended by the indigenous representatives of the CPI, the provincial government signed 
26 decrees granting titles to different indigenous communities settled in the province of 
Jujuy.131 
                                               
127 Data cited in the local newspaper El Pregón (“Para la Entrega de Tierras”, May 15, 2006). Government 
officials claimed a relatively different number of granted titles: 7 (see, for instance, statement of the 
Secretary of Human Rights of the government of Jujuy, Elizabeth Eisemberg in El Pregón; “Dialogar sin 
presiones” May 10, 2006). In any case, it was a relatively small number of titles granted compared to the 
number of communities waiting for theirs. 
128 It was a divided resolution. Judge Villafane and judge Morales voted in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
judge Gonzáles voted in favor of the provincial government. 
129 See Pagina 12 (“Un doble corte de rutas en Jujuy por el reclamo indígena de tierras”, August 9, 2006). 
130 For the complete text of the agreement see the local newspaper El Pregón (“Fellner afianza su política a 
favor de las comunidades originarias, August 11, 2006). 




Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
The demand for land tenure rights for the indigenous communities in Jujuy can 
hardly be considered a “loser” of the policy process. The main assumption of the loser 
argument is that when social actors cannot achieve their policy goals through the 
traditional political venues, they turn to the judiciary. But in this case, there was a 
covenant and a protocol signed by the national and provincial governments establishing 
the program to grant land tenure rights to the indigenous communities, and the program 
was ratified by the provincial legislature. It is true that when the local legislature ratified 
the covenant (law 5030/97) it also established very strict provisions regarding the 
granting of communal rights. Arguably, this law expressed a policy view that differed 
significantly from the one embedded in the agreement creating the land program. 
However, three years later, the provincial legislature passed a new law (5231/00) that 
ratified the PRATAJ again, and modified the previous law (5030/97) that restricted the 
granting of communal land tenure rights. In this context, the judicialization of the 
demands of the indigenous groups clearly dealt with the implementation of policy goals 
and measures that they had achieved through the conventional policy making process, but 
were not being properly enforced. 
 
The social actors demanding land tenure rights for the indigenous communities in 
Jujuy were not politically disadvantaged either. Their level of organized collective action 
of the local indigenous groups was relatively strong, and they were able to access and to 
be part of the policy making processes and debate around the land tenure rights. As 
mentioned above, during the year 2000, the indigenous groups with the support of the 
Catholic church, organized the “Foro de Comunidades Aborígenes de la Provincia de 
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Jujuy” to coordinate their efforts on the issue of indigenous land rights and the 
reactivation of the land tenure program. Given the obstacles faced by the program after 
the covenant was signed, the indigenous groups actively participated in the negotiations 
for the additional protocol, which reinforced the mandate that the land tenure titles should 
be granted to the communities, and they strongly lobbied the provincial legislature to 
ratify the new agreement (law 5231). Furthermore, they actively participated in the 
“Comisión de Participación Indígena” –CPI– created by the protocol to advise and 
monitor the implementation of the program. Beyond the discussion about how relevant or 
efficacious the mechanism of the CPI might have been, the participation in the 
institutional structure of the program helped indigenous groups to access information and 
other actors involved in this policy, including national government officials. For instance, 
when in 2004, the national government did not make on time the third installment of the 
program‟s funds to the provincial government, the members of the CPI contacted the 
national authorities and got part of the funds transferred, so the program‟s technical team 
could keep working.132 This is just an example of the type of access and contact that the 
indigenous groups and its allies gained through the CPI. In sum, they were able to access 
and be part of the policy process.  
 
Despite the agreements signed with the national government, the provincial 
executive did not support the policy of granting collective land tenure rights to the 
communities. Two main reasons justify this assessment. First, the provincial government 
did not advance on the implementation of the program even though it had the resources to 
do so. As mentioned above, by mid 2006, when the court issued its resolution and almost 
a decade after the creation of the program, the province had granted only between 3 to 7 
                                               
132Media statement from the CPI  (available in http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2004/03/185730.php).  
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(depending on the sources) collective land tenure titles to indigenous communities.133 It is 
worth noting that during all that period, the province was run by the same political party, 
the Peronist party (in fact, since the return to democracy in 1983, Jujuy has always been 
governed by the Peronist party); moreover, for most of that period, the provincial 
government was led by the same governor, Eduardo Fellner (1998-2007).134 Second, the 
government developed a policy of grating property rights to individuals over lands that 
were encompassed by the PRATPAJ and which were supposed to be granted to the 
indigenous communities. In other words, the provincial government was not just reluctant 
to fully implement the land program, it also took measures and actions that weakened the 
program‟s policy goals.  
Many different reasons can be articulated for explaining why the provincial 
government did not support the implementation of this policy. In principle, communal 
rights cannot be the object of market transactions (they cannot be sold, transmitted or 
subject to liens or attachments) which was perceived as an obstacle to modernizing the 
local economy and to promoting economic development. More specifically, many 
potential mining projects in Jujuy overlapped with indigenous land rights claims, which 
seriously threatened the prospect of those mining investments in the province, given the 
specific indigenous and environmental protection regulations that would apply to those 
lands.135 Others have even suggested that the notion of indigenous territories could lead 
                                               
133 In relation to the different numbers of land title granted and the different sources, see above, footnote 
127. 
134In December 1996, the initial agreement with the federal government establishing the program was 
signed by governor Carlos Ferraro. When in December 1998, Ferraro resigned due to social turmoil and 
corruption scandals, the local legislature elected Eduardo Fellner as governor to complete the period 
December 1998- December 1999. Fellner, then, won the governor‟s elections for the periods 1999-2003 
and 2003-2007. In 2007, Fellner‟s vice-governor, Walter Barrionuevo, won the gubernatorial election and 
became governor for the period 2007- 2011. 
135 In fact, for many observers, mining investment is one of the main obstacles (if not the main) to the 
granting of land tenure titles to the indigenous communities (phone interview with Agustina Roca, 
November 4, 2009). 
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to potential future challengers to the authority of the state. In short, and beyond all these 
plausible reasons, the issue of communal property rights clearly raised a lot of resistance 
among the political establishment in Jujuy (as well as in other Argentine provinces with 
significant indigenous population).136 One can pose the question, then, why did the 
provincial government take the legal and policy commitment to implement this program 
in the first place? pressures from the national government? access to national and 
international funds? reputational fears to be perceived as backward? Whatever the 
reasons, the evidence detailed above clearly indicate that the provincial government did 
not have the political will to fully implement the indigenous land tenure program. 
 
In contrast, state capacity issues did not significantly affect the implementation of 
the PRATPAJ. The national government provided funds to cover the program‟s costs, 
and the technical and human capabilities required to carry out land measurement works 
and titling processes where easily within the reach of the Jujuy state apparatus (in fact, 
the province already had a land agency).  Furthermore, by the middle of 2006, after 
almost a decade of the creation of the program, the province had granted few collective 
land tenure titles to indigenous communities; however, by the end of 2006, after the court 
issued its resolution and governor Fellner signed the agreement with the indigenous 
representatives ending the route blockages, the provincial government granted 26 
collective land tenure titles in less than eight months.  This sudden increase in such short 
term clearly suggests that the weak implementation of the PRATPAJ during almost a 
decade was mainly due to the government‟s policy preferences, and not because of 
deficiencies in the state apparatus or lack of state capability to implement the program. 
 
                                               
136  A similar resistance to the notion of communal territory and communal property rights can be observed 
in the case of Lhaka Honhat in Salta, also –briefly- analyzed at the end of this chapter. 
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In relation to the provincial legislature, the local assembly was clearly aligned 
with the executive and did not assume its monitor role regarding the implementation of 
the land policy. As mentioned above, the Peronist party of Jujuy has always controlled 
the executive government and the provincial legislature since the return to democracy in 
1983. This is a political and institutional system, then, characterized by the dominant role 
of the local Peronist party, which arguably helps explain the legislature‟s alignment with 
the executive on the indigenous land issue and the weak legislative oversight over the 
government‟s actions.  
As mentioned above, the legislature ratified the two agreements signed by the 
provincial government with the national government establishing the indigenous land 
program. In November 1997, the legislature passed law 5030 ratifying the covenant 
which created the PRATPAJ, and in December 2000, the local assembly passed law 5231 
which ratified the additional protocol to the covenant. However, when the legislature 
passed law 5030/97, it included a provision making more difficult the granting of 
communal land tenure rights (article 3). Evidently, this contradicted the policy goals of 
the covenant promoted by the federal government and signed by the provincial 
government (at that time under the administration of Carlos Ferraro). One may argue that 
this might be an indicator of an autonomous legislature which was actually modifying an 
executive‟s policy decision. But that was not really the case. Three years later, the 
Peronist legislative block (indeed, many of the same individual legislators) voted in favor 
of law 5231/00, which explicitly derogated article 3 of the law 5030/97. I do not have a 
clear explanation of why the provincial legislature included such provision (article 3) in 
the law in the first place. I can only hypothesize that, given the resistance and disfavor 
that the issue of communal land rights raised across the political establishment in Jujuy, 
the provincial legislature in 1997 might have being just more open about its policy 
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preferences on this matter than the provincial executive who signed the covenants but did 
not  implemented the program, and even boycotted it. Whatever the reason, it is clear that 
there were not significant policy differences between the Peronist controlled legislature 
and the provincial executive on this issue. 
The alignment of the provincial legislature with the executive became even 
clearer in the implementation stage of the land program. Once law 5231/00 ratified the 
additional protocol and the PRATPAJ was formally re-enacted, the legislature did not 
fully exercise its power to monitor the unfolding of the program or to oversee the 
executive, which was taking measures that were weakening the policy goals of the 
PRATPAJ. This lack of legislative control is especially relevant in this case because the 
provincial assembly had a certain level of direct responsibility over the execution and 
implementation of the program. In fact, the legislature was part of the PRATAJ 
institutional structure: two legislators, one from the opposition and one from the party of 
the government, were part of the UEP (Unidad Ejecutora del Programa), the commission 
in charge of the execution of the program. In different public statements, however, the 
indigenous communities and their allies openly criticized the representatives of the 
provincial legislature in the UEP, for their lack of support to the indigenous land 
program.137 The following quote from the minute of the II meeting of indigenous 
communities of Jujuy (April 18, 2002), is quite indicative of the opinion of the 
indigenous groups about the role of the legislature representatives at the UEP (own 
translation from Spanish):  
…Due to the delays and lack of execution [of the program], the representatives of 
the communities asked for the immediate removal of the provincial legislators 
Humberto  López [UCR] and Hugo Mamani  [Peronist party] from  the 
UEP…..because of their lack of engagement with the program and the 
communities, they requested to the president of the provincial legislature and to 
                                               
137 See, for instance, CPI media statement (CPI  Programa de Tierras de Jujuy, March 26, 2004). 
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the presidents of the two legislative blocks to change these legislators for others 
who know about the indigenous cause… 
 
Summing up, the resistance of the provincial government to implement the 
indigenous land tenure program was complemented by a passive and aligned legislature 
which did not monitor the executive actions. This configuration of political conditions 
lead to the judicialization of this policy even in a context in which the social actors had 
political leverage and the state apparatus was capable of implementing the policy 
mandates. 
  
CEAMSE’S WASTE DISPOSAL POLICY IN ENSENADA 
During the year 2003, CEAMSE, the state-owned company responsible for the 
treatment and disposal of residential and industrial solid waste in the metropolitan area of 
Buenos Aires (AMBA), began gradually closing the highly controversial landfill of Villa 
Dominico in the Avellaneda-Quilmes counties, and redirecting part of that waste to the 
smaller Punta Lara landfill located in the municipality of Ensenada.138 The company 
presented this increase in the waste disposed in Punta Lara as a transitory measure while 
they were looking for other permanent sites to dispose of the waste. CEAMSE‟s decision, 
however, raised strong social opposition in Ensenada and triggered a long policy dispute 
that ultimately had consequences for the solid waste disposal policy for the entire Buenos 
Aires metropolitan area. 
In order to understand the dispute around the Punta Lara landfill, it is necessary to 
provide some basic information about CEAMSE and the institutional scheme regarding 
solid waste management in the AMBA. The state company Coordinación Ecológica Área 
                                               
138 Throughout this case, I use the term municipality and county as synonymous. 
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Metropolitana Sociedad del Estado (CEAMSE is the acronym in Spanish) was created in 
1977 during the military regime, by an agreement between the military appointed 
authorities of the province of Buenos Aires and the city of Buenos Aires. Since its 
inception, CEAMSE‟s main purpose was to centralize the treatment and disposition of 
waste across the AMBA through sanitary landfills.139 Accordingly, the city of Buenos 
Aires and 34 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires that form the broadly 
defined metropolitan area, deliver their solid waste to CEAMSE.140 The company, in 
turn, charges each local government a tipping fee per ton of waste delivered to the 
landfills. A central feature of this legal scheme is that the governments of the province of 
Buenos Aires and city of Buenos Aires are the co-owners of CEAMSE. In fact, they 
appoint the members of the board who run the state company.141 Meanwhile, the 
municipalities of the metropolitan area are not partners but captive clients of CEAMSE. 
By provincial law 9111/78, these municipalities are banned from treating and disposing 
the waste originating in their jurisdictions. Instead, they are required to deliver it to 
CEAMSE, and pay for that service. Furthermore, they have no formal participation in 
CEAMSE‟s decision making process and management. As one can expect, this scheme 
generates a lot of tension between the local governments and CEAMSE, which manages 
                                               
139  Before the creation of CEAMSE, solid waste in the AMBA used to be burnt in open air dumps. Some 
of these dumps were managed by the local governments while others were just open sites where waste was 
dumped illegally (“basurales”). In any case, the practice of open-air waste dumping created great health 
and pollution risks (World Bank report, p. 87-90). The creation of CEAMSE reduced significantly the 
number of “basurales” in the AMBA, even though the practice still continues.  
140 The number of municipal districts covered by CEAMSE has changed over time due to subdivisions of 
existing districts, creations of new districts, etc. When the company was created in 1979, CEAMSE 
encompassed 22 districts. Currently, it covers 34 districts (the list of districts is available at CEAMSE web 
site, http://www.ceamse.gov.ar/abre-home.html, cited March 30, 2010).  
141 Currently, the company is run by a board composed by three members. One of the members is 
appointed by the government of the province of Buenos Aires, and one by the city of Buenos Aires. The 
third member of the board is jointly appointed by both governments, but he/she is proposed by the 
government of the province of Buenos Aires (article 10; Estatuto Social del CEAMSE; available at 
http://www.ceamse.gov.ar/abre-home.html). 
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the waste treatment and disposal service in the territories of those municipalities, but 
without their involvement or control.  
A main point of friction is the location and operation of the landfills. When 
CEAMSE was created, the province of Buenos Aires provided the land where the sites 
were to be located.142  Basically, the provincial government expropriated these lands and 
gave them to the company. For many observers and actors involved in this issue, the 
process of creating CEAMSE can be explained only in the context of an authoritarian 
regime, which was able to unilaterally formulate a policy, in a top-down fashion, without 
the need to take into account or reach consensus with local actors ( Suarez 1998, 22-26). 
However, with the return and consolidation of democracy in Argentina, and as the 
process of urban growth continued in the metropolitan area, the sites of the landfills 
ended up very close to new neighborhoods and urbanizations, and they became a focus of 
local complaints and mobilizations. 
 By 2003, CEAMSE had four main landfills: Villa Domínico, Gonzales Catán, 
Norte 3 and Punta Lara. Each one of these landfills served a specific part of the 
metropolitan area.143 The decision to close Villa Domínico (the largest landfill in 
Argentina and the oldest in operation in the AMBA) implied that the waste being 
disposed in that site had to be placed somewhere else. In that context, CEAMSE began 
assessing the possibility of redirecting at least part of that waste to the Punta Lara landfill.   
                                               
142 For many observers, the implicit purpose for the creation of CEAMSE was to solve the waste problem 
of the city of Buenos Aires. The central city lacked physical space to dispose the waste (or rather, land was 
too valuable to be used as landfill). Furthermore, by “exporting” its waste  (as well as forcing the relocation 
of slums to metropolitan districts, banning  polluting industrial activities, etc), the central city could 
strengthen  its residential features in detriment of the surrounding municipalities (see Suarez 1998, 22-26). 
143 Villa Domínico served the city of Buenos Aires; (by far, the largest producer of waste in the AMBA) 
and several municipalities in the south of the AMBA; the Gonzales Catán landfill served the west part of 
the AMBA; Norte 3 served the districts located in the north of the AMBA; finally, the Punta Lara landfill 
served the city of La Plata and the surrounding counties (Berisso, Ensenada, Brandsen). 
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As mentioned above, this triggered a strong local opposition in Ensenada. There 
was a widespread fear among the local community that CEAMSE‟s supposedly transitory 
measure would become permanent, and it would lead Punta Lara to become a second 
Villa Domínico.144 The local governments of Ensenada and other nearby cities (Berisso, 
La Plata) were also concerned about CEAMSE‟s measure.145 A main argument used by 
the local groups was that CEAMSE was not fulfilling the existing legislation regulating 
CEAMSE‟s waste treatment and disposal service in the metropolitan area. The “new” 
waste coming to Punta Lara originated in towns and counties that were beyond the 
maximum distance established in law 9111/78. Article 4 of that law explicitly states that 
the waste ought to be disposed in landfills which are to be located at a maximum distance 
of 20 kilometers from the limits of the counties where the waste originates.146 In support 
of this argument, the city council of Ensenada passed resolution 2843/03, reproducing 
article 4 of the law 9111 and banning the entry of trucks to the Punta Lara landfill with 
waste originating in counties located beyond the 20 kilometer rule.147 However, and 
                                               
144See  for instance, the coverage of  El Día, a regional newspaper from the city of La Plata, about the local 
reactions to CEAMSE‟s measures (“„No queremos convertirnos en basurero del conurbano‟ Lo dijeron 
vecinos que anoche se reunieron en Ensenada por el CEAMSE de Ensenada”; April 2, 2003; “El problema 
de la basura se debe resolver y no mudarlo a otro lado” , April 6, 2003;  “Nuevo rechazo vecinal al traslado 
de basura al CEAMSE de Ensenada”; April 8, 2003). 
145 El Día, “Fuerte oposición a la idea de traer más basura al CEAMSE. Preocupa la iniciativa de ubicar los 
desperdicios del Conurbano en el predio de Ensenada” (March 30, 2003). Also El Día, “Nueva movida para 
frenar envío de basura a la región Se reunieron concejales de La Plata, Berisso y Ensenada para actuar en 
forma conjunta “(April 23, 2003). 
146 Provincial law 9111/78, article 4:  “La disposición final de los residuos mediante el sistema de relleno 
sanitario se efectuará únicamente por intermedio de "Cinturón Ecológico Área Metropolitana Sociedad del 
Estado" – (C.E.A.M.S.E.), y a medida que dicha Sociedad del Estado se encuentre en condiciones de 
recibir todo o parte de los residuos originados en el territorio de los Partidos involucrados y en lugares 
especialmente habilitados a tal fin, dentro de una distancia máxima de veinte (20) kilómetros fuera de los 
límites del Partido en el cual fueran aquéllos recolectados…”. 
147 The resolution was mainly a response from the local government to the growing social concern in 
Ensenada (interview with Marcelo Martinez, La Plata, May 4, 2008). Arguably, the local banning of trucks 
with “outer-jurisdictional” waste was a purely symbolic measure (its constitutionality was very debatable 
given that it openly contradicted the commerce clause). Nevertheless, it also entailed a clear political 
message to CEAMSE and the provincial government. 
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despite the local protests, CEAMSE gradually began disposing waste from other counties 
in the Punta Lara landfill.148  
In regard to the provincial government, during the first months of 2003 the focus 
of the executive was on renegotiating with the city of Buenos Aires the terms under 
which the province would receive the waste produced by the city. In May 2003, the 
provincial Senate quickly approved a bill sent by Governor Sola, which authorized the 
executive to take measures to end the CEAMSE and negotiate a new agreement with the 
city of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, the bill banned the entry of waste from other 
jurisdictions into the province of Buenos Aires (a measure that clearly aimed to force the 
city of Buenos Aires to negotiate).  However, the bill did not gain enough support in the 
House of Representatives, and a few weeks later, the governor announced he was 
desisting from pushing the proposal forward. At that point, the provincial government 
and CEAMSE were also advancing the idea of disposing waste from the AMBA 
somewhere outside the heavily urbanized metropolitan area.149 This was rather a middle 
term solution, which required –first- to find municipalities willing to authorize CEAMSE 
to build landfills in their jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the provincial government tacitly 
supported CEAMSE‟s measure to dispose outer-jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara.150 
In January 2004, CEAMSE reached an agreement with the new government of the 
municipality of Ensenada which arguably aimed to contain and soften the local 
                                               
148 It is worth clarifying that not all the waste from Villa Dominico was redirected to Punta Lara. The waste 
was distributed among the three CEAMSE‟s landfills (Noticias CEAMSE 2004). 
149 In 2003, CEAMSE published a plan of action for the next decade which included the building of new 
landfills in low urbanized areas during the next five years (see Fundación Metropolitana 2004) . See also El 
Día (“La provincia ya no sabe dónde tirar la basura”, June 11, 2003).  
150 For instance, in the ceremony of closure of Villa Domínico, governor Sola explained to the press how 
the waste being disposed in that site was going to be distributed among the three others landfills, including 
Punta Lara (see, for example, Clarin, “Solá encabezó el acto de cierre del basural del CEAMSE en Villa 
Domínico”, February 2, 2004). 
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opposition.151 According to the agreement, the company would dispose waste from other 
counties in Punta Lara‟s landfill only for a year –until December 31, 2004. In return, 
CEAMSE committed itself to build a recycling plant in Punta Lara (which would create 
around 200 jobs in a region that suffered from high levels of unemployment), plus giving 
other financial benefits to the municipality of Ensenada. The most active local groups and 
NGOs, however, continued to oppose CEAMSE‟s policy of disposing outer-jurisdictional 
waste in Punta Lara.152 
CEAMSE, meanwhile, began looking for potential sites for new landfills. The 
state company opened a bidding process to build a mega-landfill in the province of 
Buenos Aires.153 Some local governments initially showed certain interest in receiving 
the landfill because of the economic and financial benefits that they would receive in 
exchange. However, there was a strong social opposition, including large social 
mobilizations, in the counties and towns that were being mentioned as potential sites of 
CEAMSE‟s landfills.154 In that context, the bidding process for the new landfills did not 
advance, and CEAMSE announced that it could not fulfill the deadline set in the 
agreement signed with the municipality of Ensenada.  
                                               
151 In December 2003, Mario Secco became the mayor of Ensenada. Secco belonged to the Frente Para la 
Victoria (FPV), which was a political coalition lead by the Kichnerist faction of the Peronist party. The 
previous mayor, Adlberto del Negro, who held the office for 12 years, belonged to an opponent faction of 
the Peronist party.  
152 Interview with Marcelo Martinez (La Plata, May 4, 2008). See also the coverage of the local newspaper 
El Día (“Anunciaron construcción de una planta procesadora de residuos”, January 9, 2004; “Vecinos de 
acuerdo con la planta procesadora de residuos”, January 11, 2004 ). 
153 The bid encompassed the design, building and operation of a landfill for 20 years in a site of 300 
hectares located within 150 km radius from the city of Buenos Aires. The interested companies had to 
obtain the authorization of  the municipalities where they were proposing to build the landfill (for more 
information about the bid process, see Noticias CEAMSE 2005).  
154 See for instance, El Día (“Aceptar o no la basura ajena, debate que divide a Brandsen”, March 16, 
2004) regarding the situation in Brandsen, a town in the province of Buenos Aires, which was being 
mentioned as a potential site for a landfill. According to the journalist covering the issue, the local mayor 
was interested in this possibility because of the economic benefits it would entail for the municipality, 
while most of the local population rejected the proposal because of the potential environmental and health 
hazards.  
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On January 2005, the deadline expired and local protests in Ensenada increased 
again. For several days the local government did not allow trucks with outer-
jurisdictional waste to enter the site.155 Furthermore, neighbors‟ groups regularly carried 
out protests in front of the landfill gates as well as at the provincial government‟s 
headquarters in La Plata. Despite the local opposition, outer-jurisdictional waste 
continued to be disposed in Punta Lara. Moreover, at some point during 2005, CEAMSE 
also began enlarging the landfill, incorporating a new area known as module D.156  
By the end of 2005, two of the most active local associations, Nuevo Ambiente 
and Centro Vecinal Punta Lara, filed a recurso de amparo against CEAMSE at a 
provincial district court ("Asociación Civil Nuevo Ambiente CEN. VEC. P. Lara c/ 
CEAMSE S.A./ Amparo -Expte 4559").157 The plaintiffs basically asked the court to 
order CEAMSE to stop disposing waste in the Punta Lara landfill from jurisdictions 
beyond the 20 kilometers established by provincial law 9111/78. Moreover, they required 
CEAMSE to stop the works aiming to enlarge the landfill (module D), because they had 
not been approved by the environmental provincial agency and the expansion of the 
landfill was violating several federal and provincial environmental regulations. In March 
2006, the court issued its resolution which favored the local associations. The judge, 
however, stated that the implementation of the plaintiffs‟ claims should be done gradually 
as to not jeopardize the provision of waste disposal services to the other counties of the 
                                               
155 The local government of Ensenada claimed that it was taking that measure because CEAMSE did not 
fulfilled the terms of the agreement. (El Día, “520 toneladas de basura sin destino cierto” January 4, 2005). 
CEAMSE, then, brought a legal claim against the municipality, and a district court ordered the municipality 
of Ensenada to allow the trucks into the landfill. 
156 CEAMSE claimed that module D did not constitute as an expansion of the landfill, but rather it was 
part of the original plan for the site (see statement of Carlos Hurt, the president of CEAMSE, in El Día “La 
batalla por la basura de la CEAMSE llega a la Justicia”, April 20, 2005). In contrast, the local groups 
basically argued the amount of waste being disposed at Punta Lara was filling the existing capacity of the 
landfill at a higher speed than expected, which meant that the site had to be expanded so it could continue 
operating.  
157 Juzgado de Primera Instancia en los Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 1, Judge Luis F. Arias. 
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metropolitan area. Accordingly, the judge banned the disposal of outer-jurisdictional 
waste in Punta Lara from June 30, 2006 onward, and the disposal of any waste in module 
D of the landfill from October 30, 2006. It is worth noting that the banning of waste 
disposal in module D meant, in practice, that the Punta Lara landfill would stop operating 
because the existing capacity of the site was almost full. 
As expected, CEAMSE appealed. The court of appeals (Cámara de Apelación en 
lo Contencioso Administrativo de La Plata) ratified the resolution of the trial court, even 
though it postponed the deadlines to September 30, and December 31, 2006 
respectively.158 CEAMSE, then, appealed to the Supreme Court of the province of 
Buenos Aires. While the judicial procedures were going on, CEAMSE continued 
disposing waste in the Punta Lara landfill based on the argument that the appeals 
procedures suspended the enforcement of the courts‟ resolution. Meanwhile, local 
protests continued. During the months of September/October 2006, the level of social 
tension and confrontation reached one of its peaks when groups of local residents 
blockaded the gate of the Punta Lara Landfill for several days, demanding the 
enforcement of the judicial resolution. 159 
                                               
158 The resolution of the court of appeals was not unanimous. Two judges ratified the resolution of the trial 
court, and one favored CEAMSE‟s claim. 
159 The events developed during the blockade of September-October 2006 are clear indicators of the level 
the social tension as well as the lack of a clear exercise of political and state authority around this conflict.  
On September 30 (the deadlines established by the court of appeal for CEAMSE to stop disposing outer-
jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara) groups of neighbors and local NGOs began blockading the gates of the 
landfill, and did not allow trucks transporting outer-jurisdictional waste to enter the Punta Lara landfill.  
CEAMSE‟s workers union, then, organized a counter-blockade and they stopped all trucks to get into the 
landfill affecting the disposing of waste from the towns and counties served by Punta Lara (Ensenada, 
Berisso, La Plata). The union was protesting that the closing of the landfill implied losing jobs, but for 
many observers it was clear that their action were promoted by, or at least had the tacit support of  the 
company. On the fourth day of the blockade, the local mayor of Ensenada, leading a convoy of trucks full 
of waste from the town of Ensenada, and with the support of the workers from the local municipality, 
attempted to break the CEAMSE workers blockage. This led to a very tense situation and even some street-
fights between people belonging to the two groups. Finally, the public criminal prosecutor from La Plata 
(Fiscal Penal) showed up at the site and resolved to enforce (with police support) the resolution of the 
court of appeals. As result, the trucks with outer-jurisdictional waste that were waiting outside of the site 
were not allowed to dispose their waste in the Punta Lara landfill. Only those trucks from Ensenada, 
Berizzo and La Plata were allowed into the site. CEAMSE, as expected, strongly criticized the actions of 
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In this context, the Supreme Court opened a process of negotiation which 
encompassed the local associations and the CEAMSE (the initial parties to the legal 
dispute), and also the government of the province of Buenos Aires.160 By that time, the 
provincial government had already submitted a new bill to the legislature aiming to 
regulate the management of residential waste, including its treatment and disposal, in the 
entire province.161 The bill was quickly treated and approved by the Senate (November 1, 
2006) and by the House of Representatives (December 7, 2006). One of the most relevant 
(and most polemic) provisions of the new law 13.592 was article 12, which authorized 
the provincial executive to assign sites for the construction of landfills without the need 
for local governments‟ authorization. In this way, the provincial government attempted to 
unlock the problems of where to dispose the waste originated in the metropolitan area. 
Based on the new law and after few months of negotiations, CEAMSE, the local 
associations from Ensenada and the provincial government reached a series of 
agreements which were approved by the Supreme Court on December 20, 2006.162 
Basically, CEAMSE committed itself to identify and purchase the sites for two new 
landfills, and begin the operation of the new landfills by December 2007. The landfill at 
Punta Lara would continue to operate until that date. The provincial government, in its 
turn, agreed to authorize the new landfills in accordance with the new law 13.592.  
                                                                                                                                            
the public prosecutor, arguing that she ignored the ongoing appeal  procedure before the Supreme Court 
(See El Día, “Otro duro round en la pelea por la basura”, October 5, 2006 ). 
160 In October, 2006, the Court summoned the provincial government to be part of hearing with the parties 
(CEAMSE and the NGOs). In the hearing, which took place on October 20, 2006, all the parties agreed to 
formally begin a process of negotiation. 
161 The waste management project of the Sola‟s administration was publically known since 2005, but it 
was only submitted to the Senate on August 9, 2006. 
162 The overall agreement reached by the parties was composed by an agreement between the local 
associations and CEAMSE, an agreement between the provincial government and CEAMSE. A third 
agreement between CEAMSE and the municipality of Ensenada was also included in the judicial resolution 
("Asociación Civil Nuevo Ambiente - Centro Vecinal Punta Lara c/ CEAMSE -Recurso Extraordinario de 
Inaplicabilidad de Ley-  Letra A 68857").  
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A couple of months later, in February 2007, CEAMSE announced the counties 
which were considered to be potentially apt for the landfill sites: Brandsen and Campana. 
The local opposition, especially in Brandsen, was enormous, and included large social 
mobilizations and routes blockade.163 Just a month later, and in response to the popular 
protests, the provincial House of Representatives and the Senate quickly approved a new 
law suspending the application of article 12 of law 13.592 for 6 months. In this context, 
the provincial government and CEAMSE announced that they could not fulfill their 
obligations under the terms of the agreements; the provincial Supreme Court, then, 
established new deadlines which were not fulfilled either. By 2009, when the first version 
of this chapter was written, the Punta Lara landfill was still operating and the process of 
judicialization still continued.164 
 
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
As in the previous case, the first factor to analyze is whether the social opposition 
to CEAMSE‟s policy in Punta Lara can be considered as a loser of the policy process or 
not. On the one hand, it can be argued that the existence of landfills in some of the 
metropolitan districts was clearly the result of the existing policy and legislation 
regarding solid waste treatment and disposal in the AMBA, specifically provincial law 
9111/78. As result, some districts (in this case Ensenada) had to receive the waste 
originated in other municipalities of the area. However, the social actors protesting 
against CEAMSE‟s policy and management in the Punta Lara landfill were mainly 
                                               
163 See coverage of the local newspaper El Día, “Brandsen endurece su reclamo contra el relleno sanitario” 
(February 19, 2007), “Crece en la Región el debate por la basura” (March 11, 2007) 
164 It is worth noting, however, that currently no outer-jurisdictional waste is being disposed in the Punta 
Lara landfill.  
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demanding the enforcement and application of existing legislation as well. Law 9111/78 
not only establishes that the municipalities in the AMBA have to dispose their waste in 
landfills operated by CEAMSE; it also regulates the geographical origin of the waste 
disposed in each landfill through the 20 kilometer rule (article 4, law 9111/78). The local 
claim against the “outer-jurisdictional” waste being dumped in Punta Lara was based 
precisely on that legal mandate. Furthermore, local actors also protested for what they 
perceived as the lack of provincial government control over CEAMSE‟s landfill 
operations and lack of government enforcement of existing environmental legislation. For 
instance, CEAMSE began expanding the capability of the Punta Lara landfill (module D) 
without going through the environmental impact assessment procedure established by the 
provincial regulations and without requiring the authorization of the provincial 
environmental agency. More relevant, the provincial agency did not attempt to exercise 
its police power in light of CEAMSE‟s decisions. In sum, the demands of the local 
groups mainly referred to policy goals and measures that had already been approved 
through the conventional policy making venues, but were not being enforced by the 
provincial government. 
 
In turn, the social actors protesting against CEAMSE‟s policy in Punta Lara were 
not politically disadvantaged although their capability to be part of the policy debate at 
the provincial level was rather limited. The core of the local opposition was embodied by 
the “asamblea”, a network of residents from Punta Lara and some local associations, 
mainly the Centro Vecinal Punta Lara (a well known neighborhood association) and 
Nuevo Ambiente (a local environmental NGO).165 When the first news erupted about the 
                                               
165 Punta Lara is a small town located in the Ensenada county. According to the census data 2001 
(INDEC), Punta Lara had 8.400 inhabitants, and the Ensenada county had an overall population of 51.000 
people. 
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possibility of CEAMSE disposing outer jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara, this network 
of local residents and associations concerned about the issue was rather small, but as the 
dispute evolved, it began gaining the attention and support from the broader community 
in the Ensenada county and the region.166 In March 2005, for instance, the “asamblea” 
delivered to the municipality of Ensenada a petition signed by 9.700 residents, requesting 
that the local government enforce local regulations that were allegedly being infringed by 
CEAMSE. Given that the whole population of Ensenada county was just over 51.000, the 
number of people who signed the petition gives a good idea of the level of concern raised 
by the Punta Lara issue among the local population and the capability of the “asamblea” 
to reach the local community. In this context, and although the relationship between the 
“asamblea” and the mayor of Ensenada was very conflictive,167 the local government 
could not and did not ignore the local concerns and claims about the situation in the Punta 
Lara landfill (in fact, even the local mayor once blockaded the gates of the landfill, so the 
trucks with outer-jurisdictional waste could not enter the site!).168  
At the provincial level -where the central locus of the policy process was, the 
capability of the local groups to influence the policy debate was more limited. As will be 
discussed below, the provincial government maintained a rather passive role in relation to 
CEAMSE‟s policy on Punta Lara and, hence, it did not engage the local groups in any 
substantial policy negotiations.169 However, the local groups carried out different actions 
                                               
166 Interview with Marcelo Martinez, one of the local leaders of the movement against CEAMSE and 
founder of the NGO Nuevo Ambiente (La Plata, May 4). The same point was made by Luis Malagamba, 
the former Ombudsman of the city of La Plata (La Plata, July 21).  
167 For instance, on occasion of the deliverance of the signatures mentioned above, the event ended with 
fights between protesters and partisans of the local mayor (See El Día, “Crece la tensión en Ensenada por la 
pelea contra el basurero”, March 12, 2005).  Also Interview with Marcelo Martinez (La Plata, May 4, 
2008). 
168 See above, footnote 159 for a description of these events. 
169 As explained above, this situation changed substantially after the judicialization of the dispute, which 
gave to the local groups a seat at the “negotiating table” on the future of the Punta Lara landfill, and 
required the provincial government to take a more active role in the policy process. 
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aiming to gain the attention of the provincial government and the broader public opinion 
about the situation in Punta Lara. For instance, in May 2004, the NGO Nuevo Ambiente 
filed a complaint to the national Ombudsman office, which was also signed by 800 
residents from Ensenada, claiming that CEAMSE was infringing environmental 
legislation, and requesting the intervention of the office.170 Similarly, in December 2004, 
the local groups delivered a petition to governor Sola, requesting to stop the disposal of 
outer-jurisdictional waste in the Punta Lara landfill.171 The local groups also filed a 
complaint to the provincial agency in charge of protecting the quality of water resources, 
arguing that the Punta Lara landfill was polluting a nearby stream and the underground 
waters. The issue raised a lot of media attention after the agency announced that the 
stream was in fact polluted by lead and other metals (although the agency did not 
attributed the pollution to the landfill or any other source).172 Besides the use of 
institutionalized modes of advocacy, the local groups also organized street mobilizations 
and, as it has been described above, they even took direct actions like blockading the 
gates of the Punta Lara landfill.173 An aspect worth noting is that these groups were quite 
able to sustain their advocacy efforts through time, which arguably helped to place the 
issue on the public agenda. In short, the social actors protesting against CEAMSE‟s 
                                               
170 Diario El Día (“Nueva denuncia por la basura que llega a predio de CEAMSE”, May 16, 2004) 
171 Diario El Día (“CEAMSE va a la justicia por la basura extra”, December 18, 2004). 
172 See the regional newspaper Hoy (“Admiten que la concentración de metales es superior a lo admitido”, 
November 9, 2005). 
173 The “asamblea” organized several mobilizations to the headquarters of the provincial government in 
the city of La Plata (interview with Marcelo Martinez, La Plata, May 7, 2008)). Furthermore, several times 
they blockaded the gate of the Punta Lara landfill for few hours or days, stopping trucks with outer-
jurisdictional waste for entering the site. It is interesting to note, however, that largest (in terms of the 
amount of people who participated) and the longest blockades occurred after the dispute was already 
judicialized. These blockades took place in September 2006, when CEAMSE did not fulfilled the deadline 
established by the court of appeals to stop disposing outer-jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara, and in 
October 2007, when  CEAMSE and the provincial government did not fulfilled the agreements signed 
before the Supreme Court. 
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policy in Ensenada were somewhat able to access and be part of the policy process and 
debate around the Punta Lara landfill. 
 
In its turn, the provincial government basically let CEAMSE carry out its policy 
regarding Punta Lara. While the executive did not openly support CEAMSE‟s decision to 
dispose outer jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara or to expand the landfill capabilities, the 
government neither exercised its policy power of control nor attempted to enforce the 
existing legislation over the company. Based on the evidence we have gathered, one can 
hypothesize several different arguments for explaining this government‟s policy. First, it 
can be argued that the policy priority for the administration of governor Solá was the 
closure of the Villa Domínico landfill (a measure that was announced and postponed 
several times for different previous provincial administrations). The disposal of outer-
jurisdictional waste in Punta Lara, then, was more or less a natural and expected side-
effect of that measure. Second, the opening of new landfills to dispose the waste from the 
metropolitan area was extremely difficult and costly in political terms. Arguably, it was 
more convenient for the provincial administration at the time just to keep bringing new 
waste into Punta Lara (even with the opposition of already critical local groups), and pass 
the problem to the next administration, than to trigger new focuses of social conflicts and 
resistance in other parts of the province.174 Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that the 
relative passivity of the provincial executive implied a tacit ratification of CEAMSE‟s 
policies and of the existing state of affairs on the Punta Lara landfill. 
The government became more openly involved in the policy process after the 
dispute got judicialized and the district and appeals courts ordered the Punta Lara landfill 
to be closed because its capacity was full. These judicial decisions greatly affected the 
                                               
174 This is a process is commonly known in policy studies as NIMTO: Not In My Term Of Office. 
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dynamic of the policy debate and the timing of the policy process. Arguably, they 
“forced” the government to address the issue earlier than what they expected to. If the 
Punta Lara landfill had to be closed, what was going to happen with the waste (intra and 
outer jurisdictional) that was being disposed of there? Where was that waste going to be 
placed? These questions raised policy issues that clearly went beyond the Punta Lara 
landfill and affected the waste disposal policy of the entire Metropolitan area. In this 
context, and under the pressure of the judicial orders to close the Punta Lara landfill, the 
government then promoted and got the provincial legislature to approve the law 13.592 
on residential waste management in a few weeks, after years of executive and legislative 
inaction on the matter. Several speeches during the legislative debate made precisely 
made that point (own translation from Spanish): “…We are going to approve the bill in 
general because we know of the urgency the executive has in solving the problem of 
Ensenada in the term of a year, given the agreements made with the Supreme Court of 
Justice...”  (Deputy Aispuru, Peronist dissident, Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Diputados de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, December 7, 2006, p. 7711); “...the true is 
that Ensenada collapses because there is a judicial decision; and then, because 
Ensenada collapses, we make a law…” (Deputy Gobbi, UCR, p. 7716).  As these 
speeches stress, the sudden activism of the executive in this matter was largely in 
response to the involvement of the courts. 
 
Meanwhile, the role of the provincial legislature in the policy process and debate 
around the Punta Lara landfill can also be characterized as rather passive. Throughout the 
period analyzed in this work (broadly 2002 to 2007), both houses of the provincial 
legislature were largely controlled by the Peronist party, which also controlled the 
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executive.175 During this period, several bills were introduced by members of the 
legislature dealing with the issue of waste management in general. The interesting 
phenomenon is that many of these bills were approved by one of the chambers of the 
provincial legislature, but then elapsed in the other chamber‟s commissions without being 
treated. Moreover, when approved, these bills gathered a broad political support that 
crossed party lines. For instance, in December 2001, the provincial Senate unanimously 
approved a bill authored by senator Genoud (Peronist party), which later “died” in the 
House of Representative after one year without being treated.176 In May 2003, the Senate 
again approved unanimously a bill sponsored by Senator Carlos Diaz (Peronist party), 
which reproduced senator Genoud‟s bill.177 However, after a year, the bill died again in 
the House‟s committees without being considered. In December 2004, this time the 
House of Representatives approved, unanimously, a bill sponsored by deputy María 
Fernandez (Peronist party), which was largely based upon senator Genoud‟s bill.178 The 
bill, however, expired in the Senate.  
There are no easy explanations for the behavior of the legislature. Clearly, the 
lack of legislative decisiveness was not due to differences between the political parties (in 
fact, the Peronist and main opposition parties voted in favor of these bills when they 
reached the floor). Similarly, there were not main policy differences between the bills 
approved by the Senate in 2001 and 2003, and the bill passed by the House in 2004 
(indeed, all of them share the same policy core).179 In this regard, it is interesting to 
                                               
175 In fact, the Peronist party had controlled the government of the province of Buenos Aires for most of 
the time since the return to democracy in 1983. The UCR was in charge of government for a brief period 
(1983-1987), but after that, the Peronist party had always held the provincial executive. 
176  Bill E-71/01-02 (Diario de Sesiones del Senado de Buenos Aires, December 27, 2001,  p. 2816-2817). 
177 Bill E-17/03-04 (Diario de Sesiones del Senado de Buenos Aires  May 8, 2003, p. 306-307). 
178 Bill D/525/03-04.  In her speech in the House‟s plenary, deputy María Díaz explicitly stated that her 
project was largely based on Genoud‟s bill (see Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires, December 22, 2004, p. 6150-6151). 
179 The policy core of these bills was basically the same: i) they banned open air dumps in the entire 
province (at that time, open dumps were only banned in the metropolitan area); this was a measure that 
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transcribe a piece of Senator Díaz‟s speech during the Senate session, which stressed the 
lack of apparent reasons for explaining the inaction of the provincial assembly regarding 
these bills (own translation from Spanish): “…and we do not understand the reasons why 
this bill was repeatedly deferred by  the House of Representatives, even though the 
differences between the legislative blocks have been overcome and a consensus has been 
reached among all the political sectors  represented here…” (Diario de Sesiones del 
Senado de Buenos Aires  May 8, 2003, p. 306-307). 
Alternatively, one can hypothesize that the performance of the legislature on this 
issue can be explained in terms of short term costs vs. long term benefits. Arguably, the 
proposed changes in urban waste policy were likely to generate positive socio-
environmental consequences only in the middle or long term, while the costs of those 
policy reforms for local government and residents would occur in the short term. In this 
context, the different legislative blocks and sectors just let the issue flow back and forth 
through the legislative agenda and procedures without an explicit and open opposition but 
without a definitive and strong support neither. Implicitly, the legislature was allowing 
for the status quo to continue. 
Whatever the reason was, the legislature finally overcame its inaction when it 
approved law 13.592/06 on waste management. As explained above, this bill was 
forcefully promoted by the executive in order to fulfill with the agreements made at the 
provincial Supreme Court of Justice and under the threat of a judicially -order closing of 
the Punta Lara land fill. The executive, then, introduced the bill in the legislature on 
August 9, 2006, and less than six month later, it was already approved by the Senate 
(November 1, 2006) and by the House of Representatives (December 7, 2006).  A sharp 
                                                                                                                                            
raised some resistance among local governments because it was costly to implement; ii) they allow and 
encourage  municipal governments to take recycling and waste reduction measures (for many observers, 
this type of policy measures were generally resisted by CEAMSE because it affected it waste disposal 
business);  iii) they did not directly address the CEAMSE; the company was left intact and working. 
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contrast when compared to the legislative passivity that characterized the treatment of the 
previous bills. Clearly, the strong leadership and involvement of the executive in the 
legislative process was the key factor for the quick legislative response.180  
 
In contrast, state capacity issues did not play a significant role in the unfolding of 
the policy conflict around CEAMSE‟s policy in the Punta Lara landfill. The lack of 
enforcement of the 20 km. rule established by law 9111/78 was not due to deficiencies of 
the state apparatus but, as explained above, to the political preferences of the provincial 
government, who basically let CEAMSE carry out its policy towards Punta Lara. The 
same can be argued in relation to the lack of state authorization and control over 
CEAMSE‟s expansion of the Punta Lara landfill.  In fact, the availability of resources and 
technical capability of the provincial environmental agency to perform those basic tasks 
was not an issue in the policy debate, even though the lack of exercise of the state‟s 
police power was a main complaint of the social groups protesting against CEAMSE.  
 
Summing up, the judicialization of the Punta Lara dispute occurred in a political 
scenario in which the provincial government tacitly supported CEAMSE‟s policies and 
management towards the Punta Lara landfill even though the company was infringing the 
applicable legislation, and the provincial legislature was rather passive and unwilling to 
open the policy debate about where to dispose the waste from the metropolitan area. This 
led to the judicialization of the dispute around CEAMSE‟s policy in Punta Lara even in a 
                                               
180 It is worth noting, however, that law 13.592 did not gain the same broad political support as the 
previous bills (when they were approved by one of the houses). In this case, law 13.592 was approved with 
the support of the FPV (the governing electoral coalition led by the Kichnerist faction of the Peronist 
party), the Peronist dissidents, and some other smaller legislative blocks (the PAUFE and the PRO). Two of 
the main opposition parties, the UCR and the ARI, voted against the bill mainly because of the provision 
that allowed the provincial executive to assign sites for landfills without the intervention of the local 
governments (article 12). 
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context in which the involved social actors were relatively able to access the policy 
process and voice their concerns and the state apparatus was capable of enforcing the 
existing legislation. 
 
RE-NEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY TARIFFS   
In January 2002, in the context of one of the most acute economic, social and 
political crises affecting Argentina since the return to democracy in 1983, Senator 
Eduardo Duhalde was appointed interim president by the national legislative assembly.181 
The new administration quickly got congress to approve law 25.561, which declared a 
broad administrative, economic and financial emergency, and radically changed the 
existing economic and financial policy framework by ending the convertibility regime.182  
The emergency law greatly impacted on the public utility services sector.  Tariffs, 
which were previously tied to the US dollar, were converted to Argentine pesos at a rate 
of one-to one, and they could not longer be indexed to foreign inflation.183 The law also 
authorized the executive branch to renegotiate the contracts with the privatized public 
utility companies,184 and created a legislative bicameral commission (Comisión 
                                               
181 Senator Duhalde was one of the main leaders of the Peronist party, which was the main opposition party 
during the presidency of Fernando de La Rua (coalition UCR - FREPASO). In December 2001, President 
Fernando de La Rua renounced in middle of massive social protests against the government‟s economic 
policies. During the following few weeks, the office of the presidency changed hands several times creating 
even more uncertainty about the direction of the country. Furthermore, the argentine state had declared 
itself in default and the economy was into a deep recession. In this context, Senator Duhalde (who had been 
the Peronist candidate running against de La Rua in the 1999 presidential campaign)  was appointed  
interim president as a result of a broad political agreement between the Peronist party, the UCR, FREPASO  
and other parties with legislative representation. 
182 The convertibility regime was established in 1991. Basically, it legally guaranteed the exchange of 
Argentine pesos to US dollars at a one-to-one fixed rated. Moreover, it limited the printing of additional 
currency (pesos) only to amounts supported by the government‟s reserve in dollars. 
183 At the same time, the Argentine peso was devaluated. In few days the US dollar reached 3 Argentine 
pesos, while the tariffs had been converted to pesos at a 1 to 1 exchange rate.   
184 The emergency law (article 9) also mandated that the government should take into account the 
following five factors when renegotiating the public utility contracts: i) the impact of tariffs on the 
competitiveness of the economy and the distribution of income, ii) the quality of services, iii) the interests 
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Bicameral de Seguimiento) to monitor, verify and make pronouncements about the 
actions carried out by the executive.185 As expected, the public utility companies strongly 
reacted against the tariffs‟ “pesificación”. Most of the public utility sector was privatized 
during the 1990s, mainly to foreign companies and investors. Basically, the companies 
claimed that the “pesificación” and freezing of the tariffs affected their returns on the 
investments already made and, moreover, it discouraged much needed further 
investments in the sector. The companies‟ complaints were backed by international 
financial institutions and the governments from the countries where the companies were 
based. Both international financial institutions and foreign governments also began to 
heavily lobby Duhalde‟s administration to increase the tariffs.186  
On February 12, 2002, the government issued decree 293/2002, signaling the 
beginning of the re-negotiation of the contracts with the public utility companies. The 
decree stated that negotiations were to be centralized under the minister of economy, who 
would have 120 days to produce the new contract proposals. The decree also created a 
commission (Comisión de Renegociación de Contratos) which was in charge of advising 
and assisting the minister of economy during the process of re-negotiation; the decree 
also established that one member of the commission should be a representative of the 
consumers‟ associations (article 4). The government, however, was reluctant to 
incorporate the NGO‟s representative in the negotiation, and especially, to grant access to 
                                                                                                                                            
of the users and the accessibility of services, iv) the reliability of the services and iv) the profitability of the 
companies.  
185 Article 20 of the law also stated that the commission will be formed by six senators and six deputies 
based on a proportional representation of the different parties with legislative presence. Moreover, the chair 
of the commission will be proposed by the main opposition party in congress. 
186 See for instance, the coverage of La Nación which recounted a phone call from president Aznar (Spain) 
to president Duhalde, interceding on behalf  of the Spanish companies with investments in Argentina while 
the Argentine congress was still discussing the emergency law (La Nación, “En España reniegan del plan 
de Duhalde”, January 6, 2002). 
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the information provided by the public utility companies.187  Only by the end of April 
2002, after several formal protests made by the consumer groups, Ariel Caplan -the 
representative elected by the NGOS, was finally appointed as a member of the 
commission.188  
The executive also attempted to reduce the involvement of congress in the public 
utility contracts renegotiation. Decree 293/02 stated that the bicameral legislative 
commission established by the emergency law has to be informed by the executive about 
the development of the negotiations and the contracts‟ reforms, but the opinions of the 
legislative commission were not binding.  This triggered a negative reaction in congress, 
even among the Peronist legislative blocks.189 In fact, several Peronist legislators initially 
submitted bills to congress declaring that the opinions of the legislative commission were 
binding, and these proposals raised support among the opposition parties. However, when 
the issue was treated by the plenary of the House of Representative, the Peronist 
legislative block did not provide quorum and the proposals to give more involvement to 
congress in the re-negotiation process lapsed.  
Meanwhile the public utility companies were heavily lobbying the government to 
readjust the tariffs. During those months, several companies declared themselves, or 
threatened to declare themselves, in default.190 Furthermore, it was claimed that without 
tariff increases, the companies would not be able to guarantee the provision and the 
                                               
187 On March 18, 2002, the minister of economy issued resolution 20/2002, which detailed all the 
information that the public utility companies had to provide for the re-negotiation process. That information 
had to be submitted to the commission. 
188 However, the appointment of the consumer representative did not solve the problem of the lack of 
access to the information about the re-negotiation. Only after a judicial order ("Caplan, Ariel Orlando c/EN 
- Ministerio de Economía - Res. 20/02. Medida cautelar (Expte 127.160/2002)") , the government granted 
Caplan access to the information provided by the companies according to resolution 20/2002. For more 
details about the NGOs efforts to participate in the negotiation process, see the Proconsumer‟s reports 
(available at www.proconsumer.org.ar/actualidad/renegiciacion_de_loscontratos.htm) . 
189 La Nación (“El Congreso procura incidir en la discusión sobre tarifas públicas”, March 30, 2002) 
190 La Nación (“Los servicios públicos al borde del default. Metrogas es la primera privatizada que no paga 
su deuda”, March 26, 2002) 
 154 
quality of the services.191 The international pressure was also increasing; tariff adjustment 
was one of the main conditions of the IMF to grant new funds to the Argentina state.192 
By August, the government had openly announced that there will be increases in public 
utilities tariffs.193 Public hearings to consider tariff changes in water, energy and gas 
services were scheduled to take place during September 2002. The government made 
efforts to distinguish and separate the issue of the tariff adjustments from the 
renegotiation of the public utility contracts. It argued that the re-negotiation of the 
contracts was a long-term process, with long-term policy implications, which could not 
be resolved by the Duhalde administration which was an interim government.194 The 
tariff adjustment, instead, was an emergency measure aimed to avoid the collapse of the 
public utility services.195  
                                               
191See, for instance, the statement of the association of energy transporting companies -ADEERA- (La 
Nación, “Distribuidoras de energía eléctrica renovaron presiones para subir tarifas”, August 12, 2002). 
192 For instance, see the following paragraph  in the Proconsumer‟s report  describing the claims of the 
IMF mission visiting Argentina in August/September 2002 (own translation from Spanish): “…On 
September 6, 2002, in his last day in Argentina, the chief of the IMF mission, John Thorton, requested the 
government to move forward  the schedule for the public utility tariff increases. The request was based on 
two reasons: First….[Second] the countries where the companies are from, have a lot of leverage in the 
directory of the IMF…” (www.proconsumer.org.ar/actualidad/renegiciacion_de_los_contratos.htm).  See 
also media coverage in La Nación (“El FMI aconsejó aumentos tarifarios”, October 4, 2002; “El FMI 
insiste: mayor suba de tarifas”, October 23, 2002; “Lavagna viaja hoy a EEUU para firmar con el Fondo. 
Se comprometerá a cumplir un cronograma de suba de tarifas y desregulación cambiaria”, October 30, 
2002). 
193 The minister of economy, Roberto Lavagna, affirmed that the increases would not be higher than 10% 
(La Nación, “Admitió Economía que habrá aumentos de tarifas”, July 9, 2002). On August, the companies 
submitted their request for tariff increases; the requests varied depending on sector and type of coverage, 
but most increases ranged between 30 to 65% (La Nación, “Las privatizadas piden alzas del 9% al 493%”, 
August 24, 2002). 
194 On September 2002, the government issued decree 1893/02, extending the deadline for the 
renegotiation of the public utility contracts for almost a year. In that way, the Duhalde administration made 
sure that the renegotiation of the contracts would be resolved by the new incoming administration.  
195 See Lavagna‟s statement regarding the differences between tariff adjustments and the re-negotiation of 
contracts: "...one thing is the renegotiation of the contracts, which is a long term process, and another thing 
is the adjustment of the tariffs, which is to face the emergency...” (La Nación, “Privatizadas: La 
renegociación le quedará al próximo gobierno”; September 18, 2002).  Also, see Duhalde‟s claim that his 
government was an interim administration (La Nación, “Tarifas: Duhalde defendió la suba”; December 15, 
2002). 
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Consumer groups and other social actors strongly rejected the government‟s 
policy of increasing tariffs. A main argument was that the population was already 
suffering a very hard economic situation and could not afford tariff increases.196 
Furthermore, utility companies had extraordinary levels of profits during the 1990‟s and, 
therefore, any higher costs in the provision of services resulting from the pesification” 
should be faced by the companies not by the consumers.197 Finally, they claimed that 
changes in the tariff schemes had to be a part of the comprehensive re-negotiation of the 
public utility contracts -which included other items such as investment plans and quality 
of services-, as it was established by the emergency law approved by Congress.198  
During August and September, the social opposition to the government‟s policy 
on tariffs grew strong. Besides the consumer associations, other social actors such as the 
CTA (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos), different groups belonging to the 
“piqueteros” movement, small and medium business associations and other groups, 
openly opposed to potential increases in public utility tariffs. Street mobilizations and 
other type of collective protest against tariff increases were carried out in Buenos Aires 
and other parts of the country.199 A few days before the first of the public hearings 
organized by the government to discuss tariff increases, a group of consumer associations 
and the ombudsman office of the city of Buenos Aires filed a claim against the national 
                                               
196In fact, large sectors of the population were not even able to pay the current tariffs‟ level at the time. For 
instance, phone companies cut services to 300.000 users during the first months of 2002 because they were 
not paying their bills (La Nación, “Se dieron de baja en el último trimestre 300.000 teléfonos”; March 17, 
2002). 
197 During the convertibility regime, many utility companies took loans in US dollars in the international 
financial market because it was cheaper than in the Argentina‟s financial markets. With the “pesification” 
of the tariffs, the companies had now incomes in argentine pesos but debts in US dollars. This higher 
financial cost was one of the main arguments made by some companies to justify their requests for tariff 
increases.  
198 The main issues raised by the consumer associations are summarized in a six point memorandum  
submitted by the consumer representative Caplan to the commission of contract renegotiations ("Seis 
Puntos Básicos para la Renegociación de los Contratos de los Servicios Públicos", available in the 
Proconsumer Report). 
199 La Nación (“Apagón contra el aumento de tarifas”, September 24, 2002) 
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government in a federal district court ("Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores y Otros c/ 
Ministerio de Economia e Infraestructura -Resol 20/20 Amp. Proc. Sumarisimo (causa 
162.765/02)").200 Basically, the plaintiffs claimed that the public hearings had not been 
convened according to the proper legal and administrative regulations, and were 
organized just to consider tariff increases. They requested the judge to order the 
government to renegotiate the public utility contracts according to the procedures and 
criteria established by the emergency law 25.561. Furthermore, as a provisional remedy 
while the legal procedure was pending, the plaintiffs asked for the suspension of the 
hearings. A few days later, the judged granted the provisional remedy, stating that the 
hearings were convened exclusively to consider tariff adjustments.  
Facing the judicial suspension of the public hearings, the government modified its 
strategy and attempted to directly increase the tariffs by executive decree. On December 
2, 2002, the government issued decree 2437/02, and raised the tariffs on gas and energy. 
The national ombudsman, in coordination with the consumer associations, filed a new 
legal claim against the decree issued by national government ("Defensoria del Pueblo de 
la Nación c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional"  2002). Basically, the plaintiff argued that the 
government decision to increase the tariffs was violating the emergency law passed by 
congress, and requested that the court suspend the tariff increase as a provisional remedy 
when the legal procedure was pending. The government, in turn, justified the decree as an 
emergency measure aimed to adjust the tariffs in order to guarantee the provision and 
quality of the services. On December 12, 2002, the judge granted the provisional remedy 
and suspended the application of decree 2437/02.  
The government then took a more radical approach. On January 23, the Duhalde 
administration issued a necessity and emergency decree (decreto de necesidad y 
                                               
200 The claim was filed at Juzgado Federal contencioso administrativo # 3 of the city of Buenos Aires, 
Judge Claudia Rodríguez Vidal. 
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urgencia) which expressly modified emergency law 25.561, allowing the government to 
issue temporary tariff increases while the processes of contractual renegotiation were 
pending (decree 120/03).201 The government then increased the tariffs for gas and energy 
(decree 146/03). As expected, several legal actions were brought against the 
government‟s measures. On February 25, 2003, a federal district court suspended the 
tariff increases based on a legal claim filed by the consumer groups ("Unión de Usuarios 
y Consumidores y Otros c/ Ministerio de Economia e Infraestructura -Resol 20/20 Amp. 
Proc. Sumarisimo"  2003). A few days later, another federal district court also suspended 
the increases based on a legal claim filed by the national ombudsman office ("Defensor 
del Pueblo de la Nación c/ EN PEN - Dec 120/03 s/proceso de conocimiento - incidente 
medida cautelar (causa 369/2003)"  2003). In both cases, the courts rejected the 
government‟s justification to exercise legislative power belonging to congress. 
Furthermore, the courts affirmed that, according to emergency law 25.561, any revision 
of the tariff schemes had to be a part of the comprehensive re-negotiation of the public 
utility contracts.202 
                                               
201 A necessity and urgency decree (decreto de necesidad y urgencia, also known as DNU) is a special 
kind of decree issued by the executive. Unlike regular decrees, DNUs have the force of law.  In this way, 
DNUs represent an exercise by the executive, of legislative power belonging to congress. The executive 
power to issue DNU was established by the constitutional reform of 1994 (although previous 
administrations had already issued this type of decree). Article 99 (c) of the Argentine constitution states 
that DNU can be issued only under exceptional situations, when it is not possible to follow the normal 
procedure to create laws in Congress. In addition, the President cannot sanction DNU's legislating about 
criminal, tributary or electoral matters.  
202 However, it is worth mentioning that there was one judicial resolution which did not suspend the tariff 
increases based on DNU 120/03 ("Defensoria del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires c/ Ministerio de 
Economia"  2003). In this case, the judge did not resolve the plaintiff‟s request to suspend the tariff 
increase. Instead, the judge ordered the government to provide information about the process of 
renegotiation with the public utility companies. Implicitly, the court‟s resolution was allowing the 
government to increase the tariffs. Nevertheless, the tariff increases were suspended by the other 
resolutions mentioned above.  
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By March and April of 2003, Argentina was fully into the presidential campaign. 
Duhalde had already announced that he was not going to run for president, and the issue 
of the public utility tariffs was left to be resolved by the incoming administration. 
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
The social opposition to the public utility tariff increases was not a strict loser of 
the policy process. Law 25.561 was relatively clear when stating that any changes in the 
public utility tariffs ought to be part of the general renegotiation of the public utility 
contracts. The different government‟s attempts to increase the tariffs independently of the 
contracts‟ renegotiation were criticized by the consumer groups and their allies as 
violating the emergency law approved by congress. Even the government –implicitly- 
recognized that it was not fulfilling the existing legal framework when it tried to modify 
the emergency law by a necessity and urgency decree (DNU 120/03), which would have 
allowed the executive to modify tariffs while the contract renegotiations were pending.  
In short, the consumer groups and their allies were basically demanding the government 
to apply the existing legislation when dealing with the issue of public utility tariffs. 
 
In relation to the political leverage of social groups opposing the tariff increases, 
they were relatively able to access and be part of the policy process. Decree 293/02 stated 
that consumer groups had to be part of the contract renegotiation commission. Although, 
at first, the government did not facilitate the participation of the consumer representative, 
the consumer associations were finally able to be part of the commission and to access to 
the information, which strengthened their position as active players in the policy process. 
They had access to government officials working on the matter, and even met with the 
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minister of economy to discuss the issue of the tariffs.203  In my interview with Ariel 
Caplan, the consumer representative in the Comisión de Renegociación de Contratos, he 
outlined  how the participation in the commission  gave them a position of  relative 
authority in relation to the public utility companies and other  governmental agencies 
involved in the process: “…at the beginning we did not know much about the public 
utility contracts and the negotiations (there were over 50 different contracts)…but we 
learned a lot….we gathered a lot of information……, the companies came  to talk with 
us…it is easier when you are in a situation of relative  power… ” (Interview with Ariel 
Caplan, Buenos Aires, April 8, 2008). 
Moreover, the opposition to the tariff increases was composed not only by 
consumer associations but also by a broad range of social actors such as unions 
(especially the CTA), business associations, “piqueteros” groups, etc.204 The national 
ombudsman office and the ombudsman of the city of Buenos Aires were also actively 
involved in the dispute about the tariffs. More generally, public opinion was also largely 
against any increases in tariffs given the broad and acute economic crisis affecting the 
country. Finally, the policy conflict was widely covered by the national media, which 
helped raising public attention about the issue, and arguably, strengthened the capability 
of the groups opposing the increases in the tariffs to voice their arguments and critiques 
against the government‟s policy. 
  
In relation to the role of the executive, the government clearly supported the tariff 
increases but it was not willing to carry out a full re-negotiation of the public utility 
contracts. As described above, a main argument developed by the Duhalde administration 
                                               
203 See for instance, the media coverage of the meeting between the consumers‟ associations and the 
minister of economy at the end of May, 2002, when the first news about tariffs increases were leaked to the 
public (La Nación, “Deciden no aumentar las tarifas de servicios; May 30, 2002). 
204 Interview with Ariel Caplan ( Buenos Aires, April 8, 2008). 
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was that they were a transition government; a full re-negotiation of the public utility 
contracts implied taking long-term policy decisions that ought to be made by a newly 
democratically elected government, with full electoral legitimacy and a clear policy 
mandate. In fact, the government extended the deadlines for the re-negotiation of 
contracts (which in practice meant that the contracts would be re-negotiated by the 
incoming administration), while at the same time it was attempting to raise the tariffs in 
the short-term.205 The government justified its policy decision to increase the tariffs on 
the need to maintain the quality of the services provided by the public utility companies, 
which were arguably harmed by the pesification and freezing of the tariffs. Furthermore, 
the government‟s policy can also be explained as a result of the lobby of the foreign 
governments and international financial institutions, especially the IMF, which included 
the issue of tariff increases among the conditions for granting financial aid to Argentina. 
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that government supported the increase of the public 
utility tariffs, while at the same time it did not advance in the re-negotiation of the 
contracts. 
 
The national congress, in its turn, played a relatively passive role in the dispute 
about tariff increases, allowing the executive to exercise its power in a quite discretionary 
way in order to pursue the tariff reform. As explained above, the emergency law 25.561 
established a bicameral commission to monitor the public utility contract re-negotiation. 
However, when the government issued decree 293/02, it stated that the legislative 
commission‟s reports were not binding. In this way, the government attempted to reduce 
the involvement of congress in the issue. This triggered an initial negative reaction 
among the different legislative blocks, including the Peronist legislative block which, at 
                                               
205 La Nación (“Privatizadas: la renegociación le quedará al próximo gobierno”, September 18, 2002). 
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the time, had a large majority in the Senate and a near majority in the House of 
Representatives. Several Peronist legislators, then, submitted bills declaring that the 
opinions of the legislative commission were binding, and these proposals raised support 
among opposition parties.206 In this context, the Duhalde administration placed a lot of 
pressure on the Peronist legislators, especially through the Peronist governors, to align 
the Peronist legislative blocks with the government‟s policy in the matter.207 A main 
argument used by the government was that the fate of the economic agreement with the 
IMF -which would allow the national as well as provincial governments to access badly 
needed new funds- was linked to an increase in the public utility tariffs.208 At the end, the 
government was successful in its efforts to bring into line most of the Peronist legislators. 
When the bill granting more power to congress in the contracts re-negotiations was 
scheduled to be discussed in the plenary of the House of Representative, a large part of 
the Peronist legislative block did not provide quorum for the sessions, and the bill 
lapsed.209 Similarly, the legislature did not react when the Duhalde administration issued 
the decree of necessity and urgency 120/02, exercising legislative power that belonged to 
congress.210 Furthermore, the conformation of the bicameral commission established by 
                                               
206 There were seven bills related to this issue which were harmonized in one legislative project , file 4230-
D-02 (online database of the Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina).  
207 It is worth remembering that the Duhalde‟s administration did not fully control the Peronist legislative 
blocks in congress. Instead, the individual legislators were much more sensible to the political needs of the 
governors of their provinces, who were their more direct political bosses. 
208 See media coverage in La Nación (“Respaldo de los gobernadores para acordar con el FMI”; November 
18, 2002; “Pacto para avanzar por decreto en las tarifas”, November 19, 2002). Also, PROCONSUMER 
report  (available online www.proconsumer.org.ar/actualidad/renegiciacion_de_los_contratos.htm).  
209 See the congressional record of the House of Representative session on August 28, 2002 (Diario de 
Sesiones de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina, 13a Sesión Ordinaria, item 4230-
D-02, August 28, 2002).  There were, however, some few Peronist legislators that still supported a stronger 
role for congress in the re-negotiation of the public utility contracts. For instance, see the statements of 
legislator Oscar Gonzales during that same legislative session.  
210 La Nación (“El Congreso no objetará la medida”, December 1, 2002). It is worth noting that the 
Duhalde‟s administration issued the DNU 120/02 the day after the legislative ordinary period was over, and 
congress was beginning its extraordinary sessions. During the extraordinary sessions, congress can only 
treat the legislative agenda set by the executive, and the government did not include the DNU 120/02 as 
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the emergency law to monitor the contract renegotiation was delayed for several months. 
In fact, the commission‟s internal regulation, a basic legal tool needed for the 
commission to operate, was only approved by the end of February 2003,211 more than 
half a year after the Duhalde government openly announced its plan to increase the public 
utility tariffs and began taking measures to that end. 
Given that the Peronist party had control of the national legislature, it is 
reasonable to ask why the Duhalde administration did not attempt to get congress to 
modify the emergency law so as to allow the executive to directly raise the tariffs? A 
tentative response could be that the Peronist legislative majority was not willing to pay 
the political costs of voting in favor of a law raising tariffs in the context of a dramatic 
social and economic crisis, and with a presidential election coming soon. In any case, and 
whatever the reasons were, it is quite clear that the national congress played a rather 
passive role in the policy dispute about the public utility tariffs, allowing the executive 
interpret and apply the existing legislation in a discretionary way in order to achieve its 
policy goals. 
 
Finally, state capacity issues were not relevant in the development of this policy 
conflict. Arguably,  the economic crisis affecting Argentine at that time, and especially 
the government‟s need to access to the international financial markets, made the 
Argentine state more vulnerable to the lobby of the IMF and foreign governments. 
However, while international pressure may help explain why the Duhalde administration 
pursued the increases in public utility tariffs so vehemently, it does not speak to the 
capability of the state apparatus to regulate and control the public utility services. In fact, 
                                                                                                                                            
part of the agenda. Arguably, this provided a formal justification for congress in general, and for the 
Peronist legislative majority in particular, to explain its lack of attention to the issue.  
211 See Reglamento de la Comisión Bicameral de seguimiento de las facultades delegadas al Poder 
Ejecutivo Nacional - Ley 25.561 (2003). 
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the lack of re-negotiation of the public utility contracts was not due to deficiencies in the 
capability of the state to carry out those very complex technical negotiations, but to a 
political decision of Duhalde‟s administration. As mentioned above, Duhalde himself 
stated that the public utility re-negotiations should be carried out by a new, elected 
government and not by his interim government.  
 
Summing up, the judicialization of this policy dispute occurred in a context in 
which the national government took measures to raise public utility tariffs but it was not 
willing to carry out a full re-negotiation of the public utility contracts as mandated by the 
national emergency law, and congress was rather passive on this issue, allowing the 
executive to exercise its power in a quite discretionary way in order to pursue the tariff 
reform. Under this political scenario, the dispute become judicialized even when the 
social actors opposing the tariff increases were relatively able to be part of the policy 
process and voice their concerns, and state capacity issues were not relevant in the 
development of the policy dispute. 
 
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTE ABOUT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S LAND RIGHTS 
IN SALTA: THE LHAKA HONHAT CASE  
Note: given that the chapter has already a considerable length, I do not develop a 
detailed, historical case study of this dispute like in the previous three cases. Instead, I 
provide a very brief summary of the main events that lead to the judicialization of the 
dispute.  
This case refers to the claims made by Lhaka Honhat, an association of 
indigenous communities, for a collective land right over an area known as fiscal lots 
(lotes fiscales) 55 and 14 owned by the province of Salta. Fiscal lots 14 and 55 are 
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located in an area near the Pilcomayo River, in the northeast of the province of Salta. 
They are home to some 45 indigenous communities (between 6000 and 7000 people) 
belonging to five different ethnic groups who have been living in the area since time 
immemorial. The indigenous communities coexist with about 2600 criollos (non-
indigenous population). This is a sparsely populated zone, with few signs of urbanization, 
covering about 650,000 hectares.212  
In 1991, with the support of the Anglican church in Argentina and International 
Survival (an international NGO working on indigenous rights issues), the indigenous 
communities living in the fiscal lots created a legal entity, the association Lhaka Honhat, 
in order to be legally able to request a collective land title (Carrasco and Zimerman 
2006); in July 1991, they formally submitted their request to the state of Salta.213 By the 
end of that year, few days before finishing his term, the administration of governor 
Cornejo (Peronist party), made an agreement with Lhaka Honhat ratified by decree 
2601/91, by which the provincial government agreed to grant a collective property right 
to the communities living in the fiscal lots, with no subdivisions and in a single title. With 
the change of government, the new administration of governor Ulloa (Salta Renovator 
Party) ratified the agreement and created a commission formed by experts and the 
interested parties to operationalize the agreement.214 By 1995, the commission issued its 
report, making recommendations about how to distribute the land between the indigenous 
                                               
212Data cited by the admissibility resolution of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006); 
also see (Carrasco and Zimerman 2006). 
213 At that time, indigenous communities were not recognize as legal entities; for that reason, they 
constituted this non - profit association called  Lhaka Honha. When Lhaka Honhat formally submitted its 
request for a collective land title, the request also included a set of documentation such as a written history 
and map of the indigenous settlements and the economic uses of the territory. The work was done by a 
group of experts, many of which were closely linked with the Anglican Church in Argentina, and with the 
support of Survival International and ICCO (Inter Church organization for development cooperation). For 
an account of the process of producing this documentations see Carrasco and Briones (1996).  
214 The commission was formed by experts from the local universities (Salta Catholic university and 
National University of Salta), as well as with representatives from the government of Salta, Lhaka Honhat 
and the criollos families also settled in the lots.  
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communities and the criollos living in the area, and Ulloa‟s administration ratified it 
(decree 3097/95).215  
However, time passed and the communities did not receive the land title. On the 
contrary, the Ulloa government began building a bridge over the Pilcomayo river and 
carrying out other infrastructural works, which allegedly affected indigenous 
communities settled in the area.216 Moreover, in 1999, the government of Salta (at this 
time, under the administration of governor Romero, from the Peronist party) granted 
several individual property rights to criollos families and indigenous groups in lots 55 
and 14 (decree 461/99). In that context, the indigenous association filed a recurso de 
amparo against the government‟s measure, which was rejected by the provincial courts, 
but finally was favorably resolved by the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice 
("Asociación de Comunidades Aborigenes Lhaka Honhat c/ Poder Ejecutivo de la 
provincia de Salta -Recurso de Hecho"  2004). Previously, Lhaka Honhat had filed a 
claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in relation to 
the damages resulting from the construction of the bridge and other public works carried 
out by the provincial government.217 In the context of this claim, in 2000, Lhaka Honhat, 
                                               
215 Basically, the commission recommended granting 2/3 of the lots to the indigenous communities in the 
form of community ownership, with no subdivisions, and a single title, and 1/3 to the criollos families. 
Decree 3097 ratified the recommendations, and it stated that the executive will submit a bill to the congress 
to grant the land according to the recommendations made by the commission. Moreover, it states that until 
that bill is approved, the fiscal lots 55 and 14 were declared areas of environmental protection and 
recovery. 
216 In August 1996, the chiefs of the indigenous communities decided to block the international bridge as a 
protest for damages caused in the indigenous settlement Misión La Paz, but more broadly for the lack of the 
government‟s response to their land claim. For 23 days, over 1000 indigenous people block the bridge. The 
blockade finished on September 16, when the chief minister of the administration of governor Romero 
visited the site and signed a memorandum of understanding with the indigenous communities, by which the 
government made the commitment to grant the collective land title in 90 days. However, after the 90 days, 
there were no advances regarding the regularization of the communities land tenure rights. For a detail 
description of the events in the bridge, see Carrasco and Briones (1996, 232-242). 
217 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is an autonomous organ of the Organization of 
American States (OAS), which receives, analyzes and investigates individual petitions which allege human 
rights violations. For more information about the IACHR and its quasi judicial procedure see the web site 
of the commission (www.cidh.org/what.htm).  
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the national government and the government of Salta began a friendly settlement 
proceeding at the IACHR with the purpose of solving the communal land right issue. 
However, by 2005, the government of Salta left the negotiating table, and began granting 
individual land titles again (Carrasco and Zimerman 2006). Accordingly, the legal 
procedure before the IACHR was re-opened and the judicialization of the dispute 
continued.218 
Based on this brief summary, it can be argued that the indigenous communities 
were not losers of the policy process. In 1991, the government of Salta made a legal 
commitment (ratified again in 1995) to grant a collective land right to the indigenous 
communities living in the lots 55 and 14. The communities, then, were basically 
requesting that the state comply with an existing legal obligation. However, the measures 
needed to implement that commitment were not taken, and under the administration of 
governor Romero, the government of Salta openly began granting individual rights over 
the same land committed to the communities. In this scenario, the legislative branch of 
government played a rather passive and deferential role towards the executive on this 
matter. The provincial legislature was clearly not the venue in which this policy process 
and debate evolved.219 Meanwhile, the indigenous communities forming Lhaka Honhat 
                                                                                                                                            
The complain before the IACHR was the result of  a long process of judicialization that began in 1995, 
with a recurso de amparo filed by Lhaka Honhat against the government of Salta, requesting the 
suspension of the public works and the bridge construction over the Pilcomayo river. The provincial courts 
ruled against the association, and Lhaka Honhat appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice, which in 
February 1998, also rejected its claim. At this stage, with the support of CELS, the indigenous communities 
filed their claim before the IACHR.  
218 In October 2006, the IACHR declared the Lhaka Honhat‟s petition  admissible and  began its 
examination of the merits of the case ("Report Nº 78/06. Petition 12.094 Admissibility. Aboriginal 
Community of Lhaka Honhat - Argentina"  2006). 
219 The only mayor intervention of the provincial legislature in this policy dispute occurred in July 2005, 
when it approved a bill submitted by the governor Romero calling for a referendum in the county where 
fiscal lots 14 and 55 were located. The Peronist party (the party of government) had a large majority in both 
houses, and easily approved the bill submitted by the executive. The residents were asked whether they 
agreed that the lands corresponding to fiscal lots 14 and 55 should be turned over to their current occupants. 
The question was intentionally broad and vague, and the result was (as expected) overwhelming in support 
of the YES. The government used the result to justify granting individual property rights to criollos and 
indigenous people living in the fiscal lots.  
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had the support of the Anglican Church and indigenous rights activists and organizations, 
which were critical allies in helping the communities to organize themselves and 
formalize their claims. However, the political leverage of the indigenous communities 
living the lots 55 and 14 was very limited. Their population was not significant in 
electoral terms;220 furthermore, the provincial political elites were reluctant to recognize 
Lhaka Honhat as the monolithic voice of the communities, and individual indigenous 
groups and families were target of clientelists practices aiming to weaken their claim for 
an indivisible, collective land right.221 Summing up, the judicialization of the dispute 
occurred in a context in which the provincial government was forcefully opposed to grant 
the collective land right as established by existing regulations, the provincial legislature 
was passive and deferential to the executive on this matter, and the involved indigenous 
groups had a limited political leverage.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The judicialization of the policy disputes analyzed in this chapter occurred under 
a similar, basic causal configuration. In all the cases, the social groups making claims on 
the state were not, in a strict sense, losers of the policy process. They were posing 
demands on the state that were based upon existing legislation, establishing relatively 
clear policy mandates that the governments were not fulfilling or enforcing properly. In 
the cases of Jujuy and Salta, the provincial states had taken clear legal commitments to 
transfer land rights to their indigenous communities, which were not implementing. In the 
                                               
220 678.000 people were able to vote in Salta for the 2003 election for governor (source: Tow, Atlas de 
Elecciones en Argentina). Given that the entire indigenous population living in lots 55 and 14 is around 
7000 people according to Carrasco and Zimerman (2006, 23) , we can conclude that the indigenous voters 
from this area easily represent  less than 1% of the provincial electorate.  
221 See, for instance, several government measures denounced in the sub-headings 42-43 of the 
admissibility resolution of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2006). 
 168 
case of CEAMSE‟s management of the Punta Lara landfill, the government of the 
province of Buenos Aires was not enforcing the existing environmental legislation. 
Likewise, in the case of utility tariff increases, the national government was not 
complying with the emergency law, which clearly required a full re-negotiation of the 
public utility contracts. 
In contrast to the cases analyzed in the previous chapter 3, the lack of 
implementation or enforcement of existing legislation in the cases examined in this 
chapter was not related to deficiencies in the state apparatus. In fact, state capacity issues 
were not relevant in the development of any of these policy disputes. Instead, the key 
political condition explaining weak implementation or enforcement was the opposition of 
the governments to comply with existing legal regulations. In the case of Jujuy, the 
provincial government not only was extremely slow in transferring land rights to the 
indigenous communities as mandated by the existing legislation, but also, through other 
agencies of the state, the government took measures that clearly contradict the goals of 
the indigenous land program. A similar situation occurred in the case of Salta, where the 
Romero administration did not take measures to transfer the communal land right to 
Lhaka Honhat as established by provincial norms, and instead, began granting individual 
property rights over the same land. Similarly, in the case of the public utility, the Duhalde 
administration made several different attempts to increase the tariffs independently of the 
contract renegotiations, even though the Emergency Law 25561 was quite clear when 
stating that any changes in the tariffs ought to be part of a general renegotiation of the 
public utility contracts. Likewise, in the case of the Punta Lara landfill, the provincial 
executive tacitly endorsed CEAMSE‟s decision to dispose outer jurisdictional waste in 
Punta Lara and to expand the landfill capabilities; therefore, the provincial government 
 169 
neither fully exercised its policy power to control CEAMSE nor attempted to enforce the 
existing environmental legislation. 
Furthermore, in all these policy disputes, the legislative assemblies were quite 
passive, they did not fully exercise their check and balance powers, allowing the 
executive to apply existing legislation according to its own policy preferences or even not 
to apply it at all. In the case of Jujuy, the provincial legislature clearly failed to exercise 
its oversight role over the government‟s implementation of the indigenous land program 
(PRATPAJ). This should not be surprising given that the party of the government, the 
Peronist party, also controlled the legislature. In fact, the Peronist party has controlled 
Jujuy‟s political and institutional system since the return to democracy in 1983. A similar 
situation occurred in the dispute about indigenous land rights in Salta, where the 
legislature –fully controlled by the party of the government- was aligned with the 
executive on this matter, and did not oversee the government‟s implementation of 
existing provincial norms. Likewise, in the dispute about the public utility tariffs, the 
national congress also played a quite passive role in relation to the executive throughout 
the policy process. The Duhalde administration reduced by decree the power of the 
bicameral legislative commission established by law 25561, limiting the involvement of 
congress in issues related to the public utility contract re-negotiations. Later, the 
government exercised power that belonged to congress when it modified law 25561 by a 
decree of necessity and urgency, and in that way, it attempted to open a window to raise 
the tariffs. In both situations, congress did not react limiting and containing the executive. 
Finally, in the dispute about CEAMSE and the Punta Lara landfill, the role of the 
provincial legislature can also be characterized as rather passive. As explained above, 
there were several bills about waste policy during the period we examined, but all lapsed 
in one chamber or another without being considered. Interestingly, this lack of legislative 
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decisiveness was not due to differences between the political parties. In fact, the Peronist 
party (which controlled the executive and the provincial legislature) and the main 
opposition parties, voted in favor of these bills when they reached the floor (but then, no 
party openly championed the bills when they were treated in the second chamber). The 
legislature only overcame its inaction and inefficiency when the provincial executive 
forcefully promoted a new bill on waste management (law 13.592/06), which one of its 
purpose was to help solving the situation in Punta Lara. By that time, however, the 
dispute around the Punta Lara landfill was already deeply judicialized.  
In relation to the political leverage of the social actors involved in each of these 
policy disputes, there were some differences among the cases. In the Jujuy case, the local 
indigenous groups and its allies showed a high level of organized collective action and 
were able to be part of the policy making processes about the land tenure rights. A similar 
situation occurred in the dispute about the re-negotiation of the public utility contracts, 
where the consumers associations had a relative direct access to the policy process. In 
contrast, the indigenous groups claiming for communal land rights in Salta had a limited 
political leverage when dealing with the provincial political institutions, although they 
had support from national and international NGOs and the Anglican Church. Meanwhile, 
in the case of the social actors protesting against CEAMSE‟s policy in Punta Lara, their 
political leverage at the provincial level was rather limited, but the social groups showed 
a high level of mobilization at the local level and were quite able to sustain their 
advocacy efforts through time, which helped placing the issue in the public agenda. In 
short, there was some variation in the level of political leverage showed by the social 
actors involved in each of the policy processes. However, regardless of this variation, all 
four policy disputes were judicialized, which indicates that the political leverage of the 
social actors was not a relevant causal factor at least in this political scenario.  
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Summing up, the judicialization of the public policies examined in this chapter 
occurred in political contexts that were characterized by the resistance (or even the open 
opposition) of the executive branch to implement existing policies or to act according to 
existing regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, the opposition of the government was 
complemented by a rather passive and deferential legislature, which did not fully exercise 
its powers and oversight role, allowing the political elites in charge of the executive to 
interpret and apply existing laws and policies according to their own policy preferences. 
This combination of a discretionary exercise of executive power and weak legislative 
control and oversight over the executive, constituted the critical political scenario under 
which these disputes about public policy issues became judicialized. 
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CHAPTER 6: LACK OF POLITICAL LEVERAGE AS A SOURCE 
OF JUDICIALIZATION 
This chapter describes and compares three of our cases of judicialization of public 
policy in Argentina: the re-structuring of the phone tariffs that occurred during the 1990s, 
the dispute about oil drilling in the Llancanelo wetlands in the province of Mendoza, and 
the re-negotiation of the Metropolitan train concessions during the Menem 
administration. It also analyzes, although briefly, the conflict over environmental 
pollution in the Matanza-Riachuelo basin.  Our QCA analysis shows that all these cases 
shared a basic pattern: the judicialization of these policy issues were triggered by social 
actors with very low political leverage, unable to modify the existing status quo in certain 
policy field or to block policy reforms promoted by the governments.  
To a large extent, this configuration reflects the political disadvantage argument 
developed by the literature on legal mobilization, which points out that policy litigation is 
basically pursued by social groups that have structural difficulties or limitations to access 
and affect majoritarian or regulatory policy processes (Cortner 1968; Sathe 2002; also 
Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006). However, a main contribution of our QCA 
analysis is that it also shows that these groups, although they are politically 
disadvantaged, they are not necessarily losers of the policy process. In half of the cases 
covered by this configuration, the involved social groups were basically demanding the 
implementation or enforcement of policy mandates that were previously approved (for 
whatever reason) by the legislature or regulatory agencies, and therefore were already 
part of the existing normative and policy framework. In sum, the distinguishing feature of 
these policy disputes is that they became judicialized in political scenarios in which the 
involved social groups had a limited capability to access and be part of policy 
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negotiations, regardless of whether they lost in the majoritarian policymaking venues or 
were demanding the proper implementation/enforcement of existing legislation.  
As explained in the previous empirical chapters, the purpose of the case studies is 
twofold. In the first place, a detailed, historical analysis of each of these policy disputes 
allows for assessing the fsQCA coding on these cases. Second, they allow for examining 
the internal validity of the causal configurations (the minimal formulas) identified 
through the QCA analysis. As in the previous chapters, the case studies are organized in 
two sections. The first part is a historical description of how a particular policy issue 
evolved and became judicialized. This part emphasizes the chain of events and situations 
leading to the judicialization of that policy dispute. The second part constitutes a more 
structured and focused analysis. It only deals with those aspects or features of a case that 
directly speaks to the conditions that are theoretically relevant for this study. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the similarities and differences between all the 
cases examined in the chapter. 
Following, I include the fuzzy set coding of the casual conditions for the four 
cases analyzed in this chapter. 













.67 (1) .67 .67 .67 .33 
Oil production 
Llancanelo 
.33 .67 .33 1 .33 
Train service 
reform 
1 .67 .33 1 .33 
Pollution 
Riachuelo basin 
.33 1 .67 .67 1 
(1) In fuzzy set language, 1 means a case has full membership in a set, .67 means that a case is more in than 
out of a set, .33 means a case is more out than in a set, and 0 means a case is clearly excluded from the set. 
When these scores are translated into Boolean logic, scores 1 and .67 indicate that, in a given case, a causal 
condition is relevant or present. On the contrary, scores .33 and 0 indicates that a causal condition is 
irrelevant or absent. 
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THE RE-STRUCTURING OF THE PHONE TARIFFS  
The re-structuring of the phone tariffs during the Menem administration was one 
of the most intense and disputed tariffs conflicts resulting from the privatization of public 
services that occurred in the 1990s. The telecommunication sector was the first major 
public service to be privatized by the Menem government. ENTEL, the state-owned 
company that had the monopoly of the telephone services, was privatized in 1990 through 
an open and public bidding process.222 To that end, ENTEL was broken down into two 
units, each one covering roughly half of the country, and the government offered seven 
years exclusivity to the winning bidder in each region, with the prospect of extending the 
exclusivity period for three more years if certain investment conditions were satisfied. A 
consortium led by Telefónica de España won the bid for the southern half of the country, 
which included a large portion of Buenos Aires metropolitan area, while France Telecom 
was awarded the northern region. 
The new phone companies began providing the services based on a similar tariff 
structure to the one used by ENTEL. Basically, tariffs for local urban calls were relatively 
low in comparison with long distance and international service rates. Some observers 
even framed this structure in terms of long distance and international services 
“subsidizing” local phone services in the large urban areas. Given that Telefónica and 
Telecom had regional monopolies for local as well as for long distance/international 
services, this tariff structure was not a main issue at the moment of the privatization. 
However, few years later, Telecom and Telefónica began facing a very strong 
                                               
222 Decree 731/89 established the process for the privatization of ENTEL. The state company was finally 
privatized in November 1990.  
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competition in the long distance segment, from companies located abroad which offered 
call back services at a very low price.  
In this context, the re-structuring of the phone tariffs became a main issue of 
negotiation between the government and the phone companies. By September 1994, the 
government announced its support for a proposal made by the companies, which 
basically consisted of an average 15% reduction in long distance tariffs and a general 
tariff increase in local phone services which could amount to over 60% depending on the 
area.223 ADELCO, one of the few consumer associations existing at the time, quickly 
filed a recurso de amparo.224 The plaintiff argued that the government had first to 
convoke a public hearing to discuss the tariff reform as established by article 42 of the 
national constitution.225 The presiding judge granted a preliminary injunction requested 
by ADELCO, and stopped the government from moving forward with the tariff reform. 
In this context, the government decided to organize a public hearing (the first in the 
privatized telecommunication sector), which was held in December 1994. In the hearing, 
the re-structuring of the tariffs  faced the expected opposition of consumer groups, but 
also it was largely resisted by the board of the CNT (Comisión Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones), the agency in charge of controlling the phone companies; and the 
tariff reform proposal did not advance (Urbiztondo et al. 1998, 384).226  
                                               
223 See brief description of this tariff reform proposal in La Nación (“Vuelve a negociarse la tarifa de 
teléfonos”, October 18, 1996). 
224 In her book, Rhodes (2006, 84-85) states  that ADELCO‟s representatives learned  thought the media 
about the government‟s agreement with the phone companies. They immediately contacted and requested a 
meeting with the involved government officials, but their efforts were unsuccessful. 
225 Article 42 of the constitution reformed in 1994 refers to consumer‟s rights. 
226 The CNT was created by the Menem administration when Entel was privatized in 1990. The first 
CNT‟s board was directly appointed by the national government and it was characterized by the low 
technical and professional capability of its members, which greatly affected the credibility and prestige of 
the agency (Urbiztondo et al. 1998). In October 1993, the government reformed the commission and 
carried out an open selection process (which involved competitive examinations) for appointing the new 
members of the CNT‟s board.  This was the board who opposed the re-structuring of the tariffs.  
In relation to the re-structuring of the phone tariffs, although the CNT did not have the final decision power 
about the issue, its opposition greatly affected the prospect of the companies‟ proposal in the short term. 
 176 
However, the Menem administration strongly supported the idea of re-structuring 
the phone tariffs.227 In May 1995, few months after the hearing, the Menem 
administration intervened the CNT and removed its board (decree 702/95). The agency‟s 
autonomy was greatly reduced and the policymaking process in relation to the tariffs was 
further centralized by the government, creating a more favorable environment for the re-
structuring negotiations.228 In parallel, the government hired an international consultant, 
the National Economic Research Center (NERC), to produce alternative scenarios for re-
balancing the phone tariffs. In January 1996, the government organized a public hearing 
in the city of Buenos Aires, in which four different proposals for tariff restructuring 
generated by the NERC were presented to the public. The core of the proposals was 
basically the same: to reduce long distance tariffs, while increasing local services costs.  
229 In the hearing, the national ombudsman office and consumer associations manifested 
their opposition to increasing urban phone tariffs.230 A few months later, in October 1996, 
the government requested Telefónica and Telecom to submit their own proposals for 
restructuring the tariffs. By the end of October, the companies submitted their proposals, 
which included a 100% increase in local call tariffs during peak times and a 40% 
reduction in long distance tariffs.231 The government, then, convoked a new public 
hearing to discuss the companies‟ proposal, which took place in the city of Posadas on 
December 5-11. Several provincial governors and mayors of provincial cities and towns 
(most of them belonging to the Peronist party) spoke in the hearing in favor of re-
                                               
227 Some members of government, especially the minister of economy Domingo Cavallo, saw in the re-
structuring of tariff the possibility to request the phone companies to liberalize the telecommunication 
market before the dateline established in the original concession. See, for instance, references to a 
Cavallo‟s statement about this issue in La Nación (“La apertura telefónica está en camino”, February 11, 
1997). 
228 The re-structuring negotiations were basically conducted by the Secretary of Communications. 
229 La Nación (“Nuevas tarifas telefónicas, January 30, 1996) 
230 La Nación (No subirán por ahora las tarifas telefónicas”, January 31;  “Todavía no está cerrado el 
debate respecto de las tarifas telefónicas” February 1, 1997). 
231 La Nación (“ Las telefónicas proponen alzas y subas en sus precios”, November 30, 1996) 
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structuring the phone tariffs; they stressed that the current structure favored the large 
urban areas, mainly the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, in detriment of the smaller 
provincial cities and towns.232 Similar arguments were made by several provincial 
business associations, which outlined the higher communication costs facing businesses 
operating from the provinces. The opposition to the phone companies‟ proposal was 
embodied by the national ombudsman office and different consumer associations which 
basically agreed that inter urban/international phone tariffs needed to be reduced, but 
stressed that the phone companies had had extraordinary profits since the privatization of 
the services, and therefore they should face the costs of re-structuring the tariffs, not the 
consumers. Several national legislators from opposition parties also spoke at the hearing, 
rejecting the tariff increases.  
A month after the hearing, on January 30, 1997, the government issued decree 
92/97 modifying the phone tariff structure. Although the tariff changes finally approved 
by the government varied from the one proposed by the companies, the core structure of 
the reform was basically the same. Local phone tariffs suffered a mayor increase 
(between 41-66%) while inter-urban and international phone service costs decreased 
significantly (for instance, 60% reduction in calls to USA).233 As expected, there was a 
strong reaction among those opposed to the phone tariff re-structuring.234  On February 
10, legislators from opposition parties, consumer associations and other social actors 
called the public to protest against the tariff increases by leaving their phone off the hook 
for 15 minutes at 12:45 pm. The protest (known as “el telefonazo”) was repeated on 
February 24 and March 3. However, public response and involvement in the protests was 
                                               
232 See the Whereas section of decree 92/97, which described the main arguments made by different 
speakers in the hearing. 
233 La Nación (“Suben los abonos y bajan las tarifas interurbanas”, January 31, 1997). 
234 La Nación (“Teléfonos: un aumento inevitable”, February 1, 1997; “Crece el rechazo al ajuste de las 
tarifas de teléfonos, February 4, 1997). 
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far from massive.235 At the same time, in congress, opposition parties and even some 
members of the Peronist party (the party of government) submitted different declaration 
projects calling the government to review or to suspend the application of the phone tariff 
increases. However, the Peronist party controlled both houses of congress and did not 
allow these proposals to advance within the legislature agenda. 
Meanwhile, several legal complaints were filed against the government by 
consumer associations and ombudsman offices in relation to decree 92/97. On February 
10, a federal district court in the province of Mendoza granted a recurso de amparo 
submitted by PRODELCO, a local consumer association, and ordered the government to 
suspend the tariff increases established by decree 92/97 while the legal procedure was 
pending ("PRODELCO v. Estado nacional s/amparo").236 The plaintiff basically argued 
that article 2 of decree 92/97 was unconstitutional because the tariff increases were 
unreasonable (they benefited the companies in detriment of the large majority of 
consumers), they had not been submitted to a public hearing (the company‟s tariff 
proposal were submitted to a hearing but not the tariff structure approved by the 
government), and they were violating the conditions under which the phone concessions 
were granted.  A couple of days earlier, a federal district court from the city of Buenos 
Aires had also granted a recurso de amparo submitted by the national ombudsman, and 
ordered the government to suspend the application of decree 92/97 while the legal 
procedure was pending ("Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación v. Poder Ejecutivo nacional 
                                               
235 Moreover, the companies did not measure the volume of phone calls during the time “el telefonazo” 
was being carried out, so there was no clear public information about the extent of the protest, which 
arguably further weakened its impact. See La Nación (“Apagón telefónico de 12 a 13 en protesta por el 
rebalanceo”, February 24, 1997). In relation to the apparent low popular involvement in the protest, see La 
Nación (“Se diluye la oposición al ajuste telefónico”, March 4, 1997). 
236 It worth noting that only the tariff increases were suspended (article 2 of the decree); the rest of the 
decree was still valid (and therefore the reduction in the long distance and international tariffs). Moreover, 
the tariff increase was only suspended in the province of Mendoza, which was the jurisdiction of the court 
hearing the case. For a brief description of the judicial resolution see Maurino et al. (2005, 108-109). 
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(Ministerio de Economía y Servicios Públicos) s/ amparo"). On February 12, another 
federal court of the city of Buenos Aires granted a provisional remedy requested by two 
consumer associations ("Consumidores Libres Coop. Ltda. y otro v. Estado nacional -
Presidencia de la Nación- y otro s/sumarísimo") , and suspended the application of article 
2 of the decree 92/97. All these provisional measures were confirmed by different courts 
of appeal. 
At the same time, social actors supporting the re-structuring of the phone tariffs 
also submitted different legal motions requesting the courts to maintain decree 92/97. On 
February 13, a federal district court from the province of Córdoba granted a motion 
submitted by the Córdoba industrial association requesting the court to declare the 
legality of decree 92/97 ("Unión Industrial de Córdoba v. estado nacional s/ medida 
cautelar autónoma"). In April, a federal district court from the province of Chubut 
granted a similar motion submitted by the Puerto Madryn business association, and 
ordered the phone companies to implement the tariff changes established by decree 92/97 
("Cámara de Industria, Comercio y Producción de Puerto Madryn v. Estado nacional s/ 
medida cautelar").237  
This tangled web of contradictory judicial resolutions created a situation of 
extreme uncertainty for the phone companies as well as for the consumers regarding what 
tariffs were legally in place. As result, the issue of the tariff re-structuring soon landed on 
the Supreme Court‟s docket. On May 7, 1998, the Court decided the PRODELCO case, 
overturning the decision of the court of appeals and rejecting the plaintiff‟s claim.238 The 
majority vote (the five justices known as the “Menemist court” because of their close 
                                               
237 For a brief legal description of these judicial resolutions, see Maurino et al. (2005, 110-111). Besides 
these two actions mentioned above, there were several other legal motions requesting the application of 
decree 92/97.  
238 The Supreme Court also ruled in Defensor del Pueblo v. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, about the validity of 
the provisional measure that suspended the application of decree 92/97. As in the PRODELCO case, the 
Court resolved against the plaintiff and in favor of the national government. 
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relationship with the Menem administration) basically stated that the executive branch of 
government has the power to issue the tariffs for the privatized phone services and that 
the tariff re-structuring was done according to the law. Moreover, they stressed that the 
legal claim was based upon the plaintiff‟s disagreement with the content of a policy 
measure taken by the executive, and it was not the role of the judiciary to assess the 
opportunity or convenience of a government‟s decision without affecting the separation 
of powers. The other four justices sitting on the Supreme Court also rejected the 
plaintiff‟s complaint, but did so based on procedural issues and did not address the 
substantive claims. Although consumer associations and their allies continued opposing 
the tariff increases, the resolutions of the Supreme Court basically signaled the end of the 
policy dispute over the re-structuring of the phone tariffs.  
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
The social opposition to the re-structuring of the phone tariff can be considered a 
loser of the policy process. The issue went thought different administrative stages until 
the government finally issued decree 92/97 establishing the new tariff structure. The 
social actors opposed to the re-structuring basically argued that the reform was mainly 
benefiting the phone companies in detriment of residential consumers. In other words, 
they disagreed with the content of the policy promoted and approved by the executive. 
Moreover, they also argued that in promoting the tariff re-structuring the government was 
not fulfilling the existing legal framework of the phone services concession, but, this 
claim was highly contentious and far from clear cut (as the different and contradictory 
judicial resolutions suggest). On the other hand, even those opposed to the phone tariffs 
re-structuring acknowledged that the power to regulate the tariffs of public services was 
in the realm of the executive branch of government. In short, the social opposition to the 
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phone tariffs reform basically disagreed with the content of the policy promoted by the 
government. Moreover, these social actors were unsuccessful in their efforts to stop the 
Menem administration from re-structuring the phone tariffs, which clearly allows for 
considering them losers of the policy process. 
 
In relation to the political leverage of the social groups opposed to the re-
structuring of the phone tariffs, their capability to be part and affect the policy making 
process was rather limited. As mentioned above, the main opposition was embodied by 
consumer associations and the national ombudsman office. During the first part of the 
1990‟s, when the issue of the tariff re-structuring began to be discussed, the “organized” 
consumer movement in Argentina was very incipient and it was just emerging (Rhodes 
2006) . With the exception of ADELCO, which was created in the 1980‟s, most of the 
consumer associations were created after 1994, when the telecommunication sector was 
already privatized, and the government was already formulating and negotiating its phone 
tariff re-structuring policy.239 For instance, Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores and 
ADECUA, two of the most active and well known consumer associations in Argentina, 
were created in 1994 and in 1995 respectively.240 Similarly, Lopéz and Felder (1997, 37) 
report that among the 10 consumers associations legally recognized in Argentina by 
1997, most of them were created between 1994 and 1996. Among other things, this 
clearly affected the timing and the capability of consumer activists to launch coordinated 
advocacy actions in the face of the government‟s attempts to modify the phone tariffs. In 
fact, many of these consumer groups and activists did not even know each before the 
                                               
239 Another exception is Consumidores Libres, which was created in 1992, before the negotiations about 
the re-structuring of the phone tariffs became public (http://www.consumidoreslibres.org.ar/home.htm). 
240 See the Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores‟s web site (http://www.usuarios.org.ar/doc.php?doc=1) and 
ADECUA‟s (http://www.consumidoreslibres.org.ar/home.htm). 
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issue of the re-structuring of the phone tariffs erupted between the last months of 1996 
and the beginning of 1997, when the government modified the tariffs.241 
 In terms of resources, although many of the consumer associations had political 
contacts (many were created or were initially linked to opposition parties),242 in general, 
their organizational support structure was quite weak, with very limited economic and 
human resources. Their main source of funding (and in most cases the only source of 
funding) were funds provided by the state as established by the legal regime on consumer 
protection. For the year 1997, López and Felder (1997, 40) report that  the state funding 
for each registered consumer association was  U$10.000 dollar for the entire year.243 
With that level of funding, the consumer NGOs barely covered their basic operation 
costs, and did not have resources to fund and sustain long term advocacy efforts. 
Moreover, these associations were new and did not have much social insertion; their 
memberships were very small and their work (in most cases) was geographically 
focalized in the metropolitan region of Buenos Aires (López and Felder 1997, 37-40). 
These factors heavily constrained their capability to reach and mobilize broader 
constituencies against the government‟s efforts to re-structure the phone tariffs. In fact, 
no mobilizations or other type of massive collective actions were carried out when the 
government was still negotiating the tariff reform with the phone companies. The 
                                               
241 For instance, in my interview with Ariel Caplan  (a well known consumer law expert and activist in 
Argentina), he told me that he did not know about PRODELCO until he read in the newspaper that this 
association had obtained the first favorable judicial decision freezing the application of the phone tariff 
increases. Similarly, he met for the first time some of the leaders of other consumer groups (for instance, 
Horacio Berstein, another very active and well known person in the consumer movement in Argentina) at 
the public hearing organized by the government in Posadas in December 1996. A month later, in January 
1997, the government issued the decree modifying the phone tariff structure. (Interview with Ariel Caplan, 
Buenos Aires, April 8 2008). 
242 For instance, Consumidores Libres, was founded by Hector Polino, a legislator of the Argentine 
socialist party. 
243ADELCO received a larger amount of funding, apparently because it had several offices located in 
different parts of the country  (López and Felder 1997, 40). 
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“telefonazo” (and few other collective actions of protest) were organized after the 
government had issued decree 92/97 and increased the phone tariffs; and even then, the 
level of public involvement in the protests was rather low. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the social actors opposing the re-
structuring of phone tariff did participate in the different public hearings organized by the 
government. Furthermore, the national media provided ample coverage on the issue, 
including the views of those opposed to the re-structuring of the tariffs. Arguably, these 
factors (public hearings, media coverage) allowed the consumer groups and their allies to 
voice their criticisms about the government‟s policy regarding the phone tariffs and to 
place these concerns in the policy agenda. However, this argument - although valid-, does 
not affect our general assessment about the limited political leverage of the consumer 
groups. To a certain extent, these instances or windows of access to the policy process 
(public hearings, media coverage) were a result of the continuous judicialization of the 
dispute by the consumer groups and the ombudsman. As explained above, the first public 
hearing convoked by the government to discuss a tariff re-structuring proposal was the 
result of a consumer group (ADELCO) bringing a legal claim to the judiciary. Until that 
moment, the policy negotiations between the government and phone companies were 
basically taking place behind closed doors.244 Similarly, the media coverage of the re-
structuring of the phone tariff increased dramatically in 1997 (in comparison with 
previous years), after the government approved the new tariff structure and the issue 
became heavily judicialized.245 In sum, the political leverage of the social actors opposing 
                                               
244 The two other public hearing latter organized by the government should be understood  in the light of 
that precedent. Arguably, the government was not willing to risk further delays of the tariff re-structuring. 
245 For instance, I identified roughly 20 substantive articles about the re-structuring of the phone tariffs 
published by La Nación during 1996 (the year in which the government convoked the two public hearings, 
and the companies submitted their proposals for tariff re- structuring). For the year 1997, I identified 63 
articles in the same newspaper; three times more media coverage. Although this is a very simple and rough 
indicator, it does provide a sense of how the level of media attention varied after the government issued 
decree 92/97 and the dispute was fully judicialized. 
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the re-structuring of the phone tariff was rather limited; it was not until they started using 
the courts that they were able to access the policy process and be part of the debate about 
the phone tariffs.  
 
In relation to the national legislature, the party of government (the Peronist party) 
easily controlled the Senate and had a near majority in the House of Representatives.246 
This predominance of the party of government clearly shaped the role of congress in the 
policy process about the re-structuring of the phone tariffs. When the government issued 
decree 92/97, different bills and resolution projects were submitted in congress calling 
the government to suspend the tariff increases or to review the measure. The 
government‟s policy even triggered some resistance within the Peronist legislative 
block.247 Beyond the potential policy reasons for this resistance, 1997 was an election 
year, and many Peronist legislators were concerned about the potential political costs of 
the measure.248 However, the Peronist legislative block quickly realigned with the 
government, and blocked any legislative involvement in the matter. On March 4
th
, the 
House of Representatives held a special session to discuss the re-structuring of the tariffs, 
but the Peronist legislative block did not provide quorum and the session was 
cancelled.249 Similarly, the proposals suspending or reviewing the government measure 
did not advance within the legislature agenda. In short, a legislative majority aligned with 
                                               
246 Between 1989 (when Menem won his first presidential election) and the legislative election of 1997, the  
Peronist legislative block in the House of Representatives comprised between 45-50% of the 257 seats of 
the House. During that period, the Peronist party easily reached legislative majorities with the votes of 
some of the provincial parties or smaller national parties (for instance, UCEDE). Meanwhile, the main 
opposition parties (UCR and then FREPASO) only had about 35% of the House‟s seats.   
247 For instance, see projects submitted by legislator Roberto Digon (PJ), and Eduardo Mondino (PJ) 
requesting the government to suspend the phone tariff increases (files 7633-D-96, 1430-D-97 and 0194-D-
97; online data base; Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina).  
248 See La Nación (“Descontento en el PJ con el ajuste telefónico”, February 13; and “Se desató una 
interna en el PJ por la instrumentación del ajuste”, February 14, 1997). The midterm legislative election 
was scheduled for October 1997. 
249 La Nación (“Se frustró la sesión en la cámara baja”, March 5, 1997). 
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the executive blocked any possibility of congress taking a more active role in the policy 
process and debate about the re-structuring of the phone tariffs. 
 
In contrast, the executive branch of government strongly promoted and supported 
the re-structuring of the phone tariffs. A good evidence of this support is the intervention 
of the telecommunication regulatory agency (CNT) decreed by the Menem administration 
in May 1995 (decree 702/95). As mentioned above, the CNT‟s board at that time, which 
had been appointed through a meritocratic procedure, did not fully support the re- 
structuring of the phone tariffs (Urbiztondo et al. 1998). Therefore, the government 
intervened the CNT, removed the board entirely, and further centralized the phone tariffs 
negotiation. During the following year and half, the Menem administration took several 
other administrative measures aiming to prepare the scenario for the phone tariff reform 
(it hired an international consultant to produce alternative re-structuring proposals, it 
called Telecom and Telefonica to submit their own proposals, it organized the public 
hearings, etc.). Finally, in January 1997, the government issued decree 92/97 and 
established the new phone tariff structure. 
 
The last factor to consider is state capacity. Our historical analysis of this case 
suggests that this was not a relevant factor in the development of the policy dispute. In 
contrast, one could argue that the institutional weakness of the telecommunication 
regulatory agency (the CNT) left the way open for the Menem administration and the 
phone companies to advance the negotiation over the re-structuring of the phone tariffs 
according to their own preferences. However, it is worth remembering that it was the 
Menem administration which created, designed and reformed the CNT. Thus, the 
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institutional weaknesses suffered by the regulatory agency were, arguably, a direct result 
of the policy preferences and choices made by the Menem government.  
 
Summing up, the re-structuring of the phone tariffs was unsuccessfully opposed 
by consumer groups and others actors. This lead to the judicialization of this policy in a 
context in which the opposing groups did not have much political leverage during the 
policy process, the legislature was rather passive and the executive strongly supported 
and promoted the tariff reform.  
  
THE LLANCANELO WETLANDS 
The policy conflict about the Llancanelo Lagoon is a typical example of the 
problems that can arise between environmental protection and oil production projects. 
Llancanelo is a wetland ecosystem, located in the southern part of the Mendoza province, 
closed to the town of Malargue, and covers an area of 65.000 hectares. It is considered 
one of the most important wetlands of Argentina. In 1996, it was declared a Ramsar site, 
which implied an international recognition of its unique ecological value.250 But 
Llancanelo is also located over vast oil deposits, and in fact, there had been oil operations 
in the area since 1930.251 This tense relationship between environmental values and oil 
production was already present in earlier efforts to regulate the use of this area.  In 1980, 
the provincial military government at the time declared the Llancanelo Lagoon a wildlife 
reserve, although it allowed oil activities under certain conditions (law decree 9/80).252 In 
                                               
250 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (The Ramsar Convention) is an international 
treaty for the conservation and sustainable use of wetlands.  Presently, there are over 150 states parties to 
the convention. 
251 Although, given the physical-chemical features of the area‟s oil and its high costs of extraction, oil 
production in the region was rather intermittent and low scale (Sosa 2005). 
252 The reserve covers approximately 42.000 hectares, formed by the Llancanelo Lagoon and a perimeter 
of roughly 1 km around it. 
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1995, 12 year after the return to democracy, the provincial legislature approved law 6.045 
of Protected Natural Areas of Mendoza, which included the Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve. 
The new law banned any type of oil and mining operations in protected areas.253 
By the end of the 1990s, the oil company Repsol - YPF began to search for oil in 
the Llancanelo area.254 The development of the new technology of horizontal drilling 
raised the possibilities of efficiently producing oil from the region.  In August 1999, the 
provincial government authorized Repsol - YPF to begin the oil exploration activities.255 
The authorization was granted through a fast track administrative procedure, called 
“aviso de proyecto”, which did not require the development of an environmental impact 
assessment or the organization of public hearings.  A year later, on May 2000, Repsol - 
YPF requested authorization to develop the second stage of the project called “Plan de 
Acción II Proyecto 2000”. The project aimed to drill oil from 8 wells in the Llancanelo 
area, 2 of which were new and the other 6 were reactivated wells. The provincial 
government, then, opened an environmental impact assessment procedure and organized 
a public hearing in August, 2000. 
Local environmental NGOs and some scientists began to question the project. 
There were many criticisms about the poor quality of the EIA reports and the lack of 
proper information about the potential environmental impacts of the drilling (Sosa 2005). 
A main issue that began to appear in debate about the project was the exact limits of 
Llancanelo Lagoon Wildlife Reserve, and whether the proposed oil wells were inside or 
outside its boundaries (provincial law 6.045 was quite clear and definitive on banning oil 
activities within natural protected areas).256  Repsol YPF claimed that the oil wells were 
                                               
253 See articles 24 and 25 of provincial law 6.045. 
254 In 1993, REPSOL-YPF had gained a 25 years oil concession from the national government for oil 
exploration and production in the Llancanelo – Malargue area (decree 1764/93).  
255 Resolution 33/1999 of the Dirección de Saneamiento y Control Ambiental (DSCA). 
256 See for instance, the coverage about the issue in the local newspaper Los Andes (“Califican de ilegal al 
proyecto de Llancanelo”, September 21, 2000; “No nos olvidemos de Llancanelo”, October 24, 2001) 
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outside the limits of the reserve; opponents of the project, on the other hand, argued that 
there was no conclusive evidence of that. The problem was that more than two decades 
after the state of Mendoza created the Llancanelo reserve, its biological boundaries had 
not been defined yet. In 1989, some work was done on marking the northern boundaries 
of the reserve, but the rest of the reserve‟s limits were not finished (Ramsar Advisory 
Mission 2002, subhead 134).257 
Meanwhile, the provincial government strongly supported the project. At that 
time, the government of Mendoza was in the hands of the Alianza UCR – Frepaso. 258 In 
September, 2000, governor Iglesias himself, together with members of his cabinet 
including the minister of environment, publicly announced the oil drilling project from 
the shores of the Llancanelo Lagoon, stressing that  Repsol – YPF was planning to invest 
over 200 million dollars, which would represent 37 million dollars of royalty for the 
Mendoza‟s state, and 280 jobs for the region. Governor Iglesias is quoted by the local 
media stressing that “the government has worked on this with the company”.259 In the 
following weeks, several members of the cabinet also went public, claiming that the 
project was environmentally friendly and fulfilled local regulations.260 
However, in March, 2001, the development of the project was altered by a 
complaint for oil pollution in one of the Repsol YPF water wells in the Llancanelo area. 
The complaint was made by the department of irrigation, which is the provincial state 
agency in charge of controlling water use and quality in Mendoza.261  As result of the 
                                               
257 See also Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands submitted by the Argentine government in relation to 
the Llancanello Lagoon (Heber Sosa1995, 9). 
258 The Alianza was a nationwide electoral coalition between the UCR and the center-left Frepaso. In the 
province of Mendoza, the Alianza was dominated by the UCR. On October 1999, the Alianza won the 
gubernatorial election. 
259  Own translation; Diario Uno (“El área Llancanelo se abre al petróleo”, September 12, 2000). 
260 See coverage in local media, Los Andes (September 25 and 27, 2000) and Diario Uno (September 23, 
2000). 
261 In a dry province like Mendoza, the management of water resources represents a very important 
political and economic asset. In this context, the Department of Irrigation is a relatively powerful 
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complaint, the EIA procedure for the Repsol-YPF‟s oil drilling project was suspended. 
Furthermore, media coverage of the issue began raising broader public attention and 
concern about the prospects of oil drilling in the Llancanelo area. The fiscalía de estado 
(state attorney‟s office) also felt compelled to act and opened an investigation around this 
complaint.262 Meanwhile, Repsol YPF denied the existence of pollution and the 
provincial government strongly criticized the department of irrigation, and argued that the 
agency was making an unjustified complaint. Members of the government, such as the 
Director of Environmental Control and Cleanup, affirmed that there was no pollution in 
the water well and that the Department of Irrigation had loosened its standards.263Despite 
its negative reaction to the department of irrigation‟s complaint, the government finally 
decided to carry out a technical study to assess if the Llancanelo lagoon had been 
polluted or not.264 Arguably, this measure aimed to show that the government was 
concerned and acting on the matter, although it did not solve the suspension affecting the 
Repsol YPF project which was a main concern for the government and the oil company 
as well. However, by June 2002, the government could appoint the new authorities of the 
department of irrigation. One of the first measures of the newly appointed authorities was 
to authorize the continuation of the EIA procedure on the Repsol – YPF project, even 
though the studies about oil pollution in the Llancanelo water well were not finished. 
                                                                                                                                            
bureaucratic agency, who has institutional and financial autonomy. The head of the agency 
(Superintendente) and others officials are appointed by the governor with the approval of the Senate every 
5 years.  Moreover, the  governor and the superintendent‟s terms of office do not match, so it is possible 
(like in this case) to have a superintendent appointed by a different administration than the one currently in 
charge of the government. 
262 According to Mendoza‟s legislation (law 5965), the fiscalía is the provincial ombudsman for 
environmental issues. Nevertheless, the fiscalía was somewhat reluctant to become involved on the issue of 
oil drilling in the Llancanelo area. In fact, there were 35 previous presentations made by different 
individuals and NGOs at the fiscalía  about the potential environmental impact of oil drilling in the 
Llancanelo area, but no mayor action was taken by the fiscalía about them (Sosa 2005). 
263 Diario Los Andes (“Detectan petróleo en el agua en Llancanelo”, March 20, 2001). 
264 It is worth pointing out that the study was funded by Repsol – YPF. 
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Shortly after that, the state attorney office also authorized the continuity of the EIA 
procedure. 
During the time the Repsol YPF project was at a standstill, the Llancanelo 
wetland was included in the Montreux Record of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.265  
In July 2001, The Argentinean government formally requested the inclusion of 
Llancanelo Lagoon in the Montreux Record (only a state party to the convention can 
request a site to be included in the Record), and it also requested a Ramsar Advisory 
Mission to study and offer technical advice relating to the conservation problems or 
threats facing the Llancanelo wetland. The requests were prepared and fostered by the 
minister of environment of the government of Mendoza. Opponents to oil drilling in 
Llancanelo deemed the government‟s measure as one of “contained risk”.266 Ramsar 
missions are considered to be very balanced and prudent in their assessments, and they do 
not tend to openly criticize governments‟ policies. At the same time, the inclusion of 
Llancanelo in the Register had a strong symbolic value and signaled the government‟s 
commitment to conservation. The Ramsar Mission arrived in Mendoza in late October 
2001. Besides exploring the Llancanelo Lagoon, the Mission held meetings with 
government officials, the oil company, local business, environmental NGOS and others 
interested parties. In February 2002, the Mission made public its report (Report N 48, 
Llancanelo Lagoon, Argentina) which concluded that oil activities could be carried out in 
the Llancanelo region as long as certain environmental and safety measures were taken, 
including formulating an environmental management plan and defining the biological 
limits of the reserve. 
                                               
265 The Montreux Record is a list of endangered and threatened wetlands of international importance. It 
serves the purpose of “highlighting those sites where adverse change in ecological character has occurred, 
is occurring, or is likely to occur, and which are therefore in need of priority conservation attention” 
(article 3.1, Resolution VI.1, Guidelines for the operation of the Montreux Record, 1996). 
266  Interview with Eduardo Sosa (Buenos Aires, April 14, 2008). 
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By the end of 2002, after the department of irrigation and the state attorney office 
re-authorized the continuation of the EIA, the provincial government speeded up the 
administrative process to approve the Repsol YPF oil drilling project in the Llancanelo 
area. Between December 2002 and January 2003, different governmental departments 
approved the EIA and the project was finally authorized by resolution 190/2003 of the 
ministry of environment.267 In the same resolution, the government also created the 
Llancanelo Environmental Management Unit as suggested by the Ramsar Mission. 
Among other tasks, the Unit had to cooperate in defining the final boundaries for the 
Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve (article 7).268  As expected, local environmental NGOs 
strongly opposed the government‟s decision to authorize oil drilling in the region. During 
those months previous to resolution 190, the local media reflected environmental groups‟ 
arguments and warnings about the potential environmental consequences of the project 
but their opposition did not affect the government‟s final decision.269  
Two weeks after the government‟s authorization of the oil drilling project in 
Llancanelo, one of the most active local environmental groups, Red Ambiental OIKOS,  
filed a recurso de amparo against the government of Mendoza  at a local district court 
("Asociación OIKOS Red Ambiental c/ Gobierno de la Provincia de Mendoza p/ Acción 
de Amparo. Expte. 80.866"  2003). Oikos asked the court to declare resolution 190/03 
unconstitutional and to order the government of Mendoza to refrain from authorizing the 
Repsol YPF project until various national and provincial regulations about the EIA and 
access to information were fulfilled, and especially, until the geographical limits of the 
                                               
267 The government fully authorized 5 of the 8 proposed wells. The other 3 wells were going to be located 
too close to water courses, and therefore they got a conditional authorization until they were re-localized. 
This was based on a recommendation of the Ramsar Mission (see article 3, Resolution 190/03).  
268 According to resolution 190/03, the Unit was also responsible for controlling the environmental impact 
of the oil activities and formulating the environmental management plan for the reserve (article 4.c and h). 
269  See for instance, media coverage in Los Andes (“Protesta de ONG ambientalistas por Llancanelo”, 
December 18, 2002; “La explotación en Llancanelo depende de Fiscalía de Estado”, December 27, 2002). 
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Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve were established, given that the provincial law 6.045 
prohibited oil activities within protected areas.270 Furthermore, Oikos asked for the 
suspension of the project as a provisional remedy while the legal procedure was pending. 
In March 2003, the judge granted the provisional remedy to avoid potential 
environmental damages until the core of the legal dispute was resolved. A few months 
later, in July 2003, the district court declared resolution 190/03 unconstitutional, and 
stated that the government‟s authorization to the Repsol YPF project must be based on 
the previous demarcation of the boundaries of the protected area. As expected, the 
government appealed the judicial decision. But first, the provincial Court of Appeals 
(September 12, 2003), and then, the Supreme Court of Mendoza (March 11, 2005), 
upheld the core of the district court‟s decision.  
Shortly after the resolution of the Supreme Court, the governor of the province 
finally received and met for the first time with the local environmental NGOs to discuss 
the issue of oil drilling in Llancanelo.271 Almost five years had gone since the beginning 
of the policy dispute. The government, then, started a process of formal negotiation with 
the different stakeholders (the oil company, Malargue‟s local government, etc.) to define 
the boundaries of the reserve, and in that way, the area in which oil drilling will be 
allowed. In that context, the government produced a proposal for the reserve‟s boundaries 
which was supported by the oil company, the Malargue city council and private 
landowners in the Llancanelo region, but was rejected by the environmental NGOs 
because critical ecological areas of the Llancanelo wetland were not included.272 By the 
                                               
270 The plaintiffs argued that the government has “[given] green light for the project to begin without 
knowing the boundaries of the Reserve and  whether the oil drilling will be inside or outside the Protected 
Natural Area” (own translation; subhead 82 of the legal complaint). 
271 Diario Uno (“OIKOS y el gobierno negocian una solución para Llancanelo”, March 31, 2005). At that 
moment, the governor of Mendoza was Julio Cobos, who belonged to the UCR, the same political party of 
the previous governor Iglesias. Cobos was elected for the period December 2003- December 2007. 
272 Diario Uno (“Plan para volver a extraer petróleo en Llancanelo”, November 17, 2005; “A Oikos no le 
convence el plan oficial para Llancanelo”, November 18, 2005).  
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end of 2006, the government submitted its proposal to the House of Representatives. At 
that time, the government‟s party -the UCR- had the largest block in the House and in the 
Senate, but it did not have a legislative majority and the bill did not gain enough support 
to be approved.273 After several months of stalemate, the government, Repsol YPF and 
Oikos began negotiating again, and this time, they reached an agreement about the 
boundaries of the Llancanelo Reserve. In September 2007, the government submitted the 
new bill to the legislature, and by November it was approved by both houses. Provincial 
law 7.824, finally, defined the limits of the Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve.  
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
Although the provincial government approved the oil drilling project in the 
Llancanelo area, the social opposition to the government‟s policy cannot be considered as 
a strict “loser” of the policymaking process. Two main reasons justify this assessment. 
First, the main argument used by the environmental groups against the project was that 
the government had to define the biological boundaries of the Llancanelo reserve before 
it could approve the location of any oil drilling well in the area. As explained above, the 
natural reserve in the Llancanelo wetland was created by the military government in 1980 
and latter ratified by law of the provincial legislature in 1995. Clearly, the environmental 
groups were requesting the government to implement legislation that was already in force 
at the time Repsol YPF requested the government‟s authorization for the project.  
Second, the government itself acknowledged that it had a policy mandate to fulfill 
regarding the boundaries of the Llancanelo reserve. When the government issued 
resolution 190/03 approving the Repsol – YPF project, it also created the Llancanelo 
                                               
273 Based on the results of the two previous legislative elections (October 2003 and 2005), I calculated the 
UCR had 21 out of 48 representatives of the House and 18 senators out of 38 members of the Senate. 
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Environmental Management Unit, and one of the main tasks of the unit was precisely to 
cooperate in defining the final boundaries for the Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve.274 In 
short, the social opposition to the oil project in the Llancanelo wetland were basically 
requesting the government to implement and enforce policy measures that were already 
approved through the policy making process. 
 
However, the opposing groups to the oil drilling project had very limited political 
leverage. As mentioned before, the main opposition was embodied by local 
environmental NGOs. The organized “environmental movement” in Mendoza was quite 
small, with rather limited appeal to the broader public, and with very limited human and 
economic resources. For instance, the annual operative budgets of Oikos Red Ambiental 
and Fundación Cullunche (perhaps the two most organized environmental associations in 
Mendoza, and both actively involved in the dispute about Llanacanelo) was just between 
U$5,000 to U$6,000 dollars jointly.275 Clearly, this speaks of a very limited capability of 
the local environmental NGO‟s to launch a coordinated advocacy campaign aiming to 
lobby policy makers or to mobilize broader constituencies to protest against the 
government policy in Llancanelo. Beyond the NGOs, some local scientists were also 
source of opposition to the project. However, the attitude of the local scientific 
community as a whole was far from homogeneous (Sosa 2005). While many research and 
technical institutions such as the Provincial Board of Arqueologist and the Regional 
                                               
274 Article 7, Resolution 190/2003. 
275 Data available in CIPPEC‟s online database Directorio de ONGS Vinculadas a la Política Pública 
(CIPPEC, www.directoriodeongs.org/index.php). The data corresponds to the year 2002 and it was reported 
by the associations. Fundación Cullunche reported a budget of $2,358 Argentine pesos; OIKOS reported an 
approximate budget between $10,000 to $15,000 Argentine pesos. Just to provide a local standard for 
assessing these numbers, the annual budget of FAVIM (a well known NGO in Mendoza, working on 
human rights issues) was between $100,000 to $250,000 Argentine pesos during the same period 
(FAVIM‟s data is also available at the Directorio de ONGs). That represents more than 10 times the joint 
budget of the two environmental groups involved in the Llancanelo dispute. 
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Research Center of  Science and Technology (CRICYT) expressed their concerns about 
the project or were openly opposed to it,276 others institutions endorsed the EIA reports, 
such as the Argentine Institute of Research on Dry Regions (IADIZA) and the Andean 
Regional Center (INA), and stated that oil production in the Llancanelo region was 
environmentally feasible if precautionary measures were taken.277 The lack of a clear and 
predominantly critical view of the project from within the scientific community further 
reduced the ability of the NGOs to resist the project, or at least to raise the political cost 
of the government‟s policy toward oil drilling in Llancanelo. 
Meanwhile, in relation to Mendoza‟s general public, it is difficult to clearly assert 
whether public opinion was leading for or against the oil drilling project in Llancanelo. 
There were no opinion polls carried out (at least that we know of it). Local newspapers 
did cover the dispute and – as a whole- it was a relatively balanced coverage. The main 
newspapers in Mendoza had opinion articles and editorials against and in favor of oil 
drilling in the Llancanelo area.278 In short, there were no clear indicators of a strong trend 
in the public opinion. Rather than clear opposition or support, uncertainty might have 
been the predominant attitude among the broader public of Mendoza.  
In the Llancanelo - Malargue region, in contrast, the project raised a clear 
support.279 Malargue was the closest town to the proposed oil drilling sites in the 
                                               
276 These institutions and individuals filed presentations at the state attorney office opposing the oil drilling 
project in Llancanelo (cited in the subhead B2 of the law complaint filed by OIKOS against the government 
of Mendoza).  
277 These research institutions are cited in the Whereas of Resolution 190/03 as endorsing the 
environmental impact assessment of the Repsol – YPF oil project.  
278  See, for instance, the contrasting articles published by Los Andes (“El dilema del Llancanelo, 
December 14, 2002; “Llancanelo, un tesoro ecológico y petrolero”, December 15, 2002). 
279 Oikos‟s volunteers carried out an informal, “home-made” opinion survey in Malargue, and 80% of the 
respondents were in favor of the oil drilling project and only 20% were against. They carried out the same 
survey in the city of Mendoza, and the result were 60% in favor and 40% against the project (in this case, 
the “survey” was done after the judicialization of the dispute, which generated a lot of media coverage of 
the issue). Even though, these “surveys” cannot be considered representative, they might indicate –
especially in the case of Malargue- a trend in the local public opinion. Data provided by Eduardo Sosa, 
executive director of OIKOS, (interview with Eduardo Sosa, Buenos Aires, April 14, 2008). 
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Llancanelo wetlands.280 Even though there were some general concerns about water 
pollution and the environmental impact, they were overwhelmed by the town‟s 
expectations about the potential economic growth and the promise of much-needed new 
jobs that were attached to the development of the Repsol YPF project in the region.281 
That support became much more vocal when the oil project was first suspended by order 
of the district court.282 In sum, Mendoza‟s public opinion was not mobilized against oil 
drilling in the Llancanelo wetlands; in contrast, the local community of Malargue was 
quite supportive of the project.  
In this context of limited possibilities of reaching and mobilizing broader 
constituencies against the oil project, the local NGOs tried to take advantage of the few 
institutional channels available for them to influence the policy debate and process. These 
were venues in which the costs of access -for the NGOs- were very low in terms of 
human and institutional resources needed to participate. For instance, they voiced their 
concerns in the only public hearing organized by the government in the context of the 
EIA procedure –August 2000-. Similarly, they met with the Ramsar Mission to discuss 
the oil drilling project in Llancanelo, and their opinions were cited in the final report 
made public by the Mission (Ramsar Advisory Mission 2002, subheads 45 and 117). 
However, it is highly debatable to what extent these instances of public participation 
offered a significant way for the NGOs to be involved in the policy process, or were just 
used by the government as “window dressing” opportunities.  In any case, it is clear that 
the access and leverage of the environmental groups changed dramatically after the 
dispute become judicialized. In this new scenario, the government could not ignore the 
                                               
280 At that time, the Malargue county had a population of over 18.000 inhabitants, about 1.2% of the entire 
population of the province of Mendoza (Census 2001). 
281Diario Los Andes (“Llancanelo: analizan la tecnología que usa Repsol en los pozos”, November 11, 
2001). See also the Ramsar Mission Report (2002, subheads 117 and 188). 
282 Diario Los Andes (“El gobierno apelaría hoy el freno judicial por Llancanelo”, March 5, 2003). 
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local environmental groups as a main actor in the policy process. The final negotiations 
between the provincial government, the oil company and the environmental groups, 
which defined the boundaries of the Llancanelo reserve latter approved by the provincial 
legislature, clearly speaks to the leverage gained by the NGOs as a result of the 
judicialization of the dispute. 
 
In relation to the provincial legislature, although it was not a main player in the 
policy process about oil drilling in the Llancanelo region (at least in the first stage), the 
environmental commission of the legislature did perform some level of oversight over the 
government‟s policy in the matter. Between 1999 (when Repsol YPF formally submitted 
its project for authorization) and February 2003 (when the provincial government finally 
authorized it through resolution 190/03), both houses of the legislature were roughly 
divided in three equally large legislative blocks between the Alianza (UCR-Frepaso), the 
Peronist party and the Democratic Party (a conservative provincial party). Accordingly, 
the political coalition in charge of the executive branch of government at the time –the 
Alianza-, did not control the legislative assemblies during this period.283 In this context, 
one could suppose that the legislature could have become a main venue for the opposition 
parties to challenge the government policies on Llancanelo. But this was not the case.  
The Peronist party (PJ) and the Democratic party (PD) did not take clear positions on the 
issue of oil drilling in the Llancanelo region. There were only a few individual legislators 
from the main opposition parties who did assume a critical role about the government‟s 
                                               
283 Based on the 1997 and 1999 electoral results, the provincial legislature during the legislative period 
December 1999-december 2001was composed in the following way: House of Representative:  Democratic 
Party –PD- 16 members, Alianza-UCR 15 members, Peronist Party –PJ- 14 members, others parties 3. 
Senate: Alianza-UCR 13 members, PD 13 members, PJ 11 members, others 1. After the 2001 election, the 
political composition of the legislature, for the period December 2001-December 2003, was not 
significantly modified: House of Representative: Alianza –UCR 16, PJ 14, PD 13, others 6. Senate: 
Alianza-UCR 13, PJ 11, PD 11, other 3. 
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policy on this issue.284 That was the case, for instance, of Senator Elena Giordano (PJ) 
and Senator Sebastian Brizuela (PJ), who successively held the position of chair of the 
environmental commission of the Senate. During the first stage of the dispute (roughly 
from 1999 to 2001), the environmental commissions of the legislature promoted several 
resolutions requiring government officials to provide information about the Repsol YPF 
oil drilling project and the measures envisaged by the government to protect the 
Llancanelo wetlands.285 Between October and December 2002, the environmental 
commission of the Senate hold meetings with different stakeholders to learn about their 
opinions and critiques about the project.286 After the passing of resolution 190/03 
authorizing the project, the Senate‟ environmental commission monitored and questioned 
how the government was organizing the Llancanelo Environment management Unit.287 In 
                                               
284 There were also members of the opposition parties that openly supported the oil drilling project in 
Llancanelo. That was the case, for instance, of the mayor of Malargue, Celso Jaque (Peronist), who will 
become governor of Mendoza in 2007. See Mayor Jaque‟s remarks on Diario Uno (“Jaque, a favor de 
Llancanelo”, December 12, 2002). 
285 For instance, in the session of September 27, 2000 (right after the public hearing organized by the 
government about the Repsol YPF‟s EIA) the House of Representatives approved a resolution requesting 
the minister of environment to inform about the project and its potential environmental impact. The 
resolution was sponsored by legislator Ahumada  and  legislator Caceres, both from the Peronist Party, 
{files 26830 and 26845`, see online database`, \Cámara de Diputados de la provincia de Mendoza,  #637}. 
Few days earlier, the environmental commission of the Senate approved a similar resolution  sponsored  by 
Senator Brizuela and others legislators from the Peronist party- {file 40870`, online database`, \Cámara de 
Senadores de la Provincia de Mendoza,  #636}.  In March 2001, the environmental commission of the 
Senate approved a resolution sponsored by senator Herrera (PD) requesting the Department of Irrigation to 
inform about  the potential oil pollution in the Repsol YPF‟s water well  (file 41622, online database, 
Camára de Senadores de la Provincia de Mendoza). In April 2001, members of the environmental 
commission of the Senate visited the Llancanelo Reserve and the contaminated water well (see Diario Los 
Andes, April 20, 2000). On June 26, 2002, the House of Representative approved Resolution 302 
sponsored by legislator S. Martin (PJ) requesting the minister of environment to inform whether the 
ministry agreed with the recommendations issued by the Ramsar Mission, and in that case, what measures 
were going to be taken to implemented it (file 20625, online database, Cámara de Diputados de la provincia 
de Mendoza). 
286 The meetings were promoted by the chairman of the commission, senator Brizuela –PJ-  {files 44411 
and 44878`, online database \Cámara de Senadores de la Provincia de Mendoza,  #636}. 
287 For instance, see the brief media coverage of a crisped meeting between members of the Senate 
commission and government officials regarding the oil drilling in Llancanelo (Diario Uno, “Se extiende 
litigio por el petróleo”, March 7, 2003). Moreover, the Senate‟s environmental commission also approved a 
resolution sponsored by senator Brizuela (PJ), which required the government to include a representative 
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short, although the provincial legislature was not heavily involved during this first stage 
of the dispute about oil drilling in the Llancanelo region, the environmental commissions 
of the legislature (especially of the Senate) did exercise some level of oversight of the 
government‟s policy on this matter. 
The local legislature became a more central venue in the policy process after the 
Mendoza Supreme Court upheld the lower courts‟ resolutions and stated that oil drilling 
in Llancanelo could only be authorized upon the previous delimitation of the biological 
limits of the reserve.  The decision of the executive government to define these limits by 
law and not by a mere administrative resolution, placed the legislature in the center of the 
policy making process. 
 
In relation to the provincial government, the executive strongly supported and 
promoted the oil drilling project in the Llancanelo region. The initial government reaction 
against the complaint made by the department of irrigation about oil pollution in one of 
the Repsol YPF water well put in evidence that the government prioritized the 
development of the oil production in the Llancanelo region over environmental 
concerns.288 Similarly, the government‟s actions and arguments in the policy debate 
about the location of the oil drilling wells and the boundaries of the natural reserve, 
clearly favored the development of the oil project in detriment of the preservation of the 
wetlands.289  
                                                                                                                                            
from the local government of Malargue and from an academic institution in the Llanacanelo Environmental 
Management Unit {file 45119`, online database \Cámara de Senadores de la Provincia de Mendoza,  #636}. 
288 As explained in footnote  261, the department of irrigation was an agency of the state with certain levels 
of  autonomy and independence from the political administrations in charge of the executive branch of 
government. 
289 A brief overview of the courts‟ proceedings on this issue is enlightened. For instance, in its response to 
the lawsuit filed by Oikos, the government affirmed that the oil drilling sites were located outside the 
Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve based on documents and a map produced by Repsol YPF itself. That map, 
indeed, showed a demarcation layout between the oil production area and the shoreline of the lagoon. 
However, as the district court pointed out in its resolution ("Asociación OIKOS Red Ambiental c/ Gobierno 
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The support given by the government to the Llancanelo project can be easily 
understood if one takes into account the importance of the oil industry, and specifically of 
the company Repsol YPF, in the economy of Mendoza. Oil was (and still is) one of the 
main economic activities in the province and a main source of income for the provincial 
state. In 2002, oil royalties represented 35% of the Mendoza state‟s fiscal income -about 
300 million dollars.290 In its initial stages, the Llancanelo project was expected to amount 
to only 1% of the total oil production of Mendoza. However, the oil reserves located in 
the area were believed to be extremely important, which could generate a substantial 
increase in the levels of oil production in Mendoza in a near future, and therefore, in the 
amount of the royalties to be perceived by the state.291 Furthermore, over 70% of the 
whole oil production in Mendoza belonged to Repsol YPF, which evidently speaks to the 
relevance of the company in Mendoza‟s economy and politics.292 In short, the importance 
of oil production for the economy of the province, and especially the relevance of the oil 
royalties for the state‟s finances, clearly helps explain the strong support provided by the 
provincial government to the Repsol YPF project in the Llancanelo wetlands. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
de la Provincia de Mendoza p/ Acción de Amparo. Expte. 80.866", sub-heading V), that map was not 
previously submitted to the control and approval of the proper state agencies, including the provincial land 
registry office. In other words, the government was justifying its policy upon a private measurement done 
for the company. 
290 Diario Los Andes (“Petróleo en Llancanelo”, October 17, 2002). 
291 Some studies stated that about half of the oil reserves of the province  were probably located in the 
Llancanelo area (Diario Uno, “Repsol – YPF invertirá U$7 millones en Llancanelo”, December 13, 2002; 
Diario Los Andes, “En 30 días comenzaría la explotación de Llancanelo”, December 13, 2002) 
292 A concrete example of this relevance is the role played by the Repsol YPF in the surrender of the 
Aconcagua provincial bonds. During the second half of 2002, the state of Mendoza was at the edge of 
default. The provincial Aconcagua bond was due in early October of that year and the government could 
not ensure funds from Banco Nación to service the debt in term. Few days before the maturity of the bonds, 
Repsol YPF agreed to make an advance payment of oil royalties, allowing the provincial government to 
pay off the bonds and avoiding the financial default. Opponents to oil drilling in Llancanelo suggested that 
the Repsol YPF lobbied the provincial government to speed the authorization of the Llancanelo project as 
part of agreement to advance the payment of the oil royalties (Sosa, 2005). Regardless of whether 
Llancanelo was part of those negotiations or not, the role played by Repsol YPF in the Aconcagua bond 
tale clearly speaks to the leverage the company had in the provincial economy and, arguably, in the 
provincial politics. 
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 A last issue to analyze is whether the policy dispute about Llancanelo was related 
to problems of state capacity. Many different governments went by since the creation of 
the Llancanelo Wildlife Reserve in 1980 and its legislative confirmation in 1995. 
However, the biological boundaries of the Reserve were not defined. It is not clear why 
the delimitation was not done during that time, but the evidence suggests that it was the 
result of not being a policy priority of the successive governments than to a clear lack of 
state capacity. In fact, the Mendoza state apparatus had the human resources needed to 
carry out this task. As mentioned above, the northern part of the Llancanelo Reserve 
boundaries were marked in 1989, and this work was done by experts that worked or were 
related to the provincial state apparatus.293  
 
Summing up, the oil drilling project in the Llancanelo wetlands was strongly 
promoted and supported by the provincial government, while the social opposition -
although intense- was politically weak. This combination of conditions led to the 
judicialization of the dispute in a context in which provincial legislature exercised its 
oversight role over the executive in this matter and state capacity issues were not relevant 
in the development of the dispute.  
 
THE RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRAIN CONCESSIONS  
Between 1991 and 1995, the national government under the presidency of Carlos 
Menem privatized the operation of the passenger train services in the metropolitan area of 
                                               
293 This is the case, for instance, of the biologist Heber Sosa, who was part of the team of expert that 
marked the northern biological limits of the Reserve (see citation in the Ramsar Mission Report, subhead 
134) and also worked for several years at the Department of Wildlife of Mendoza. Moreover, H. Sosa was 
also heavily involved in promoting and preparing the documentation for the inclusion of Llancanelo 
wetland in the Montreaux Report (Interview with Eduardo Sosa, Buenos Aires, April 14, 2008). 
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Buenos Aires.294 This policy was part of a broad market reform carried out by the Menem  
administration during the 1990s, which included the privatization of the entire national 
railway system as well as most public utility companies owned by the Argentine state. In 
order to facilitate the privatization of the passenger services, the metropolitan railway 
system was break up into different segments, and the operation of each segment was 
granted in concession through a competitive bidding.295 Most of the concessions were 
granted for 10 years and were supposed to end between 2004 and 2005. However, in June 
1997, only two years after the companies began providing the services, the Menem 
administration issued decree 543/97, beginning a process of renegotiation of the 
concessions.  
The renegotiation was mainly justified with the argument that there was an 
increase in the use of the metropolitan passenger trains since the privatization of the 
services, and the satisfaction of that demand required new investment.296 Basically, the 
government was proposing to extend the current concessions for longer periods and to 
increase tariffs, while the concessionaire companies would make investments not 
                                               
294 In April 1991, the government issued decree 1143/91 which established the privatization of the 
metropolitan passenger train services. 
295 During 1991, the national government organized a public bidding for the operation the metropolitan 
passenger train services. To facilitate the privatization process, the metropolitan network was break up into 
7 different segments. In 1993, the government granted the concessions, which – in accordance to the legal 
framework regulating the bidding- were awarded to the business groups which requested the less amount of 
government subsidy to provide the services. However, the bidding and award processes suffered serious 
delays as resulted of various administrative challenges and claims brought by different business groups that 
participated in the process. Only by May 1995, all the services were transferred to the new operators, and 
the process of privatization was complete. Below, I listed the companies (underlined) which were awarded 
the concession of the different segments of the metropolitan passenger train system:  
1) Metrovías was awarded the Urquiza branch line and the subway system of the city of Buenos Aires; 2) 
TBA was awarded the Mitre and Sarmiento branch lines; 3) Ferrovías was awarded the Belgrano Norte 
branch; 4) Metropolitano was awarded the San Martin, Belgrano Sur and Roca branch lines. 
For a more detailed description and analysis of the privatization of the metropolitan railway system see 
Felder (2001), also Azpiazu (2002). 
296 According to a report produced by the Comptroller General of the Nation (Auditoria General de la 
Nación), the assessment of the passenger train service that triggered the re-negotiation process was based 
on a research carried out by a private consultant company, Parson Brinckerhoff International S.A, hired by 
the concessionaire TBA (Auditoria General de la Nación 2002, 3). 
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required in the original contracts. By April 1998, the government and the concessionaire 
TBA signed the first agreement (addendum) modifying one of the original concession 
contracts.297 The negotiation with TBA was the leading case for the government‟s policy 
in this matter, and the agreement was broadly considered as the model to follow in the 
negotiation with the other concessionaries. As part of this agreement, the TBA 
concession would be extended until 2025 (originally, it was going to end in 2005), the 
tariff would be gradually increased as much as 80% in a term of 5 years, while the 
company would carry out a modernization plan for over 2,200 million US dollars to 
improve the service‟s infrastructure. The modernization plan would be funded by the 
tariff increases, and TBA could only implement the increases insofar as the works 
established in the addendum were being completed. For instance, TBA could only 
charged the first tariff increase after it had refurbished 8 train stations and incorporated 
33 new passenger wagons.298 
Up to that moment, the renegotiations between the government and the 
concessionaries had largely occurred behind closed doors, and were not object of much 
attention by the media. However, some consumer groups and legislators from opposition 
parties began alerting that the new agreement was not just a modification to the existing 
contract, but rather it constituted an entirely new concession, and as such it should be 
object of a new, open and public bidding.299 Furthermore, consumer groups and the 
                                               
297 The government used the term addenda as a way to stress that the new agreements with the 
concessionaries did not constitute new contracts but just additions to the existing ones. 
298La Nación (“Se renegoció un contrato ferroviario”, April 17, 1998). Also, see the TBA‟s web site 
(www.tbanet.com.ar/empresa/historia-print.asp). 
299See, for instance, the statement made by Héctor Polino (a socialist legislator and also president of the 
consumer group Asociación Consumidores Libres) in relation to the agreement between the government 
and TBA (own translation from Spanish): “...a new bidding should be called, because [the agreement] is 
modifying the tariffs, the investments and the deadline of the original contract; it is a new contract…” (La 
Nación “Se renegoció un contrato ferroviario”, April 17, 1998). See also La Nación (“Presión empresarial 
para que aumenten los trenes”, April 9, 1998). 
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national ombudsman office objected that the negotiations were taking place without any 
input and involvement of the trains‟ users.300 
In October 1998, the congressional bicameral commission in charge of 
monitoring the privatization process (Comisión Bicameral de Seguimiento de las 
Privatizaciones y Reforma del Estado) began discussing the TBA‟s addendum.301 The 
commission was constituted by 6 members from the government‟s party (the Peronist 
party) and 6 members from different opposition parties (3 from the UCR, 1 Frepaso and 2 
from provincial parties). Initially, the Peronist legislative block in the commission was 
unable to get the 7
th
 vote needed to approve the TBA‟s addendum.302 The main 
opposition parties, the UCR and FREPASO, were increasingly critical of the privatization 
processes carried out during the Menem administration. Furthermore, the presidential 
election was coming the following year (October 1999), and the quality and costs of 
privatized public services were already a main issue in the opposition parties‟ electoral 
campaign. In this context, the negotiations within the commission were stalemated for the 
following couple of months, but by December 1998, the Peronist block was able to get a 
                                               
300 See, for instance, the statements made by the national ombudsman, Jorge Maiorano reproduced by La 
Nación (own translation,  November 6, 1997): “…the contracts are being renegotiated without taking into 
account the rights of the consumers…the 1994 constitution provided for consumer rights, but we are living 
like we were in 1990…I  advised the secretary of transport Armando Canosa to convene a public hearing 
to define the trains and subway tariff increases, but Canosa told me that it would politicize the issue, and I 
answered him that in that case, I won‟t have other option but to bring a claim to the courts...” 
301 This congressional bicameral commission was established by article 14 of law 23.696, also known as 
the State Reform Law. This law was approved by congress on August 1989, at beginning of the Menem 
administration, and among other things, it authorized the government to privatize the state companies. 
According to the law, the bicameral commission was in charge of monitoring the process of privatization, 
and it had the power to issue non-binding reports (dictámenes) approving or not the different privatization 
agreements and negotiations made by the executive. 
302 La Nación (“Debate el Congreso el aumento ferroviario”, October 28, 1998; “Trenes por decreto”, 
November 5, 1998). 
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majority within the bicameral commission and the TBA agreement was finally 
approved.303  
After the legislative commission‟s ratification, the government was ready to 
legalize the modification to the TBA‟s concession. The company had been already 
making investments and carrying out the works agreed with the government, which 
suggests that TBA perceived the approval of the concession‟s addendum as a certain and 
imminent outcome. In fact, by January 1999, the company formally inaugurated the eight 
refurbished train stations required by the agreement as a condition to start charging the 
tariff increases to the train users.304 However, the Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores, 
one of the most active consumer associations in this issue,  filed a legal claim against the 
national government at a federal district court ("Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores c/ 
Secretaria de Transporte y Otros (juicio sumarisimo)"), arguing that the public did not get 
the chance to participate in the re-negotiation process of the trains‟ concessions as it is 
required by the constitution reformed in 1994.305 Thus, the plaintiffs requested the 
participation of the consumers in that process and asked the court to suspend the 
renegotiation as a provisional remedy until the case was decided.306 In its response, the 
government basically argued that the public had been involved in the renegotiation 
process through different opinion polls that were carried out among trains‟ users, and that 
                                               
303 A legislator from one of the provincial parties voted along with the Peronist block in the commission to 
approve the TBA‟s addendum. For a media coverage of the work of the commission during that time, see 
La Nación (“Nuevas tarifas de trenes en febrero”, December 17, 1998). 
304La Nación (“El boleto de tren subirá en febrero”, January 22, 1999; “Aumenta el boleto de tren. 
Aplicación de la suba”, March 19, 1999). 
305 The claim was mainly based upon article 42 of the constitution that refers to consumer rights. 
306 During the previous months, the national ombudsman had also filed a legal claim against the 
government requesting the government to hold a public hearing, but it was rejected by the intervening court 
("Defensoria del Pueblo de la Nación c/ Estado Nacional. Amparo (expte. 17521/98)")  According to some 
observers, the problem with the ombudsman‟s legal claim was that it specifically requested a public 
hearing, and there were no enough legal basis for such specific request. The Union of Usuarios and 
Consumidores, instead, argued that the lack of consumer participation in the renegotiation process violated 
the constitution, and made a more broader request for public participation in the policy making process 
(interview with Horacio Bersten, Buenos Aires, August 14, 2008). 
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the polls indicated that the public largely supported tariff increases if they resulted in 
better services. In February 1999, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in relation to 
the provisional remedy and ordered the government not to sign the renegotiated contracts 
while the case was pending.307 The government appealed the provisional remedy but the 
suspension was ratified by the court of appeal.308 In this context, the government quickly 
decided to convene a public hearing on the addendum to the TBA contract. The 
government‟s measure successfully preempted the judicial procedure. In fact, in the face 
of the government‟s decision to organize a public hearing, the Union of Usuarios 
relinquished its legal complaint.309 
The public hearing took place on March 15, and one day after the hearing, the 
government issued decree 210/99 approving the addendum to the TBA‟s concession.310 
This triggered a strong reaction among consumer associations and other actors opposing 
the tariff increases. They claimed that the public hearing was just a façade; that none of 
their comments and observations about the contract expressed in the hearing, were taken 
into account. Moreover, the fact that the decree approving the addendum was issued the 
                                               
307 Juzgado Federal de 1ra. Instancia en lo contencioso administrativo, judge Liliana Heiland. 
308 The court of appeal (Cámara Nacional Contencioso Administrativa, sala 4) stated that opinion polls 
were not sufficient to fulfill the constitutional mandate because they do not allow the public to revise and to 
control the documentation (in this case, the modified contracts); moreover, they do not allow the public to 
offer alternative evidence and arguments to the government‟s proposal. For a brief legal overview of the 
court of appeal‟s resolution, see Maurino et al. (2005, 384). 
309 The secretary of transport (the government agency in charge of the renegotiation of the trains‟ 
contracts) contacted the Union de Usuarios and informed them that the government was going to organize 
a public hearing to discuss the train‟s renegotiations. After an internal discussion about how to proceed, the 
Union decided to drop the judicial claim (interview with Horacio Bersten, Buenos Aires, August 14, 2008). 
On February 26, 1999, the Union of Usuarios and the secretary of transport signed a judicial agreement by 
which the consumer association dropped its legal claim for lack of consumer participation and the 
government committed itself to organize a public hearing (La Nación, “La semana que paso”, February 28, 
1999). 
310 The government signed the decree on March 16 (the day after the hearing), and the decree was 
published in the Boletín Oficial on March 17, 1999. 
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next day after the hearing, it was largely considered as an evidence that the measure was 
ready even before the hearing took place and that the meeting was a mere formality.311  
Decree 210/99 triggered a new wave of legal actions. In the following weeks, the 
national ombudsman office ("Defensor del Pueblo de La Nación c/ Estado Nacional y 
otros  (expte. 9845/99)")  and a group of consumer associations ("Consumidores Libres y 
Otros c/ Estado Nacional –MOSP – Dto 210 s/Proceso de Conocimiento (Expte 
9610/99)") filed legal actions against the national government requesting the courts to 
declare decree 210/99 null and void.312 Basically, they argued that the addendum did not 
constitute a mere modification of the existing contract but rather an entirely new 
concession, and as such it should be object of new, open and public bidding. 
Furthermore, they request the suspension of decree 210/99 while the judicial procedures 
were pending. In both cases, the district courts granted the provisional measures 
requested by the plaintiffs and temporarily suspended the application of the addendum to 
the TBA‟s concession contract, and therefore it suspend the tariff‟s increases. As 
expected, TBA and the national government quickly appealed these court‟s resolutions, 
but they were only able to overturn the provisional measures by the end of January 
2000.313  
                                               
311 Interviews with Hector Polino (Buenos Aires, June 9, 2008) and Horacio Bersten (Buenos Aires, 
August 14, 2008). For a more detailed description of the development of the hearing, and opinions of 
different actors after the government issued the decree approving the addendum see Clarín (“Cuestionan los 
aumentos de tarifas para los trenes urbanos”, March 16, 1999); also La Nación (“Intolerancia e insultos en 
debate sobre trenes”, March 16, 1999; “Duras imputaciones”, March 19, 1999). 
312 Both complaints were filed at federal district courts. In the case of the consumer associations, their 
claim was filed at the juzgado nacional de 1ra. instancia en lo contencioso administrativo federal Nro. 4, 
judge Osvaldo Guglielmino In its tem, the national ombudsman‟s claim was filed at the juzgado nacional 
de 1ra. instancia contencioso administrativo Nro. 11, judge María José Sarmiento. 
313 On September 8, 1999, a federal courts of appeals (Cámara Federal en lo Contencioso Administrativo, 
Sala V) revoked the provisional measure granted by the district court in the case Defensor del Pueblo c/ 
Estado Nacional (Expte. 9845/99).  However, decree 210/99 could not be applied yet, because the district 
court resolution on Consumidores Libres c/ Estado Nacional (Expte. 9610/99)  was still valid (annual 
report, Defensor del Pueblo de La Nación 1999, 267). This resolution was only revoked by the end of 
January 2000 (See La Nación, “Breves. Trenes en la justicia” February 3, 2000).  
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In parallel to the judicial procedures regarding the TBA contract, the re-
negotiations between the government and the other concessionaries kept advancing. In 
April 1999, the bicameral legislative commission approved the changes to the Metrovias 
concession (the company in charge of the Urquiza branch line and the subway system of 
the city of Buenos Aires) and the government formally legalized the changes by decree 
393/99.314 In October 1999, the bicameral legislative commission approved the reforms 
to the Ferrovías‟s concession (the company in charge of the Belgrano Norte branch), and 
in the following month, it approved the addendum to the Metropolitano‟s concession (the 
concessionaire in charge of the San Martin, Belgrano Sur and Roca branches). On 
December 2 1999, a few days before the end of the Menem administration‟s term, the 
government issued the decrees granting the modified concessions to Metropolitano and 
Ferrovías, which included up to 80% gradual tariffs‟ increases and a 20 years extension 
of the concessions.315 As expected, there was a strong reaction against these last minute 
decisions of the Menem administration among consumer groups but also among the new 
incoming government of the Alianza,316 and even some sectors of the Peronist party.317 
By the end of December 1999, President Fernando de La Rua took office. The 
new administration quickly announced that the train contracts modified by Menem would 
                                               
314 In contrast to the other renegotiations, the changes to the Metrovias concession were unanimously 
approved by the bilateral commission, and did not raise such strong opposition among the consumer 
associations. This can be explained by the fact that some of changes introduced in the Metrovias concession 
were different from the changes introduced in the other train concessions. First, the time of the concession 
was extended for only 4 years (until 2017), instead of 20 years as in the other contracts. Moreover, the 
Metrovías tariffs would increase between 50-60% against 80% average in the other concessions. However, 
all the modified concessions shared a main feature: the companies‟ investments in infrastructure were 
going to be cover by the consumers. See Clarín (“Autorizan un aumento del 20% en los subtes”, April 24, 
1999) also a La Nación‟s article comparing the changes in the different train concessions (“Mantiene la 
Alianza posiciones ambiguas en las renegociaciones”, November 12, 1999). 
315Decrees 1416/99, 1418/99 and 1419/99. 
316 The electoral coalition formed by the UCR and FREPASO (the “Alianza”) defeated the Peronist party 
in the presidential election of October 1999, and Fernando de la Rua (UCR) was elected president.  
317La Nación (“Carga pesada contra los trenes”, November 3, 1999); Clarín (“Generalizado rechazo al 
aumento en los trenes”, November 3, 1999). 
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be revised.318 The new government, then, made an agreement with the train 
concessionaries by which the contract reforms (and therefore the tariff increases) 
approved by the Menem administration were temporally suspended, and a new round of 
negotiations between government and concessionaries was opened.319 
 
Analysis of conditions triggering judicialization 
The social opposition to the train tariffs increases can be considered a loser of the 
policy process. The government negotiated changes in the train concession contracts with 
the concessionaries, those changes or addenda were ratified by the bicameral legislative 
commission, and finally the government issued the decrees formally incorporating the 
changes to the existing concessions despite the opposition of consumer groups and other 
actors. One could argue that the opposing groups were demanding the effective 
implementation of existing legislation that affect how the renegotiation of the train 
concessions should be conducted. That might be the case in relation to the claim for 
consumer participation (basically, the requirement to convene a public hearing and to 
provide information to the public), which by that time, it was a relatively standard 
practice in administrative procedures dealing with privatized state companies, backed up 
by a bulk of regulatory norms and administrative law and constitutional jurisprudence. 
But as mentioned above, the government quickly preempted the legal claim for lack of 
public participation by convoking a public hearing on the addendum to the TBA 
                                               
318 Clarín (“Gallo: se revisarán los aumentos en los boletos de los trenes”, December 16,1999 “Trenes: 
comenzó la revisión de los últimos contratos”, December 23, 1999). 
319 At the end, the outcome of this new round of negotiations between the de La Rua‟s administration and 
the train concessionaries was not substantially different from that of the Menem government. During 2001, 
in the context of a broad set of measures aiming to reduce the state‟s spending and deficit, the government 
of the Alianza issued a decree of necessity and urgency modifying the train concession and raising tariffs. 
However, by the end of 2001, president Fernando de La Rua resigned and the new government declared the 
train system in emergency and the tariffs were frozen. 
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concession. Once this procedural requirement was formally fulfilled, the government 
firmly continued its policy aiming to modify the train concessions. 
 
In relation to the political leverage of the social actors opposing the tariffs 
increases, they were not fully able to be part of the policy process and their ability to 
influence the policy negotiations was rather limited. This assessment is based on two 
main reasons. First, the consumer groups did not have access to the negotiation process 
between the government and the concessionaries. In fact, they did not even have access to 
the information needed to be part of the policy debate. The consumer groups were only 
able to get a copy of the text of TBA‟s addendum (the first concession to be renegotiated) 
when the modified contract was sent by the government to the bicameral legislative 
commission.320 In its turn, the public hearing organized by the government about the 
TBA addendum was –arguably- a façade. By the time the hearing was carried out, the 
government had already closed the agreement with the company, and the open meeting 
with the public became just a formality. In this context, it is worth noting that the 
judicialization of the dispute forced the government and the concessionaires to 
acknowledge the consumer associations as a party in the policy process. In fact, during 
the months the TBA‟s addendum was judicially suspended, the government and the 
company attempted to reach a negotiated agreement with the plaintiffs.321 Probably, this 
was one of few instances in which the consumer groups and its allies were significantly 
involved in the negotiation process of the train concessions. 
                                               
320 Interview with Horacio Bersten (Buenos Aires, August 14, 2008); see also Clarin (“La Justicia frenó la 
aplicación del aumento en los trenes”, February 4, 1999). 
321 There were several informal meetings between the different parties during the time decree 210/99 was 
judicially suspended. See, for instance, La Nación (“TBA intenta destrabar el conflicto con la justicia”, 
June 25, 1999), also interview with Hector Polino (Buenos Aires, June 9, 2008). Furthermore, in August 
1999, Judge Guglielmino formally convened a settlement hearing (audiencia de conciliación) between the 
parties. However, after several hours of deliberation, the parties did not reach an agreement (Clarín, 
“Rechazo al aumento en trenes”, August 13, 1999). 
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Second, as already explained in the case of the phone re-structuring, the 
organizational support structure of the consumer movement in Argentina was very weak. 
The consumer associations had very limited financial and human resources, and were not 
able to fund and sustain policy advocacy campaigns.322 One of the main consequences of 
this organizational weakness is that the consumer groups were unable to reach and 
mobilize the broader public against the government‟s attempt to modify the train 
concessions and raise tariffs. There were not social mobilizations or other forms of 
massive collective actions aiming to influence the government policy on this matter. 
Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that the renegotiations of the train concessions 
and the potential tariff increases were largely unknown to the broader public. The issue 
did not gain significant coverage in the national media until the government already 
announced the negotiated agreement with TBA. In sum, the consumer associations did 
not have access to the negotiation process, and the broad population of consumers of the 
metropolitan train services was not organized and mobilized against the government 
policy aiming to modify the concessions and increase tariffs.  
 
In relation to the legislative power, although the national congress was not a main 
actor in the re-negotiations of the train concession, it played a role in the policy process 
through the bicameral legislative commission in charge of monitoring the privatizations. 
As explained above, this congressional commission was created by law 23.696, also 
known as the state reform law. Among other functions, the commission has the power to 
                                               
322 For instance, in one of my interviews with a representative of a consumer association, I was told that 
the association did not closely follow up the train tariff dispute after 1989 because, among other factors, the 
person working on that issue (and many others) had serious family problems and limited the amount time 
he committed to the association (anonymous interview, Buenos Aires, 2008).  As this anecdote suggests, 
the involvement of these associations in certain policy issues, many times depended on the work and efforts 
of individual activists, which clearly speaks of the organizational weakness facing this NGOs to launch and 
sustain advocacy campaign aiming to influence policy process.  
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issue reports (dictámenes) approving or not the different privatization agreements and 
negotiations made by the executive. Although the reports were not legally binding, they 
had a strong political value and were basically deemed to provide legal certainty to the 
private investors that the privatization agreements would be fulfilled. The commission 
was constituted by 12 members (6 deputies and 6 senators) that were elected by their own 
chambers. During 1998 and 1999, when the addenda to the train concessions were 
discussed by the bicameral commission, the Peronist party (the governing party) 
controlled the Senate and had the largest legislative block in the House of Deputies 
(around 46% of the seats of the house). As expected, the bicameral commission to some 
extent reflected the composition of congress: the Peronist party held six seats in the 
commission, while the other six seats were distributed among different opposition parties 
(3 UCR, 1 Frepaso and 2 provincial parties). When the re-negotiation of the metropolitan 
train concessions were discussed in the commission, the addenda to the TBA (the 
government‟s leading case), Metropolitano and Ferrovias concessions were approved by 
just seven votes after disputed processes of negotiation between the different legislative 
blocks and even within the Peronist legislators.323In its turn, the addendum to the 
Metrovias concession was approved unanimously by the bicameral commission, with the 
support of the Peronist and the opposition legislators.324 In sum, although the national 
                                               
323 For instance, in the case of the Metropolitano‟s concession, governor Duhalde from the province of 
Buenos Aires and the powerful local Peronist party were against the changes negotiated by the national 
government. In fact, the provincial government requested to be part in the negotiations with the 
concessionaire. When the bicameral commission discussed the Metropolitano addendum, one of the 
Peronist member of the commission (deputy Echague, politically close to governor Duhalde) announced 
that he will not approved the modified concession. After a quite unclear procedure, Echague was replaced 
by Salto, another Peronist deputy, and the Metropolitano contract was finally approved by the bilateral 
legislative commission. For a more detailed description of this case, see La Nación (“Duhalde cuestiona la 
prórroga de la concesión de trenes”,  November 2; “Divide al PJ la suba en los trenes”, November 4, 1999) 
and Clarín (“ Maniobra del PJ en el Congreso para aumentar el boleto de tren”, November 4, 1999).  
324 As mentioned above, the unanimity in this case can be explained by the fact that the changes introduced 
in the Metrovias concession were, to a certain extent, different from the changes introduced in the other 
concessions (shorter time extension of the concession; lower tariff increases), although the investments in 
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congress might not have been a leading actor in the policy debate, it was clearly involved 
in the policymaking process. 
 
In relation to the executive branch of government, the Menem administration 
strongly promoted and supported the policy of renegotiating the passenger trains 
concessions. As described above, in 1997 the government issued decree 543/97 and 
began the negotiations with the concessionaries; then it advocated for the agreements 
made with the train companies at the bilateral legislative commission; finally, it issued 
the decrees modifying the concessions. In other words, the executive was a main force 
promoting the renegotiations of the train concessions. In contrast, state capacity issues 
were not relevant in the development of this policy conflict. Although state budget deficit 
problems might help explaining some of the government‟s policy choices (for instance, 
no government‟s funds to cover infrastructure investments), the re-negotiation of the train 
concessions was not mainly triggered by deficit reduction concerns, and the way the re-
negotiations were conducted and developed were not significantly shaped or affected by 
state capacity issues.  
 
Summing up, the re-negotiation of the metropolitan train services was strongly 
supported by the national government, and was unsuccessfully opposed by consumer 
groups who had had limited access to the policy process and limited political leverage. 
This combination led to the judicialization of this policy in a context in which congress 
was involved in the policy process through the bilateral legislative commission, which 
approved the government‟s policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
infrastructure at the end were going to be covered by the consumers as in the other concessions. See above, 
footnote 314. 
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A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE MATANZA-RIACHUELO BASIN CASE  
Note: given that the chapter has already a considerable length, I do not develop a 
detailed, historical case study of this dispute, but a rather brief summary, focusing on the 
political conditions under which this policy conflict evolved.  
The Matanza – Riachuelo basin is considered one of the most (if not the most) 
polluted areas in Argentina.325 Most of the basin is located in the metropolitan area of 
Buenos Aires, encompassing part of the territories of the city of Buenos Aires and 14 
municipal districts of the province of Buenos Aires.326 A large percentage of the 
population of this densely populated region (especially the population living at the banks 
of the rivers) is poor, lacks access to sewage and water services systems, and lives in 
slums in extremely precarious housing. Moreover, the basin also includes some of the 
most heavily industrialized areas in the country, which dump their effluents to the basin‟s 
watercourses.327  
Since the 1990s, there had been some governmental initiatives aiming to clean up 
the basin and to tackle different environmental problems affecting the region. In 1993, 
the national government, at that time under the administration of President Menem, 
created an executive committee (Comité Ejecutor Matanza Riachuelo) to carry out an 
environmental management plan for the basin (decree 1093/93). The secretary of 
environment at the time, María Julia Alsogaray, made a famous announcement that the 
Riachuelo would be clean in 1000 days. By September 1995, the 1000 days were over 
                                               
325In fact, according to the Blacksmith Institute, the Riachuelo basin is one of the 30 most polluted sites or 
areas in the world. See  http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/wwpp2007/finalReport2007.pdf, cited by 
Napoli and García Espil (2010, 177). 
326 For a brief but detailed overview of the geography, history,  social economic features and main 
environmental problems of the Matanza – Riachuelo basin see the report prepared by Fundación Ciudad 
(2002); also, see Nápoli (2009). 
327 According to the national government, up to December 2008, there were 4100 registered industries 
dumping  their waste in the Matanza - Riachuelo (data provided by ACUMAR, cited by Nápoli and Espil 
2010, 178). 
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and plan did not advance. The Menem administration, then, created a new executive 
committee (Comité Ejecutor del Plan de Gestión Ambiental y de Manejo de la Cuenca 
Hídrica Matanza Riachuelo -CERM-), which this time included not only the city of 
Buenos Aires but also the government of the province of Buenos Aires (decree 
482/95).328 In 1998, the Inter-American Development Bank approved a U$ 250 million 
loan to Argentina to partially fund the implementation of the environmental management 
plan for the basin (loan 1059/OC-AR).329 However, only a very small part of the loan‟s 
funds were executed by the successive Argentine governments.330Some tasks were 
carried out, like cleaning of the surface of the river (removal of old ships, etc.) and some 
flood control works, but there were no major advances in pollution control or significant 
improvements in the overall environmental quality of the basin.  
In parallel to these specific policy measures targeting the basin, during these years 
general environmental legislation was passed at the federal level, province of Buenos 
Aires and city of Buenos Aires, which provided legal tools to control the pollution 
affecting the basin. However, the shared view among experts, activists and local residents 
is that the level of enforcement of the pollution control regulations in the basin had been 
extremely low and insufficient (Fundación Ciudad 2002; Defensor del Pueblo de La 
Nación 2003).  For many observers, a main difficulty faced by all these policy efforts is 
that the exercise of state power in the basin is highly fragmented. Different agencies 
                                               
328 For a more detailed description of these policy initiatives as well as the institutional design and legal 
powers of these two committees, see the report prepared by the national ombudsman office (Defensor del 
Pueblo de La Nación 2003). 
329For a description of the terms of the loan, see the reports prepared by the national ombudsman office 
(Defensor del Pueblo de La Nación 2003) and  the federal general auditing office (Auditoria General de la 
Nación 2006). 
330 Only 7.7 million dollars (out of 250 million which constituted the total loan) were executed  in 
Riachuelo related works (Auditoria General de la Nación 2006, 16). During the 2002 economic crisis, and 
given that the funds were not executed, the IADB and the Argentina government (at this time under the 
administration of President Duhalde) agreed to use parts of the loan remaining funds to cover urgent social 
programs. 
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belonging to the national government, the government of the city of Buenos Aires and the 
province of Buenos Aires, plus the local governments, have legal competences over 
diverse issues and parts of the territory of the basin without sufficient inter and intra-
jurisdictional coordination. In this complex institutional scenario, jurisdictional problems 
are extremely common, making more difficult the implementation of policies and 
programs as well as the enforcement of existing legislation (Defensor del Pueblo de La 
Nación 2003).  
In this context, the legislatures of the main governments involved (the national 
government, the province of Buenos Aires and the city of Buenos Aires) had been 
generally passive and clearly deferential to the executives on the policies towards the 
Matanza Riachuelo basin. Beyond individuals and sporadic initiatives, there were no 
serious legislative attempts to address the problems of the basin nor to oversee the 
executives‟ implementation of the existing programs.  
Meanwhile, although social awareness and concerns about the environmental 
problems in the Riachuelo had been growing throughout the years, collective action had 
been very fragmented. Social protests and mobilizations had tended to be reactive and 
focalized, for instance, after specific events of pollution or flood affecting specific areas 
of the basin.331 Moreover, after some time, broad popular attention and mobilization 
usually languished, leaving only a small number of local residents or associations 
working on and following up the issues. Furthermore, collective actions and demands had 
tended to be territorially focused (addressing a particular environmental emergency 
                                               
331 Such was the case, for instance, of a toxic “cloud” that affected several elementary schools in the Dock 
Sur during October – November 2001, and triggered strong protest among local residents. This incident and 
the social protest that followed it, led (among other policy measures) to the creation of a environmental 
control committee in the Dock Sur, with the participation of the factories, governments and local NGOs. 
The committed was active during 2002, but by 2003, it lapsed. Some local associations continued their 
advocacy work on the issue, but the level of social attention and broad mobilization was significantly 
lower. For a more detailed description and analysis of this process see Lanzetta and Spósito (2003) and 
Ryan (2004). 
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affecting certain neighborhoods), and there had been low levels of articulation among 
local associations and neighbor groups mobilized around these issues in different parts of 
the basin.332 In short, the lack of a coordinated and sustained collective demand over the 
socio-environmental problems affecting the Riachuelo greatly limited the political 
leverage of the local groups demanding policy changes on this issue. 
In this context, by the end of 2002, the national ombudsman‟s office formed a 
working group with a few well known NGOs and other institutions to try to “move up” 
the issue of the Matanza Riachuelo in the national policy agenda. In August 2003, based 
on a report elaborated by the working group, the national ombudsman issued a resolution 
declaring the Matanza – Riachuelo basin in state of health and environmental emergency, 
and requesting different agencies and ministers of the national government to take 
measures to address the problem. Despite the media attention triggered by the report, and 
even though many high level government officials publically acknowledged the problems 
affecting the basin,333 the government‟s response (at that time already under the 
presidency of Nestor Kirchner) was poor, and no significant policy measures were 
taken.334  
In 2004, then, a group of 17 residents from Villa Inflamable (a highly polluted 
slum located in the Dock Sur, in the mouth of the Matanza – Riachuelo) and health 
workers from a nearby public hospital, filed a legal complaint for environmental damages 
                                               
332 Interviews with Mora Arauz (Buenos Aires, June, 2004), Antonio Brailovsky (Buenos Aires, July 7, 
2004), Verónica Odriazola (Buenos Aires, July 14, 2004). These interviews were part of a summer field 
research I carried on June-August 2004 on experiences of social accountability in the Matanza – Riachuelo 
basin. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see my field research report (Ryan 2004), available at 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/claspo/fieldreports/ryan04.pdf.  Also, interview with Andrés 
Nápoli (Buenos Aires, April 10, 2008). 
333 For instance, the sub-secretary of water resources stated in written that the he fully agreed with the 
report produced by the Ombudsman. Similarly, the chief of national cabinet formally responded to the 
ombudsman,  that the government acknowledged  that a specific agency for the basin, as proposed by the 
ombudsman report, was necessary (Defensor del Pueblo de La Nación 2005).  
334 See the follow up report produced by the Ombudsman office and the working group (Defensor del 
Pueblo de La Nación 2005).   
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to the Supreme Court of Justice against 44 large polluting business located in the basin 
and the national government and the governments of the province and the city of Buenos 
Aires. In June 2006, the Court declared itself competent to hear the claim for collective 
environmental damage.335 Moreover, it issued an initial resolution ordering the national 
government and the governments of the province and the city of Buenos Aires to submit 
a plan to clean up and to control the environmental pollution in the basin according to 
national environmental law 25.675 (ley general del ambiente). Furthermore, the Court 
requested the 44 large polluting businesses to provide information about the 
environmental impact of their activities and whether they had fulfilled other requirements 
established by the existing environmental regulations. A few weeks later, the Court 
granted intervention in the case to the national ombudsman and several of the 
environmental NGOs as interested third parties (“terceros interesados”), who became 
very active actors in the judicial procedure.  
In response to the Court‟s resolution, the national government submitted a bill to 
the national congress creating an agency for the Matanza Riachuelo basin, ACUMAR 
(Autoridad de Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo). The bill was quickly treated by congress, and 
by November 2006, it was already approved by both legislative chambers (law 26.168). 
In parallel, the Court began a process of hearings with the parties with the purpose of 
gather information about the situation in the basin and to monitor the parties‟ compliance 
with its initial resolution. The process of hearings helped keep the attention of the media, 
governments and the broader public on the issue.336 In July 2008, the Court finally issued 
a final resolution; it ordered the governments to develop a program to repair the 
environment of the basin and to prevent future environmental damages, and it listed some 
                                               
335 Meanwhile, the Court referred the liability claims for personal damages to the lower courts. 
336 For a brief but detailed overview of the four hearings convoked by the Supreme Court, see Nápoli 
(2009). 
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components or issues which should be encompassed and addressed by the program.337 
Furthermore, the Court created a monitoring commission (cuerpo colegiado) formed by 
the national ombudsman office and the NGOs who intervened in the cause as third-
parties, to follow up the execution of the program.338 Currently, the ACUMAR is in the 




The judicialization of the public policies analyzed in this chapter occurred under a 
similar configuration of political conditions. In all these policy disputes, the involved 
social actors had very limited political leverage. In the case of the re-structuring of the 
phone tariffs, the “organized” consumer movement in Argentina was very incipient and 
was just emerging when the issue of the tariff re-structuring began to be discussed during 
the first part of the 1990‟s. This clearly affected the capability of the consumer activists 
to develop coordinated advocacy efforts and to reach and mobilize the broad public of 
phone users against the government‟s attempt to increase local phone tariffs. Similarly, in 
the case of the dispute about oil drilling in the Llancanelo wetlands, the main opposition 
was embodied by local environmental groups, which had a small organizational structure 
and limited capability to reach and mobilize a broader constituency against the 
government‟s policy. In the same manner, the consumer groups opposed to the train 
tariffs‟ increases had a very limited access to the process of renegotiation of the train‟s 
                                               
337 The Court did not issue a final resolution regarding the attribution of civil liability for the collective 
environmental damage already cause. The procedure for these claims is still open.  
338 For more information about the Cuerpo Colegiado and its activities, see FARN‟s web site 
(http://www.farn.org.ar/riachuelo/cuerpo_colegiado.html). 
339 For a detailed analysis of the process of compliance with the judicial resolution and the implementation  
of the program by the ACUMAR, see Nápoli and García Espil (2010). 
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concessions, and did not have the capability to reach and mobilize the broader public of 
train users to protest against the government‟s initiative. Meanwhile, in relation to the 
Matanza Riachuelo, collective demands and actions were fragmented and focalized, 
usually following specific environmental emergencies affecting particular neighborhoods, 
and broad social attention and mobilization could not be sustained though time. All this 
greatly limited the political leverage of those social actors that were actively demanding 
policy changes in the basin. 
An interesting evidence of the political weakness of these different social groups 
is how their access to the policy negotiations improved after the public policies were 
judicialized. Llancanelo might be the case in which that improvement can be perceived in 
a clearer and stronger way. The final negotiations between the provincial government, the 
oil company and the environmental groups to define the boundaries of the Llancanelo 
Wildlife Reserve clearly speaks to the leverage gained by the NGOs as a result of the 
judicialization of the dispute. A similar situation occurred in relation to the dispute about 
the train tariffs. During the months the TBA‟s concession reform was judicially 
suspended, the government and the concessionaire attempted to reach a negotiated 
agreement with the consumer association that brought the legal claim to the courts. 
Arguably, this was one of few instances in which the consumer groups and allies were 
significantly involved in the process of re-negotiation of the train concessions. Likewise, 
in the case of the re-structuring of the phone tariffs, the different public hearings 
organized by the government and the ample media coverage to the issue (which clearly 
allowed consumer groups to voice and place their concerns in the policy agenda) were 
largely a side-effect of the continuous judicialization of the dispute by the consumer 
associations and their allies.  
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A significant characteristic of these political scenarios is that the social groups 
posing demands on the state were - in some cases - relatively clear losers of the policy 
processes, while in others they were not. The policy loser status is quite clear in the cases 
of the re-structuring of the phone tariffs and the re-negotiation of the metropolitan train 
concessions, in which the involved social groups were opposed to policy reforms 
championed and finally approved by the governments. In the case of Riachuelo, instead, 
the involved social groups were asking the government to implement and enforce existing 
legislation and policies. Likewise, in the case of Llancanelo, although the environmental 
groups were opposed to the oil drilling policy promoted by the government, one of their 
main arguments was that the government had to define the biological boundaries of the 
Llancanelo reserve before it could approve the location of any oil drilling well in the area. 
Clearly, the environmental groups were requesting the government to implement a 
legislation that was already in force. Moreover, in both cases, Riachuelo and Llancanelo, 
the governments had -to a certain extent- acknowledged those policy mandates.  
This variation in the policy loser status is relevant for two main reasons. First, it 
shows that the political leverage of the social groups involved in a policy dispute is 
clearly autonomous (conceptually and empirically) of whether they are strict losers of the 
policy process or not. While in the disputes about the train concessions and phone tariffs, 
the involved social actors lost in the policymaking process and had weak political 
leverage, in the Llancanelo and Riachuelo cases, the social groups were equally 
disadvantaged in political terms, but were demanding the implementation of already 
existing policies. Second, the fact that all these public policies became judicialized 
regardeless of whether actors were losers of the policy process or not, indicates this is not 
the key causal condition in this type of political scenarios. 
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In contrast, the role of the executive branch of government is clearly a relevant 
condition in this political setting. In all these cases, the political elites in charge of the 
government intensively supported and promoted the public policies that later became the 
object of judicial disputes. In the case of the passenger train services for the metropolitan 
area, the national government was the main force promoting the renegotiations of the 
concessions. In the case of the phone tariffs, the Menem administration not only issued 
the decree reforming the tariffs structure, but previously, it took different measures 
aiming to prepare or facilitate the scenario for the tariff reform. The intervention of the 
telecommunication regulatory agency (CNT), and the removal of its entire board because 
of their disagreements regarding the restructuring of the phone‟s tariffs, is a solid 
indicator of Menem‟s support for this policy change. Similarly, the government of 
Mendoza intensely advocated for the oil drilling project in the Llancanelo region. The 
government‟s actions and arguments in the debate about of the location of the oil drilling 
wells and the boundaries of the natural reserve clearly show how the provincial 
government favored the development of the oil project in detriment of the preservation of 
the wetlands. While in these three cases, the involved governments were fervently 
advocating a policy change, in the case of Riachuelo, the governments were protecting 
the status quo. As described above, the different levels of governments with jurisdiction 
over the basin were utterly passive and unresponsive to social demands for cleaning and 
controlling the environmental pollution in the area. 
In relation to the role of the legislature, there are differences among the different 
policy disputes analyzed in the chapter. In the case of the re-structuring of the phone 
tariffs, the national congress played a rather passive role in the policy process and debate. 
The national legislature was easily controlled by the party of government, and those bills 
or resolution projects opposing the executive‟s policy preferences, were blocked and 
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could not advance within the legislature agenda. Likewise, the legislatures were generally 
passive and deferential to the executives in relation to the policies and problems affecting 
the Riachuelo basin. On the contrary, in the case of Llancanelo, although the provincial 
legislative assembly was largely indifferent to the issue of oil drilling in the Llancanelo 
region, the environmental commissions of the legislature did exercise its oversight 
powers of the government‟s policy on this issue. Similarly, in the case of the 
renegotiation of the train concessions, although congress was not a main venue where this 
policymaking process evolved, the legislature was involved in the policy process through 
the bilateral legislative commission, which approved the government‟s policy in this 
matter. In short, this variation among the four cases suggests that, in this political 
scenario, the role of the legislature was not a key condition triggering the judicialization 
of these policy disputes.   
Similarly, with the exception of Riachuelo, the other three case studies show that 
state capacity issues were not relevant in the development of those policy disputes, and 
therefore, were not a main condition affecting the judicialization of these policy issues. In 
the Riachuelo case, however, the fragmentation of the state and the lack of coordination 
among different levels of government was a main factor affecting public policies in the 
basin. Although a simple application of the logic upon which qualitative comparative 
analysis is built suggests that state capacity is not relevant in this causal configuration 
(namely, if several cases differ in one condition yet have the same outcome, then that 
condition can be considered irrelevant), this logical conclusion is not applicable to the 
case of Riachuelo. The historical analysis of the development of environmental disputes 
and policies in the Riachuelo clearly indicates the contrary. In this case, then, state 
capacity deficiencies are a central condition to understand the political setting under 
which this policy issue became judicialized.  
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Regardless of this difference, it is worth stressing that the Riachuelo does not 
constitute a “different” type of causal configuration.340 It shares the same basic 
combination of conditions with the other policy disputes examined in the chapter. As the 
historical analysis of the four cases shows, all these public policy conflicts became 
judicialized under a political scenario in which the social actors posing demands on the 
state were politically weak, and the executive branch of government was strongly 
promoting or supporting the policy in question. In short, this chapter provides empirical 
evidence to argue that when this basic combination of political conditions is present, 
public policy disputes are likely to become judicialized. 
                                               
340 Instead, one could argue that the judicialization of the Matanza – Riachuelo dispute is over-
determined. In this case, judicialization is linked not only to the lack of enforcement and implementation 
of existing legislation due to the preferences of the politicians in charge of the executive, but also due to the 
deficiencies in the capability of the state to implement and enforce those regulations.  
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CHAPTER 7: POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES AND WEAK 
JUDICIALIZATION  
This chapter describes and compares two policy disputes: the Esquel case about 
mining policy in the province of Chubut, and the health coverage reform for disabled 
people promoted by the national government in 2002.  These are cases in which legal 
claims were brought to the judiciary, but the courts and judicial procedures played a very 
minor role and were not relevant in the unfolding of these policy processes. While in the 
previous empirical chapters, we have analyzed political scenarios that lead to strongly 
judicialized policy disputes, this chapter examines political configurations that resulted in 
disputes in which judicialization was weak. In this way, these less than more judicialized 
policy disputes constitute the negative cases of our study. 341  
The question driving this chapter is why these policy conflicts were not fully 
judicialized? How did the governance conditions affecting these policy processes differ 
from the cases of policy judicialization analyzed in previous chapters? The QCA analysis 
of these cases suggest that when the involved social actors have political leverage, and 
the legislature is attentive to and active in a policy issue, a dispute is not likely to become 
fully judicialized even if the executive is opposed to the policy demands made by social 
actors. This seems to indicate that the opposition of the executive to the policy claims 
posed by social actor is not a sufficient condition, by itself, to explain the judicialization 
of a policy issue. If this is correct, it clearly strengths the explanatory leverage of the 
configurations examined in the previous chapters 5 and 6, in which the opposition of the 
government combined with other conditions, trigger the involvement of the courts. 
                                               
341 In the QCA-fs lenguaje, these are cases that, although they not complety out of a set, they are 
considered to be “more out than in”. 
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As in the previous empirical chapters, the case studies are composed, first, by a 
historical description of the development of the policy issue, and second, by a “focused” 
analysis of the governance conditions affecting each process. Following, I include the 
fuzzy set coding of the two cases analyzed in this chapter. 
 
Table 7.1: Fuzzy Membership Scores  
















.33 .67 .33 0 .67 0 
(1) In fuzzy set language, 1 means a case has full membership in a set, .67 means that a case is more in than 
out of a set, .33 means a case is more out than in a set, and 0 means a case is clearly excluded from the set. 
When these scores are translated into Boolean logic, scores 1 and .67 indicate that, in a given case, a causal 
condition is relevant or present. On the contrary, scores .33 and 0 indicates that a causal condition is 
irrelevant or absent. 
 
MINING POLICY IN THE ANDES: THE CASE OF ESQUEL 
Esquel was one of the first of a series of cases of massive local opposition to 
policies promoting industrial scale mining operations in Argentina. The project “Cordon 
Esquel” consisted of an open-pit gold mine, near the town of Esquel, in the province of 
Chubut. Located at the foothills of the Patagonian Andes, Esquel is the largest town in 
western Chubut, with a population of approximately 30.000 residents. The proposed 
project covered an area of approximately 10 square kilometers, including facilities for 
extraction, processing and waste disposal. It would process the ore using cyanide vatleach 
technology. This project represented the first attempt for an industrial scale mining 
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operation in a region where the main economic activities were forestry, ranching and, 
especially, tourism.342 
On October 18, 2002, the mining company submitted its environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) to the provincial mining agency (dirección provincial de minas y 
geología).343 At that time, there was some controversy among state actors about whether 
the mining or the environmental provincial agency was legally entitled to assess the EIA, 
authorize the project and control the mining operation, but the provincial government 
reaffirmed its policy that the mining agency was the enforcement authority for the EIA 
process.344 A decision, arguably, that aimed to support the development of the Cordon 
Esquel project, and more generally, of the mining industry in the province. A few days 
after the presentation of the EIA, the mining agency convened an open public hearing to 
review the EIA.345 The public hearing was scheduled for December 4, 2002.346 
During the subsequent weeks, initial local uncertainty about the mining project 
turned into massive open opposition. A key factor triggering this process was the 
                                               
342Esquel is the gateway to Los Alerces National Park, a very well known natural protected area in the 
Argentine Patagonia. 
343 During 1999 - 2002, the mining company submitted the EIA reports regarding the exploration stage. 
These reports were approved by the provincial mining agency, which authorized the exploration activities. 
Now, the company was submitting the EIA report for the production stage. For a timeline of the entire 
environmental assessment process of the Esquel project,  see Parizeck (2008). 
344The disputes about which state agency was responsible for authorizing and controlling the project were 
based on the apparently contrasting provisions between provincial decree 84/97 and provincial law 
4032/94. On the one hand, the Decree 84/97 designated the provincial mining agency as the enforcement 
authority for the federal law 24.585 on “Environmental Protection of Mining Activities”. Among other 
things, this federal law establishes an EIA procedure for mining activities. On the other hand, provincial 
law 4032 -the General Environmental Law of the province of Chubut- also establishes an EIA procedure 
for any activity or project that may degrade the environment, but designates the environmental agency as 
the enforcement authority.  
345 It is worth noting that the public hearing was required by the provincial law 4032, but not by the federal 
law 24.585. The provincial government (and the company) argued that the EIA procedure was regulated by 
the Federal law, not the provincial legislation. Therefore, the decision to hold a public hearing was 
presented as an expression of “good will”, rather than as a legal requirement (Gerosa Lewis 2002) . This of 
course, raised doubts among the local population about to what point the opinions and concerns to be 
expressed in the hearing were going to be taken into account by the government. 
346 See the web site of the company describing the administrative story of the project  
(www.minerameridianaustral.com/proyectos_esquel_legislacion.cfm). 
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government and company‟s reluctance to make information available.347 It was extremely 
difficult for the local residents to get access to information about the project, and 
especially to the environmental impact study made by the company.348  “If they don‟t 
provide the information it is because they have something to hide” (“si no dan la 
información es porque tienen algo que ocultar”) was the idea that rapidly spread among 
many Esquel‟s residents that, up to that time, were not clearly opposed to the project.349 
By the beginning of November, a local network of self-convened neighbors and groups 
which were following the development of the project formally came out against the mine 
project, and became the Assembly of Self –convened Neighbors Against the Mine. The 
assembly began to mobilize and organize the public opposition to the project. Anti-
mining graffiti started appearing throughout the town. On November 25, took place the 
First March against the Mine, which drew large crowds, and for the first time the local 
opposition movement got coverage from the national media (BSR 2003, 270). Now, local 
                                               
347 For instance, the company refused to make public the technology that it was going to use to treat the 
cyanide, based on the protection of industrial secret, and the government justified the company position. 
This clearly helped raising doubts about the project (see statement of legislator Llamazares during the 
legislative debate about this issue, Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de Chubut, November 26 
2002, p. 77). 
348 The report made by the Business For Social Responsibility –BSR- (an international  NGO hired for the 
company to assess  its communications and communities policies with the local population in Esquel), 
transcribed an interviewed with a Esquel‟s resident which is enlightening about the difficulties faced by the 
local population to access to the information about the project”  “…One interviewee stated that when he 
heard about the proposed project, his first response was to try to find out as much information as possible 
about the mine. He began by researching the project on Internet…..but he could find no publicly available 
information about the project in Esquel. His emails to the provincial Department of Mining were 
repeatedly ignored. When he asked the company for a copy of the environmental impact study, he was told 
it was too expensive to copy and he would have to go to the provincial capital of Rawson (which is hours by 
car form Esquel). He asked to receive a copy on CD, to be able to review the study on his computer at 
home and was told that this was not possible. This made him indignant. Public information is public 
information !” he said in frustration…” (Business for Social Responsability 2003, 6-7).  
349 Phone interviewed with Gerosa Lewis (November 31, 2008). G. Lewis was one of the referents of the 
local movement against the mine 
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opposition to the mine project was open and growing as well as the level of tension and 
conflict within the town.350 
To certain extent, the political system began to react to what was happening in 
Esquel. During the first weeks of November, the provincial mining agency requested the 
company to submit new studies as part of the EIA. Furthermore, the agency decided to 
postpone the public hearing until January 4, 2003. On November 26, the legislature 
approved law 4958. The law postponed the public hearing for 90 days, a longer period 
than the one set by the government, based on the argument that more information was 
needed about the potential impact of the project. Furthermore, the new law established 
that the state environmental agency would be in charge of assessing and authorizing the 
whole EIA procedure (and not the state mining agency as it was preferred by the 
provincial government). The law was approved with the support of the Peronist 
legislators (the main opposition party) and a few legislators of the governing political 
coalition – Alianza- who were critical of  the government‟s mining policy on Esquel (in 
fact, these legislators were the authors of the bill).351 The governor partially vetoed the 
law passed by the legislature. First, he postponed the public hearing for 60 instead of 90 
days. The hearing, then, was scheduled for March 29, 2003 (decree 1628/02). Secondly, 
the governor reaffirmed that the mining agency was the state authority in charge of 
assessing and approving the EIA for the prospecting and exploration stages of mining 
projects, but it granted that the environmental agency would be the enforcement authority 
for the production stage (Decree 1629/02).352 
                                               
350 For a more detailed description of the process of social mobilization against the mine project in Esquel 
see Gerosa Lewis (2003), also Walter (2008).  Moreover, see the Business for Social responsibility report, 
which included an outline of the main mobilizations and events organized by the movement against the 
mine (2003, 28-30). 
351 See Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de Chubut (Session November 26, 2002) 
352 This meant that, in the case of the Cordon Esquel project, the assessment of the on-going EIA report 
would now be done by the environmental agency (Parizek 2008). 
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Meanwhile the social protest in Esquel kept growing. On December 4, took place 
the Second March against the Mine, which was as massive as the first one. The assembly, 
then, decided to organize a march the fourth of every month. Meanwhile, a small group 
of local lawyers and activists were working on a legal strategy to bring a judicial claim 
against the government of Chubut and the company. When this proposal of judicializing 
the conflict was discussed in the Assembly, it did not get much support. Social 
mobilization was the preferred strategy of most of the participants at the assembly.353 
However, the legal claim was pursued, and on December 16, a “recurso de amparo” was 
filed against the government of Chubut, the municipality of Esquel and the mining 
company, at a state district court located in Esquel ("Villivar, Silvana c/ Provincia del 
Chubut y Otros s/Amparo –Expte 1365"  2003). Basically, the plaintiffs asked the judge 
to suspend all activities related to the mining operation until the public hearing took place 
and the project was duly authorized according to the provincial law 4.032. The plaintiffs 
argued that even though the mining extraction had not started yet, the company was 
building routes, taking mining samples, etc, all activities that were heavily affecting the 
environment.354 Furthermore, they asked for the suspension of the project as a provisional 
remedy while the legal procedure was pending. The main defense of the provincial 
government and the company was that mining activities were regulated by federal 
legislation, and therefore, provincial law 4.032 was not applicable. 
On February 19, 2003, the district court ruled in favor of the provisional remedy 
required by the plaintiffs and ordered the temporary suspension of the mining-related 
activities. The judge stressed that the provincial law requires environmental impact 
studies to be done and approved before any activity could begin. Both the mining 
                                               
353 Interviewed with Gerosa Lewis (November 31, 2008).  G. Lewis was one of the lawyers involved in 
pursuing the legal claim  
354 The plaintiffs also asked the court to order the company to repair the environmental damage already 
caused. 
 231 
company as well as the provincial government appealed the decision of the district court. 
The government brought the appeal directly to the Superior Court of Justice of the 
province of Chubut based on an exceptional legal channel –article 195 Bis of the Civil 
Procedural Code of the province. This provision allowed the government to appeal 
directly to the Superior Court when a provisional remedy granted by a lower court affect 
“an essential activity of the state”. The mere presentation of this petition by the 
government suspended the resolution of the district court. Hence, the mining activities in 
Esquel continued.355 
A few days before the district court‟s resolution, a decision taken by Esquel‟s city 
council greatly changed the dynamic of the conflict. During January and February, there 
were massive marches against the mine, and the tension within the local community was 
escalating.356 On February 6, there was a massive mobilization to the building where the 
local council was in session. That day, and under the presence of hundreds of local 
residents who were in the building and its surroundings, the Council unanimously 
approved municipal ordinance 03/03, authorizing the local mayor to hold a non-binding 
plebiscite about the mine project Cordon Esquel.357358 That decision also signaled a deep 
change of positions toward the mining project within the political establishment of 
Esquel. Up to that moment, the local UCR and Peronist party of Esquel (with few 
                                               
355 For a detailed analysis of this stage of the judicial procedures, see Gerosa Lewis (2003). 
356 Interview with Gerosa Lewis (November 31, 2008). See also the references made by the local mayor in 
the media about the increasing level of social conflict in Esquel (El Diario de Madryn, “Por este debate se 
produjo un daño social irreparable”, February 26, 2003). 
357 For brief descriptions of the events during that day, see the media coverage in the regional newspapers 
such as Diario Cronica from Comodoro Rivadavia (“El Concejo Deliberante de Esquel prohibió el uso de 
cianuro en su ejido” February 7, 2003) and El Diario de Madryn (“Producto de la Presión Popular: 
Referéndum vinculantes para la explotación de oro en Esquel”, February 7, 2003). It is worth noting that a 
bill proposing a plebiscite was already submitted to the Esquel city council by a group of local residents in 
November 2002, but the council did not treat it at that time (Gerosa Lewis 2003) . 
358 The council also unanimously approved an ordinance (02/03) repealing a previous municipal ordinance 
of adherence to the national and provincial laws promoting mining, and another ordinance (in this case, it 
was approved by majority vote) banning the storage and use of cyanide in territory of the municipality of 
Esquel (ordinance 01/03). 
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exceptions) had supported the project. From that moment on, the local Peronist party was 
opposed (Scandizzo and Valtriani 2003, 15;  also Gerosa Lewis 2003, 256). Meanwhile, 
the local mayor, Rafael Williams, tried to resist the measure. The mayor belonged to the 
Alianza, the same political coalition which was in charge of the provincial government. 
But, under pressure from the city council and local protests, he finally agreed to authorize 
the plebiscite which was held on March 23, 2003.359 
During the electoral campaign for the plebiscite, the provincial and local 
governments openly supported the Yes to the mine project. Nevertheless, the result was 
an overwhelming victory for the opponents to the mining project. Around three-quarters 
of Esquel‟s eligible voters participated (over 15.000 out of 20.000 voters). 81.16% voted 
against the mine, only 18.53% voted in favor.360 There were also plebiscites in other 
small communities and towns around the region (Lago Puelo, Epuyen, Trevellin). In all 
of them, the NO to the mine won by an overwhelming majority as well. 
The first reaction of the provincial government was to minimize the political 
consequences of the plebiscite. Governor Lizurume publicly announced that there was no 
legal reason to stop the mining operation in the Andes.361 However, the results of 
Esquel‟s plebiscite were too overwhelming to be ignored by the political system. On 
March 25, two days after the plebiscite, the Peronist bloc in the provincial legislature 
presented a bill banning open-pit mining and the use of cyanide in mining operations in 
the territory of Chubut. It also presented a bill modifying the mining legislation and 
incrementing the mining royalties to be paid in the future.362 Two weeks later, on April 8, 
                                               
359 It is worth clarifying that, according to the local and provincial legislation, the result of the plebiscite 
was not legally binding. However, it is clear that it would be extremely costly for politicians to ignore the 
results of the popular vote. For a legal analysis of the plebiscite see Gerosa Lewis (2003). 
360 For a detailed description of Esquel‟s electoral results, see Gerosa Lewis (2003, 270). 
361 El Diario de Madryn (“Aún no hay ninguna razón legal para suspender la explotación minera”, March 
26, 2003). 
362 The political impact of the results of the plebiscite is clearly perceived in the legislative session. 
Legislators from the government party as well as from the Peronist opposition made references to the 
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the provincial legislature approved both bills with some modifications. Moreover, law 
5.001 banning open pit mining and the use of cyanide was approved unanimously.  
Meanwhile, the judicial procedures were still going on. On April 10, 2003, the 
provincial Superior Court upheld the provisional measure granted by the district court 
(the Court of Appeal on response to an appeal made by the mining company also upheld 
that decision of the district court). In practical terms, these judicial resolutions did not 
have much impact, because the company had already stopped its mining activities a few 
days before the plebiscite occurred (BSR 2003, 29).  On June 9, 2003, the district court 
finally decided over the core issue of the legal claim. It resolved that the mining project 
had not fulfilled the requirement established by the provincial legislation, law 4.032, and 
therefore, it ordered to keep the suspension of the mining operations until the public 
hearing was carried out and the EIA was duly approved.363 Again, the company appealed 
the decision (and in fact, took the case all the way to the Argentine Supreme Court, which 
finally upheld the district court decision). But this time, the government of Chubut did 
not join the company in the appeals and accepted the judicial decision. 
 
Relevance of Judicializacion 
In comparison to the other judicialized policy conflicts analyzed in the previous 
chapters, Esquel is a case of weak judicialization. The courts and the judicial procedures, 
even though relatively relevant at certain moments of the dispute, were not a main 
                                                                                                                                            
electoral results, and to the need for the government  to answer to the “message” from the people of Esquel 
(see Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de Chubut, session 887, March 25, 2003).There were 
also strong criticisms to the government, even from legislators from the governing coalition. See for 
instances the speech of  Representative Llamazares (Alianza/UCR) who said that many legislators raised 
their voices against the project but they were not listened by the government (Diario de Sesiones de la 
Honorable Legislatura de Chubut, session 887, March 25, 2003, 69). 
363 The other claim brought by the plaintiffs about the repair of the environmental damage was rejected by 
the district court. 
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scenario in which the policy process unfolded. As described above, there were several 
different venues in which the policy debate around the mining project took place. But 
among these different venues, the local level clearly became the main scenario in which 
the policy conflict developed. The scale and intensity of the social mobilization and 
protest in Esquel, and particularly, the call for the plebiscite, were local events that 
shaped the dynamic of the policy process, and around which the other actors and venues 
revolved, including the judiciary and judicial procedures. It should not be surprising, for 
instance, that all but one of the provincial courts‟ decisions against the government‟s 
mining policy were taken after the overwhelming result of the plebiscite.364 Similarly, the 
provincial legislature only passed the law banning open mining in Chubut after the 
citizenry of Esquel massively voted against the mining project. 
More significant, the judicialization of the dispute was not the central advocacy 
strategy of the local social movement opposed to the mining project. Most of the 
advocacy efforts and resources were focused on organizing and mobilizing the public 
and, latter, on wining the plebiscite. As mentioned above, the decision to file the legal 
claim was basically a measure taken just by a group of local residents, mostly lawyers, 
which did not raise much support among the rest of local groups and residents actively 
involved in the dispute.365 Social mobilization and political activism were the preferred 
strategies of the local movement against the mine. In fact, even after obtaining the 
favorable district court decision granting the provisional remedy (which ordered the 
temporal suspension of the mining operations), this initial victory in the judicial venue 
did not change the emphasis of the local groups on social mobilization and political 
                                               
364 This was a point stressed by Gerosa Lewis in the interview (November 21, 2008). Only the district 
court‟s decision granting the provisional remedy (the temporal suspension of the mining operations) was 
taken before the plebiscite.  
365 Interviewed with Gerosa Lewis (November 31, 2008).  
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activism. This has very clear explanation. This judicial decision was taken after the 
Esquel‟s local government agreed to hold the plebiscite. Clearly, the decision to carry out 
the plebiscite represented an important political defeat for the provincial government and 
the local mayor, and after that, all the efforts and resources of the local groups were 
placed in the campaign to win the plebiscite. In short, the local level, and not the courts,  
was the main scenario in which the policy conflict around the Esquel mining project 
developed. 
 
Analysis of Conditions 
As in the previous chapters, the first factor to analyze is whether the social 
opposition to the provincial government‟s mining policy can be considered a strict 
“loser” of the policy process. One could argue that they were policy losers because the 
social demands to stop the mining project in Esquel were not initially satisfied by the 
government. In fact, between 1999 and 2002, the company carried out the mining 
exploration works with government authorization.366 However, this argument is missing 
that the core of the social opposition to the Cordón Esquel project only began by the 
middle of 2002, when the company requested authorization to begin the production of the 
mine. In order to get that authorization, the company submitted the EIA, but it was never 
formally approved by the provincial government (despite that the government strongly 
supported the project). As explained above, in the face of the increasing criticisms and 
concerns about the project, the provincial mining agency in charge of assessing the EIA 
requested the company to provide more studies in order for the project to be authorized. 
Then, the public hearing was postponed in several opportunities which also delayed the 
                                               
366 Between 1999-2002, the provincial mining agency approved the EIAs submitted for the company for 
the exploration stages, and authorized the exploration works (Parizek 2008) . 
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authorization process. Finally the provincial legislature approved law 5001 banning the 
type of mining activity that the company was requesting authorization for. In other 
words, the project “died” before the government was able to finally authorize it.  
If my assessment is correct, then, one could question the relevance of examining 
this case. If the actors obtained what they wanted from this policymaking process, it is 
obvious they did not need to judicialize their claims. However, this observation is 
missing the history of the policy process; how it evolved. As mentioned above, although 
the local social opposition was able to stop the provincial government from allowing the 
mine to begin production, the provincial executive had previously granted several 
authorizations to the company which allowed the project to advance to that stage. The 
interesting feature in this process is that, despite this steady government support for the 
mining project, the social actors still prioritized political mobilization and political 
venues to contest the government policy and they did not fully judicialize the dispute. 
This clearly raises the relevance of this case for this study. Moreover, it requires us to 
examine the other features of the political scenario in which the policy process developed 
in order to explain why this dispute was only weakly judicialized. 
 
Accordingly, the second condition to be analyzed is the political leverage of the 
social actors involved. As described above, Esquel was the epicenter of the social 
opposition against the mining project and, hence, against the provincial government‟s 
mining policy. The Assembly of  Self–convened Neighbors Against the Mine was the 
main “organizational” expression of the local opposition. The assembly was a very 
heterogeneous network of local residents and groups; it encompassed middle class 
professionals, researchers from the local university, residents from working class 
neighborhoods, community organizers, etc. (Walter 2008). The main focus of the 
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assembly was on mobilizing public opposition to the project. The mass marches against 
the mine, organized the 4
th
 of every month, are the best example of this. Furthermore, the 
local mobilization was able to gain attention from the national media and support from 
non-local political actors (the national ombudsman, national and international NGOs like 
Greenpeace, etc.). However, beyond these actions, there was a relatively low level of 
strategic planning and coordination of actions among the different groups and networks 
of residents.367 Arguably, this might have affected the ability of the opposing social 
groups to take part in potential policy negotiations, beyond their rejection of the mining 
project in Esquel. 
Despite these limitations, the leverage of the opposition groups increased as the 
policy conflict evolved. At first, the ability of the local groups to access the policy 
process at the provincial level (the central locus of the decision making process) was very 
limited. In fact, one of the main factors –if not the main one- that helped trigger the 
massive popular opposition to the mining project was the government and company‟s 
reluctance to provide adequate information (BSR 2003).368 Nevertheless, as the level of 
local mobilization increased, the provincial government did begin taking notice of the 
local opposition. For instance, in November 2002, a few days before the first massive 
mobilization against the mining project in Esquel, the provincial government requested the 
mining company to submit new studies as part of its EIA. Arguably, the government‟s 
measure can be read as an attempt to respond to some of the local criticisms and contain the 
social protest.  
                                               
367 As one of the local referents of the Assembly said: “Each one did whatever it could do to contribute to 
the movement” (interview with Gerosa Lewis, November 31, 2008). 
368 Furthermore, the attitude and discourse of government‟s official emphasizing the need for technical 
knowledge and skills to participate in the EIA process, also discouraged neighbors‟ participation 
(BSR2003; Walter 2008). 
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The leverage of the opposition groups was much stronger at the local level. Even 
though most of the political leadership in Esquel supported the project at first, they could 
not resist the growing local mobilization against the mine. The best evidence of this is the 
city council decision to approve, on February 2003, various local ordinances demanded 
by the movement against the mine, including the organization of the non binding 
plebiscite.  
The result of the plebiscite greatly strengthened the political leverage of the local 
groups opposing the government‟s mining policy. As mentioned above, 80% of the voters 
rejected the mining project. Even though the total number of voters of the Esquel region 
represents less than 10% of the provincial electorate,369 the city of Esquel is by far the 
most important economic and political urban center in the Western part of Chubut. 
Therefore, the political significance of the result of the plebiscite was enormous, and 
greatly affected the policy process. The unanimous decision to ban open-pit mining and 
the use of cyanide in mining operations, taken by the provincial legislature few days after 
the plebiscite, is a clear evidence of this political impact. In sum, the social opposition to 
the mining government policy in the Andes was not politically disadvantaged; they were 
able to access and affect the policy process. 
 
In relation to the provincial legislature, its role in the policy process evolved as 
the level of social protest in Esquel increased. Between the period 1999 – 2003, the 
legislative assembly was controlled by the Alianza, a political coalition between the UCR 
and the FREPASO, which also was in charge of the executive branch of the provincial 
government. By the middle of 2002, popular concerns about the mining project had 
grown sharply, but the legislature played a relatively minor oversight role during those 
                                               
369 Esquel had around 20.000 voters out of a provincial electorate of almost 280.000 voters for the year 
2003 (Tow data base , available at www.towsa.com/andy/totalpais/chubut/2003p.html). 
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months. It required the government to provide information about the project and held 
meetings with executive government officials.370 Furthermore, some legislators visited 
Esquel and met with local groups opposing the mine project.371 By the end of 2002, the 
legislature assumed a much more visible role with the approval of law 4.958, which 
suspended the public hearing for 90 days until more information was gathered. Law 
4.958, then, was approved by a circumstantial majority coalition formed by the Peronist 
legislators (the main opposition party) and a few legislators from the Alianza who 
disagreed with the government mining policy. Clearly, the approval of law 4.958 
indicates that the government did not control the legislature over this issue, and that the 
assembly was taking a more proactive role in the policy process. 
After Esquel‟s city government approved the organization of the plebiscite, and as 
the level of conflict in the region kept escalating, the provincial legislature tried to change 
the dynamic of the conflict. On February 20, 2003, the legislative assembly approved law 
4.972 which suspended the public hearing definitely, until all the needed information 
about the potential impact of the mining project was available. The bill was presented by 
the Peronist legislative block and was approved unanimously with the support of the 
Alianza. Right after approving this law, the assembly approved a declaration asking the 
city of Esquel to suspend the plebiscite.  The declaration was proposed by the Alianza 
and was approved unanimously with the support of the Peronist legislators. The 
declaration was justified on the fact that given that the public hearing was suspended, 
there was no point in carrying out the plebiscite. Instead, the plebiscite should be done 
                                               
370 For example, the Peronist legislative block requested information about the industrial secret alleged by 
the company (see speech of legislator Bernardi -PJ-, Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de 
Chubut, session November 26, 2002, 60). Similarly, there were requests for information about the 
transportation of the cyanide  (see statement of legislator Llamazares –Alianza-, Diario de Sesiones de la 
Honorable Legislatura de Chubut, session November 26, 2002, 78). 
371 For example, see the references to meetings with local residents in Esquel made by legislators 
Llamazares and Risso during their statements in the legislature (Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable 
Legislatura de Chubut, session November 26, 2002). 
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after the hearing, when the public had the chance to receive better and more complete 
information than the one that was available at that time.372 Arguably, this political 
agreement between the two legislative blocks represented an attempt to calm the social 
opposition in Esquel and, especially, to take control over the development of the issue. 
However, the attempt was unsuccessful attempt because the plebiscite was carried out 
anyway.  
The legislature did, finally, become a main center of political and social attention 
after the plebiscite occurred. Between March and April 2003, the legislative assembly 
discussed and approved two laws changing the legal framework for mining activities in 
the province, and specifically, banning open pit mining and the use of cyanide. By that 
time, the population of Esquel had expressed its overwhelming rejection of the mining 
project. In sum, the provincial legislature had a relatively active role in the policy 
process, although it was not the main venue in which the policy dispute and debate took 
place. Most of the time, the legislative assembly seemed to be following the development 
of the events rather than leading the process; nevertheless, it was clearly not a passive 
actor. 
 
In its turn, the executive strongly supported the mining project in the Cordon 
Esquel. This support clearly affected the way the government interpreted and 
implemented existing environmental policy and legislation, so as not to hinder the mining 
operations. The best example of this might be the governments‟ arguments in relation to 
the implementation of the general environmental law 4.032. Basically, the government 
stated that the provincial law was not applicable to the mining operation but the federal 
law, which did not require a public hearing in order for the project to be authorized. 
                                               
372 See statement of legislator Lorenzo –Alianza (Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de 
Chubut, session 882, February 20, 2003, 11-16) 
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Beyond the complex legal debate about this jurisdictional issue, what is clearly surprising 
is the fact that the provincial government was so openly and eagerly claiming that its own 
legislation was not applicable.  
Similarly, the policy discussion about which state agency should be in charge of 
assessing and controlling the EIA procedure is an example of the government‟s policy 
preferences. Even though one can argue that the legal issues involved were not clear-cut, 
the government systematically favored the provincial mining agency as the enforcement 
authority over the provincial environmental agency. Arguably, this was a policy decision 
aimed to support the development of the mining industry in the province. A state agency 
focused on promoting mining operations can reasonably be considered a more “friendly” 
agency for the mining investments than one concerned mainly with environmental 
quality.  Finally, the role of the provincial government during the plebiscite in Esquel 
constitutes a clear evidence of the government‟s support for the mining project. As 
mentioned above, the governor himself actively campaigned in favor of the Yes. 
Furthermore, after the plebiscite, the first reaction of the provincial government was to 
minimize the result, so as to maintain the viability of the mining project in Cordon 
Esquel.373 In sum, the government strongly supported the development of mining 
operation in the Andes, and particularly the Cordon Esquel project.  
 
Finally, state capacity issues did not play a relevant role in the unfolding of the 
policy conflict around the mining project in Esquel. The lack of implementation of the 
provincial environmental law 4032 was not related to problems of the state apparatus, 
                                               
373 Governor Lizurume publicly announced that there was no legal reason to stop the mining operation: 
“the residents of Esquel have a right to express their opinions about the development of mining activities 
within the territory of their municipality, but not in relation to the rest of the province”  (own translation, 
El Diario de Madryn, “Aún no hay ninguna razón legal para suspender la explotación minera”, March 26, 
2003) . 
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like lack of sufficient resources or technical capabilities. Instead, as we explained above, 
it was clearly due to the policy preferences of the political elite in charge of the executive 
branch of government. The same can be argued about the fact that the mining agency - 
and not the environmental agency- was the enforcement authority of the EIA procedure. 
Similarly, the problems regarding the availability and public access to the information 
about the EIA were related to political decisions taken by the government and not to 
deficiencies of the state apparatus. For instance, the government supported the company 
decision not to make public the information about how it was going to treat the cyanide 
used in the mining operations (a highly toxic substance), based on the argument that it 
would violate the protection of trade secret.374  In short, issues of state capacity were not 
a factor shaping the process and policy debate around the Cordón Esquel project. 
 
Summing up, in a context in which the social actors opposing the government 
mining policy were highly mobilized and had political leverage, and the provincial 
legislature was relatively active and involved in the issue, the courts and judicial 
procedures did not become a main venue in which the policy process around the Esquel 
project developed. 
 
HEALTH COVERAGE FOR DISABLED PEOPLE 
This case is about a conflict that developed around the national government‟s 
attempt during the first months of 2002 to modify health care coverage and services for 
disabled people. This conflict occurred in the context of the most acute social, economic 
and political crises affecting Argentina since the return to democracy in the 1980s. In 
                                               
374  See statements of legislator Bernardi (PJ) and legislator Llamazares (Alianza) in which they analyzed 
the government‟s response to a request made by the provincial legislature precisely about this issue (Diario 
de Sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de Chubut, session November 26, 2002, 65-77). 
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December 2001, president de La Rua had resigned in the midst of huge social protests 
against government economic policies; the Argentine state had declared itself in default 
and most services provided or funded by the state were at risk. In January 2002, Senator 
Duhalde was elected interim president by the national congress.375 The new 
administration quickly got congress to approve law 25.561 declaring a broad 
administrative, economic and financial emergency and delegating legislative power to the 
executive.376 
In this context, the new minister of health, Ginés Gonzáles Garcia, began working 
on an emergency plan for the health care system, especially given the economic situation 
affecting the social security system.377 Many obras sociales were at risk of financial 
collapse.378 Moreover, many were not even fulfilling the PMO (Programa Medico 
Obligatorio) which established the list of medical benefits and services they were 
required to provide by law.379 The obras sociales as well as private health insurance 
                                               
375 Senator Duhalde belonged to the Peronist party, which was the main opposition party during the 
presidency of Fernando de La Rua (coalition UCR - FREPASO). After the resignation of de La Rua, and 
after a few weeks in which the office of the presidency changed hands several times, Senator Duhalde was 
appointed  interim president as a result of a broad political agreement between the Peronist party, the UCR, 
FREPASO  and other parties with legislative representation. 
376 Law 25.561 was proposed by the executive and approved with few changes by congress during the 
session on January 5-6, 2002. The core of the law is about economic and financial issues and policies. The 
law just mentions social policy when declaring the emergency (article 1) and it does not specify what 
competences and powers are delegated to the executive regarding this policy field. 
377 As explained in previous footnote 68, the Argentine healthcare system is constituted by three 
subsectors: social security, private medicine and the public health sector. The social security sector 
basically covers employees and their families through institutions, called obras sociales, managed by each 
trade union. The private sector encompassed individual practitioners, hospitals, clinics and varied forms of 
private medical insurance. The public sector is made up of public hospitals (under provincial and municipal 
authority). In principle, this sector offers free health services to the whole population, but in fact, it mainly 
serves the poorest sectors of argentine society, those who do not have social security medical coverage and 
cannot afford private health services. 
378 See, for instance, the media statement made by the head of social services (Superintendencia de 
Servicios de Salud), an agency belonging to the minister of  health, regarding the financial crisis affecting 
the system of  obras sociales (“las obras sociales en crisis no serán subsidiadas. El día que se corto el 
chorro”, Pagina 12, February 2, 2002). 
379 The Programa Medico Obligatorio –PMO- was established in 1995 (decree 429/95). It establishes the 
list of medical benefits that all national obras sociales were required to provide to their members. In 
November 1996, congress passed law 24.754 which required private health insurers to provide the PMO to 
their clients as well.   
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companies were extremely critical of the existing PMO because it basically required them 
to provide a too broad and generous coverage.380 In particular, they argued against 
coverage for high cost illness including disabilities which were considered to increase 
their costs excessively.381 It is worth noting, however, that these criticisms about the 
coverage of disabilities were not new among the obras sociales and private medical 
insurers. In fact, already during the 1990s, they lobbied against the passing of law 24901 
which established a basic package of benefits for disability coverage and included that 
coverage in the PMO.382  
On March 13 2002, by decree, the government declared the national health system 
in a state of emergency (decree 486/02). Basically, the declaration of emergency allowed 
the national health minister to redefine the PMO (article 18). In relation to the health 
coverage of disabled people established by national law 24.901, the decree similarly 
allowed the health minister to redefine which basic health services were considered 
essential (article 34).383  In order to implement this provision about the coverage for 
disabled people, the minister of health delegated to an administrative board -Directorio 
del Sistema Único de Prestaciones Básicas para Personas con Discapacidad- the task of 
defining which benefits and services were considered essential. This board was composed 
by the different ministers and states agencies with jurisdiction over disability issues.384 
Moreover, the board had two institutions representing the non-profit sector working on 
                                               
380 See coverage of La Nación on this issue (“Limitan el plan obligatorio de salud”, April 9, 2008). 
381 See, for instance, presentations made by representatives of different obras sociales and private health 
insurers at the Second Conference on Health organized by the journal Medicos (“La gran muralla 
solidaria”, Revista Medicos Nro. 23, December 2002). 
382 Phone interview with Pablo Molero (September 13, 2008). For a more detailed analysis of the system of 
basic coverage for people with disabilities established by national law 24.091 and how it works, see 
Esquivel  and Figari (2006). 
383 According to article 34 (decree 486/02), basic and essential benefits are defined as those needed for the 
preservation of life and treatment of illness. 
384 For more information about the Directorio del Sistema Único de Prestaciones Básicas para Personas 
con Discapacidad see  the web site of the national commission for the integration of disabled people -
CONADIS (http://www.cndisc.gov.ar/doc_publicar/spb.htm; cited October 10, 2008) . 
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disability issues. At that moment, the NGO representatives were from Cotolengo Don 
Orione (a very well known association in Argentina that provides health services to the 
poor, including people suffering disabilities) and the Commission for People with 
Disabilities belonging to the Catholic Archdiocese of Buenos Aires.385 
As expected, there was a strong and widespread opposition to decree 486 among 
the NGOs working on disability issues. This opposition included the non-profit 
organizations that provide services to disabled people as well as the more advocacy 
oriented NGOs. The main argument against the decree was that article 34, by establishing 
that basic benefits for disability were only those needed to preserve life and to treat 
illness, was excluding education, rehabilitation and other benefits critical for the quality 
of life of disabled people.386 Even before the decree was issued, NGOs were already 
lobbying government officials against including disability coverage in the health 
emergency declaration. After the policy decision was taken, the level of NGO opposition 
increased and networks of parents and families of disabled people became more active in 
the conflict.387The FORO-PRO (Foro Permanente para la Promoción y la Defensa de los 
Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad), a network of over 500 NGOs and 
individuals working on disability issues in Argentina, played a significant role 
articulating some of the advocacy efforts. Congress also became a venue for the debate 
around the health emergency and its impact of the coverage for disabled people. During 
March 2002, two bills were presented in the Senate declaring that all benefits established 
by law 24.901 should be considered essential and therefore could not be restricted by the 
                                               
385 During March 2002, the board began working on the issue. It formed a smaller technical commission to 
analyze the issue and make a proposal. After several meetings, the commission agreed to propose a basic 
nomenclature of services and benefits, but with substantially smaller payments to the institutions providing 
services to disabled people. Among the associations and pro-disabled rights groups, it was believed that this 
would greatly affect the quality of services. 
386  Interviews with Pablo Montero (September 13, 2008), and Isabel Ferreira (August 15, 2008). 
387 Interview with Pablo Montero (September 13, 2008). 
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health emergency declaration. These bills were authored and supported by legislators 
from the opposition and government party. 
While advocacy actions were being developed at the administrative level and at 
the congress, there were also initial actions to judicialize the conflict. On March 17, a 
group of associations, parents and legal representatives of disabled people brought  a 
“recurso de amparo” against the national government at a federal district court in the city 
of Buenos Aires ("Fendin y otros c/PEN-dto. 486/02 s/amparo ley 16.986"  2002).388  The 
plaintiffs requested the court to declare article 34 of decree 486/02 unconstitutional 
because it arbitrarily restricted the system of benefits for disabled people established by 
law 24.901. Furthermore, while their legal claim was being substantiated, they requested 
the application of article 34 to be suspended as a provisional remedy. During the next few 
days, similar legal actions were filled by other NGOs and groups of parents in different 
provinces of Argentina (Molero 2002a). 
Despite these advocacy efforts, the health minister was unresponsive to the social 
actors demanding policy changes. Moreover, Minister Ginés Gonzáles Garcia did not 
even meet with the involved associations and parents group to discuss this issue, despite 
repeated requests for audience.389  This situation changed significantly after the 
involvement of Hilda “Chiche” Duhalde, who was the wife of president Duhalde and, at 
that time, also the head of the National Council for Social Policies. Ms. Duhalde had 
forged a political career based on her work on welfare issues, and had strong contacts 
with catholic organizations. Precisely through contacts in the Catholic Church, the NGOs 
got access to Chiche Duhalde, and sometime by the end of March 2002, they had a 
                                               
388 The plaintiffs were members of FOROPRO. The case was brought to the Juzgado Federal en lo 
Contencioso Administrativo Nro. 3. 
389 In our interview, the FORO PRO‟s coordinator, priest Pablo Molero stressed several time that Minister 
Ginés Gonzáles Garcia was completely unresponsive to their request for a meeting to discuss the issue. In 
his view, it seems as there was no margin for negotiation with the health minister, it was an already settled 
policy decision (phone interview with Pablo Molero, September 13, 2008). 
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meeting with her in which they discussed the potential problems and threats posed by the 
new governmental policy to the health coverage for disabled people (Molero 2002b).390  
A few days later, on April 2, at the meeting of the Directorio del Sistema Único 
de Prestaciones Básicas para Personas con Discapacidad, Minister Ginés Gonzáles 
Garcia announced that the government will derogate the polemic article 34.391 On May 
10, 2002, the government passed decree 788/02 formally derogating article 34 of decree 
486/02.392  
Between the announcement of Minister Ginés Garcia and the issue of decree 
788/02, the judge hearing the case in “Fendin y otros c/PEN” favorably resolved on the 
provisional remedy request by the plaintiffs and ordered article 34 not to be implemented 
temporarily. However, by that time, the fate of article 34 was already politically settled 
and the decision to change the policy had already been made. 
 
Relevance of judicialization 
As described above, the actors opposing the minister of health‟s policy on 
disability coverage carried out different advocacy measures and efforts including 
litigation. However, the courts and judicial procedures clearly played a very minor role in 
this case, and did not constitute a main scenario in which the policy debate and process 
unfolded.  The NGOs‟ access to Chiche Duhalde, a very high level political figure in 
Duhalde‟s government, and her quick response and involvement in the dispute, 
                                               
390 It is worth mentioning that Pablo Molero, the coordinator of  FORO-PRO, was a Catholic priest. 
Moreover, many of the institutions providing health and other services to disabled people were also related 
to the Catholic Church (for instance, the Cotolengo Don Orione).   
391 It is worth noting that “Chiche” Duhalde was also present at that meeting  (Molero 2002b). 
392 In its justification, decree 788 stated that there were no agreements among the members of the 
Directorio regarding the extent and the possibility of implementing article 34. Moreover, it acknowledged 
that different associations and institutions working on disability issues had expressed their concern about 
the potential impacts that article 34 could have on the services provided to disabled people. 
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significantly changed the dynamic of the conflict. Arguably, it was her involvement 
which opened the possibility to review the health minister‟s policy despite the initial 
unresponsiveness of the government officials involved in the matter. In this context, the 
judicial procedures became a quite irrelevant site for the policy negotiation between the 
parties involved in the issue. 
 
Analysis of conditions 
Initially, the social actors opposing the government‟s policy on coverage of 
disability were clear losers of the policy process. Despite their advocacy efforts, the 
minister of health passed decree 486/02 declaring the health system in state of emergency 
which opened the possibility of restricting the coverage for disability.393 However, they 
were not politically disadvantaged groups.  They had access to the policy process. For 
instance, the NGO sector had representatives in the Directorio del Sistema Único de 
Prestaciones Básicas para Personas con Discapacidad, and as described above, this 
board was in charge of defining which benefits and services would be considered 
essential according to the terms of article 34 of the decree 486/02. Moreover, they had 
contacts and institutional relationships that allowed them to gain access to the political 
elites, as it was the case with Chiche Duhalde. In sum, although they were initial losers in 
the policy process, the networks of associations and NGOs working on disability issues 
were able to access and be part of the policy negotiations. 
 
                                               
393 In contrast, one may argue that the NGOs were not policy losers in a strict sense because they were 
basically demanding the application of law 24.091, which was being somehow violated by the new 
government‟s policy. Nevertheless, it worth remembering that congress had delegated legislative powers to 
the executive given the crisis affecting Argentina, and decree 486/02 was issued by the executive based on 
those emergency powers. 
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In relation to the national legislature, congress was to a certain extent quite 
attentive to this policy conflict. As explained above, in the context of the very acute 
economic and social crisis affecting Argentina at the beginning of 2002, the national 
congress delegated broad legislative powers to the new interim government led by 
Senator Duhalde.394 Although these powers arguably mainly referred to economic and 
financial policies, the new government also used the power delegated by congress to 
promote changes in the social policy realm, as was the case of the health care emergency. 
Nevertheless, congress reacted to the policy changes made by the government in relation 
to the health coverage of disabled people, and attempted to get involved in the policy 
debate.395 As mentioned above, during March 2002, a few days after the government 
issued decree 486/02, two bills were presented in the Senate stating that the health 
emergency declared by the government should not affect the benefits and services for 
disabled people established by law 24.901. These bills were authored and sponsored by 
legislators from the opposition and the government‟s party.396 Both bills were integrated 
in one version that was unanimously approved by the Senate on August 1, 2002, although 
by that time the government had already derogated article 34 of decree 486/02. In short, 
                                               
394 Law 24.091was approved with the support of the Peronist legislative blocks (the party of government), 
and most of the opposition. The UCR (the largest opposition party) and the FREPASO voted in favor of the 
law.  
395 After the legislative election of 2001, the Peronist party controlled the Senate and was the first minority 
in the House of Representative. However, the Peronist legislative blocks were not easily controlled by 
Duhalde‟s government. It is worth remembering that Duhalde became President not because he won a 
presidential election but because he was appointed by congress after the resignation of president de La Rua. 
Although Duhalde‟s appointment was a result of a broad political agreement between the Peronist party and 
the other main parties with legislative representation, his control over the Peronist legislative majority was 
relatively weak.  
396 One of the bills was authored by Senator Negre de Alonso from the Peronist party and sponsored by 
Senator Vilma Ibarra from FREPASO, one of the opposition parties; the other bill was authored by senator 
Carlos Maestro, from the UCR, the main opposition party (See online data base, Honorable Senado de la 
Nación Argentina, files 234/02 and 205/02).  Similarly, in the House of Representatives, a group of 
legislators from the UCR sponsored a resolution requesting the government not to modify the coverage 
established by law 24.901 (see online data base, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina, file 2331-D-
2002). 
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in spite of the legislative delegation approved by congress few months earlier, the 
national legislature was not passive in relation to the changes in the disability health 
coverage promoted by the government. 
 
In its turn, state capacity issues were not relevant in the development of this 
policy conflict. Although the economic crisis affecting Argentine at that time arguably 
impacted the state‟s resources, the government‟s reform of health coverage of disabled 
people was mainly triggered by the critical financial situation affecting the obras sociales 
system, linked to the trade unions.397 In contrast to state capacity issue, the changing 
policy preferences of the executive branch of government did play a central role in the 
unfolding of this policy process. As described above, Health Minister Ginés Gonzáles 
Garcia was a main force behind the declaration of the health emergency, and despite the 
critiques and protests of associations and institutions working on disability issues, he was 
not responsive to their demands to exclude disability coverage from the emergency 
declarations. However, the involvement of Chiche Duhalde signaled a change in the 
receptivity of the government to these demands, and ultimately, opened the way to 
reviewing the health minister‟s policy in the matter. 
 
Summing up, in a context in which the social actors opposing the national 
government‟s policy had access to the policy process and political leverage, and congress 
was relatively active and involved in the issue, judicial procedures did not played a 
relevant role in the development of the conflict around the reform of the health care 
coverage for disabled people. 
 
                                               
397 See above, footnote 378. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Although legal claims were brought to the courts in each case, judicialization was 
not central to either of these policy disputes. In the Esquel case, the main venue for policy 
contestation against the provincial government mining policy was the local political level. 
In the health emergency case it was direct negotiation with the political elites in charge of 
the government. In both cases, developments in the judicial sphere followed the 
developments of the policy processes that were taking place in some other venue. In the 
Esquel case, most judicial resolutions occurred after the plebiscite had taken place and 
the provincial legislature passed the law banning open pit mining. Similarly, in the 
disability case, the first substantial resolution of the court suspending the application of 
health care emergency for disabled people occurred after the government had modified its 
original policy.  
The question is, then, why were these policy conflicts not fully judicialized? How 
did the governance conditions affecting these policy processes differ from the cases of 
policy judicialization analyzed in previous chapters? Both of these cases of weak 
judicialization shared a similar causal configuration, except in relation to the policy loser 
factor.  In the case of health coverage for disabled people, the social actors opposing the 
national government policy were losers of the policymaking process; despite their 
opposition, the minister of health declared the health system in state of emergency 
restricting the coverage for disability. On the contrary, in the Esquel case, the social 
actors were able to stop the provincial government from authorizing the mine to begin 
producing, although the government had previously granted several authorizations that 
allowed the project to advance to that stage. In principle, the different “value” of this 
condition in the two cases indicates that this factor, by itself, cannot explain the low 
relevance of the courts in these policy disputes. Moreover, it suggests that weak 
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judicialization can occur in both scenarios: when the social actors contesting a 
government decision are strict losers of a policy process as well as when they are not.  
In contrast, in both cases, the social actors opposed to the governments‟ policies, 
were not politically disadvantaged groups. In the Esquel case, the social opposition to the 
mining government policy was massive and highly mobilized; it gained the public space 
and public attention through mass demonstrations and mobilizations which clearly shaped 
the dynamic of the conflict. Moreover, by winning the plebiscite by an overwhelming 
majority of the popular vote, the opposition movement showed its political strength. 
Meanwhile, in the health care emergency case, the political leverage of the NGOs and 
groups working on disability issues was based on their inside access to the policy process 
and policy makers, and their links to elites actors, mainly the Argentine Catholic church. 
The fact that they were able to personally involve Chiche Duhalde - a high rank political 
figure of the government at the time - in the policy debate about disability coverage, 
clearly speaks to the capability of these social actors to access the political elites. 
Similarly, in both cases, the legislatures were relatively involved and active in 
both policy issues. In the Esquel case, the legislature initially attempted to reform the 
government‟s mining policy by postponing the public hearing until the mining company 
would provide more information, and by appointing the environmental agency as the 
enforcement agency. After the plebiscite, the legislature took a more radical position 
regarding the government‟s mining policy, and banned open pit mining in the territory of 
Chubut, ending the Cordon Esquel project. In the health care case, although the national 
congress had delegated legislative powers to the executive to issue emergency legislation, 
congress reacted when the government reform affected the health coverage for disabled 
people. Furthermore, the legislative opposition crossed party lines. In fact, legislators 
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from the governing Peronist party and from opposition parties submitted bills against the 
health minister policy on disability coverage. 
Finally, in both cases, the policy preferences of the executive were clearly 
opposed to the preferences of the involved social actors. In Esquel, the provincial 
government strongly supported the mining project. In the disability case, the national 
health minister was the main force behind the declaration of the health emergency 
restricting the coverage for disabled people. However, in neither case, the role of the 
executive led to the full judicialization of these policy disputes.  
This is a critical feature when compared to the causal configurations examined in 
chapter 5 and 6. In these previous two chapters, the judicialization of the policy conflicts 
occurred in contexts in which there was executive opposition in combination with a 
deferential and passive legislature (chapter 5) or in combination with politically 
disadvantaged social actors (chapter 6). This indicates, first, that the opposition of the 
executive to policy claims made by social actors is not a sufficient condition, by itself, to 
drive and sustain the demand for judicial intervention in a policy process. Second, it 
stresses the explanatory leverage of the configurations identified in chapters 5 and 6. In 
other words, when the opposition of the executive combines with the other political 
conditions specified in each of these configurations, then it is very likely that the courts 
and judicial procedures would become a main venue where the policy process and 
negotiations can evolve, because either there are no other political venues open to the 
social actors involved in the dispute (chapter 5), or because these actors do not have 
political leverage to access and engage the government in policy negotiations (chapter 6). 
Framed in a different way, these cases suggest that in contexts in which the involved 
social actors have political leverage and the legislature is attentive to an issue and 
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involved in the policy process, judicialization is not likely to be relevant. In other words, 
judicialization is likely to be weak. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in the introductory chapter, this study claims there are certain 
regularities, certain patterns in how a democratic polity works that drive the demand for 
judicial intervention. Furthermore, it argues that instead of a single, general explanatory 
factor, there are several, different conditions or combinations of conditions that trigger 
the involvement of courts in public policy. In other words, there is not just one, but 
various, alternative political scenarios which are likely to drive the judicialization of 
policy. Within this conceptual framework open to the possibility of equifinality, my study 
shows that the existing theoretical explanations (namely, the political disadvantage and 
the legislative fragmentation arguments, including a strict formulation of the policy loser 
argument as the one developed in our study) can account for certain types of cases of 
policy judicialization, but not for others. In particular, these theories cannot fully explain 
the judicialization of disputes related to the lack of enforcement or implementation of 
existing legislation. 
Accordingly, my dissertation argues that the demand for judicialization of policy 
can also be triggered by weak rule of law scenarios. In these political contexts, the policy 
goals and measures demanded and claimed by social actors are already part of the 
existing normative framework, but these goals and mandates are not realized in practice 
because either the state apparatus is unable to implement or enforce these policies, or the 
political elites in charge of the executive do not fully support those existing policies, and 
the legislature is too passive and deferential towards the executive on that matter. When 
social actors face these political contexts, they are likely to turn to the courts and 
judicialize their policy claims.  
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To assess this argument, I developed, first, a qualitative comparative analysis (fs-
QCA) of 13 major policy disputes that occurred in Argentina during the last two decades. 
As a result of fs-QCA analysis, I identified three (3) configurations of political conditions 
as sufficient to trigger the judicialization of policy. Two of these combinations clearly fit 
with my theoretical argument and expectations about what political scenarios are likely to 
lead to policy judicialization in Argentina, while the third combination closely reflects 
the political disadvantage argument. Then, I carried out a detailed case study of each of 
the 13 disputes. The historical analysis of the cases confirmed the validity of the basic, 
causal configurations resulting from the QCA.  
This chapter concludes the project. First, it reviews and summarizes the main 
arguments and findings of the study. Second, it outlines its theoretical implications, 
stressing that the study provides a typological framework for analyzing the political 
sources driving the judicialization of policy disputes in democratic regimes. Finally, it 
analyzes how the findings and results of the study shed light on the role that 
judicialization and courts play in democratic politics.  
 
JUDICIALIZATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IN ARGENTINA 
As explained above, based on the analysis of 13 main policy disputes, this study 
identifies three main types of combinations of conditions which drive the demand for 
judicialization of public policy in Argentina. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly 
summarize the research‟s results in relation to each one of these combinations, focusing 
especially on how the different political conditions and dimensions interact in each type 
of political scenarios. Needless to say, this is just a brief overview of the analysis 
developed in detail in each of the empirical chapters. 
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In the first place, I review the weak horizontal accountability scenario and how it 
leads to the judicialization of public policy. As described in chapter 5, four of the 
judicialized policy disputes examined by this study can be explained by this type of 
political configuration (the land tenure program for indigenous communities in Jujuy, 
CEAMSE‟s waste disposal policy in the Punta Lara landfill, the re-negotiation of the 
public utilities concessions during the Duhalde government, and the indigenous land 
rights conflict in the province of Salta). In all these cases, the groups making demands to 
the state were not strict losers of the democratic policymaking processes. Their claims 
were based upon existing legislation which established relatively clear policy mandates 
that were not properly fulfilled or enforced by the state.  
In all these policy disputes, the key political factor explaining the lack of proper 
implementation or enforcement was the opposition of the political elites in charge of the 
executive government to comply with the existing normative framework. For instance, in 
the case of the indigenous land program in Jujuy (PRATPAJ), the provincial government 
not only was extremely slow in transferring land property rights to the indigenous 
communities as mandated by the existing legislation, but also, through other agencies of 
the state, the government was taking measures that clearly contradicted and weakened the 
indigenous land program. A similar situation occurred in the case of indigenous land in 
the province of Salta, where the administration of governor Romero did not take the 
necessary measures to transfer the communal land right to Lhaka Honhat as established 
by provincial norms, and instead, it began granting individual property rights over the 
same land. Similarly, in the case of the public utility contracts, the Duhalde 
administration made several different attempts to increase the tariffs independently of the 
contract renegotiations, even though the Emergency Law 25561 explicitly stated that any 
changes in the tariffs ought to be part of a general renegotiation of the contracts. 
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Likewise, in the case of the Punta Lara landfill, the government of the province of 
Buenos Aires tacitly endorsed CEAMSE‟s decision to dispose outer jurisdictional waste 
in Punta Lara and to expand the landfill capabilities; in this way, the provincial 
government neither fully exercised its power to control CEAMSE nor attempted to 
enforce the existing environmental legislation. 
Furthermore, in all these policy disputes, the legislative assemblies were quite 
passive. They did not fully exercise their check and balance powers, allowing the 
executive to apply the disputed legislation according to its own policy preferences, or 
even not to apply it at all. For instance, in the case of Jujuy, the provincial legislature 
clearly failed to exercise its oversight role over the government‟s implementation of the 
indigenous land program. This should not be surprising given that the Peronist party, the 
party in charge of the executive government, also controlled the legislature. Likewise, in 
the dispute about the public utility tariffs during the Duhalde administration, the national 
congress also played a quite passive role. First, the government reduced by decree the 
power of the bicameral legislative commission in charge of following the public utility 
re-negotiations. Later, the government modified law 25561 by a decree of necessity and 
urgency, and tried to open a window to raise the tariffs without renegotiating the public 
utility contracts. In neither situation, congress reacted to the executive initiatives.  
In sum, the social demand for the involvement of the courts in these public 
policies occurred in political contexts that were characterized by the resistance, or even 
the open opposition, of the executive branch of government to act according to existing 
regulatory frameworks or to implement existing policies. Furthermore, this discretional 
behavior of the executive government was backed up by a passive and deferential 
legislature, which did not fully exercise its oversight powers, and allowed the executive 
to interpret and apply existing laws and policies according to its own policy preferences. 
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This combination of discretional exercise of executive powers and relatively passive 
legislatures underlines the chronic problem of weak accountability affecting democratic 
governance in Argentina (O'Donnell 1994; Morgenstern and Manzetti 2003), which 
ultimately, constitutes one of the main sources of the judicialization of public policy 
issues in this country. 
This scenario, however, also raises the question as to what extent the courts would 
be willing to make the government accountable for its lack of compliance with existing 
legislation. In fact, a predominant view within the judicial politics literature argues that 
when political power is not disseminated or there is a single dominant party or political 
coalition, courts tend to be more deferential to the political branches of government and 
less likely to confront governmental policies (Ferejohn 2002; Ginsburg 2003; Chavez 
2004; Chavez et al. 2011). In this type of situations, then, it is reasonable to expect that 
actors would not turn to the courts to make claims against the government. However, my 
research provides strong evidence showing that, in contrast to the expectation of the 
literature, judicialization still occurs in political contexts characterized by unified 
governments or the presence of a relatively dominant political coalition.398 How can this 
be possible? 
As I pointed out in a previous chapter, a way to address this paradox is by 
distinguishing between the supply and the demand side of judicalization (Clayton 2002). 
As mentioned above, there is a large body of research supporting the argument that the 
political context does matter on how judges and courts behave, and more specifically, 
that political competitiveness and fragmentation of political power tend to produce more 
                                               
398 I have already made this point in a previous footnote, but it is worth mentioning again: even if we are 
referring to cases of unified government or dominant political coalitions, we are working under the 
assumption that there is a relative level of judicial independence. If a case is lacking even that minimum 
level of judicial independence, then it is clearly outside the scope of applicability of our argument, because 
one of the necessary, enabling conditions for judicialization, is missing (for a discussion on the scope 
conditions, see chapter 2). 
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powerful judiciaries, willing to control and decide against governments‟ interests (for the 
application of this argument to the Argentine case see, Chavez 2003;; 2004).Meanwhile, 
in relation to the demand side, the existence of a competitive and balanced political 
system suggests that the actors have viable, alternative institutional channels –including 
the courts- to pursue their policy goals.399 However, this is not the case of the four policy 
disputes I examined and described above. In these disputes, the social actors were 
contesting government actions (or inaction) in political contexts characterized by the 
presence of relatively dominant political coalitions and situations of unified governments. 
For the actors involved in these disputes, the courts and judicial procedures arguably 
represented the last or even the only feasible institutional channel available to pursue 
their demands and seek a policy resolution to their concerns. The historical development 
of these policy disputes depicts the demand for judicialization less as a result of 
strategically made decisions, based on calculated assessment of costs and benefits of the 
different options open to the actors involved, and more as a consequence of context 
driven processes, characterized by the inertia and unresponsiveness of elected branches of 
governments and state agencies. In this type of contexts, even if the actors foresee that 
the courts might rule against their claims, the judicialization of the dispute allows them at 
least to “force” the government to address their claims and to provide a response, 
justifying its actions or inactions.400  
 
                                               
399 In these types of contexts, one would expect that social and political actors would turn to the judiciary 
when the system is too fragmented and, therefore unable, to produce policies, o when the actors are strict 
losers of the policymaking process and therefore they try to achieve their goals through the courts. 
400 As explained by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2002), one of the more interesting and appealing features of 
legal mobilization is that once a policy claim against a government agency is admitted in a court of law, the 
government is required to provide an official and formal response. In other words, the government has to 
justify its action or inaction.  This is not necessarily the case when social actors pose policy demands to 
executive officials or submit bills to the legislature, where policymakers can simply ignore their claims or 
proposals. 
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The second scenario is built around the notion of state deficiencies (chapter 4). 
Three of the policy conflicts examined by this research are explained by this 
configuration (the national production of the FHA vaccine, the health and food 
emergency affecting indigenous communities in Chaco, and the provision of medicines 
and treatment for people living with HIV-AIDS). In all these cases, the social groups 
making claims on the state could hardly be considered losers of the policymaking 
processes. Their demands were largely based on already existing legislation or 
administrative regulations which were not fully or properly implemented or enforced. 
However, in contrast to the weak accountability scenario describe above, the lack of 
policy implementation in these cases was not due to the opposition of the political 
administrations in charge of the executive, but rather to problems in the capability and 
organization of the state apparatus to fulfill the goals and commitments made by the 
elected branches of government.  
Some can still argue that these policies were not properly and timely implemented 
by the state apparatus because - at the end - they were not priorities for the political elites 
in charge of the government. Above, I have already discussed this argument, and pointed 
out its limitations. Here, I just want to stress again that there is a significant conceptual 
and empirical difference between a situation in which an executive government is 
reluctant, or even opposed to implement a policy approved through the democratic 
decision-making process, and therefore it forestalls the state bureaucracy to comply with 
that legislation; and a situation in which a government takes some minimum and 
necessary steps to implement a policy, but they are not sufficient or effective enough to 
overcome the state capacity problems weakening the implementation of that policy. 
Clearly, these are two different types of political scenarios leading to the judicialization 
of a policy issue. In the former, the demand for judicialization is activated and sustained 
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by the lack of political will of the politicians in charge of government to comply with the 
rule of law. In the latter, the involvement of the courts is driven by the weaknesses of the 
state apparatus to properly and timely implement or enforce a policy. In the three cases I 
mentioned above (the production of the FHA vaccine, the provision of HIV-AIDS 
medicines, and the health and food emergency in Chaco), the involved administrations 
took a very basic but fundamental step needed to implement a policy: they assigned 
budget funds to carry out the policy measures in question. This indicates that these 
governments were, at least, not openly opposed to these policies and were not reluctant to 
comply. However, in all three cases, policy implementation was greatly limited and 
affected by different structural problems in the operation and organization of the state 
apparatus. 
Furthermore, the deficient capability of the state to intervene in these policy 
issues was clearly independent from changes in the political administrations in charge of 
the executive. In fact, there were  different administrations involved in each of the policy 
disputes, and despite the political changes, judicialization continued in all of the cases. 
This is very clear in the case of the health and food emergency in Chaco. The 
involvement of the courts began during the administration of governor Nikish (UCR), 
who took measures to address the emergency that were largely considered insufficient by 
the indigenous groups and their allies. The new administration of governor Capitanich 
(PJ) was much more accessible to the indigenous groups and took more aggressive 
measures to address the emergency, however, the situation in the communities did not 
change significantly, and the judicialization of the issue continued.  
In sum, the sustained demand for judicial involvement in these disputes was 
driven by serious state deficiencies in the implementation of existing policy mandates. 
This occurred in contexts where the executives were not openly opposed to these policies, 
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and the legislatures were relatively attentive to the policy issue. In this context, actors 
turn to the courts not because they are losers of the policymaking process, but because the 
state cannot fulfill the policies goals and deliver the public goods committed by the 
political branches of government. In short, this scenario stresses that lack of 
implementation or enforcement resulting from problems of state capacity, rather than 
from the opposition of the politicians in charge of the government, constitutes a main 
source of judicialization of certain policy issues.  
However, one may question why actors would turn to the courts in this type of 
scenarios. If the problem is the lack of capability of the state to properly implement a 
policy, then what can be achieved through the involvement of the courts? To answer 
these observations, it is important to revisit the notion of state deficiencies. Following 
Mainwaring (2006), the idea of state deficiencies depicts a state that has organizational 
and capability problems to properly implement or enforce existing legislation in certain 
policy fields, but it is not a failed state. That is, the state is not entirely unable to carry out 
its functions. On the contrary, the idea of state deficiencies implies that the state has a 
basic policy infrastructure in place, but it does not fully and efficiently organize and use 
its resources and capabilities (Brinks and Gauri 2008). The case about provision of 
medicines for people with HIV-AIDS is a clear example of this situation. Despite 
significant budget increases, the state apparatus had serious organizational deficits that 
greatly affected the proper and timely implementation of the policy in question. Similar 
state deficiencies affected policy implementation in the FHA vaccine case and in the 
health and food emergency in the Chaco. In this type of cases, then, judicialization works 
as a kind of fire alarm system (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984;  also Brinks and Gauri 
2008). Actors turn to the court, not to demand radical policy changes, but to call the 
attention, and to seek solutions, about gaps or shortcomings in the operation of an 
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existing policy infrastructure. This feature is very clear in our three disputes mentioned 
above. In none of these cases, the involved actors were demanding sweeping reforms that 
were obviously beyond the capability of the state in question. Instead, their claims and 
demands were pointing out and making visible specific failures and deficits in the 
organization and operation of state resources and capabilities. 
 
Finally, the third scenario identified and analyzed by this study (chapter 6), 
outlines the lack of political leverage of the actors involved in a policy dispute as a main 
factor triggering the judicialization of certain policy issues. Four of the judicialized 
policy disputes examined in this study fit this explanation (the re-structuring of the phone 
tariffs, the dispute about oil drilling in Llancanelo, the re-negotiation of the metropolitan 
train concessions, and the conflict over environmental pollution in the Matanza-
Riachuelo basin). In the case of the re-structuring of the phone tariffs, the “organized” 
consumer movement in Argentina was just emerging when the issue of the tariff re-
structuring began to be discussed during the first part of the 1990s. This clearly affected 
the capability of the consumer activists to develop coordinated advocacy efforts and to 
mobilize the broad public of phone users against the government‟s attempt to increase 
local phone tariffs. Similarly, in the dispute about oil drilling in the Llancanelo wetlands 
and about the renegotiation of the train concessions, the main opposition was embodied 
by NGOs that had a small organizational structure and limited capability to reach and 
mobilize a broader constituency against the government‟s policies. Meanwhile, in the 
case of the environmental pollution in the Matanza – Riachuelo basin, collective demands 
and protests were fragmented and focalized (usually following specific environmental 
emergencies affecting particular neighborhoods) and broad social attention and 
mobilization could not be sustained though time. Clearly, this affected and limited the 
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political leverage of those social actors that were actively demanding more structural 
policy changes in the basin. 
A significant characteristic of these policy disputes is that the social groups 
putting demands on the state were, in some of the cases, strict losers of the policymaking 
processes; while in others they were not. The policy loser status is quite clear in the cases 
of the re-structuring of the phone tariffs and the re-negotiation of the metropolitan train 
concessions, in which the involved social groups were opposed to policy reforms 
championed and finally approved by the governments. Instead, in the cases of Riachuelo 
and Llancanelo, the involved social groups were demanding the governments to 
implement and enforce existing legislation and policies. At this point, it is worth 
analyzing in some detail these different combinations between the lack of political 
leverage of the actors involved and whether these actors are losers of the policy process. 
Theoretically, when both of these conditions are present, it is reasonable to expect that 
judicialization will occur.401 In other words, social actors with low political leverage and 
limited access to the policy venues would tend to judicialize their policy claims because 
they are either losers or likely losers of the democratic policymaking process. This is a 
relatively common scenario for judicialization, which has been already intensively 
documented by the literature on legal mobilization.402 Among our cases, the 
judicialization of the phone tariffs and of the train concession clearly fit within this 
explanation.  
The second combination, however, is quite counterintuitive. In this type of cases, 
the actors turning to the courts are politically disadvantaged but are not strict policy 
                                               
401 This expectation, of course, assumes that the enabling conditions for judicialization are present (see 
chapter 2).  
402 This is the scenario, for instance, faced by African American and civil right groups in the South during 
the time of the Jim Crow laws. 
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losers; they are demanding the enforcement of existing policies and legislation. There 
might be various and different reasons explaining why the political branches of 
government passed regulations and established policies that favor sectors of society with 
low political leverage. Whatever the reasons, the relevant point here is that when social 
actors call on the state to implement or enforce these norms and policies, these groups 
cannot be considered strict losers of the democratic policymaking process. The disputes 
about Riachuelo and Llancanelo clearly respond to this pattern: the involved social actors 
were requesting the enforcement of existing environmental policies and rules but they 
had limited political leverage to advocate and advance their policy goals thought the 
political venues. Facing these contexts, the actors turned to the courts.  
In sum, the analysis of these combinations between whether the actors involved 
had political leverage and whether they were policy losers, provides insights about the 
different political dynamics that lead to the judicialization of policy in these 
configurations. At the same time, it also makes clear and evident that the lack of political 
leverage was the key factor driving the process of judicialization in all these cases.  
 
At this point, it is worth briefly revisiting our two cases of weak judicialization 
analyzed in the previous chapter 7 (the Esquel case about mining policy and the health 
coverage reform for disabled people). As explained above, these are disputes in which the 
social actors turned to the courts and judicialized their claims against the state, but the 
judicial procedures did not become a relevant venue in which the policy process and 
debate unfolded. My analysis indicates that when the involved social actors have political 
leverage to access policymakers and policy negotiations, and the legislature is active and 
involved in a policy issue, judicialization is likely to be weak even if the executive is 
initially opposed to the policy demands made by the social actors.  
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This “weak judicialization” configuration has two important implications for my 
analysis of the political factors that can trigger judicialization. First, it suggests that the 
opposition of the executive to policy claims made by social actors is not a sufficient 
condition, by itself, to drive and sustain the demand for judicial intervention in a policy 
process. Second, it indirectly stresses the explanatory value of the combinations 
identified in chapter 5 and 6. That is, when the opposition of the executive is combined 
with a passive legislature (chapter 5) or with social actors with low political leverage 
(chapter 6), then it is very likely that a policy dispute would become judicialized either 
because there are not other political venues open to the social actors involved in the 
dispute (chapter 5), or because these actors do not have political leverage to access and 
engage the government in policy negotiations (chapter 6).  
 
Summing up, this study identifies three main combinations of conditions which 
drive the demand for judicialization of public policy in Argentina. In the first of these 
combinations, the involvement of the courts occurs in political scenarios characterized by 
a weak system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. In the 
second one, the judicialization of policy is triggered by the deficiencies of the state 
apparatus to properly implement and enforce policy commitments already made by the 
elected branches of government. Finally, in the third scenario, judicialization occurs in 
political contexts in which the social actors involved in a policy issue had limited access 
to the policymaking process and limited political leverage, and their claims faced a strong 
opposition from the executive. When facing any of these three contexts, my research 
shows that social actors posing claims to the state are likely to turn to the courts to pursue 




Beyond an analysis of the phenomenon of judicialization in Argentina, this study 
has important theoretical implications for our general understanding of the political 
factors driving the demands for judicial intervention in public policy. 
In the first place, this research clearly demonstrates that the judicialization of 
policy disputes is a result of a much more complex political picture than the widespread 
notion of the policy loser portrays. The attempt to explain the demand for judicial 
involvement in public policy by just arguing that those who litigate is because they 
cannot attain their policy goals through the traditional political branches of government,   
clearly oversimplifies how democratic governance works, and how it is linked to the 
phenomenon of judicialization As I mentioned in a previous chapter, such a general 
explanation cannot tell us whether the losers‟ opinions and views could be heard in the 
policy process, or if the disputed policies were taken according to the proper rules of a 
democratic polity, or even if the government was effectively upholding the laws and 
regulations already in force. In sum, it cannot give us insights about the political factors 
that trigger the demand for judicial involvement in public policy.  
Second, my research also shows that other alternative theoretical explanations 
developed by the specialized literature, namely the politically disadvantaged groups and 
the political fragmentation argument, may explain certain types of cases of 
judicialization, but not others. For instance, the political disadvantage argument was only 
fully reflected in one of the three political scenarios identified by this study as triggering 
policy litigation in Argentina. In the other two scenarios, the political leverage of the 
involved social actors was not a key condition driving the demand for judicial 
involvement. As I mentioned in a previous chapter, this is a finding of significant 
empirical and theoretical value given that observers and scholars tend to overstress the 
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relevance of under-represented actors when explaining the phenomenon of 
judicialization. This is an even more striking finding when one takes into account that the 
policy fields covered by this research involved populations that are historically 
disadvantaged social groups in Argentina like indigenous people, or suffer from structural 
problems of collective action like the cases of societal demands for consumer or 
environmental protection.  
In its turn, the political fragmentation argument was not relevant at all to explain 
the judicialization of the public policy disputes covered by this study. The case studies 
largely confirm our expectation that legislative deadlocks or stalemates are not a key 
factor triggering the phenomenon of judicialization in Argentina. Indeed, most of the 
policy conflicts examined occurred in political contexts that could hardly be considered 
fragmented and in which the involved governments had policy making majorities or were 
potentially able to garner the legislative support they needed. 
However, the limited empirical coverage of these theories (the political 
fragmentation and the politically disadvantaged groups) does not indicate that their causal 
arguments are invalid, but rather that they can explain only certain types of cases of 
policy judicialization. A key contribution of this dissertation is precisely to show that 
there are substantially different political scenarios under which public policy disputes are 
likely to become judicialized, and that the existing theoretical arguments can explain 
some of them, but not others.  
In the third place, the results of this research validate my argument that scenarios 
of weak rule of law can trigger the judicialization of public policy. As I have already 
explained above, in these types of cases, judicialization results from the lack of 
enforcement or implementation of existing policy mandates due to deficiencies of the 
state apparatus, or to the opposition of the political elites in charge of the government to 
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uphold the rule of law and the passivity of the legislature to control the executive. From a 
theory building point of view, the conceptual formulation and empirical validation of 
these two sources of judicialization, are a main contribution of my research. In fact, the 
specialized literature has not really examined and discussed weak horizontal 
accountability and state deficiencies as factors driving the demand for judicial 
intervention in public policy. Moreover, these scenarios of weak rule of law explain 
certain types of cases of judicialization that the existing theoretical explanations cannot 
account for. As mentioned above, the literature on judicialization has largely tended to 
focus on disputes in which the actors turning to the courts are advocating changes in the 
existing normative framework.403 However, as this study shows, the involvement of the 
courts in public policy processes is most of the time related to disputes regarding the 
implementation or enforcement of existing legislation. As Brinks and Gauri argue (2008),  
judicialization tends to follow legislative production, not to precede it. In this regard, my 
explanations about how state deficiencies and how situations of weak horizontal 
accountability affect the rule of law, driving the demand for judicial intervention, clearly 
fill a gap in the literature on judicialization. 
Finally, my research strongly suggests that the study of the phenomenon of policy 
judicialization can greatly benefit from configurational analysis and typological 
theorizing. As mentioned above, a key contribution of this dissertation is precisely to 
show that there are substantially different political conditions or combinations of 
conditions triggering the involvement of the courts in policy disputes. Clearly, this fits 
perfectly with a typological theory approach, which is inherently open to the possibility 
of equifinality. As mentioned in a previous chapter, typological theorizing allows for 
identifying alternative types of combinations of causal conditions that are linked to the 
                                               
403 There are, of course, exceptions. See, for instance,  Olson‟s work on litigation on the rights of disabled 
people (1984). 
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phenomenon under investigation. In this way, it also allows researchers to develop 
contingent generalizations about specific type of configurations (George and Bennett 
2004).  
In building a typological and configurational approach to the study of 
judicialization, my research makes an important contribution by specifying an initial list 
of theoretical conditions that can trigger the involvement of the courts in public policy 
(namely, a strict formulation of the policy loser argument, the political leverage of the 
social actors posing claims to the state, the role of the legislature, the role of the executive 
branch of government and the capability of the state apparatus). The identification and 
conceptualization of these conditions was partly based on the analysis and reformulation 
of the existing theories developed by the specialized literature on legal mobilization and 
judicial politics, and partly based on the empirical analysis of the cases covered by this 
study. These conditions, as a whole, constitute an analytical framework that allows 
researchers to analyze and assess how the different ways in which a democratic polity 
works can drive the demand for judicial intervention in policy issues. In fact, my research 
shows how these conditions, either individually or in combination, can account for 
different types of political scenarios that trigger the judicialization of public policy. 
Whether this framework covers all the possible political scenarios in which 
judicialization is likely to occur in democratic regimes, or whether are there other critical 
political factors that trigger the demand for judicial involvement in public policy, these 
are issues and questions open to further comparative research. 
 
ABOUT THE ROLE OF JUDICIALIZATION IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 
The results of this study also speak to the different types of roles that 
judicialization can play in a system of democratic governance. Does judicialization work 
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mainly as a countermajoritarian venue, as traditionally has been assumed by legal 
scholars and constitutional law theorists, protecting the interests of the minorities against 
the majorities? Or do judicial procedures act as substitutes for majoritarian politics, 
addressing policy issues which the political branches of government are unable or 
unwilling to resolve? Or rather does judicialization fulfill a pro-majoritarian role, 
monitoring state compliance and implementation of policies and laws approved through 
majoritarian institutions? Clearly these roles are not mutually exclusive. Courts can 
perform these alternative roles in different types of conflicts. Nevertheless, the mere 
exercise of posing these questions is valid because it makes us revisit our assumptions 
about what courts supposedly do and what they actually do.  
In relation to the first question, my research shows only limited evidence of 
judicialization playing a countermajoritarian role in the policy disputes covered by this 
study. By a countermajoritarian role, I am basically referring to measures taken in the 
context of judicial procedures which are opposed to policy decisions made by the 
majoritarian policymaking institutions in a democratic regime. This countermajoritarian 
function of the judiciary is predicated on the idea that courts are the venues in which the 
minorities seek to protect their rights and interests against the will of the majorities, 
regardless of whether they are powerless and voiceless minorities (Ely 1980; Dworkin 
1985), or strong and powerful ones (Hirschl 2004). The argument is clearly based upon 
the assumption that the minorities are the losers or the likely losers of democratic, 
majoritarian policymaking processes; that is the reason why they turn to the courts.  
Following the logic of this argument, then, it is not surprising that judicialization did not 
play a major countermajoritarian role in the cases examined by my study. The patterns of 
judicialization identified through my research clearly show that litigation, at least in the 
policy fields covered by the study, was not a result of policy losers turning to the courts. 
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A different issue is whether judicialization benefits politically disadvantaged 
actors. It is worth clarifying that here I am not referring to whether the substantive court 
decisions favor these actors, but rather whether the judicialization of the policy processes 
and policy negotiations benefits them. In this regard, my research shows that the 
involvement of the courts often increased the political leverage of this type of actors, 
giving them greater access and voice in the policy processes. The dispute about oil 
production in the Llancanelo wetlands (chapter 6) is one of the cases in which the access 
and leverage of the social groups changed most dramatically as a result of the 
intervention of the courts. Once the conflict became judicialized, the provincial 
government could not ignore the local environmental groups as a main actor in the policy 
process. The final negotiations between the provincial government, the oil company and 
the environmental groups to define the boundaries of the Llancanelo reserve (which were 
later approved by the provincial legislature) clearly speaks to the leverage gained by the 
NGOs as a result of the judicialization of the dispute. Another interesting example of this 
dynamic is the dispute about the renegotiation of the metropolitan train concessions (also 
see chapter 6). During the months the TBA‟s concession reform was judicially 
suspended, the government and the concessionaire attempted to reach a negotiated 
agreement with the consumer group that brought the legal claim to the courts. This was 
one of few instances (if not the only) in which the consumer groups were significantly 
involved in the process of re-negotiation of the train concessions. In sum, as these 
examples suggest, judicialization clearly plays a role in opening policy processes to 
politically weak social actors, who otherwise would not be fully considered as relevant 
stakeholders by the governments.404  
                                               
404 This, of course, raises a lot of other important questions and issues, such as the representativeness and 
the accountability of the specific associations and groups that gain access to a particular policy process as 
result of the involvement of the courts. In other words, to what extent can they be considered representative 
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A third issue to analyze is whether judicialization results in courts and judicial 
procedures acting as substitutes of majoritarian politics. Most of the literature on 
judicialization, explicitly or implicitly, assumes that the involvement of the courts is at 
the expense of the executive and the legislature. Tate and Vallinder‟s seminal work on 
judicialization (1995) stresses that the judicial displacement of the other branches of 
government is the distinguishing feature of this phenomenon. Based on this logic, many 
scholars have underlined how legislative inaction resulting from deadlocks and 
stalemates trigger judicial intervention in public policymaking (Clayton 1992; Tate 1995; 
Edelman 1995; Ferejohn 2002; Whittington 2005). In this type of contexts, in which the 
elected branches of government are blocked and inactive, courts and judicial procedures 
become the place where policy is made.  
My research, however, does not provide much evidence of the courts acting as 
substitutes of majoritarian politics. This finding should not be surprising given that 
legislative deadlocks and stalemates were not a key factor in the judicialization of the 
policy disputes covered by this research. Furthermore, when facing legal cases with 
strong and broad policy implications, courts often tend to open and foster processes of 
negotiation among the parties involved in a dispute rather than to formulate a policy 
response by themselves. The case of CEAMSE and the Punta Lara landfill is a good 
example of this dynamic (see chapter 5). Facing a situation in which the landfill had to be 
closed, but there were no other places readily available to receive the waste, the Supreme 
Court of the province of Buenos Aires opened and led a very complex process of 
                                                                                                                                            
of the broader, diffuse constituencies that are affected by the policy in question? to whom are they 
accountable for the “good” or “bad” policy consequences that may result from their actions? It is not the 
purpose of my study to address these issues, but at least I want to point out that when a court opens a space 
in the negotiating table for a specific association or group, the issue of the political and social legitimacy 




negotiation between the company, the local groups and the provincial government with 
the purpose of designing a policy solution to the issue, which later was approved by the 
provincial legislature. Likewise, in the dispute about oil production in the Llancanelo 
wetlands (chapter 6), the courts stated that the government‟s authorizations to the oil 
drilling projects had to be based on the previous demarcation of the boundaries of the 
Llancanelo protected area. But the courts did not establish those limits by themselves 
(which was one of the main contentious issues in this case); instead, the provincial 
Supreme Court commanded the provincial government to achieve a negotiated agreement 
with the different stakeholders (this agreement was later approved by the provincial 
legislature). Clearly, the type of role played by courts and judicial procedures in these 
cases is quite distant from the traditional perception of judges as having the “last word” 
on a dispute. Moreover, these cases largely confirm Brinks and Gauri‟s argument (2008) 
that judicialization does not necessarily substitute for the policy debates and negotiations 
that might take place in the other branches of government. Instead, it adds another venue 
where the policy process might evolve, and injects new elements in the policy debate. 
Finally, the last question to address is whether judicialization fulfills a pro-
majoritarian role. While my research found little evidence of the court playing a 
countermajoritarian role or as substitute of democratic politics, its results largely support 
that idea that judicialization can work as a venue for majoritarian politics. In fact, in most 
of the disputes examined by my study, social actors turned to the judiciary to demand the 
enforcement or implementation of policy mandates and commitments acquired through 
majoritarian political processes, which the state was unwilling or unable to realize in 
practice. In this type of cases, as I explained before, judicialization usually worked as a 
fire alarm system, signalling deficits and gaps between the policy goals and mandates 
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expressed in the legislation, and their effective and concrete fulfillment in practice.405 In 
conclusion, this predominant “pro-majoritarian” feature of the phenomenon of 
judicialization in the Argentine context is consistent with one the main arguments 
developed throughout this dissertation: the weakness of the rule of law, defined as the 
lack of enforcement and compliance with the existing rules, is one of the main sources -if 
not the main source- driving the involvement of the courts in public policy in Argentina.  
 
                                               
405 Clearly, our view of  judicialization as avenue to achieve the goals and commitments made through 
democratic politics, substantially differs from the view that conceive the courts as agents of the ruling 
majority (for instance, Dahl 1957).  In this view, the “majoritarian” feature of the courts is based on 
whether the courts rule for or against the policy preferences of the ruling political coalition. In such a view, 
the potential accountability function of the courts would not be considered “pro-majoritarian”. 
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Appendix A: Interviews and Personal communications 
 
Abramovich, Victor. Former Executive Director of Centro de Estudios Legales y 
Sociales (CELS). Interview, Buenos Aires, August 12, 2008. 
Amaya, Jorge A. Consumer law expert. Personal communication. April 1, 2008. 
Arauz, Mora. Member of Fundación Ciudad. Interview. Buenos Aires, June, 
2004.(*) 
Bianco, Mabel. Executive Director of Fundación para el Estudio e Investigación 
de la Mujer (FEIM); former Director of the HIV- AIDs program of the national Minister 
of Health. Interview. Buenos Aires, June 3, 2008. 
Bianco, María ines. Lawyer specialized on health care issues. Interview, Buenos 
Aires, June 30, 2008. 
Berstein, Horacio. Member of the Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores. Personal 
communication. August 2, 2008. Interviews. Buenos Aires, April 21, 2008 and August 
14, 2008 
Brailovsky, Antonio. Former Environmental Ombudsman of the city of Buenos 
Aires. Interview. Buenos Aires, July 7, 2004.(*) 
Caplan, Ariel. Consumer law expert; former representative of the consumer 
associations in the Comisión de Renegociación de Contratos. Interview. Buenos Aires, 
April 8, 2008. 
Carrasco, Morita. Antropologist; co-director of Geaprona -Grupo de estudios en 
aboriginalidad, provincias y nación-. Interview. Buenos Aires, May 23, 2008. 
Di Paola, Maria Eugenia. Executive Director of Fundación Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales (FARN). Interview. Buenos Aires, June 5, 2008. 
Enria, Delia. Director of Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Virales Humanas 
“Dr. Julio I. Maiztegui”  Phone interview. October 1, 2008. 
Ferreira, Isabel. 2008. Interview. Ombusdamn office of the City of Buenos Aires. 
Buenos Aires , August 15, 2008. 
Frieder, Kurt. 2008. Executive Director of Fundación Huesped. Interview. 
Buenos Aires, June 3, 2008. 
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Gerosa Lewis. Ricardo. Lawyer and member of Assembly of Self –convened 
Neighbors Against the Mine from Esquel. Phone interview. November 31, 2008. 
Hiquis, Jorge. President Sociedad de Fomento del Dock Sud. Interview. July 20, 
2004.(*) 
Julia, Marta. Personal communication. Environmental law and policy expert; 
former Director of the Environmental Agency of the province of Cordoba. Personal 
communication. February 9, 2008. 
Kaplun, Santiago. Legal attorney of the plaintiffs in the Mendoza case 
(Riachuelo). Interview, Buenos Aires, April 16, 2008. 
Kravetz, Diego. Legislator of the City of Buenos Aires. Interview. Buenos Aires. 
Buenos Aires, May 23, 2008. 
Lowenrosen, Flavio. Consumer law expert. Interview. Buenos Aires, April 22, 
2008. 
Napoli, Andrés. Director of the Citizen Control program of FARN. Personal 
communication, October 16, 2007. Interview. Buenos Aires, May 10, 2008. 
Maiztegui, Cristina.  National Ombudsman office. Buenos Aires. Interview. April 
22, 2008. 
Malagamba, Luis. Provincial Senator of the province of Buenos Aires; former 
ombudsman of the city of La Plata. Interview, La Plata, July 21, 2008. 
Marcelo Martinez. Member of Asociación Nuevo Ambiente; former member of 
city council of Ensenada. Interview. Ciudad de La Plata, May 7, 2008. 
Molero, Pablo. Coordinator of FOROPRO . Phone interview. September 13, 2008 
Odriazola, Veronica. Director of the pollution control program; Greenpeace 
Argentina. Interview, Buenos Aires, July 14, 2004.(*) 
Polino, Hector. National deputy; founder of Consumidores Libres. Interview. 
Buenos Aires, June 9, 2008. 
Prieto, Martin. 2007. Executive Director of Greenpeace Argentina. Personal 
communication. November 12, 2007. 
Roca, Agustina. Former technical advisor of the indigenous association Warmis 
Sayajsunqo (Jujuy). Interview. Buenos Aires, May, 2008. Phone interview, November 4, 
2008. 
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Rodriguez Salas, Aldo. Environmental law and policy expert; former secretary of 
environment of the province of Mendoza. Personal communication. January 9, 2008. 
Sosa, Eduardo Sosa. Executive Director of OIKOS Red Ambiental. Interview. 
Buenos Aires, April 14, 2008. 
Viñas, Adriana. National ombudsman office. Interview. Buenos Aires, July 10, 
2008. 
Walsh, Juan Rodrigo. Environmental law and policy expert; former 
Environmental Secretary of the City of Buenos Aires.  Personal communication. 
November 5, 2007. 
Yasseff, Amilcar. Lawyer specialized on health care litigation. Interview. July 25, 
2008. 
 
(*)These interviews were part of a summer field research on a project on experiences of social 
accountability in the Matanza – Riachuelo basin (Argentina) that I carried out during June- August 2004.   
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Appendix B: Case Selection 
Consumer and Environment 
In the first stage of my research, I focused on identifying the disputes related to 
environmental policy and consumer protection issues. A main reason for prioritizing 
these two policy fields was that I already had contacts with, and access to, experts and 
activists working on these issues in Argentina 
I contacted, then, five experts working on environmental policy, and three 
working on consumer protection issues.406  In both policy fields, there was strong 
agreement among the experts about the relevance of certain cases. In fact, there were a 
couple of cases that were cited by all or most of the interviewees in each policy field. Of 
course, these disputes were selected for this study. Beyond these cases, the disputes 
identified by the experts varied quite significantly. Therefore, among the cases that were 
cited by some but not all of the experts, I selected those which provided more variance to 
the pool of conflicts in terms of policy issues, jurisdictions and/or governments involved. 
This is the list of the policy disputes selected regarding environmental issues: 1) 
environmental pollution in the Matanza - Riachuelo basin; 2) oil drilling in the 
Llancanelo wetlands in Mendoza; 3) CEAMSE‟s waste disposal policy in the Punta Lara 
landfill. 
This is the list of disputes selected regarding consumer protection issues: 1) the 
re-structuring of phone tariffs during the Menem administration; 2) the re-negotiation of 
the metropolitan train concessions during the 1990s; 3) the re-negotiation of the public 
utilities concessions during the Duhalde government. 
                                               
406 In this appendix, I use the term expert in a broad sense, to refer to individuals deeply involved in a 
certain policy field. It includes individuals that have a technical or academic degree in relation to the policy 
issues under analysis, and also activists who might not have academic or professional training, but have a 
first - hand knowledge of that policy field.  
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Health Care 
In the case of environmental policy and consumer protection, there were clear 
“epistemological communities” in Argentina (that is, networks of policy experts, NGOs, 
etc., working on these policy fields). However, in the case of health care, it was very 
difficult to identify such a defined community. There were clearly identifiable networks 
of institutions working on specific health policy issues (HIV, cancer, etc.), but not on 
health care policy in general. Therefore, in relation to this policy field, the selection of 
cases was based mainly on specialized literature, and only secondarily, on expert opinion. 
Basically, I identified a small number of legal cases which were repeatedly cited by: i) 
CELS‟s annual reports on human rights in Argentina.407 ii) Other well known papers and 
publications dealing with health care litigation in Argentina, such as Bergallo (2005), 
Maurino, Nino and Sigal (2005), Abramovich and Courtis (2006). Moreover, I 
interviewed 3 experts in health care litigation in order to confirm the relevance of the 
cases selected and to ask for suggestions about other cases. 
Based on these sources, this is the list of policy disputes selected in relation to 
health care policy: 1) the provision of treatment and medicines to people living with HIV-
AIDS during the 1990‟s; 2) the production of the vaccine against the Argentine 
hemorrhagic fever or “mal de los rastrojos”. 
 
Indigenous People 
In comparison with the environment and consumer policy fields, I did not have 
previous knowledge or contact with experts or institutions working on indigenous 
                                               
407 CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y sociales) is one the most prestigious advocacy organization 
working on human right issues in Argentina, with a special focus on litigation. Since 1997-1998, CELS has 
published this report almost every year. A section of the report deals with socio-economic rights, and 
usually there is a chapter dealing with health care issues (reports are available at 
http://www.cels.org.ar/documentos/). 
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people‟s issues. Therefore, my procedure for identifying relevant judicialized disputes in 
this field was not as neat as in the case of environment and consumer protection. The 
selection of cases was based mainly on interviews with three experts on indigenous 
policy issues, which I contacted using the “snowball” method. It is worth noting that each 
of these experts was directly involved in a specific policy dispute, and my first contact 
with each of them was in relation to that dispute. In parallel, I used specialized literature 
to confirm the policy relevance of the cases in which these experts were involved. 
Mainly,  I referred to the 2003 report prepared and submitted by the catholic agency on 
indigenous issues to the International Labor Organization (ILO) regarding the status of 
Convention 169 in Argentina (ENDEPA and MEDH 2003).408 This report provides a 
detailed description of the main policy disputes and rights violations affecting indigenous 
communities in Argentina. Moreover, in selecting the cases I took into account that they 
occurred in different provinces, and involved different social actors and governments. 
This is the list of the policy disputes selected regarding indigenous people: 1) 
indigenous communal land rights in Salta (the Lhaka Honhat case); 2) the land tenure 
program for indigenous communities in Jujuy; 2) the 2007 health and food emergency 
affecting the indigenous communities in Chaco.409 
 
Negative cases 
Conceptualizing and identifying relevant negative cases for this study was a 
challenging process. Following Mahoney and Goertz (2004) and Ragin (2004), a 
                                               
408 The ILO Convention 169 is an international agreement concerning the rights of indigenous people that 
was adopted in 1989. Argentina ratified the convention on 2000. 
409 Given that this case occurred in 2007, it was obviously not listed in the 2003 report submitted to the 
ILO. A main reason for selecting the case about health care and food emergency in the Chaco was that the 




relevant negative case is basically a case (policy dispute) in which the outcome 
(judicialization) is absent although it might be possible. Consequently, an irrelevant 
negative case is a case (policy dispute) in which the outcome (judicialization) is not 
possible because basic conditions for such outcome to occur are not present in the first 
place. In the context of this study, then, I conceptualize a relevant negative case as a non-
judicialized policy conflict in which: i) societal policy demands are not answered or even 
addressed by the government (government is unresponsive),410 and ii) the conditions 
enabling judicialization are present (a favorable legal framework, a relatively 
autonomous judiciary and certain level of organizational support). 
During field research I identified many instances of non-judicialized policy 
conflicts in which the government was unresponsive. However, I observed that the lack 
of judicialization was basically due to the absence of one or more of the enabling 
conditions for judicialization. For instance,  a common situation was that the social actors 
demanding policy changes lacked proper legal standing or did not have sufficient legal 
bases to bring claims to the courts, and when they did bring legal claims, their claims 
were rejected in limine by the courts. These types of non-judicialized cases were relevant 
for assessing, for example, whether a proper legal framework is a necessary enabling 
condition for judicialization to occur; but they were irrelevant to analyze under which 
political conditions policy judicialization is likely to occur –which is the purpose of this 
study-, because the lack of judicialization was due to the absence of one of the enabling 
conditions in the first place.  
However, as I advanced in my field research, I also began to observe cases of 
policy conflicts in which the actors filed legal claims in the courts, and these claims were 
declared admissible, but then the courts and judicial procedures did not become a main 
                                               
410 Clearly, if the government answered the societal demands about a policy issue, the actors have no 
reason to bring a legal claim to the courts. 
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venue in which the policy process and debate evolved.  In other words, these were cases 
in which there were claims filed at the courts, but the policy processes were not really or 
fully judicialized according to the concept of policy judicialization used in this 
research.411 Moreover, these cases clearly fell within the scope conditions of this 
research, and hence, constituted „relevant‟ negative cases for this study.  
Through interviews and analysis of documental data, I identified two of this type 
of cases, which I labeled cases of weak judicialization: 1) the health care reform for 
disabled people promoted by the national government in 2002; 2) mining policy in the 
province of Chubut (the Esquel case).412 
 
                                               
411 See the analysis of the concept of policy judicialization developed in chapter 1. 
412 The case of Esquel was mentioned by most environmental experts as a relevant policy dispute in which 
the courts got involved. However, after a close analysis of the data I concluded that, although the courts 
were involved, the policy process was not significantly judicialized.  
 285 
Appendix C: The fs-QCA Process of Minimization 
This appendix describes how the process of Boolean minimization was carried 
out. As stated in chapter 2, I use the computer program fs-QCA 2.0 to perform it.413 The 
basic, “raw” material for the minimization process is the truth table (table 8) described in 
chapter 2. The table indicates that there are eight configurations in which policy disputes 
became judicialized [1 outcome], corresponding to eleven cases, and two configurations 
in which judicialization was weak [0 outcome], corresponding to two cases. As is a 
standard practice in QCA analysis, the minimization of the [1] configurations and the [0] 
configurations should be done separately (Rihoux and De Meur 2009). The appendix, 
however, only explains how I performed the process of minimization of the [1] 
configurations. The minimization of the [0] configurations was a very simple procedure 
(it only encompassed two configurations that differed on only one condition) and is 
already explained in chapter 2. 
Just to remind the reader, the most fundamental rule in the process of Boolean 
minimization is very simple: if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal 
condition but share the same outcome, then that causal condition can be considered  
superfluous and it can be removed from the original expressions, creating a shorter and 
more parsimonious combined expression (Ragin 2008). At this point, it is important to 
mention that when performing the minimization process, the computer software does not 
recognize cases but the configurations specified in the truth table. After the minimization 
is done, it is possible to connect each of the cases to the minimal formula obtained.  
 
 
                                               
413 The program can be downloaded from: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. 
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Minimization of the [1] configuration without logical remainders (complex solution) 
Once the truth table is constructed, I minimize the [1] configurations using the 
software and without including any non-observed or counterfactual cases. This is the 
more complex solution resulting from the minimization process. It is composed by four 
basic configurations linked to the outcome, judicialization:414 
 
 
Policy loser * Legislative passiveness *Executive opposition* DEF STATE CAP +  
 
Pol loser * LEG PASS * EXE OPP * Deficient state capacity +   
 
WEAK POLITICAL LEVERAGE * EXE OPP * Def state cap + 
 
Pol loser * WEAK POL LEV * LEG PASS * EXE OPPO → JUDICIALIZATION 
 
As mentioned above, this minimal formula is still quite complex. To achieve a 
more parsimonious result, I need to assess the possibility of making some simplifying 
assumptions and including logical remainders (counterfactuals).415  
 
Minimization of the [1] configuration with logical remainders (intermediate 
solution) 
It is worth remembering that QCA assesses the presence as well as the absence of 
the different causal conditions. Therefore, in order to achieve more parsimony, the 
                                               
414In Boolean language, uppercase indicates „positive” values or presence and lowercase indicates 
“negative” values or absence. Furthermore, the symbol * indicates the logical AND, and the symbol + 
indicates the logical OR. 
415 In the language of QCA, logical remainders are basically those combinations of causal conditions that 
lack empirical cases (Ragin and Sonnett 2004, 6). As I explained in chapter 2, my QCA analysis is based 
on five causal conditions; therefore there are 32 logically possible causal combinations. Only 10 of those 32 
possible combinations have empirical cases. These 22 combinations left are the logical remainders. Any of 
these remainders is a potential counterfactual case. 
In its turn, a simplifying assumption is an assumption made on the outcome value of a logical remainder, so 
it can be included in the minimization procedure (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 183). 
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software allows the researcher to define whether a condition should contribute to the 
outcome only when present or only when absent, or both (See Ragin 2008). Based on my 
knowledge of the cases, then, I assume that only the presence of DEFICIENT STATE 
CAPACITY may be linked to the outcome, not its absence. In other words, I assume that 
only a deficient state apparatus may contribute to the judicialization of a policy issue. On 
the contrary, when the state is capable to intervene in a policy matter, and therefore it is 
capable to implement and enforce the relevant policies, that condition is rather irrelevant 
in explaining judicialization. In sum, based on my knowledge of the cases, I eliminate the 
absence of the condition “deficient state capacity” from the configurations linked to the 
outcome, and in that way, I was able to obtain a simpler minimal formula. 
After performing the minimization, the resulting minimal formula consists of just 
three causal configurations. This is what the software refers to as the “intermediate” 
formula because it has incorporated an easy counterfactual and assumption, based on our 
knowledge of the cases. These are the three configurations formalized with a Boolean 
notation: 
 
Policy loser * Legislative passiveness *Executive opposition* DEF STATE CAP +  
(cases covered: FHA; Chaco; HIV-AIDS) 
 
Pol loser * LEG PASS * EXE OPP +   
(cases covered: Ceamse; Jujuy; Tariffs; Salta; Riachuelo) 
 
WEAK POLITICAL LEVERAGE * EXE OPP  → JUDICIALIZATION 
(cases covered: Phone, Llancanelo, Trains, Riachuelo, Salta) 
 
As the reader might already realize, there are two cases (Salta and Riachuelo) 
which are covered by two different configurations. This is not an unusual situation in 
QCA analysis, given that the computer software does not perform the minimization 
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process based on the cases but on the causal configurations specified in the truth table 
(See Rihoux and De Meur 2009) . Therefore, when there is a situation like this one in 
which, as a result of the process of minimization, a case is covered by two different 
configurations, it is up to the researcher to make a choice based on his/her knowledge of 
the cases and to place the case under one of the alternative configurations. Accordingly, 
in the context of this study, I first assessed –based on my knowledge of the cases- which 
of the two alternative configurations better reflected the political scenario under which 
each of these policy disputes became judicialized. Then, I decided to place the Salta case 
in the second configuration, together with Ceamse, Jujuy and Tariffs, and I decided to 
place Riachuelo in the last configuration, together with Phone, Llancanelo and Trains. 
 
 
Further minimization of the [1] configuration with logical remainders 
(parsimonious solution) 
Finally, the software can further minimize the configurations by incorporating any 
logical remainder (counterfactual) that helps generate a logically simpler formula. This is 
what the software refers as the “parsimonious” solution. However, I do not consider this 
solution for mainly two main reasons. First, the threshold of admissibility for 
counterfactuals used in this stage is too low, which raises enormous doubts about the 
internal and external empirical validity of the results. Second, in the quest for 
parsimonious results, this solution does not allow for an analysis of the conditions as part 
of political scenarios in which judicialization is likely to occur. In other words, it loses 
the configurational approach which is one of the main benefits and advantages of using 
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